FRENCH  AND  GERMAN. 

PROF.  KEETELS’  NEW  FRENCH  SERIES. 


The  Oral  Method  tvith  the  French.  By  Prof.  Jean 

Gustave  Iveetels,  Author  of  “ Keetels’  New  Method  with  the 

French.”  In  three  parts,  12mo,  cloth, 

[ The  student  is  saved  the  expense  of  a large  hook  in  commencing 
the  study  ] 

The  Oral  Method  of  Teaching  living  languages  is  superior  to  all  others  in 
many  respects. 

It  teaches  the  pupil  to  speak  the  language  he  is  learning,  and  he  begins  to  do 
so  from  the  first  lesson. 

He  never  becomes  tired  of  the  book,  because  he  feels  that,  with  moderate 
efforts,  he  is  making  constant  and  rapid  progress. 

The  lessons  are  arranged  so  as  to  bring  in  one  difficulty  at  a time.  They  are 
adapted  to  class  purposes,  and  suitable  for  large  or  small  classes,  and  for 
scholars  of  all  ages. 

The  teacher,  with  this  book  in  his  hand,  is  never  at  a loss  to  profitably 
entertain  his  pupils,  without  rendering  their  task  irksome. 

In  fine,  the  Oral  Method  works  charmingly  in  a class.  Teachers  and  pupils 
are  equally  pleased  with  it;  the  latter  all  learn— the  quick  and  the  dull— each  in 
proportion  to  his  ability  and  application.  It  is  our  opinion  that  before  long 
the  Oral  Method  will  find  its  way  into  every  school  where  French  is  taught 

“I  find  that  pupils  understand  and  improve  more  rapidly  under  the  Oral 
Method  of  Keetels’  instruction  than  any  other  heretofore  used.” — A.  Taylor, 
B.mwoocl  Seminary , Glenn's  Falls,  N.  Y. 

A New  Method  of  Teaming  the  French \ Language. 

By  Jean  Gustave  Keetels,  Professor  of  French  and  German 

in  the  Brooklyn  Polytechnic  Institute.  13mo. 

A Keg  to  the  above.  By  J.  G.  Keetels. 

This  work  contains  a clear  and  methodical  expose  of  the  principles  of  the 
language,  on  a plan  entirely  new.  The  arrangement  is  admirable.  The  les- 
sons are  of  a suitable  length,  and  within  the  comprehension  of  all  classes  of 
students.  The  exercises  are  various,  and  well  adapted  to  the  purpose  for 
which  they  are  intended,  of  reading,  writing,  and  speaking  the  language.  The 
Grammar  part  is  complete,  and  accompanied  by  questions  and  exercises  on 
every  subject.  The  book  possesses  many  attractions  for  the  teacher  and  stu- 
dent, and  is  destined  to  become  a popular  school-book.  It  has  already  been 
introduced  into  many  of  the  principal  schools  and  colleges  in  the  country. 


A Comparative  English-German  Grammar,  baled  on 
the  affinity  of  the  two  languages.  By  Prof.  Elias  Peissner, 
late  of  the  University  of  Munich,  and  of  Union  College,  Sche- 
nectady. New  edition,  revised.  316  pages. 


Sheldon  & Company’s  Text-ffooks. 


OLNEY’S  HIGHER  MATHEMATICS. 

Olney’s  Introduction  to  Algebra 

Olney’s  Complete  School  Algebra 

Olney’s  Key  to  do.  with  extra  examples. . . 

Olney’s  Book  of  Test  Examples  in  Algebra 

Olney’s  University  Algebra 

Olney’s  Key  to  do.  

Olney’s  Elements  Geom.  & Trigonom.  (Sell.  Ed.) 

Olney’s  Elements  of  Geometry.  Separate 

Olney’s  Elements  of  Trigonometry.  Separate. . 
Olney’s  Elements  of  Geometry  and  Trigonom- 
etry. (Univ.  Ed.,  witli  Tables  of  Logarithms.) 

Olney’s  Elements  of  Geometry  and  Trigonom- 
etry. (University  Edition,  without  Tables.) 

Olney’s  Tables  of  Logarithms.  (Flexible  covers.). 
Olney’s  General  Geometry  and  Calculus 

The  universal  favor  with  which  these  books  have  been  received 
by  educators  in  all  parts  of  the  country,  leads  the  publishers  to 
think  that  they  have  supplied  a felt  want  in  our  educational  ap- 
pliances. 

There  is  one  feature  which  characterizes  this  series,  so  unique, 
and  yet  so  eminently  practical,  that  we  feel  desirous  of  calling 
special  attention  to  it.  It  is 

The  facility  with  which  the  books  can  be  used  for  ciasses  of 
all  grades,  and  in  schools  of  the  widest 
diversity  of  purpose. 

Each  volume  in  the  series  is  so  constructed  that  it  may  be  used 
writli  equal  ease  by  the  youngest  and  least  disciplined  who  should 
be  pursuing  its  theme,  and  by  those  who  in  more  mature  years 
and  with  more  ample  preparation  enter  upon  the  study. 


Any  of  the  above  sent  by  mail , post-paid , on  receipt  of  price. 


https://archive.org/details/elementsoflogic01  what_0 

k 


ELEMENTS  OE  LOGIC: 


COMPRISING 


THE  SUBSTANCE  OF  THE  ARTICLE 

IN  THE 

ENCYCLOPAEDIA  METROPOLITANA, 


WITH  ADDITIONS,  Etc. 


By  BICHARD  WHATELY,  D.  D., 

ARCHBISHOP  OP  DUBLIN. 


NEW  EDITION— REVISED  BY  THE  AUTHOR. 


NEW  YORK: 

SHELDON  & COMPANY, 

No.  8 MURRAY  STREET. 


■ 


ADVERTISEMENT 


IUO 

VJSSSff 


THE  NINTH  EDITION 


In  the  present  edition,  a few  insertions,  and 
alterations  of  expression,  in  some  places,  have 
been  introduced.  In  this  and  in  the  preceding 
edition,  several  passages  "have  been  transferred 
from  the  places  they  formerly  occupied,  to  others 
which  appeared  more  suitable.  And  a brief,  but, 
I trust,  clear  exposure  has  been  added  (in  Introd. 
^ 4,  and  b.  iv.  ch.  i.  ^ 1,  2)  of  the  untenable  char- 
acter of  some  objections  which  have  been  of  late 
years  revived,  in  a somewhat  new  form,  against 
the  utility  of  Science  generally,  — against  the 
syllogistic  theory,  — and  against  the  explanations 
given  in  this  treatise,  of  reasoning  from  Induction. 

These  answers  (and  also  additional  remarks  on 
some  of  the  same  points,  in  ^ 4 of  the  Introduc- 


V 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


tion  to  the  “ Elements  of  Rhetoric”)  have  been 
before  the  Public  now  some  years , and  as  no  at- 
tempt at  a reply  has  been  made,  even  in  subse- 
quent editions  of  the  very  works  Containing  the 
objections,  a strong  presumption  is  thus  afforded 
of  the  soundness  of  my  views. 

The  reader  is  to  observe  that  tne  angular 
[brackets]  denote  that  the  word  so  enclosed  is 
equivalent  in  meaning  to  that  which  precedes  it 


COlNTEJNTS. 


nai 

DEDICATION  . is 

PREFACE • *ii> 

INTRODUCTION . 1 

BOOK  I. 

ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE  OF  THE  SCIENCE  . . .25 

BOOK  II. 

SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM 60 

CHAPTER  I. 


OF  THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  MIND  AND  OF  TERMS  . 6C 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF  PROPOSITIONS 68 

CHAPTER  III. 

OF  ARGUMENTS 86 

CHAPTER  IV. 

SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAPTER  III 107 

CHAPTER  V. 


SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAPTER  I.  . . . ....  132 

BOOK  III. 

199383 


OF  FALLACIES 


168 


CONTENTS. 


fit 

BOOK  IV. 

DISSERTATION  ON  THE  PROVINCE  OP  REASONING  . 251 

CHAPTER  I. 

OF  NDUCTION 252 

CHAPTER  II. 

ON  THE  DISCOVERY  OF  TRUTH  ...  ...  262 

CHAPTER  III. 

OF  INFERENCE  AND  PROOF 29C 

CHAPTER  IV. 

OF  VERBAL  and  REAL  QUESTIONS . 297 

CHAPTER  V. 

OF  REALISM 305 


APPENDIX. 

No.  I. 

ON  CERTAIN  TERMS  WHICH  ARE  PECULIARLY  LIABLE 

TO  BE  USED  AMBIGUOUSLY 319 

No.  II. 

MISCELLANEOUS  EXAMPLES  FOR  TnE  EXERCISE  OF  LEABV 

ers 398 

No  III. 

EXAMPLE  OF  ANALYSIS 417 


INDEX 


435 


THE  RIGHT  REVEREND 


EDWARD  COPLESTON,  D.  I). 

LORD  BISHOP  OF  LLANDAFF, 

&c.  &c. 


Ms  Dear  Lord, 

To  enumerate  the  advantages  I have  derived 
from  your  instructions,  both  in  regular  lectures  and 
m private  conversation,  would  be  needless  to  those 
acquainted  with  the  parties,  and  to  the  Public, 
uninteresting.  My  object  at  present  is  simply  to 
acknowledge  how  greatly  I am  indebted  to  you  in 
respect  of  the  present  Work  ; not  merely  as  having 
originally  imparted  to  me  the  principles  of  the 
Science,  but  also  as  having  contributed  remarks, 
explanations,  and  illustrations,  relative  to  the  most 
important  points,  o so  great  an  amount  that  I can 
hardly  consider  myself  as  the  Author  of  more  than 
half  of  such  portions  of  the  treatise  as  are  not  boi* 


< 


DEDICATION. 


rowed  from  former  publications.  I could  ha\>e  wished 
indeed,  to  acknowledge  this  more  explicitly,  by  mark* 
mg  with  some  note  of  distinction  those  parts  which 
are  least  my  own.  But  I found  it  could  not  be  done, 
in  most  instances  there  is  something  belonging  to 
each  of  us ; and  even  in  those  parts  where  your  share 
is  the  largest,  it  would  not  be  fair  that  you  should 
be  made  responsible  for  any  thing  that  is  not  611111-617 
your  own.  Nor  is  it  possible,  in  the  case  of  a Sci* 
ence,  to  remember  distinctly  how  far  one  has  been, 
m each  instance,  indebted  to  the  suggestions  of 
another.  Information,  as  to  matters  of  fact,  may 
easily  be  referred  in  the  mind  to  the  person  from 
whom  we  have  derived  it : but  scientific  truths,  when 
thoroughly  embraced,  become  much  more  a part  of 
the  mind,  as  it  were;  since  they  rest,  not  on  the 
uthority  of  the  instructor,  but  on  reasoning  from 
data,  which  we  ourselves  furnish;*  they  are  scions 
engrafted  on  the  stems  previously  rooted  in  our  own 
soil ; and  we  are  apt  to  confound  them  with  its  indi- 
genous productions. 

You  yourself  also,  I have  reason  to  believe,  have 
forgotten  the  greater  part  of  the  assistance  you  have 
afforded  in  the  course  of  conversations  on  the  sub< 


* See  B.  IV.  Ch.  ii.  4 1. 


DEDICATION. 


SI 


jeet ; as  I have  found,  more  than  once,  that  ideas 
which  I distinctly  remembered  to  have  received  from 
you,  have  not  been  recognized  by  you  when  read  or 
repeated.  As  far,  however,  as  I can  recollect,  though 
there  is  no  part  of  the  following  pages  in  which 
I have  not,  more  or  less,  received  valuable  suggestions 
from  you,  I believe  you  have  contributed  less  to  the 
Analytical  Outline,  and  to  the  Treatise  on  Fallacies, 
and  more,  to  the  subjoined  Dissertation,  than  to  the 
rest  of  the  Work. 

I take  this  opportunity  of  publicly  declaring,  that 
as,  on  the  one  hand,  you  are  not  responsible  for  any 
thing  contained  in  this  Work,  so,  on  the  other 
hand,  should  you  ever  favor  the  world  with  a pub- 
lication of  your  own  on  the  subject,  the  coincidence 
which  will  doubtless  be  found  in  it  with  many  things 
here  brought  forward  as  my  own,  is  not  to  be 
-egarded  as  any  indication  of  plagiarism,  at  least  on 
your  side. 

Believe  me  to  be, 

My  dear  Lord, 

Your  obliged  and  affectionate 

Pupil  and  Friend, 
RICHARD  WHATELY. 


PREFACE. 


The  following  treatise  contains  the  substance  of 
the  Article  Logic  ” in  the  Encyclopaedia  Metropob 
itana.  It  was  suggested  to  me  that  a separate  pub- 
lication of  it  might  prove  acceptable,  not  only  to  some 
who  are  not  subscribers  to  that  work,  but  also  to 
several  who  are ; but  who,  for  convenience  of  refer- 
ence, would  prefer  a more  portable  volume.  In  fact  a 
number  of  individuals  had  actually  formed  a design 
(prevented  only  by  this  publication)  of  joining  to- 
gether to  have  the  Article  printed  for  their  own 
private  use. 

I accordingly  revised  it,  and  made  such  additions, 
chiefly  in  the  form  of  Notes,  as  I thought  likely  to 
increase  its  utility. 

When  applied  to  to  contribute  the  Article,  I asked 
and  obtained  permission  from  Dr.  Copleston  (now 
Bishop  of  Llandaff)  to  make  use  of  manuscripts  com- 
piled in  great  measure  from  what  I had  heard  from 
him  in  conversations  on  the  subject,  or  which  he  had 
read  to  me  from  his  common-place  book,  interspersed 
with  observations  of  my  own.  These  manuscripts  I 
had  drawn  up  and  was  in  the  habit  of  employing,  foi 
the  use  of  my  own  pupils, 
h 


XIV 


PREFACE. 


In  throwing  them  into  a form  suit&ki  for  the  Em 
cyclopoedia,  and  in  subsequently  enlarging  the  Article 
into  the  present  volume,  I have  taken  without  scruple 
whatever  appeared  most  valuable  from  the  works  ot 
former  writers ; especially  the  concise,  but  in  genera, 
accurate,  treatise  of  Aldrich.  But  while  I acknowledge 
my  obligations  to  my  predecessors,  of  whose  labors 
I have  largely  availed  myself,  I do  not  profess  to  be 
altogether  satisfied  with  any  of  the  treatises  that  have 
yet  appeared  ; nor  have  I accordingly  judged  it  any 
unreasonable  presumption  to  point  out  what  seem  to 
me  the  errors  they  contain.  Indeed,  whatever  defer- 
ence an  Author  may  profess  for  the  authority  of  those 
who  have  preceded  him,  the  very  circumstance  of  his 
publishing  a work  on  the  same  subject,  proves  that 
he  thinks  theirs  open  to  improvement.  In  censuring 
however,  as  I have  had  occasion  to  do,  several  of  the 
doctrines  and  explanations  of  logical  writers,  and  of 
Aldrich  in  particular,  I wish  it  to  be  understood  that 
this  is  not  from  my  having  formed  a low  estimate 
of  the  merits  of  the  Compendium  drawn  up  by  the 
Author  just  mentioned,  but,  on  the  contrary,  from  its 
popularity,  (it  being  the  one  commonly  used  at  Oxford) 
— from  the  impossibility  of  noticing  particularly  all 
the  points  in  which  we  agree, — and  from  the  consid- 
eration that  errors  are  the  more  carefully  to  be  pointed 
out  in  proportion  to  the  authority  by  which  they  are 
sanctioned. 

I have  to  acknowledge  assistance  received  from 
several  friends  who  have  at  various  timos  suggested 
remarks  and  alterations.  But  I cannot  avoid  parti- 
cularizing the  Rev.  J.  Newman,  Fellow  of  Oriel  Col 


PEERAGE. 


XV 


ege  who  actually  composed  a considerab  e portion  of 
the  work  as  it  now  stands,  from  manuscripts  not 
designed  for  publication,  and  who  is  the  original 
author  of  several  pages.  Some  valuable  illustrations 
of  the  importance  of  attending  to  the  ambiguity  of 
the  terms  used  in  Political  Economy,  were  furnished 
by  the  kindness  of  my  friend  and  former  pupil,  Mr. 
Senior,  of  Magdalen  College,  and  now  Master  in 
Chancery,  who  preceded  me  in  the  office  of  Professor 
of  Political  Economy  at  Oxford,  and  afterwards  was 
appointed  to  the  same  at  King’s  College,  London. 
They  are  printed  in  the  Appendix.  But  the  friend  to 
whom  it  is  inscribed  has  contributed  far  more,  and 
that,  in  the  most  important  parts,  than  all  others  to- 
gether ; so  much,  indeed,  that,  though  there-  is  in  the 
treatise  nothing  of  his  which  has  not  undergone  such 
expansion  or  modification  as  leaves  me  solely  responsi- 
ble for  the  whole,  there  is  not  a little  of  which  I can- 
not fairly  claim  to  be  the  Author. 

Each  successive  edition  has  been  revised  with  the 
utmost  care.  But  though  the  work  has  undergone 
not  only  the  close  examination  of  myself  and  several 
friends,  but  the  severer  scrutiny  of  determined  oppo- 
nents, I am  happy  to  find  that  no  material  errors  have 
been  detected,  nor  any  considerable  alterations  found 
necessary. 

On  the  utility  of  Logic  many  writers  have  said 
much  in  which  I cannot  coincide,  and  which  has  tend- 
ad  to  bring  the  study  into  unmerited  disrepute.  By 
representing  Logic  as  furnishing  the  sole  instrument 
for  the  discovery  of  truth  in  all  subjects,  and  as  teach* 


2vi  PREFACE. 

ing  the  use  of  the  intellectual  faculties  in  general 
they  raised  expectations  which  could  not  be  realized 
and  which  naturally  led  to  a reaction.  The  whols 
system,  whose  unfounded  pretensions  had  been  thus 
blazoned  forth,  came  to  be  commonly  regarded  as 
utterly  futile  and  empty:  like  several  of  our  most 
valuable  medicines,  which,  when  first  introduced,  were 
proclaimed,  each,  as  a panacea,  infallible  in  the  most 
opposite  disorders  ; and  which  consequently,  in  many 
instances,  fell  for  a time  into  total  disuse  ; though, 
after  a long  interval,  they  were  established  in  then 
just  estimation,  and  employed  conformably  to  then 
real  properties. 

In  one  of  Lord  Dudley’s  (lately  published)  letters 
to  Bishop  Copleston,  of  the  date  of  1814,  he  adduces 
a presumption  against  the  study  of  Logic,  that  it  was 
sedulously  cultivated  during  the  dark  periods  in  which 
the  intellectual  powers  of  mankind  seemed  nearly 
paralyzed,  — when  no  discoveries  were  made,  and 
when  various  errors  were  wide-spread  and  deep-rooted: 
and  that  when  the  mental  activity  of  the  world  re- 
vived, and  philosophical  inquiry  flourished  and  bore 
its  fruits,  logical  studies  fell  into  decay  and  contempt. 
And  this  I have  introduced  in  the  “ Elements  of 
Rhetoric,”  (Part  II.  Ch.  iii.  <§>  2,)  among  other  exam- 
ples of  a presumption  not  in  itself  unreasonable,  but 
capable  of  being  rebutted  by  a counter-presumption. 
When  any  study  has  been  unduly  or  unwisely  culti- 
vated to  the  neglect  of  others,  and  has  even  been 
intruded  into  their  province,  there  is  a presumption 
that  a reaction  * will  ensue,  and  an  equally  excessive 


See  “ Charge, " 1843. 


PREFACE 


xvu 


contempt,  or  dread,  or  disgust,  succeed.  And  in  the 
present  instance,  the  mistaken  and  absurd  cultivation 
of  Logic  during  Ages  of  great  intellectual  darkness 
might  have  been  expected  to  produce,  in  a subsequent 
age  of  comparative  light,  an  association  in  men’s 
minds,  of  Logic,  with  the  idea  of  apathetic  ignorance, 
prejudice,  and  adherence  to  error;  so  that  the  legiti- 
mate uses,  and  just  value  of  the  science  (supposing 
it  to  have  any)  would  be  likely  to  be  scornfully  over- 
looked. Our  ancestors  having  neglected  to  raise  fresh 
crops  of  corn,  and  contented  themselves  with  vainly 
threshing  over  and  over  the  same  straw  and  winnow- 
ing the  same  chaff,  it  might  have  been  anticipated  that 
their  descendants  would,  for  a time,  regard  the  very 
operations  of  threshing  and  winnowing  with  con- 
tempt, and  would  attempt  to  grind  corn,  straw,  and 
chaff  all  together. 

The  revival  of  a study  which  had  for  a long  time 
been  regarded  as  an  obsolete  absurdity,  would  proba- 
bly have  appeared  to  many  persons,  thirty  years  ago, 
as  an  undertaking  far  more  difficult  than  the  introduc- 
tion of  some  new  study ; — as  resembling  rather  the 
attempt  to  restore  life  to  one  of  the  antediluvian  fossil- 
plants,  than  the  rearing  of  a young  seedling  into  a tree. 

It  is  a curious  circumstance  that  the  very  person  to 
whom  the  letter  just  alluded  to  was  addressed  should 
have  lived  to  witness  so  great  a change  of  public 
opinion  brought  about  (in  a great  degree  through  hi s 
own  instrumentality*)  within  the  short  interval  — in- 
deed within  a small  portion  of  the  interval  — between 


* See  Dedication. 


b* 


SVlii  PREFACE. 

the  writing  of  that  letter  and  its  publication,  that  the 
whole  ground  of  the  presumption  alluded  to  has  been 
completely  cut  away.  During  that  interval,  the  trea- 
tise which  was  with  his  aid  composed,  and  by  his  per- 
mission inserted  in  the  Encyclopaedia,  attracted  so 
much  attention  as  to  occasion  its  separate  publication, 
in  a volume  which  has  been  frequently  reprinted,  not 
only  in  England,  but  in  the  United  States  of  America; 
where  it  is  in  use,  I believe,  in  every  one  of  their  Col- 
leges. Add  to  which,  the  frequent  allusions  (com- 
pared with  what  could  have  been  met  with  twenty  or 
thirty  years  ago)  to  the  subject  of  Logic,  by  writers 
on  various  subjects.  And  moreover  several  other  trea- 
tises on  the  subject,  either  original  works  01  abridg- 
ments, have  been  making  their  appearance  with  con- 
tinually increased  frequency  of  late  years.  Some 
indeed  of  these  have  little  or  nothing  in  common  with 
the  present  work  except  the  title.  But  even  that  very 
circumstance  is  so  far  encouraging,  as  indicating  that 
the  name  of  this  science  instead  of  exciting,  as  for- 
merly, an  almost  universal  prejudice,  is  considered  as 
likely  to  prove  a recommendation.  Certainly  Lord 
Dudley,  were  he  now  living,  would  not  speak  of  the 
general  neglect  and  contempt  of  Logic  ; though  every 
branch  of  Science,  Philosophy,  and  Literature,  have 
flourished  during  the  interval. 

To  explain  fully  the  utility  of  Logic  is  what  can  be 
done  only  in  the  course  of  an  explanation  of  the  sys- 
tem itself.  One  preliminary  observation  only  (for  the 
original  suggestion  of  which  I am  indebted  to  the 
same  friend  to  whom  this  work  is  inscribed)  it  may  be 
worth  while  to  offer  in  this  place.  If  it  were  inquired 


PREFACE 


Xii 

what  is  to  be  legarded  as  the  most  api  ropriate  inteb 
iectual  occupation  of  MAN,  as  man,  what  would  be 
the  answer?  The  Statesman  is  engaged  with  political 
affairs  ; the  Soldier  with  military  ; the  Mathematician, 
with  the  properties  of  numbers  and  magnitudes  ; the 
Merchant,  with  commercial  concerns,  &c. ; but  in  what 
are  all  and  each  of  these  employed  ? — employed,  I 
mean,  as  men ; for  there  are  many  modes  of  exercise 
of  the  faculties,  mental  as  well  as  bodily,  which  are  in 
great  measure  common  to  us  with  the  lower  animals. 
Evidently,  in  Reasoning.  They  are  all  occupied  in 
deducing,  well  or  ill,  Conclusions  from  Premisses  ; each, 
concerning  the  subject  of  his  own  particular  business. 
If,  therefore,  it  be  found  that  the  process  going  on 
daily,  in  each  of  so  many  different  minds,  is,  in  any 
respect,  the  same , and  if  the  principles  on  which  it  is 
conducted  can  be  reduced  to  a regular  system,  and  if 
rules  can  be  deduced  from  that  system,  for  the  bettei 
conducting  of  the  process,  then,  it  can  hardly  be 
denied  that  such  a system  and  such  rules  must  be 
especially  worthy  the  attention,  — not  of  the  members 
of  this  or  that  profession  merely,  but — of  everyone 
who  is  desirous  of  possessing  a cultivated  mind.  To 
understand  the  theory  of  that  which  is  the  appropriate 
intellectual  occupation  of  Man  in  general,  and  to  learn 
to  do  that  well , which  every  one  will  and  must  do_ 
whether  well  or  ill,  may  surely  be  considered  as  an 
essential  part  of  a liberal  education. 

Even  supposing  that  no  practical  improvement  in 
argumentation  resulted  from  the  study  of  Logic,  it 
would  not  by  any  means  follow  that  it  is  unworthy  of 
attention.  The  pursuit  of  knowledge  on  curious  andi 


2CX 


PREFACE. 


interesting  subjects,  for  its  own  sake,  is  usually 
reckoned  no  misetnployment  of  time ; and  is  consid- 
ered as,  incidentally,  if  not  directly,  useful  to  the 
individual,  by  the  exercise  thus  afforded  to  the  mental 
faculties.  All  who  study  Mathematics  are  not  training 
themselves  to  become  Surveyors  or  Mechanics;  some 
knowledge  of  Anatomy  and  Chemistry  is  even  expected 
in  a man  liberally  educated,  though  without  any  view 
to  his  practising  Surgery  or  Medicine.  And  the  inves- 
tigation of  a process  which  is  peculiarly  and  univer- 
sally the  occupation  of  Man,  considered  as  Man,  can 
hardly  be  reckoned  a less  philosophical  pursuit  than 
those  just  instanced. 

It  has  usually  been  assumed,  however,  in  the  case 
of  the  present  subject,  that  a theory  which  does  not 
tend  to  the  improvement  of  practice  is  utterly  unworthy 
of  regard  ; and  then,  it  is  contended  that  Logic  has 
no  such  tendency,  on  the  plea  that  men  may  and  do 
reason  correctly  without  it : an  objection  which  would 
equally  apply  in  the  case  of  Grammar,  Music,  Chem- 
istry, Mechanics.  &c..  in  all  of  which  systems  the  prac- 
tice must  have  existed  previously  to  the  theory. 

But  many  who  allow  the  use  of  systematic  principles 
in  other  things,  are  accustomed  to  cry  up  Common- 
Sense  as  the  sufficient  and  only  safe  guide  in  Reason- 
ing. Now  by  Common-Sense  is  meant,  I apprehend, 
(when  the  term  is  used  with  any  distinct  meaning,)  an 
exercise  of  the  judgment  unaided  by  any  Art  or  system 
of  rules  : such  an  exercise  as  we  must  necessarily  em- 
ploy in  numberless  cases  of  daily  occurrence  ; in  which, 
having  no  established  principles  to  guide  us,  — no  line 
»f  proc  edure,  as  it  were,  distinctly  chalked  out, — »we 


PREFACE. 


II  ' 

must  needs  act  on  the  best  extemporaneous  conjectures 
we  can  form.  He  who  is  eminently  skilful  in  doing 
this,  is  said  to  possess  a superior  degree  of  Common- 
Sense.  But  that  Common-Sense  is  only  our  second- 
best  guide  — that  the  rules  of  Art,  if  judiciously  framed, 
are  always  desirable  when  they  can  be  had,  is  an 
assertion,  for  the  truth  of  which  I may  appeal  to  the 
testimony  of  mankind  in  general ; which  is  so  much 
the  more  valuable,  inasmuch  as  it  may  be  accounted 
the  testimony  of  adversaries.  For  the  generality  have 
a strong  predilection  in  favor  of  Common-Sense, 
except  in  those  points  in  which  they,  respectively, 
possess  the  knowledge  of  a system  of  rules  ; but  in 
these  points  they  deride  any  one  who  trusts  to  unaided 
Common-Sense.  A Sailor  e.  g.  will,  perhaps,  despise 
the  pretensions  of  medical  men,  and  prefer  treating  a 
disease  by  Common-Sense:  but  he  would  ridicule  the 
proposal  of  navigating  a ship  by  Common-Sense,  with- 
out regard  to  the  maxims  of  nautical  art.  A Physician, 
again,  will  perhaps  contemn  Systems  of  Political- 
Economy,*  of  Logic,  or  Metaphysics,  and  insist  on 
the  superior  wisdom  of  trusting  to  Common-Sense  in 
such  matters ; but  he  would  never  approve  of  trusting 
to  Common-Sense  in  the  treatment  of  diseases.  Nei- 
ther, again,  would  the  Architect  recommend  a reliance 
on  Common-Sense  alone,  in  building,  nor  the  Musi- 
cian, in  music,  to  the  neglect  of  those  systems  of  rules, 
which,  in  their  respective  arts,  have  been  deduced  from 
scientific  reasoning  aided  by  experience.  And  the  in- 
duction might  be  extended  to  every  department  of  prac- 


See  Senior’s  Introductory  Lecture  on  Political  Economy,  p 28. 


XXII 


PREFACE. 


tice.  Since,  therefore,  each  give',  .he  preference  to 
unassisted  Common-Sense  only  in  .those  cases  where 
he  himself  has  nothing  else  to  trust  to,  and  invariably 
resorts  to  the  rules  of  art,  wherever  he  possesses  th? 
knowledge  of  them,  it  is  plain  that  mankind  universally 
bear  their  testimony,  though  unconsciously  and  often 
unwillingly,  to  the  preferableness  of  systematic  know 
ledge  to  conjectural  judgments. 

There  is,  however,  abundant  room  for  the  employ- 
ment of  Common-Sense  in  the  application  of  thj 
system.  To  bring  arguments,  out  of  the  form  it? 
which  they  are  expressed  in  conversation  am  At  books 
into  the  regular  logical  shape,  must  be,  of  course,  the 
business  of  Common-Sense,  aided  by  practice ; for 
such  arguments  are,  by  supposition,  not  as  yet  within 
the  province  of  Science ; else  they  would  not  br 
irregular,  but  would  be  already  strict  syllogisms.  To 
exercise  the  learner  in  this  operation,  I have  subjoined 
in  the  Appendix,  some  examples,  both  of  insulated 
arguments,  and  (in  the  later  editions)  of  the  analysis 
of  argumentative  works.  It  should  be  added,  however 
that  a large  portion  of  what  is  usually  introduced  into 
Logical  treatises,  relative  to  the  finding  of  Arguments. 
— the  different  kinds  of  them,  &c.,  I have  referred  to 
the  head  of  Rhetoric,  and  treated  of  in  a work  on  the 
Elements  of  that  Art. 

It  was  doubtless  from  a strong  and  deliberate  con- 
viction of  the  advantages,  direct  and  indirect,  accruing 
from  an  acquaintance  with  Logic,  that  the  University 
af  Oxford,  when  remodelling  their  system,  not  only 
retained  that  branch  of  study,  regardless  of  the  clamor* 


PREFACE 


XXlli 


ef  many  of  the  half-learned,  but  even  assigned  a 
prominent  place  to  it,  by  making  it  an  indispensable 
part  of  the  Examination  for  the  first  Degree.  This 
last  circumstance,  however,  I am  convinced,  has,  in  a 
great  degree,  produced  an  effect  opposite  to  what  was 
designed.  It  has  contributed  to  lower  instead  of  ex- 
alting, the  estimation  of  the  study  ; and  to  withhold 
from  it  the  earnest  attention  of  many  who  might  have 
-applied  to  it  with  profit.  I am  not  so  weak  as  to 
imagine  that  any  System  can  ensure  great  proficiency 
in  any  pursuit  whatever,  either  in  all  students,  or  in  a 
very  large  proportion  of  them  : “ we  sow  many  seeds 
to  obtain  a few  flowers:”  but  it  might  have  been 
expected  (and  doubtless  was  expected)  that  a majority 
at  least  of  successful  candidates  would  derive  some 
benefit  worm  mentioning  from  their  logical  pursuits; 
and  that  a considerable  proportion  of  the  distinguished 
candidates  would  prove  respectable,  if  not  eminent 
logicians.  Such  expectations  I do  not  censure  as 
unreasonable,  or  such  as  I might  not  have  formed 
myself,  had  I been  called  upon  to  judge  at  that  period 
when  our  experience  was  all  to  come.  Subsequently, 
however,  experience  has  shown  that  those  expectations 
have  been  very  inadequately  realized.  The  truth  is, 
that  a very  small  proportion,  even  of  distinguished 
students,  ever  become  proficients  in  Logic  ; and  that 
by  far  the  greater  part  pass  through  the  University 
without  knowing  any  thing  at  all  of  the  subject.  1 do 
not  mean  that  they  have  not  learned  by  rote  a string 
of  technical  terms ; but  that  they  understand  atso- 
u hy  nothing  whatever  of  the  principles  of  th« 
r,  fence. 


XXIV 


PREFACE. 


I am  aware  that  some  injudicious  friends  :f  Oxford 
will  censure  the  frankness  of  this  avowal.  I have  only 
to  reply  that  such  is  the  truth;  and  that  I think  too 
well  of,  and  know  far  too  well,  the  University  in  which 
I have  been  employed  in  various  academical  occupa- 
tions above  a quarter  of  a century,  to  apprehend  dan- 
ger to  her  reputation  from  declaring  the  exact  truth, 
With  all  its  defects,  and  no  human  institution  is  per- 
fect, the  University  would  stand,  I am  convinced, 
higher  in  public  estimation  than  it  does,  were  the 
whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  in  all  points 
respecting  it,  more  fully  known.  But  the  scanty  and 
partial  success  of  the  measures  employed  to  promote 
logical  studies  is  the  consequence,  I apiprehend,  of  the 
universality  of  the  requisition.  That  which  must  be 
done  by  every  one,  will,  of  course,  often  be  done 
but  indifferently  ; and  wheti  the  belief  is  once  fully 
established,  which  it  certainly  has  long  been,  that 
any  thing  which  is  indispensable  to  a testimonial, 
has  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  attainment  of 
honors,*  the  lowest  standard  soon  becomes  the  estab- 
lished one  in  the  minds  of  the  greater  number ; and 
provided  that  standard  be  once  reached,  so  as  to 
secure  the  candidate  from  rejection,  a greater  or  less 
proficiency  in  any  such  branch  of  study  is  regarded  as 
a matter  of  indifference,  as  far  as  any  views  of  aca- 
demical distinction  are  concerned. 

Divinity  is  one  of  these  branches,  and  to  this  also 


* In  the  last-framed  Examination- statute  an  express  declaration, 
has  been  inserted,  that  proficiency  in  Logic  is  to  have  weight  in  th* 
assignment  of  honors. 


PREFACE. 


XXV 


most  of  what  has  been  said  concerning  Logic  might 
be  considered  as  equally  applicable ; but,  in  fact,  there 
are  several  important  differences  between  the  two 
cases.  In  the  first  place,  most  of  the  students  who 
are  designed  for  the  Church,  and  many  who  are  not, 
have  a value  for  theological  knowledge,  independently 
of  the  requisition  of  the  schools ; and  on  that  ground 
do  not  confine  their  views  to  the  lowest  admissible 
degree  of  proficiency : whereas  this  can  be  said  of 
very  few  in  the  case  of  Logic.  And  moreover,  such 
as  design  to  become  candidates  for  holy  Orders,  know 
that  another  examination  in  Theology  awaits  them. 
But  a consideration,  which  is  still  more  to  the  present 
purpose,  is,  that  Theology,  not  being  a Science,  admits 
of  infinite  degrees  of  proficiency,  from  that  which  is 
within  the  reach  of  a child,  up  to  the  highest  that  is 
attainable  by  the  most  exalted  genius  ; every  one  of 
which  degrees  is  inestimably  valuable  as  far  as  it 
goes.  If  any  one  understands  tolerably  the  Church- 
catechism,  or  even  half  of  it,  he  knows  something  of 
divinity ; and  that  something  is  incalculably  prefer- 
able * ^ nothing.  But  it  is  not  so  with  a Science : 
one  who  does  not  understand  the  principles  of  Eu- 
clid’s demonstrations,  whatever  number  of  questions 
and  answers  he  may  have  learnt  by  rote,  knows  abso- 
lutely nothing  of  Geometry:  unless  he  attain  this 
point,  all  his  labor  is  utterly  lost ; worse  than  lost, 
perhaps,  if  he  is  led  to  believe  that  he  has  learnt 
something  of  Mathematics,  when,  in  truth,  he  has 
not.  And  the  same  is  the  case  with  Logic,  or  any 
other  Science.  It  does  not  admit  of  such  various 
degrees,  as  a knowledge  of  religion.  Of  course  l an? 


c 


XXVI 


PREFACE 


far  from  supposing  that  all  who  understand  any  thing, 
much  or  little,  of  a certain  Science,  stand  on  the  same 
level  ; but  I mean,  what  is  surely  undeniable,  that 
one  who  does  not  embrace  the  fundamental  principles, 
of  a Science,  whatever  he  may  have  taken  on  au- 
thority, and  learned  by  rote,  knows,  properly  speak- 
ing, nothing  of  that  science.  And  such,  I have  no 
hesitation  in  saying,  is  the  case  with  a considerable 
proportion  even  of  chose  candidates  who  obtain  testi- 
monials, including  many  who  gain  distinction.  There 
are  some  persons  (probably  not  so  many  as  one  in 
ten,  of  such  as  have  in  other  respects  tolerable  abil- 
ities,) who  are  physically  incapable  of  the  degree  of 
steady  abstraction  requisite  for  really  embmeing  the 
principles  of  Logic  or  of  any  other  Science,  whatever 
oains  may  be  taken  by  themselves  or  their  teachers. 
But  there  is  a much  greater  number  to  whom  this  is 
a great  difficulty , though  not  an . impossibility  ; and 
who  having,  of  course,  a strong  disinclination  to  such 
a study,  look  naturally  to  the  very  lowest  admissible 
standard.  And  the  example  of  such  examinations  in 
Logic  as  must  be  expected  in  the  case  of  men  of 
these  descriptions,  tends,  in  combination  with  popular 
prejudice,  to  degrade  the  study  altogether  in  the  minds 
of  the  generality. 

It  was  from  these  considerations,  perhaps,  that  it 
was  proposed,  a few  years  ago,  to  leave  the  study  of 
Logic  altogether  to  the  option  of  the  candidates ; but 
the  suggestion  was  rejected  ; the  majority  appearing 
to  think  (in  which  opinion  I most  fully  coincide)  that, 
so  strongly  as  the  tide  of  popular  opinion  set  against 
the  study  the  result  would  have  been,  withiii  a fevif 


PREFACE. 


XXV 11 


years  an  almost  universal  neglect  of  that  science 
Matters  were  accordingly  left,  at  that  time,  in  respect 
of  this  point,  on  their  former  footing;  which  I am 
convinced  was  far  preferable  to  the  proposed  altera- 
tion 

But  a middle  course  between  these  two  was  sug- 
gested, which  I was  persuaded  would  be  infinitely 
preferable  to  either ; a persuasion  which  I had  long 
entertained,  and  which  is  confirmed  by  every  day’s 
observations  and  reflections;  of  which,  few  persons, 
1 believe,  have  bestowed  more  on  this  subject.  Let 
the  study  of  Logic,  it  was  urged,  be  made  optional 
to  those  who  are  merely  candidates  for  a degree , but 
indispensable  to  the  attainment  of  academical  honors ; 
and  the  consequence  would  be,  that  it  would  speedily 
begin  and  progressively  continue,  to  rise  in  estima- 
tion and  to  be  studied  with  real  profit.  The  ex- 
amination might  then,  it  was  urged,  without  any 
hardship,  be  made  a strict  one  ; since  no  one  could 
complain  that  a certain  moderate  degree  of  scientific 
ability,  and  a resolution  to  apply  to  a certain  pre- 
scribed study,  should  be  the  conditions  of  obtaining 
distinction.  The  far  greater  part  would  still  study 
Logic  ; since  there  would  be  (as  before)  but  few  who 
would  be  willing  to  exclude  themselves  from  the 
possibility  of  obtaining  distinction  ; but  it  would  be 
studied  with  a very  different  mind,  when  ennobled, 
as  it  were,  by  being  made  part  of  the  passport  to  Uni- 
versity honors,  and  when  a proficiency  in  it  came  to 
be  regarded  generally  as  an  honorable  distinction. 
A.nd  in  proportion  as  the  number  increased  of  those 
who  really  understood  the  science,  the  number  it  waj 


-IXVlll 


PREFACE. 


contended,  would  increase  of  such  as  would  value  it 
ou  higher  and  better  grounds.  It  would  in  time  coine 
to  be  better  known  and  better  appreciated  by  all  the 
well-informed  part  of  society : and  lectures  in  Logic 
at  the  University  would  then,  perhaps,  no  longer  con- 
sist  exclusively  of  an  explanation  of  the  mere  ele- 
ments. This  would  be  necessary  indeed  for  begin- 
ners ; but  to  the  more  advanced  students,  the  tutors 
would  no  more  think  of  lecturing  in  the  bare  rudi- 
ments, than  of  lecturing  in  the  Latin  or  Greek  Gram- 
mar ; but,  in  the  same  manner  as  they  exercise  their 
pupils  in  Grammar,  by  reading  with  them  Latin  and 
Greek  authors  with  continual  reference  to  grammar- 
rules,  so,  they  would  exercise  them  in  Logic  by  read- 
ing some  argumentative  work,  requiring  an  analysis 
of  it  on  logical  principles. 

These  effects  could  not  indeed,  it  was  acknowl- 
edged, be  expected  to  show  themselves  fully  till  after 
a considerable  lapse  of  time ; but  that  the  change 
would  begin  to  appear,  (and  that  very  decidedly) 
within  three  or  four  years,  was  confidently  antici- 
pated. 

To  this  it  was  replied,  that  it  was  most  desirable 
that  no  one  should  be  allowed  to  obtain  the  Degree 
of  B.  A.  without  a knowledge  of  Logic.  This  an- 
swer carries  a plausible  appearance  to  - those  unac- 
quainted with  the  actual  state  of  the  University; 
though  in  fact  it  is  totally  irrelevant.  For  it  goes  on 
the  supposition,  that  hitherto  this  object  has  been  ac- 
complished ; — that  everyone  who  passes  his  exami- 
nation does  possess  a knowledge  of  Logic;  which  is 
notoriously  not  the  fact,  nor  ever  can  be,  without 


PREFACE 


xxix 


ome  important  change  in  some  pa  t of  our  system. 
The  question  therefore  is,  not,  as  the  above  objection 
would  seem  to  imply,  whether  a real,  profitable  knowl- 
edge of  Logic  shall  be  strictly  required  of  every  can- 
didate for  a Degree,  (for  this  in  fact  never  has  been 
done)  but  whether,  in  the  attempt  to  accomplish  this 
by  requiring  the  form  of  a logical  examination  from 
every  candidate  without  exception,  we  shall  continue 
-to  degrade  the  science,  and  to  let  this  part  of  the 
examination  be  regarded  as  a mere  form,  by  many 
who  might  otherwise  have  studied  Logic  in  earnest, 
and  with  advantage  : — whether  the  great  majority  of 
candidates,  and  those  too  of  a more  promising  descrip- 
tion, shall  lose  a real  and  important  benefit  through 
the  attempt,  (which,  after  all,  experience  has  proved 
to  be  a vain  attempt)  to  comprehend  in  this  benefit  a 
very  small  number,  and  of  the  least  promising. 

Something  of  an  approach  to  the  proposed  altera- 
tion, was  introduced  into  the  Examination-statute 
passed  in  1830  ; in  which,  permission  is  granted  to 
such  as  are  candidates  merely  for  a testimonial,  to  sub- 
stitute for  Logic  a portion  of  Euclid.  I fear,  however, 
that  little  or  nothing  will  be  gained  by  this;  unless 
indeed  the  Examiners  resolve  to  make  the  examina- 
tions in  Logic  far  stricter  than  those  in  Euclid.  For 
since  every  one  who  is  capable  of  really  understanding 
Euclid  must  be  also  capable  of  Logic,  the  alteration 
does  not  meet  the  case  of  those  whose  inaptitude  for 
Science  is  invincible  ; and  these  are  the  very  descrip- 
tion of  men  whose  (so  called)  logical-examinations  tend 
‘a  depress  the  science.  Those  few  who  really  are  phys- 
ic ally  incapable  of  scientific  reasoning,  and  the  far 


XXX 


PREFACE. 


greater  number  who  fancy  themselves  so,  or  who  at 
least  will  rather  run  a risk  than  surmount  their  aver- 
sion, and  set  themselves  to  study  in  earnest,  — a., 
these  will  be  likely,  when  the  alternative  is  proposed, 
to  prefer  Logic  to  Euclid  ; because  in  the  latter,  it  is 
hardly  possible,  at  least  not  near  so  easy  as  in  Logic, 
to  present  the  semblance  of  preparation  by  learning 
questions  and  answers  by  rote:  — in  the  cant  phrase 
of  undergraduates,  by  getting  crammed.  Experience 
has  proved  this,  in  the  case  of  the  Responsion-exam- 
inations, where  the  alternative  of  Logic  or  Euclid  has 
always  been  proposed  to  the  candidates;  of  whom 
those  most  averse  to  Science,  or  incapable  of  it,  are 
almost  always  found  to  prefer  Logic. 

The  determination  may  indeed  be  formed,  and 
acted  on  from  henceforth,  that  all  who  do  in  reality 
know  nothing,  properly  speaking,  of  any  Science, 
shall  be  rejected . all  I know  is,  t!  lat  this  has  never 
been  the  case  hitherto. 

Still,  it  is  a satisfaction  to  me,  that  attention  has 
been  called  to  the  evil  in  question,  and  an  experimen- 
tal measure  adopted  for  its  abatement.  A confident 
hope  is  thus  afforded,  that  in  the  event  (which  I much 
fear)  of  the  failure  of  the  experiment,  some  other 
more  effectual  measure  may  be  resorted  to.* 

I am  sensible  that  many  may  object,  that  this  is  nof 
the  proper  place  for  such  remarks  as  the  foregoing: 
what  has  the  Public'  at  large,  they  may  say,  to  do  with 


* Since  tliis  was  written,  the  experiment  has  been  tried.  In  thi 
first  Examination-list  under  the  new  Statute  (Easter,  1831),  of  12J 
candidates  who  did  not  aspire  to  the  higher  classes,  twenty -Jive  pre 
•ented  Euclid  for  their  examination,  and  one  hundred,  Logic  i 


PHEFAUE. 


XXXI 


tue  statutes  of  the  University  of  Oxford?  To  tnis  ij 
might  fairly  be  replied,  that  not  only  all  who  think  of 
sending  their  sons  or  other  near  relatives  to  Oxford, 
but  all  likewise  who  are  placed  under  the  ministry  of 
such  as  have  been  educated  there,  are  indirectly  con- 
cerned, to  a certain  degree,  in  the  system  there  pur- 
sued But  the  consideration  which  had  the  chief 
share  in  inducing  me  to  say  what  I have,  is,  that  the 
vindication  of  Logic  from  the  prevailing  disregard 
and  contempt  under  which  it  labors,  would  have 
been  altogether  incomplete  without  it.  For  let  it  be 
remembered  that  the  science  is  judged  of  by  the  Pub- 
lic in  this  country,  in  a very  great  degree,  from  the 
specimens  displayed,  and  the  reports  made,  by  those 
whom  Oxford  sends  forth.  Every  one,  on  looking 
into  the  University-Calendar  or  Statute-Book,  feels 
himself  justified  in  assuming,  that  whoever  has  gradu- 
ated at  Oxford  must  be  a Logician : not,  indeed, 
necessarily,  a first-rate  Logician  ; but  such  as  to  sat- 
isfy the  public  examiners  that  he  has  a competen 
knowledge  of  the  science.  Now,  if  a very  large  pro- 
portion of  these  persons  neither  are,  nor  think  them- 
selves at  all  benefited  by  their  (so  called)  logical 
education,  and  if  many  of  them  treat  the  study  with 
contempt,  and  represent  it  as  a mere  tissue  of  obsolete 
and  empty  jargon,  which  it  is  a mere  waste  of  time  to 
attend  to,  let  any  one  judge  what  conclusions  respect- 
ing the  utility  of  the  study,  and  the  wisdom  of  the 
University  in  upholding  it,  are  likely  to  be  the  result. 

That  prejudices  so  deeply  rooted  as  those  I tiavn 
tlluded  to,  and  supported  by  the  authority  of  suet 


XXX11 


PREFACE 


eminent  names,  especially  that  of  Locke,  and  (as  ii 
commonly,  though  not  very  correctly  supposed)  Bacon 
should  be  overthrown  at  once  by  the  present  treatise, 
I am  not  so  sanguine  as  to  expect ; but  if  I have  been 
successful  in  refuting  some  of  the  most  popular  objec- 
tions, and  explaining  some  principles  which  are  in 
general  ill-understood,  it  may  be  hoped  that  just 
notions  on  the  subject  may  continue  (as  they  have 
begun)  to  gain  ground  more  and  more. 

It  may  be  permitted  me  to  mention,  that  as  I have 
addressed  myself  to  various  classes  of  students,  from 
the  most  uninstructed  tyro,  to  the  furthest-advanced 
Logician,  and  have  touched  accordingly  both  on  the 
most  elementary  principles,  and  on  some  of  the  most 
remote  deductions  from  them,  it  must  be  expected 
that  readers  of  each  class  will  find  some  parts  not  v/ell 
calculated  for  them.  Some  explanations  will  appear 
to  the  one  too  simple  and  puerile  ; and  for  another 
class,  some  of  the  disquisitions  will  be  at  first  too 
abstruse.  If  to  each  description  some  portions  are 
found  interesting,  it  is  as  much  as  I can  expect. 

With  regard  to  the  style,  I have  considered  perspi- 
cuity not  only,  as  it  always  must  be,  the  first  point, 
but  as  one  of  such  paramount  importance  in  such  a 
subject,  as  to  justify  the  neglect  of  all  others.  Pro- 
lixity of  explanation, — homeliness  in  illustration,— 
and  baldness  of  expression,  I have  regarded  as  blem- 
ishes not  worth  thinking  of,  when  any  thing  was  to  be 
gained  in  respect  of  clearness.  To  some  of  my 
readers  a temporary  difficulty  may  occasionally  occui 
trom  the  use  of  some  technical  terms  different,  ot 


PREFACE.  XXxiil 

aifferently  applied,  from  what  they  have  been  accus- 
tomed to.*  They  must  consider,  however,  that  the 
attempt  to  conform  in  this  point  to  the  usage  of  every 
logical  writer,  would  have  been,  on  account  of  then 
variations  from  each  other,  utterly  hopeless.  I have 
endeavored,  in  the  terms  employed,  to  make  no  wan- 
ton innovations,  but  to  conform  generally  to  estab- 
’shed  usage,  except  when  there  is  some  very  strong 
objection  to  it ; — where  usage  is  divided,  to  prefer 
what  may  appear  in  each  case  the  most  convenient 
term  ; — and,  above  all,  to  explain  distinctly  the  sense 
in  which  each  is  employed  in  the  present  work. 

If  any  should  complain  of  my  not  having  given  a 
history  of  all  the  senses  in  which  each  technical  term 
has  been  used  by  each  writer  from  its  first  introduc- 
tion, and  a review  of  the  works  of  each,  I can  only 
reply  that  my  design  was  not  to  write  a Logical 
Archaeology,  or  a Commentary  on  the  works  of  for- 
mer Logicians,  but  an  elementary  introduction  to  the 
science.  And  few,  I suppose,  would  consider  a trea- 
tise, for  instance,  on  Agriculture,  as  incomplete,  which 
should  leave  untouched  the  questions  of,  who  was 
the  inventor  of  the  plough,  — what  successive  altera- 
tions that  implement  has  undergone,  — and  from  what 
legion  wheat  was  first  introduced. 

And  if  again  any  should  complain  of  the  omission 
of  such  metaphysical  disquisitions  on  the  laws  of 
thought,  and  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind 
generally,  as  they  have  been  accustomed  to  include 
under  the  head  of  Logic,  my  answer  must  be,  tlial 


See  Book  II.  Chap.  i.  $ 1. 


XX  XIV 


PREFACE. 


that  term  has  been  employed  by  me  in  a different 
sense  ; for  reasons  which  I have  stated  in  several  parts 
of  this  treatise,  and  especially  in  Book  IV.  Chap.  iii.  < 
and  that  I am  therefore  only  to  be  censured,  at  the 
utmost,  as  not  having  undertaken  a work  of  a differen4 
xind,  and  on  a different  subject. 

I would  not,  on  the  other  hand,  be  understood  as 
complaining  of  those  who  have  used  the  word  Logic 
in  a more  extended  sense,  or  as  underrating  the  value 
of  their  works.  Only,  the  reader  should  be  cautioned 
against  the  mistake — much  commoner,  I believe, 
than  is  generally  thought  — of  confounding  the  exten- 
sion of  the  application  of  a name , with  the  enlarge- 
ment of  the  boundaries  of  a science. 

It  is  proper  however  to  mention  that  the  first  Part 
of  the  “Elements  of  Rhetoric”  contains  a discussion 
of  such  points  as  many  writers  have  treated  of  under 
the  department  of  Logic. 

The  technical  language  employed  in  this  treatise,  is, 
throughout,  with  the  exception  of  a very  few  cases 
where  some  departure  from  ancient  usage  appeared 
indispensable,  that  of  the  older  works  on  the  subject. 
Some  degree  of  prejudice  perhaps  might  have  been, 
in  the  outset,  avoided,  and  a far  greater  appearance. 
of  originality  produced,  by  adopting  novel  forms  of 
expression.  There  are  also  many  writers  who  have 
found  fault  with  the  established  technical  language,  as 
cumbrous  and  perplexing.  I have  always  found  how- 
ever that  the  phraseology  they  adopt  in  its  stead 
consists  of  far  more  tedious  circumlocution  than  that 
«vhich  they  censure ; while  it  is  often  less  clear  and 
ess  correct. 


PREFACE. 


XXXV 


It  should  be  observed  however  that  all  technical 
anguage  (as  well  as  all  rules  of  art)  must  be  expected 
to  present,  at  first,  a difficulty  for  the  learner  to  sur- 
mount ; though  in  the  end,  it  will  greatly  facilitate  his 
procedure.  But  with  this  view  it  is  necessary  that 
such  language  and  rules  should  be  not  only  distinctly 
understood , but  also  learnt,  and  remembered  as  famil- 
iarly as  the  Alphabet,  and  employed  constantly , and 
with  scrupulous  exactness.  Otherwise  technical  lan- 
guage will  prove  an  encumbrance  instead  of  an  advan- 
tage ; just  as  a suit  of  clothes  would  be,  if  instead  of 
putting  them  on  and  wearing  them,  one  should  carry 
them  about  in  his  hands. 

Of  the  correctness  of  the  fundamental  doctrines 
maintained  in  the  work,  I may  be  allowed  to  feel 
some  confidence ; not  so  much  from  the  length  of 
time  that  I have  been  more  or  less  occupied  with  it,  — 
enjoying  at  the  same  time  the  advantage  of  frequent 
suggestions  and  corrections  from  several  judicious 
friends,  — as  from  the  nature  of  the  subject.  In  works 
of  taste,  an  author  cannot  be  sure  that  the  judgment 
of  the  Public  will  coincide  with  his  own  ; and  if  he 
fail  to  give  pleasure,  he  fails  of  his  sole  or  most  appro- 
priate object.  But  in  the  case  of  truths  which  admit 
of  scientific  demonstration,  it  is  possible  to  arrive  by 
reasoning  at  as  full  an  assurance  of  the  justness  of  the 
conclusions  established,  as  ihe  imperfection  of  the 
human  faculties  will  admit;  and  experience,  accom- 
panied with  attentive  observation,  and  with  repeated 
trials  of  various  methods,  may  enable  one  long  accus- 
omed  to  tuition,  to  ascertain  with  considerable  cer- 
tainty what  explanations  are  the  best  comprehended 


IXXV1 


PREFACE 


Many  parts  cf  the  detail,  however,  may  probabl]  1 j 
open  to  objections ; but  if  (as  experience  now  aut,  ar- 
izes me  the  more  confidently  to  hope ) no  errors  are 
discovered,  which  materially  affect  the  substantial 
utility  of  the  work,  but  only  such  as  detract  from  the 
credit  of  the  author,  the  object  will  have  been  attained 
which  I ought  to  have  had  principally  in  view. 

No  credit,  I am  aware,  is  given  to  an  author’s  own 
disclaimer  of  personal  motives,  and  profession  of  ex* 
elusive  regard  for  public  utility ; since  even  sincerity 
cannot,  on  this  point,  secure  him  from  deceiving  him- 
self ; but  it  may  be  allowable  to  observe,  that  one 
whose  object  was  the  increase  of  his  reputation  as  a 
writer,  could  hardly  have  chosen  a subject  less  suitable 
for  his  purpose  than  the  present.  At  the  time  of  the 
first  publication,  the  study  was  neither  popular,  nor, 
apparently,  likely  soon  to  become  so.  Ignorance, 
fortified  by  prejudice,  opposed  its  reception,  even 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  are  considered  as  both 
candid  and  well-informed.  And  as,  on  the  one 
hand,  a large  class  of  modern  philosophers  might 
be  expected  to  raise  a clamor  against  “ obsolete 
prejudices ; ” “ bigoted  devotion  to  the  decrees  of 
Aristotle ; ” “ confining  the  human  mind  in  the 

trammels  of  the  Schoolmen,”  &c.,  so,  on  the  other 
hand,  all  such  as  really  are  thus  bigoted  to  every 
thing  that  has  been  long  established,  merely  becausa 
it  has  been  long  established,  were  likely  to  exclaim 
against  the  presumption  of  an  author,  who  presumes 
to  depart  in  several  points  from  the  track  of  his  pre- 
decessors. 

There  is  another  circumstance,  also,  whi^h  tend 


F REFACE. 


XXXVU 


naterially  to  diminish  the  credit  of  a writer  on  this 
and  some  other  kindred  subjects.  We  can  make  no 
discoveries  of  striking  novelties  : the  senses  of  our 
readers  are  not  struck,  as  with  the  return  of  a Comet 
which  had  been  foretold,  or  the  extinction  of  a taper 
in  carbonic-acid  gas : the  materials  we  work  upon  are 
common  and  familiar  to  all,  and,  therefore,  supposed 
to  be  well  understood  by  all.  And  not  only  is  any 
one’s  deficiency  in  the  use  of  these  materials,  such  as 
is  generally  unfelt  by  himself,  but  when  it  is  removed 
by  satisfactory  explanations  — when  the  notions,  which 
had  been  perplexed  and  entangled,  are  cleared  up  by 
the  introduction  of  a few  simple  and  apparently 
obvious  principles,  he  will  generally  forget  that  any 
explanation  at  all  was  needed,  and  consider  all  that 
has  been  said  as  mere  truisms,  which  even  a child 
could  supply  to  himself.  Such  is  the  nature  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  a science  — they  are  so  fully 
implied,  in  the  most  evident  and  well-known  truths, 
that  the  moment  they  are  fully  embraced,  it  becomes 
a difficulty  to  conceive  that  we  could  ever  have  been 
not  aware  of  them.  And  hence,  the  more  simple, 
clear,  and  obvious  any  principle  is  rendered,  the  mere 
likely  is  its  exposition  to  elicit  those  common  remarks, 
“ of  course  ! of  course  ! ” “ no  one  could  ever  doubt 
that ; ” “ this  is  all  very  true,  but  there  is  nothing 
new  brought  to  light;  — nothing  that  was  not  familiar 
to  every  one,”  “there  needs  no  ghost  to  tell  us  that.” 
j am  convinced  that  a verbose,  mystical,  and  partially 
! ccure  way  of  writing  on  such  a subject,  is  the  most 
likely  to  catch  the  attention  of  the  multitude.  The 
generality  verify  the  observation  of  Tacitus,  “ omna 
d 


xxxvin 


PREFACE. 


ignotum  pro  mirifico  ; ” and  when  any  thing  is  mad® 
very  plain  to  them,  are  apt  to  fancy  that  they  knew  it 
already;  so  that  the  explanations  of  scientific  truths 
are  likely,  for  a considerable  time  at  least,  to  be,  by 
most  men,  underrated  the  more,  the  more  perfectly 
they  accomplish  their  object. 

A very  slow  progress,  therefore,  towards  popularity 
(far  slower  indeed  than  has  in  fact  taken  place)  is  the 
utmost  that  I expected  for  such  a treatise  as  I have 
endeavored  to  make  the  present.  I felt  myselt  bound, 
however,  not  only  as  a membei  of  Society,  but  more 
especially  as  a Minister  of  the  Gospel,  to  use  my* 
endeavors  towards  promoting  an  object  which  to  me 
appears  highly  important,  and  (what  is  much  more) 
whose  importance  was  appreciated  by  very  few 
besides.  The  cause  of  Truth  universally,  and  not 
least,  of  religious  Truth,  is  benefited  by  every  thing 
that  tends  to  promote  sound  reasoning,  and  facilitate 
the  detection  of  fallacy.  The  adversaries  of  our  Faith 
would,  I am  convinced,  have  been  on  many  occasions 
more  satisfactorily  answered,  and  would  have  had 
fewer  openings  for  cavil,  had  a thorough  acquaintance 
with  Logic  been  a more  common  qualification  than  it 
is.  In  lending  my  endeavors,  therefore,  whether 
with  greater  or  less  success,  towards  this  object,  I trust 
that  I am  neither  uselessly  nor  unsuitably  employed. 

Those  who  are  engaged  in,  or  designed  for  the 
Sacred  Ministry,  and  all  others  who  are  sensible  that 
the  cause  of  true  Religion  is  not  a concern  of  the 
Ministry  alone,  should  remember  that  this  is  no  time 
to  forego  any  of  the  advantages  which  that  cause  may 
derive  from  an  active  and  judicious  cultivation  of  the 


FKEFACE. 


XXXIX 


faculties.  Among  the  enemies  of  Christianity  in  ths 
present  day,  are  included,  if  I mistake  not,  a very 
Afferent  description  of  persons  from  those  who  were 
/niefly  to  be  met  with  a century,  or  even  half  a cen- 
tury ago  : what  were  called  “ men  of  wit  and  pleasure 
about  town;  ” — ignorant,  shallow,  flippant  declaiiners, 
or  dull  and  powerless  pretenders  to  Philosophy. 
Among  the  enemies  of  the  Gospel  now,  are  to  be 
found  men  not  only  of  learning  and  ingenuity,  but  of 
cultivated,  argximentative  powers,  and  not  unversed  in 
the  principles  of  Logic.  If  the  advocates  of  our  Re- 
ligion think  proper  to  disregard  this  help,  they  will  find, 
on  careful  inquiry,  that  their  opponents  do  not.  And 
let  them  not  trust  too  carelessly  to  the  strength  of  their 
tause.  Truth  will,  indeed,  prevail,  where  all  other 
points  are  nearly  equal  ; but  it  may  suffer  a temporary 
discomfiture,  if  hasty  assumptions,  unsound  arguments, 
and  vague  and  empty  declamation,  occupy  the  place 
of  a train  of  close,  accurate,  and  luminous  reasoning. 

It  is  not,  however,  solely,  or  chiefly,  for  polemical 
purposes,  that  the  cultivation  of  the  reasoning-faculty 
is  desirable  • in  persuading,  in  investigating,  in  learn 
ing,  or  teaching,  in  all  the  multitude  of  cases  in  whiel; 
it  is  our  object  to  arrive  at  just  conclusions,  or  to  lead 
others  to  them,  it  is  most  important.  A knowledge: 
ot  logical  rules  will  not  indeed  supply  the  want  of 
other  knowledge  ; nor  was  it  «-  ?r  proposed,  by  any 
one  who  really  understood  this  science,  to  substitute 
it  for  any  other  : but  it  is  no  less  true  that  no  other 
can  be  substituted  for  this ; that  it  is  valuable  ii* 
every  branch  of  study  ; and  that  it  enables  us  to  use 
o file  greatest  advantage  the  know’edge  we  possess, 


XI 


PREFACE 


It  is  to  be  hoped,  therefore  tnat  tl  jse  Academical 
Bodies,  who  have  been  wise  enough  to  retain  this 
science,  will,  instead  of  being  persuaded  to  abandon 
it,  give  their  attention  ra*her  to  its  improvement  and 
more  effectual  cultivation 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


INTRODUCTION. 

$ 1.  Logic,  in  the  most  extensive  sense  in 
which  it  has  been  thought  advisable  to  employ 
the  name,  may  be  considered  as  the  Science, 
and  also  as  the  Art,  of  Reasoning.  It  investigates  the  prin- 
ciples on  which  argumentation  is  conducted,  and  furnishes 
such  rules  as  may  be  derived  from  those  principles,  for  guard- 
ing against  erroneous  deductions.  Its  most  appropriate  office, 
however,  is  that  of  instituting  an  analysis  of  the  process  of 
the  mind  in  Reasoning ; and  in  this  point  of  view  it  is,  as  1 
have  said,  strictly  a Science;  while,  considered  in  reference 
to  the  practical  rules  above  mentioned,  it  may  be  called  the 
Art  of  Reasoning.  For  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  as  t 
science  is  conversant  about  speculative  knowledge  only , ana 
art  is  the  application  of  knowledge  to  practice , hence  Logic 
(as  well  as  any  other  system  of  knowledge)  becomes,  when 
applied  to  practice,  an  art;  while  confined  to  the  theory  of 
reasoning,  it  is  strictly  a science : and  it  is  as  such  that  it 
occupies  the  higher  place  in  point  of  dignity,  since  it  professes 
1 


Definition  oj 
Logic. 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[§  L 


to  develop  some  of  the  most  interesting  and  curjous  inteh 
lectual  phenomena.* 

Prevailing  Considering  how  early  Logic  attracted  the 

Mistalies  attention  of  philosophers,  it  may  appear  sur* 

respecting  prising  that  so  little  progress  should  have  been 

Logic.  mac|fi,  as  is  confessedly  the  case,  in  developing 
its  principles,  and  perfecting  the  detail  of  the  system ; and 
this  circumstance  has  been  brought  forward  as  a proof  of  the 
barrenness  and  futility  of  the  study.  But  a similar  argument 
might  have  been  urged  with  no  less  plausibility,  at  a period 
not  very  remote,  against  the  study  of  Natural  Philosophy  ; 
and,  very  recently,  against  that  of  Chemistry.  No  science 
can  be  expected  to  make  any  considerable  progress,  which  is 
not  cultivated  on  right  principles.  Whatever  may  be  the  in* 
nerent  vigor  of  the  plant,  it  will  neither  be  flourishing  nor 
fruitful  till  it  meet  with  a suitable  soil  and  culture : and  in  no 
case  is  the  remark  more  applicable  than  in  the  present ; the 
greatest  mistakes  having  always  prevailed  respecting  the 
nature  of  Logic  ; and  its  province  having  in  consequence 
been  extended  by  many  writers  to  subjects  with  which  it  nas 
no  proper  connection.  Indeed,  with  the  exception  perhaps  of 
Aristotle,  (who  is  himself,  however,  not  entirely  exempt  from 
the  errors  in  question,)  hardly  a writer  on  Logic  can  be  men- 
tioned who  has  clearly  perceived,  and  steadily  kept  in  view 
throughout,  its  real  nature  and  object.  Before  his  time,  no 
distinction  was  drawn  between  the  science  of  which  we  are 
Bpeaking,  and  that  which  is  now  usually  called  Metaphysics, 
a circumstance  which  alone  shows  how  small  was  the  progress 


• It  is  surely  strange,  therefore,  to-  find  in  a treatise  on  Logic, 
(Aldrich’s,)  a distinct  dissertation  to  prove  that  it  is  an  Art,  and  not 
» Science ! 


INTRODUCTION. 


3 


j i.] 


History  oj 
Logic  distinct 
from  the 
teaching  of  the 
science. 


made  in  earlier  times.  Indeed,  those  who  first  turned  theii 
attention  to  the  subject,  hardly  thought  of  inquiring  into  the 
process  of  Reasoning  itself,  but  confined  themselves  almost 
entirely  to  certain  preliminary  points,  the  discussion  of  which 
is  (if  logically  considered)  subordinate  to  that  of  the  main 
inquiry. 

To  give  even  a very  condensed  account  of 
the  lives  and  works  of  all  the  principal  writers 
on  Logic,  — of  the  technical  terms  introduced  by 
each  and  the  senses  in  which  each  employed 
them,  — and  of  the  improvements  or  corruptions 
that  were  from  time  to  time  introduced, — in  short,  to  write 
the  History  and  Antiquities  of  Logical  Science,  — would  be 
foreign  to  my  present  design.  Such  a work,  if  undertaken  by 
a competent  writer,  would  be,  though  not  of  a popular  char- 
acter, yet  highly  interesting  and  instructive  to  a limited  class 
of  students.  But  the  extensive  research  which  would  form 
one  indispensable  qualification  for  such  a task,  would  be  only 
one  out  of  many,  even  less  common,  qualifications,  without 
which  such  a work  would  be  worse  than  useless.  The  author 
should  be  one  thoroughly  on  his  guard  against  the  common 
error  of  confounding  together,  or  leading  his  readers  to  con- 
found, an  intimate  acquaintance  with  many  books  on  a given 
subject,  and  a clear  insight  into  the  subject  itself.  With 
ability  and  industry  for  investigating  a multitude  of  minute 
particulars,  he  should  possess  the  power  of  rightly  estimating 
each  according  to  its  intrinsic  importance,  and  not  (as  is  verj 
commonly  done)  according  to  the  degree  of  laborious  re- 
search it  may  have  cost  him,  or  the  rarity  of  the  knowledge 
le  may  in  any  case  have  acquired.  And  he  should  be  care 
ful,  while  recording  the  opinions  and  expressions  ol  various 
authors  on  points  of  science,  to  guard  both  himself  i nd  his 


\ 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[}  Z 


readers  against  the  mistake  of  taking  any  thing  on  authority 
that  ought  to  be  evinced  by  scientific  reasoning  ; nr  of  regard- 
ing each  technical  term  as  having  a sort  of  prescriptive  right 
to  retain  forever  the  meaning  attached  to  it  by  those  who  first 
introduced  it.  In  no  subject,  in  short,  is  it  more  impor- 
tant for  an  author  to  be  free  from  all  tinge  of  antiquarian 
pedantry. 

But  if  I felt  myself  as  fully  competent  to  the  task  of  writing 
such  a history  of  Logic  as  I have  alluded  to,  as  I am  conscious 
of  not  being  so,  I should  still  decidedly  prefer  keeping  such  a 
work  altogether  distinct  from  a treatise  on  the  science ; be- 
cause the  combination  of  the  two  in  a single  volume  would 
render  it  the  more  difficult  to  avoid  the  blending  of  them  con- 
fusedly together ; and  also  because,  on  such  a plan,  the  dis- 
tinction could  not  be  so  easily  preserved  between  Logic,  in 
the  sense  in  which  I am  here  using  that  title,  and  various  met- 
aphysical disquisitions  to  which  several  writers  have  given  the 
same  name. 

For  these  reasons  I have  thought  it  best  to  take  only  a slight 
and  rapid  glance  of  the  series  of  logical  writers  down  to  the 
present  day,  and  of  the  general  tendency  of  their  labors. 

§ 2.  Zeno  the  Eleatic,  whom  most  accounts 

Eat-ly  writers  represent  as  the  earliest  systematic  writer  on 
on  Logic.  . 

the  subject  of  Logic,  or,  as  it  was  then  called, 

Dialectics,  divided  his  work  into  three  parts;  the  first  of 
which  (upon  Consequences)  is  censured  by  Socrates  [Plato, 
Parmen .]  for  obscurity  and  confusion.  In  his  second  part, 
however,  he  furnished  that  interrogatory  method  of  disputa- 
tion which  Socrates  adopted,  and  which  has  since 

borne  his  name.  The  third  part  of  his  work  was  devoted  to 
what  may  not  be  improperly  termed  the  art  of  wrangling 
wh'ch  supplied  the  disputant  with  a collection  of 


{2.] 


INTRODUCTION. 


5 


sophistical  questions,  so  contrived,  that  the  concession  of  soma 
point,  that  seemed  unavoidable,  immediately  involved  soma 
glaring  absurdity.  This,  if  it  is  to  be  esteemed  as  at  all  fall- 
ing within  the  province  of  Logic,  is  certainly  not  to  be  re- 
garded (as  some  have  ignorantly  or  heedlessly  represented  it) 
as  its  principal  or  proper  business.  The  Greek  philosophers 
generally  have  unfortunately  devoted  too  much  attention  to 
it ; but  we  must  beware  of  falling  into  the  vulgar  error  of 
supposing  the  ancients  to  have  regarded  as  a serious  and  in- 
trinsically important  study,  that  which  in  fact  they  considered 
as  an  ingenious  recreation.  The  disputants  diverted  them- 
selves in  their  leisure  hours  by  making  trial  of  their  own  and 
their  adversary’s  acuteness,  in  the  endeavor  mutually  to  per- 
plex each  other  with  subtle  fallacies  ; much  in  the  same  way 
as  men  amuse  themselves  with  propounding  and  guessing  rid- 
dles, or  with  the  game  of  chess ; to  each  of  which  diversions 
the  sportive  disputations  of  the  ancients  bore  much  resem- 
blance. They  were  closely  anologous  to  the  wrestling  and 
other  exercises  of  the  Gymnasium  ; these  last  being  reckoned 
conducive  to  bodily  vigor  and  activity,  as  the  former  were  to 
habits  of  intellectual  acuteness ; but  the  immediate  object  in 
each  was  a sportive,  not  a serious  contest ; though  doubtless 
fashion  and  emulation  often  occasioned  an  undue  importance 
to  be  attached  to  success  in  each. 

Zeno,  then,  is  hardly  to  be  regarded  as  any 
further  a logician  than  as  to  what  respects  his 
erotetic  method  of  disputation  ; a course  of  argument  con 
stmcted  on  this  principle  being  properly  a hypothetical  Sori- 
tes, which  may  easily  be  reduced  into  a series  of  syllogisms. 

To  Zeao  succeeded  Euclid  of  Megara,  and 

Antisthenes , both  pupils  of  Socrates.  The  Eiiclid  ant 
r 1 Antistnenea. 

rormer  of  these  prosecuted  the  s bject  of  the 

l* 


Zeno. 


6 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


I*  » 


third  part  of  his  predecessor’s  treatise,  and  is  said  to  have 
been  ■ the  author  of  many  of  the  fallacies  attributed  to  the 
Stoical  school.  Of  the  writings  of  the  latter  nothing  certain 
is  known  ; if,  however,  we  suppose  the  above-mentioned  sect 
to  be  his  disciples  in  this  study,  and  to  have  retained  his  prin- 
ciples, he  certainly  took  a more  correct  view  of  the  subject 
than  Euclid.  The  Stoics  divided  all  lexxu  — every  thing 
that  could  be  said  — into  three  classes;  1st,  the  Simple 
Term  ; 2d,  the  Proposition  ; 3d,  the  Syllogism ; viz.  the  hypo- 
thetical ; for  they  seem  to  have  had  little  notion  of  a more 
rigorous  analysis  of  argument  than  into  that  familiar  form. 

We  must  not  here  omit  to  notice  the  merits  of  Archytas,  to 

whom  we  are  indebted  (as  he  himself  probably 
Archytas  _ 

was,  in  a great  degree,  to  older  writers)  for  the 
doctrines  of  the  Categories.  He,  however,  (as  well  as  the 
other  writers  on  the  subject,)  appears  to  have  had  no  distinct 
view  of  the  proper  object  and  just  limits  of  the  science  of 
Logic  ; but  to  have  blended  with  it  metaphysical  discussions  not 
strictly  connected  with  it,  and  to  have  dwelt  on  the  investi- 
gation of  the  nature  of  Terms  and  Propositions,  without 
maintaining  a constant  reference  to  the  principles  of  Reason- 
ing ; to  which  all  the  rest  should  be  made  subservient. 

The  state,  then,  in  which  Aristotle  found  the 

Aristotle . 

science,  (if,  indeed,  it  can  properly  be  said  to 
have  -listed  at  all  before  his  time,)  appears  to  have  been 
nearly  nis  : the  division  into  Simple  Terms,  Propositions,  and 
Syllogisms,  had  been  slightly  sketched  out ; the  doctrine  of 
the  Categories,  and  perhaps  that  of  the  Opposition  of  propo- 
sitions- had  been  laid  down  ; and,  as  some  believe,  the  analy> 
Bis  of  Species  into  Genus  and  Differentia  had  been  introduced 
by  Socrates.  These,  at  best,  were  rather  the  materials  of  the 
Bystem,  *ban  the  system  itself ; the  foundation  of  which  indeed 


INTRODUCTION. 


7 


»*] 

he  distinctly  claims  the  merit  of’  having  laid,  and  which 
remains  fundamentally  the  same  as  he  left  it. 

It  has  been  remarked,  that  the  logical  system  is  one  of 
those  few  theories  which  have  been  begun  and  completed 
by  the  same  individual.  The  history  of  its  discovery,  as  far 
as  the  main  principles  of  the  science  are  concerned,  proper  y 
commences  and  ends  with  Aristotle  ; and  this  may  perhaps  in 
part  account  for  the  subsequent  perversions  of  it.  The  brev- 
ity and  simplicity  of  its  fundamental  truths  (to  which  point 
indeed  all  real  science  is  perpetually  tending)  has  already  led 
many  to  suppose  that  something  much  more  complex,  ab- 
struse, and  mysterious  remained  tc  be  discovered.  The  van- 
ity, too,  by  which  all  men  are  prompted  unduly  to  magnify 
their  own  pursuits,  has  led  unphiloscphical  minds,  not  in  this 
case  alone,  but  in  many  others,  to  extend  the  boundaries  of 
their  respective  sciences,  not  by  the  patient  development  and 
just  application  of  the  principles  of  those  sciences,  but  by 
wandering  into  irrelevant  subjects.  The  mystical  employment 
of  numbers  by  Pythagoras,  in  matters  utterly  foreign  to  arith- 
metic, is  perhaps  the  earliest  instance  of  the  kind.  A more 
curious  and  important  one  is  the  degeneracy  of  Astronomy 
into  judicial  Astrology ; but  none  is  more  striking  than  the 
misapplication  of  Logic  by  those  who  have  treated  of  it  as 
“ the  art  of  rightly  employing  the  rational  faculties,”  or  who 
have  intruded  it  into  the  province  of  Natural  Philosophy,  and 
regarded  the  Syllogism  as  an  engine  for  the  investigation  of 
nature ; while  they  overlooked  the  extensive  aeld  that  was 
before  them  within  the  legitimate  limits  of  the  science,  and 
perceived  not  the  importance  and  difficulty  of  the  task  of 
completing  and  properly  filling  up  the  masterly  sketch  before 
hem. 

The  writings  of  Aristotle  were  not  only  for  the  most  pan 


6 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


B* 


absolutely  lost  to  the  world  for  about  two  centuries,  but  seem 
to  have  been  but  little  studied  for  a long  time  after  their  re* 
covery.  An  art,  however,  of  Logic,  derived  from  the  princi- 
ples traditionally  preserved  by  his  disciples,  seems  to  have 
been  generally  known,  and  to  have  been  employed  by  Cicero 
n his  philosophical  works ; but  the  pursuit  of  the  science 
seems  to  have  been  abandoned  for  a long  time.  As  early  in 
the  Christian  era  as  the  second  and  third  centuries,  the  Peri- 


Boethius. 


aatstic  doctrines  experienced  a considerable  revival ; and  we 

Galen  meet  the  names  of  Galen,  Ammonius, 

Ammonius,  (who  seems  to  have  taken  the  lead  among  the 
Alexander,  commentators  on  Aristotle,)  Alexander  of  Aph- 
Porphyry.  roc|;siaSj  ancj  Porphyry,  as  logicians;  but  it  is 
not  till  the  close  of  the  fifth  century,  or  the  beginning  of  the 
sixth,  that  Aristotle’s  logical  works  were  translated  into  Latin 
by  the  celebrated  Boethius.*  Not  one  of  these 
seems  to  have  made  any  considerable  advances 
in  developing  the  theory  of  reasoning.  Of  the  labors  of  Ga- 
len, (who  added  the  insignificant  fourth  Figure  to  the  three 
recognized  by  Aristotle,)  little  is  known  ; and  Porphyry’s 
principal  work  is  merely  on  the  predicables.  We  have  little 
of  the  science  till  the  revival  of  learning  among  the  Arabians, 
by  whom  Aristotle’s  treatises  on  this,  as  well  as  on  other  sub- 
jects, were  eagerly  studied. 

§ 3.  Passing  by  the  names  of  some  Byzan- 
tine writers  of  no  great  importance,  we  come 
to  the  times  of  the  Schoolmen  ; whose  waste  of  ingenuity, 
and  frivolous  subtilty  of  disputation,  have  been  often  made 
the  subject  of  complaints,  into  the  justice  of  which  it  is  unne- 
cessary here  fully  to  inquire.  It  may  be  sufficient  to  observe 


Schoolmen. 


* Born  about  A.  D.  475,  and  died  about  A.  D.  524. 


INTRODUCTION. 


s 


tnat  their  fault  did  not  lie  in  their  diligent  study  of  1 tgic,  and 
the  high  value  they  set  upon  it,  but  in  their  utterly  mistaking 
the  true  nature  and  object  of  the  science  ; and  by  the  attempt 
to  employ  it  for  the  purpose  of  physical  discoveries,  involving 
every  subject  in  a mist  of  words,  to  the  exclusion  of  sound 
philosophical  investigation.*  Their  errors  may  serve  to  ac- 
count for  the  strong  terms  in  which  Bacon 

. . . Bacon. 

sometimes  appears  to  censure  logical  pursuits  ; 

hut  that  this  censure  was  intended  to  bear  against  the  extrav- 
agant perversions,  not  the  legitimate  cultivation,  of  the  sci- 
ence, may  be  proved  from  his  own  observations  on  the  sub- 
ject, in  his  Advancement  of  Learning.  “ Had  Bacon  lived 
in  the  present  day,  I am  inclined  to  think  he  would  have 
made  his  chief  complaint  against  unmethodized  inquiry  and 
illogical  reasoning.  Certainly  he  would  not  have  complained 
of  Dialectics  as  corrupting  Philosophy.  To  guard  uoic 
against  the  evils  prevalent  in  his  time,  would  be  to  fortify  n 
town  against  battering-rams,  instead  of  against  cannon.”  t 
His  moderation,  however,  was  not  imitated 

Locke. 

in  other  quarters.  Even  Locke  confounds  in 
one  sweeping  censure  the  Aristotelic  theory,  with  the  ab- 
surd misapplications  and  perversions  of  it  in  later  years.  His 
objection  to  the  science,  as  unserviceable  in  the  discovery 
of  truth,  (which  has  of  late  been  often  repeated,)  while  :t 
holds  good  in  reference  to  many  (misnamed)  logicians,  indi- 
cates that,  with  regard  to  the  true  nature  of  the  science  itself, 
he  had  no  clearer  notions  than  they  have,  of  the  just  limits  of 
oghal  science,  as  confined  to  the  theory  of  Reasoning ; and 


• Of  tiie  character  of  the  School-divinity,  Dr.  Hampden’s  Hamp- 
ton Lectures  furnish  the  best  view  that  has,  perhaps,  ever  appearci 
+ Pol.  Econ.  Lect.  Lx.  p.  237. 


10 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


l»» 


of  the  distinct  character  of  that  operation  from  the  observa- 
tions and  experiments  which  are  essential  to  the  study  oi 
Nature. 

For  instance,  in  chap.  xvii.  “ on  Reason,”  (which,  by  the 
way,  he  perpetually  confounds  with  Reasoning ,)  he  says,  in 
§ 4,  “ If  syllogisms  must  be  taken  for  the  only  proper 
instrument  of  reason  and  means  of  knowledge,  it  will  follow, 
that  before  Aristotle  there  was  not  one  man  that  did  or 
could  know  any  thing  by  reason  ; and  that,  since  the  inven- 
tion of  syllogisms,  there  is  not  one  in  ten  thousand  that 
doth.  But  God  has  not  been  so  sparing  to  men  to  make 
them  barely  two-legged  creatures,  and  left  it  to  Aristotle  tc 
make  them  rational,  i.  e.  those  few  of  them  that  he  could  get 
so  to  examine  the  grounds  of  syllogisms,  as  to  see  that  in 
above  threescore  ways  that  three  propositions  may  be  laid  to- 
gether, there  are  but  fourteen  wherein  one  may  be  sure  that 
tne  conclusion  is  right,”  &c.  “ God  has  been  more  bounti- 

ful to  mankind  than  so : He  has  given  them  a mind  that  can 
reason  without  being  instructed  in  methods  of  syllogizing,” 
&c.  All  this  is  not  at  all  less  absurd  than  if  any  one,  on 
being  told  of  the  discoveries  of  modern  chemists  respecting 
caloric,  and  on  hearing  described  the  process  by  which  it  is 
conducted  through  a boiler  into  the  water,  which  it  converts 
into  a gas  of  sufficient  elasticity  to  overcome  the  pressure  of 
the  atmosphere,  &c.,  should  reply,  “ If  all  this  were  so,  it 
would  follow  that  before  the  time  of  these  chemists  no  one 
ever  did  or  could  make  any  liquor  boil.” 

He  presently  after  inserts  an  encomium  upon  Aristotle, 
in  which  he  is  equally  unfortunate  ; he  praises  him  for  the 

invention  of  syllogisms  ; ” to  which  he  certainly  had  na 
more  cuiim  than  Linnaeus  to  the  creation  of  plants  and  ani- 
mals; or  Harvey,  to  the  praise  of  hav'ng  made  the  blow 


INTRODUCTION. 


II 


* 3 j 

circuit  L£  Lavoisier,  to  that  of  having  formed  the  atmos- 
phere we  breathe.  And  the  utility  of  this  invention  consists, 
according  to  him,  in  the  great  service  done  against  “ those 
who  were  not  ashamed  to  deny  any  thing  ; ” a service  which 
never  could  have  been  performed,  had  syllogisms  been  an  in 
vention  or  discovery  of  Aristotle’s ; for  what  sophist  coula 
ever  have  consented  to  restrict  himself  to  one  particular  kind 
of  arguments,  dictated  by  his  opponent  ? 

In  an  ordinary,  obscure,  and  trifling  writer,  all  this  confu- 
sion  of  thought  and  common-place  declamation  might  as  well 
have  been  left  unnoticed  ; but  it  is  due  to  the  general  ability 
and  to  the  celebrity  of  such  an  author  as  Locke,  that  errors 
of  this  kind  should  be  exposed. 

An  error  apparently  different,  but  substantially  the  same 
pervades  the  treatises  of  Watts,  and  seme  other 
modern  writers  on  the  subject.  Perceiving  the 
inadequacy  of  the  syllogistic  theory  to  the  vast  purposes  to 
which  others  had  attempted  to  apply  it,  he  still  craved  aftei 
the  attainment  of  some  equally  comprehensive  and  all-power- 
ful system  ; which  he  accordingly  attempted  to  construct  un- 
der the  title  of  The  Right  Use  of  Reason, — which  was  to 
be  a method  of  invigorating  and  properly  directing  all  the 
powers  of  the  mind  : — a most  magnificent  object  indeed,  but 
one  which  not  only  does  not  fall  under  the  province  of  Logic, 
out  cannot  be  accomplished  by  any  one  science  or  system  that 
can  even  be  conceived  to  exist.  The  attempt  to  comprehend  so 
wide  a field,  is  no  extension  of  science,  but  a mere  verbal  gen*- 
eralization,  which  leads  only  to  vague  and  barren  declamation. 

It  is  not  perhaps  much  to  be  wondered  at,  that  in  still  later 
times  several  ingenious  writers,  forming  their  notions  of  the 
ecience  itself  from  professed  masters  in  it,  such  as  have  jus! 
been  alluded  to  and  judging  of  its  value  from  their  failures 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


j2 


L j 3 


should  have  treated  the  Aristotelic  system  with  so  much 
reprobation  and  scorn. 

The  vague  aspirations  of  some  of  these  wri- 

Extravagant  ters  ap(er  a .t  true  » — “ rational  ” — “ philo- 
expectations  of  r 

some  writers.  S0Phlcal  system  of  Logic,”  which,  year  after 

year,  and  generation  after  generation,  is  talked 
of,  and  hoped  for,  and  almost  promised,  but  which  is  acknowl- 
edged to  have  never  yet  existed,*  may  recall  to  one’s  mind 
the  gorgeous  visions  which  floated  before  the  imagination  of 
the  Alchemists,  of  the  Philosopher’s  Stone,  and  the  Universal 
Medicine ; and  which  made  them  regard  with  impatience  and 
with  scorn  the  humble  labors  of  existing  Metallurgy  and  Phar- 
macy. I believe  that  in  respect  of  the  present  subject,  the 
views  I am  alluding  to  arise  in  great  measure  from  men’s  not 
perceiving  tnat  Language, i of  some  kind  or  other,  is  (as  will 
be  more  fully  shown  hereafter)  an  indispensable  instrument 
of  all  Reasoning  that  properly  deserves  the  name.  And 
hence  it  is  that  one  may  find  such  writers  as  I 
Tc™c!e’lcy  t0  allude  to  speaking  disdainfully  of  “ rules  appli- 
cable merely  to  reasoning  in  words  ; ” — rep- 
resenting Language  as  serviceable  only  “ in  conveying  argu- 
ments to  another  ; ” and  even  as  “ limiting  the  play  of  our 
faculties ; ” and  again  as  “ rendering  the  mental  perception 


* I have  even  seen  a complaint  made,  that  the  introduction  of  some 
such  perfect  system  has  been  prevented,  by  the  application  of  the 
kerm  Logic  to  that  which  is  commonly  so  called.  We  do  not  find, 
however,  that  the  application  of  the  names  of  Astronomy  and  Chem- 
istry to  the  studies  formerly  so  called,  prevented  the  origination  of 
more  philosophical  systems. 

f Hobbes,  who  has  very  clearly  pointed  this  out,  has  unhappily 
diminished  the  benefit  that  might  have  been  derived  from  much  that 
no  has  written,  by  the  prejudice  he  has  raised  against  himself  through 
his  exceptionable  doctrines  in  Morals.  Politics,  and  Religion. 


INTRODUCTION. 


13 


f 3} 

of.  all  abstract  truths  obscure  and  confused,  in  so  far  as  the 
rude  symbol  of  each  idea  is  taken  in  the  stead  of  the  idea 
itself ; ” with  other  such  expressions,  emanating  from  that 
which  is  in  truth  the  ancient  and  still  prevalent  doctrine  of 
ss  Realism.” 

The  Syllogistic  theory  has  usually  been  con-  incorrect 

sidered  by  these  objectors  as  professing  to  fur-  views  of  the 
nish  a peculiar  method  of  reasoning,  instead  of  a nature  of  the 
method  of  analyzing  that  mental  process  which  science- 
must  invariably  take  place  in  all  correct  reasoning  ; and  ac- 
cordingly they  have  contrasted  the  ordinary  mode  of  reason- 
ing with  the  syllogistic,  and  have  brought  forward  with  an  air 
of  triumph  the  argumentative  skill  of  many  who  never 
learned  the  system  ; a mistake  no  less  gross  than  if  any  one 
should  regard  Grammar  as  a peculiar  Language,  and  should 
contend  against  its  utility,  on  the  ground  that  many  speak 
correctly  who  never  studied  the  principles  of  grammar.  For 
Logic,  which  is,  as  it  were,  the  Grammar  of  Reasoning,  dues 
not  bring  forward  the  regular  Syllogism  as  a distinct  mode  of 
argumentation , designed  to  be  substituted  for  any  other 
mode  ; * but  as  the  form  to  which  all  correct  reasoning  may 
be  ultimately  reduced  : and  which,  consequently,  serves  the 


* Strange  as  it  may  seem,  there  are  some,  (I  suspect  not  a few,) 
who  even  go  a step  further,  and  consider  Logic  as  something  opposed 
.o  right  reasoning.  I have  seen  a Review,  of  a work  which  the  Re- 
viewer characterized  as  the  production  of  an  able  Logician,  and  which 
he  therefore  concluded  was  likely  to  have  influence  with  such  as  will 
not  reason!  The  “not”  might  naturally  have  been  regarded  as  a 
misprint,  but  that  the  context  shows  that  such  was  the  reviewer’s  real 
meaning. 

On  seeing  such  a passage  written  in  the  19th  century,  who  can  won 
der  that  in  the  Middle  Ages,  Grammar  (“  Gramarye  ”)  was  regarded 
vs  a kind  of  magical  art ! 

2 


L4 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 


L$  * 

purpose  (when  we  are  employing  Logic  as  an  art)  of  a lest 
to  try  the  validity  of  anj  argument ; in  the  same  manner  aa 
by  chemical  analysis  we  develop  and  submit  to  a distinct  ex- 
amination the  elements  of  which  any  compound  body  is  com- 
posed, and  are  thus  enabled  to  detect  any  latent  sophistication 
and  impurity. 

§ 4.  Many  misconceptions  not  very  dissimilar  to  those  of 
Locke,  which  continue  to  prevail,  more  or  less,  in  the  presen 
day,  will  be  hereafter  noticed,  as  far  as  is  needful,  in  appropriate 
places.  In  this  introduction  it  would  be  unsuitable  to  advert 
to  them  except  very  briefly,  and  that,  only  with  a view  to 
caution  the  learner,  unused  to  these  studies,  against  being  dis- 
heartened in  the  outset,  by  hearing,  generally,  that  objections 
have  been  raised  against  the  leading  principles  of  the  science 
by  writers  of  considerable  repute ; objections  which  he  wiH 
hardly  suppose  to  be,  in  so  great  a degree  as  they  really  are 
either  founded  on  mistake,  or  unimportant,  and  turning,  im 
reality,  on  merely  verbal  questions. 

For  instance,  some,  he  may  be  told,  have  maintained  tha 
men  reason,  — or  that  they  may  reason,  — from  a single 
premiss,  without  any  other  being  either  expressed  or  under- 
stood ; — that  men  may,  and  do,  reason  from  one  individua. 
case  to  another,  without  the  intervention  of  any  general  [uni- 
versal] proposition,  whether  stated  or  implied  ; — that  the 
inferences  from  Induction  are  not  drawn  by  any  process  that 
is,  in  substance,  Syllogistic  ; — that  the  conclusion  of  a Syllo- 
gism s not  really  inferred  from  the  Premisses  ; — that  a Syllo- 
gism m nothing  but  a kind  of  trap  for  insnaring  the  incau- 
tious ; and  that  it  necessarily  involves  the  fallacy  of  “ begging 
the  question , ” with  other  such  formidably-sounding  objec- 
tions • which,  when  simply  spoken  of  as  being  afloat,  and  a* 
maintained  by  able  men,  are  likely  to  be  supposed  far  mor« 


INTRODUCTION. 


n 


} *1 

Dowerful  than  the)  will  be  found  on  a closer  examina 
tion. 

Of  those  who  speak  of  a single  premiss  being  sufficient  to 
warrant  a conclusion  some,  it  will  be  found,  were  confining 
their  thoughts  to  such  flat  and  puerile  examples  as  Logical 
writers  are  too  apt  to  employ  exclusively  ; as  “ Socrates  is  a 
man  ; therefore  he  is  a living-creature,  &c. ; ” in  which  the 
conclusion  had  been  already  stated  in  the  one  premiss,  to  any 
one  who  does  but  understand  the  meaning  of  the  words  ; 
“ living-creature  ” being  a part  of  what  is  signified  in  the 
very  term  “ Man.”  But  in  such  an  instance  as  this  : “ He 
has  swallowed  a cup  of  laurel-water,  therefore  he  has  taken 
poison,”  the  inference  is  one  w’hich  no  one  could  draw  who 
should  be  ignorant  — as  every  body  was,  less  than  a century 
ago  (though  using  the  word  in  the  same  sense  as  now,  to  sig- 
nify a “ liquor  distilled  from  laurel-leaves  ”)  that  this  liquor 
is  poisonous. 

Others,  again,  when  they  speak  of  reasoning  from  one  indi- 
vidual instance  to  another,  without  any  universal  premiss, 
mean,  sometimes,  that  no  such  premiss  is  expressed , (which  is 
the  case  oftener  than  not,)  and  that  perhaps  even  the  reasoner 
himself,  if  possessed  of  no  great  command  of  language,  might 
ae  at  a loss  to  state  it  correctly.*  And  indeed  it  continually 


* It  may  be  added,  that  in  inward  solitary  reasoning,  many,  and 
perhaps  most  persons,  but  especially  those  not  much  accustomed  to 
read  or  speak  concerning  the  subjects  that  occupy  their  thoughts, 
make  use,  partly,  of  signs  that  are  not  arbitrary  and  conventional , but 
which  consist  of  mental  conceptions  of  individual  objects  ; taken,  each, 
as  a representative  of  a Class.  E.  g.  a person  practically  conversant 
with  mechanical  operations,  but  not  with  discussions  of  them  in  words, 
may  form  a conception  of — in  colloquial  phrase,  “ figure  to  himself’ 
— a certain  field  or  room,  with  whose  shape  he  is  familiar,  and  raaj 
tmploy  this,  in  his  inward  trains  of  thought,  as  a Sign,  to  represent 


16 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


nappens  that  even  long  trains  of  reasoning  will  flash  Lirougti 
the  mind  with  such  rapidity  that  the  process  is  performed 
unconsciously,  or  at  least  leaves  no  trace  in  the  memory,  any 
more  than  the  motions  of  the  muscles  of  the  throat  and  mouth 
in  speaking,  or  the  judgments  by  which  we  decide  as  to  the 
distances  of  visible  objects  : * so  that  a conclusion  may  be 
supposed  to  be  seized  by  intuition,  which  in  reality  is  the 
result  of  rapid  inference. 

Some,  again,  appear  to  include  under  the  title  of  “ reason- 
ing ” every  case  in  which  a person  believes  one  thing  in  con- 
sequence of  his  believing  another  thing;  however  far  he  may 
be  from  having  any  good  grounds  to  warrant  the  inference  : 
and  they  accordingly  include  those  processes  which  take  place 
in  the  minds  of  infants  and  of  brutes ; which  are  apt  to  asso- 
ciate with  the  appearance  of  an  object  before  them  the  remem- 
bered impression  of  something  that  formerly  accompanied  it. 
Such  a process  is  alluded  to  in  the  familiar  proverbs  that 
“A  burnt  child  dreads  the  fire;”  or  as  it  is  expressed  in 
another  form,  “ The  scalded  cat  fears  cold  water  ; ” or  again 
in  the  Hebrew  proverb,  “ He  who  has  been  bitten  by  a serpent 


for  instance,  “ parallelogram  ” or  “ trapezium,”  &c. ; or  he  may  “ fig- 
ure to  himself”  a man  raising  a weight  by  means  of  a pole,  and  may 
use  this  conception  as  a general  sign,  in  place  of  the  term  “ lever  ; ” 
and  the  terms  themselves  he  may  be  unacquainted  with ; in  which 
•ase  he  will  be  at  a loss  to  impart  distinctly  to  others  his  own  reason- 
ings ; and  in  the  attempt,  will  often  express  himself  (as  one  may  fre- 
quently observe  in  practical  men  unused  to  reading  and  speaking)  not 
only  indistinctly,  but  even  erroneously.  See  below,  § 5.  Hence,  partly, 
may  have  arisen  the  belief  in  those  supposed  “ abstract  ideas  ” which 
will  be  hereafter  alluded  to,  and  in  the  possibility  of  reasoning  with- 
out the  use  of  any  Signs  at  all. 

* The  distance  of  an  object  having  been,  till  a comparatively  lat* 
period  supposed  to  be  directly  perceived  by  the  eve. 


INTR . iDUCTION 


17 


Ml 

is  afraid  of  a rope.”  Most  logical  writers  however  have  con* 
fined  the  name  of  “ reasoning ” to  valid  argument;  which 
cannot  exist  without  a universal  premiss,  implied,  if  not  ex- 
pressed. For  whenever  there  are  not  two  premisses  which, 
taken  jointly,  do  imply,  and  virtually  assert,  the  conclusion, 
— the  alleged  premiss  or  premisses  being  such  that  a person 
may  without  inconsistency  believe  them  true  and  yet  not  be- 
lieve the  conclusion,  — then,  we  have  what  Logicians  have 
been  accustomed  to  call  an  apparent,  but  not  real  argument. 

Some  however  have  denied  that  the  conclusion  is  inferred 
from  the  universal  premiss.  But  then  they  acknowledge  that 
the  truth  of  that  premiss  is  an  indispensable  condition  of  such 
inference  : an  admission  which  would  satisfy  most  Logicians. 
For  if  any  botanical  physiologist,  for  instance,  were  to  deny 
that  the  branches  of  a tree  derive  nourishment  from  the  roots, 
saying  that  the-  branches  are  nourished  by  the  juices  of  the 
earth,  but  admitting  that  the  roots  are  an  indispensable  con- 
dition, and  that  if  they  are  destroyed,  the  branches  will  wither, 
this  would  not  be  reckoned  as  substantially  any  new  doctrine. 
And  so  also  if  any  one  choose  to  maintain  that  the  conclusion 
is  drawn^/rowi  the  one  premiss,  by,  or  through  the  other  prem 
iss,  this  would  be  accounted  merely  a needless  and  unim 
portant  innovation  in  phraseology. 

So  also  when  inferences  from  Induction  are  spoken  of  as 
not  being  — or  not  necessarily  being — substantially  Syllo- 
gistic, the  learner  might  at  first  sight  be  startled  and  per- 
plexed, till  he  found  it  at  the  same  time  admitted  that  we  have 
to  decidt,  in  each  case  of  Induction,  the  question,  whether 
the  instances  adduced  be  “ sufficient  ” to  warrant  the  infer 
snce  ; — whether  it  be  “ allowable  ” to  draw  the  conclusion. 
And  the  decision  of  this  question  in  the  affirmative,  — i.  e. 
She  decision  that  the  procedure  is  not  a mere  random  guess 
2* 


18 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


u* 

— is,  if  expressed  in  words,  the  very  premiss  necessary  to 
complete  the  Syllogism.  (See  B.  iv.  ch.  i.  § 1.) 

So  also  it  will  be  seen  that  the  alleged  entrapping  charactei 
of  a Syllogism,  merely  amounts  to  this;  that  whoever  per* 
ceives  the  validity  of  an  argument,  has  no  mode  of  escape 
from  the  “ snare  ” (so  called)  except  by  the  way  he  entered , 
viz.  the  premisses.  He  has  only  the  alternative  of  allowing 
one  of  them  to  be  false,  or  else,  the  conclusion  to  be  true. 
And  it  is  a matter  of  daily  occurrence,  that  a man  is  unde- 
ceived as  to  some  principle  he  had  incautiously  admitted,  by 
perceiving  what  it  would  lead  to. 

Complaints  § 5.  Complaints  have  also  been  made  that 
against  Logic.  Logic  leaves  untouched  the  greatest  difficulties, 
and  those  which  are  the  sources  of  the  chief  errors  in  reason- 
ing ; viz.  the  ambiguity  or  indistinctness  of  Terms,  and  the 
doubts  respecting  the  degrees  of  evidence  in  various  Proposi- 
tions : an  objection  which  is  not  to  be  removed  by  any  such 
attempt  as  that  of  Watts  to  lay  dow’n  “ rules  for  forming 
clear  ideas,”  and  for  “ guiding  the  judgment ; ” but  by  reply- 
ing that  no  art  is  to  be  censured  for  not  teaching  more  than 
falls  within  its  province,  and  indeed  more  than  can  be  taught 
by  any  conceivable  art.  Such  a system  of  universal  knowl 
edge  as  should  instruct  us  in  the  full  meaning  or  meanings  of 
every  term,  and  the  truth  or  falsity,  — certainty  or  uncer 
tainty, — of  every  proposition,  thus  superseding  all  othef 
studies,  it  is  most  unphilosophical  to  expect,  or  even  to  im- 
agine. And  to  find  fault  with  Logic  for  not  performing  this 
is  as  if  one  should  object  to  the  science  of  Optics  for  not 
giving  sight  to  the  blind  ; or  as  if  (like  the  man  of  whom 
Warburton  tells  a story  in  his  Div.  Leg.)  one  should  com- 
plain of  a reading-glass  for  being  of  no  service  to  a person 
who  had  never  learned  :o  read.  In  fact,  the  difficulties  and 


S.j 


INTRODUCTION. 


19 


errors  above  alluded  to  are  not  in  the  process  of  Reasoning 
itself  (which  alone  is  the  appropriate  province  of  Logic,)  but 
in  the  subject-matter  about  which  it  is  employed.  This  pro- 
cess will  have  been  correctly  conducted  if  it  have  conformed 
to  the  logical  rules,  which  preclude  the  possibility  of  any  erroi 
creeping  in  between  the  principles  assumed,  and  the  conclu- 
sions we  ieduce  from  them.  But  still  that  conclusion  may 
be  false,  .f  the  principles  we  start  from  are  so ; and  the 
known  falsity  of  a conclusion  will  often  serve  (as  has  been 
above  remarked)  to  correct  a mistake  made  in  the  outset.  In 
like  manner  no  arithmetical  skill  wiil  secure  a correct  result 
to  a calculation,  unless  the  data  are  correct  from  which  we 
calculate ; nor  does  any  one  on  that  account  undervalue 
Arithmetic ; and  yet  the  objection  against  Logic  rests  on  no 
better  foundation. 

There  is  in  fact  a striking  analogy  in  this  respect  betweer 
the  two  sciences.  All  Numbers  (which  are  the  subject  of 
Arithmetic)  must  be  numbers  of  some  things , whether  coins 
persons,  measures,  or  any  thing  else  ; but  to  introduce  into 
the  science  any  notice  of  the  things  respecting  which  calcu- 
lations are  made,  would  be  evidently  irrelevant,  and  would 
destroy  its  scientific  character ; we  proceed  therefore  with 
arbitrary  signs  representing  numbers  in  the  abstract.  So  also 
ioes  Logic  pronounce  on  the  validity  of  a regularly-con 
structed  argument,  equally  well,  though  arbitrary  symbols 
may  have  bien  substituted  for  the  Terms;  and,  consequently, 
without  any  regard  to  the  things  signified  by  those  Terms. 
And  the  possibility  of  doing  this  (though  the  employment  of 
sucn  arbitrary  symbols  has  been  absurdly  objected  to,  even 
bv  writers  who  understood  not  only  Arithmetic  but  Algebra) 
>s  a proof  of  the  strictly  scientific  character  of  the  system. 
But  many  professed  logical  writers,  not  attending  to  the  cir- 


20 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Jft 

cumstantes  which  have  been  just  mentioned,  i.ave  wandered 
into  disquisitions  on  various  branches  of  knowledge ; disqui- 
sitions which  must  evidently  be  as  boundless  as  human  knowl- 
edge itself,  since  there  is  no  subject  on  which  reasoning  k 
not  employed,  and  to  which,  consequently,  Logic  may  not  be 
applied.  The  error  lies  in  regarding  every  thing  as  the 
proper  province  of  Logic  to  which  it  is  applicable* 

Many  however  who  do  not  fall  altogether  into  that  error, 
yet  censure  any  logical  treatise  which,  like  the  present,  pro- 
fesses to  be  wholly  conversant  about  Language  ; and  speak  of 
the  science  as  treating,  properly,  of  the  comparison  of  “ ab- 
stract Ideas,"  of  which,  Language,  they  say,  merely  supplies 
the  names.  It  may  be  sufficient  at  present  to  reply,  that 
supposing  there  really  exist  in  the  mind  — or  in  some  minds 

— certain  “ abstract  ideas,”  by  means  of  which  a train  of 
reasoning  may  be  carried  on  independently  of  Common-terms 
[or  Signs  of  any  kind,]  — for  this  is  the  real  point  at  issue 

— and  that  a system  of  Logic  may  be  devised,  having  refer- 
ence to  such  reasoning,  — supposing  this,  — still,  as  I profess 
not  to  know  any  thing  of  these  “ abstract  ideas,”  or  of  any 
*'•  Universals  ” except  Signs,  or  to  be  conscious  of  any  such 
reasoning-process,  I at  least  must  confine  myself  to  the  at- 
tempt to  teach  the  only  Logic  I do  pretend  to  understand. 
Many,  again,  who  speak  slightingly  of  Logic  altogether,  on 
the  ground  of  its  being  “ conversant  only  about  words  f enter- 
tain fundamentally  the  same  views  as  the  above;  that  is, 
they  take  for  granted  that  Reasoning  may  be  carried  on  alto- 
gether independently  of  Language;  which  they  regard  fas 


• A similar  error  is  complained  of  by  Aristotle,  as  having  taken 
place  with  respect  to  Rhetoric  ; of  which,  indeed,  we  find  specimen* 
in  the  arguments  of  several  of  the  interlocutors  in  Cic.  de  Oratore. 


INTRC  DU  Cl  ICXN . 


21 


M 

was  above  remarked)  merely  as  a means  of  communicating  it 
to  others.  And  a Science  or  Art  which  they  suppose  to  be 
confined  10  this  office,  they  accordingly  rank  very  low. 

Such  a view  I believe  to  be  very  prevalent.  The  majority 
of  men  would  probably  say,  if  asked,  that  the  use  of  Lam 
guage  is  peculiar  to  Man  ; and  that  its  office  is  to  express  to 
one  another  our  thoughts  and  feelings.  But  neither  of  jrese 
is  strictly  true.  Brutes  do  possess  in  some  degree  the  power 
of  being  taught  to  understand  what  is  said  to  them,  and  some 
of  them  even  to  utter  sounds  expressive  of  what  is  passing 
within  them.  But  they  all  seem  to  be  incapable  of  another 
very  important  use  of  language,  which  does  characterize 
Man  ; viz.  the  employment  of  “ Common-terms  ” (“  general- 
terms  ”)  formed  by  Abstraction,  as  instruments  of  thought ; 
by  which  alone  a train  of  Reasoning  may  be  carried  on. 

And  accordingly,  a Deaf-mute,  before  he  has  been  taught 
a Language,  — either  the  Finger-language,  or  Reading, — 
cannot  carry  on  a train  of  Reasoning,  any  more  than  a Brute. 
He  differs  indeed  from  a Brute  in  possessing  the  mental  capa- 
bility of  employing  Language  ; but  he  can  no  more  make  use 
of  that  capability,  till  he  is  in  possession  of  some  System  of 
arbitrary  general-signs , than  a person  born  blind  from  Cata- 
ract can  make  use  of  his  capacity  of  Seeing,  till  the  Cataract 
is  removed. 

Hence,  it  will  be  found  by  any  one  who  will  question  a 
Deaf-mute  who  has  been  taught  Language  after  having  grown 
up,  that  no  such  thing  as  a train  of  Reasoning  had  ever  passed 
through  his  mind  before  he  was  taught. 

If  indeed  we  did  reason  by  means  of  those  “ Abstract- 
<Ieas  ” which  some  persons  talk  of,  and  if  the  Language  we 
use  served  merely  to  communicate  with  other  men,  then,  a per- 
son would  be  able  to  reason,  who  nad  no  knowledge  of  ant 


22 


elements  of  logic. 


ii  ® 

arbitrary  Signs.  But  there  are  no  grounds  for  believing  that 
this  is  possible  ; nor  consequently,  that  “ Abstract-ideas  ” (in 
that  sense  of  the  word)  have  any  existence  at  all.* 

§ 6.  From  what  has  been  said,  it  will  be  evident  that  there 
is  hardly  any  subject  to  which  it  is  so  difficult  to  introduce 
the  student  in  a clear  and  satisfactory  manner,  as  the  one  we 
are  now  engaged  in.  In  any  other  branch  of  knowledge,  the 
reader,  if  he  have  any  previous  acquaintance  with  the  sub- 


* There  have  been  some  very  interesting  accounts  published,  by 
travellers  in  America,  and  by  persons  residing  there,  of  a girl  named 
Laura  Bridgman,  who  has  been,  from  birth,  not  only  Deaf-and-Dumb, 
but  also  Blind.  She  has  however  been  taught  the  finger-language, 
and  even  to  read  what  is  printed  in  raised  characters,  and  also  to 
write. 

The  remarkable  circumstance  in  reference  to  the  present  subject,  is, 
that  when  she  is  alone,  her  fingers  are  gene  'ally  observed  to  be  moving , 
though  the  signs  are  so  slight  and  imperfect  that  others  cannot  make 
out  what  she  is  thinking  of.  But  if  they  inquire  of  her,  she  will  tell 
them. 

It  seems  that,  having  once  learnt  the  use  of  Signs,  she  finds  the 
necessity  of  them  as  an  Instrument  of  thought,  when  thinking  of  any 
thing  beyond  mere  individual  objects  of  sense. 

And  doubtless  every  one  else  does  the  same ; though  in  our  case,  nt 
one  can  (as  in  the  case  of  Laura  Bridgman)  see  the  operation  ; noi 
in  general  can  it  be  heard ; though  some  few  persons  have  a habit  of 
occasionally  audibly  talking  to  themselves  ; or  as  it  is  called,  “ tl  ink- 
ing aloud.”  But  the  Signs  we  commonly  use  in  silent  reflection  are 
merely  mental  conceptions,  usually,  of  uttered  words  : and  these,  doubt- 
less, are  such  as  could  be  hardly  at  all  understood  by  another,  even 
f uttered  audibly.  For  we  usually  think  in  a kind  of  short-hand,  (if 
jne  may  use  the  expression)  like  the  notes  one  sometimes  takes  down 
on  paper  to  help  the  memory,  which  consist  of  a word  or  two,  — or 
even  a letter,  — to  suggest  a whole  sentence ; so  that  such  notes  would 
be  unintelligible  to  any  one  else. 

It  has  been  observed  also  that  this  girl,  when  asleep,  and  dcubtlosi 
dreaming,  has  her  fingers  frequently  in  motion  ; being  in  fact  talking 
m her  sleep.  See  ab®ve,  § 4 


INTItODU  CTION. 


2H 


ject,  will  usually  be  so  far  the  better  prepared  for  compre- 
hending the  exposition  of  the  principles  ; or  if  he  be  entirely 
a stranger  to  it,  will  at  least  come  to  the  study  with  a mind 
unbiased,  and  free  from  prejudices  and  misconceptions 
whereas,  in  the  present  case,  it  cannot  but  happen,  that  many 
who  have  given  some  attention  to  logical  pursuits  (or  what 
are  usually  considered  as  such)  will  have  rather  been  bewil- 
dered by  fundamentally  erroneous  views,  than  prepared,  by 
the  acquistion  of  just  principles,  for  ulterior  progress  ; and 
that  not  a few  who  pretend  not  to  any  acquaintance  whatever 
with  the  science,  will  yet  have  imbibed  either  such  prejudices 
igainst  it,  or  such  false  notions  respecting  its  nature,  as  can 
tot  but  prove  obstacles  in  their  study  of  it. 

There  is,  however,  a difficulty  which  exists 
iTOre  or  less  in  all  abstract  pursuits  ; though  it 
is  perhaps  more  felt  in  this,  and  often  occasions 
it  to  be  rejected  by  beginners  as  dry  and  te- 
dious ; viz.  the  difficulty  of  perceiving  to  what 
untimate  end  — to  what  practical  or  interesting  application 
— the  abstract  principles  lead,  which  are  first  laid  before  the 
student ; so  that  he  will  often  have  to  work  his  way  patiently 
through  the  most  laborious  part  of  the  system,  before  he  can 
gain  any  clear  idea  of  the  drift  and  intention  of  it. 

This  complain!  has  often  been  made  by  chemical  students  ; 
who  are  wearied  with  descriptions  of  Oxygen,  Hydrogen,  and 
other  invisible  Elements,  before  they  have  any  knowledge 
respecting  such  bodies  as  commonly  present  Jiemselves  to 
the  senses.  And  accordingly  some  teachers  of  chemistry 
obviate  in  a great  degree  this  objection,  by  adopting  tha 
analytical  instead  of  the  synthetical  mode  of  Analytical 
procedure,  when  they  are  first  introducing  the  $ synthetical 
subject  to  beginners  i.  e.  instead  of  syntheti-  procedure. 


Difficulty 

attending 

abstract 

pursuits. 


84 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[»« 

cally  enumerating  the  elementary  substances, — proceed* 
L**g  next  to  the  simplest  combinations  of  these,  — and 
concluding  with  those  more  complex  substances  which  are 
of  the  most  common  occurrence,  they  begin  by  analyzing 
these  last,  and  resolving  them  step  by  step  into  their  simple 
elements;  thus  at  once  presenting  the  subject  in  an  interesting 
point  of  view,  and  clearly  setting  forth  the  object  of  it.  The 
synthetical  form  of  teaching  is  indeed  sufficiently  interesting 
to  one  who  has  made  considerable  progress  in  any  study  ; and 
being  more  concise,  regular,  and  systematic,  is  the  form  in 
which  our  knowledge  naturally  arranges  itself  in  the  mind, 
and  is  retained  by  the  memory  : but  the  analytical  is  the  more 
interesting,  easy,  and  natural  kind  of  introduction ; as  being 
the  form  in  which  the  first  invention  or  discovery  of  any  kind 
of  system  must  originally  have  taken  place. 

It  may  be  advisable,  therefore,  to  begin  by  giving  a slight 
sketch,  in  this  form,  of  the  logical  system,  before  we  enter 
regularly  upon  the  details  of  it.  The  reader  will  thus  be  pre* 
sented  with  a kind  of  imaginary  history  of  the  course  of  in* 
quiry  by  which  that  system  may  be  conceived  to  hav« 
occurred  to  a philosophical  mind. 


BOOK  I. 


ANAimCAL  OUTLINE  OF  THE  SCIENCE. 

§ 1. 

In  every  instance  in  which  we  reason , in  the  strict  sense 
tjf  the  word,  i.  e.  make  use  of  arguments,  (I  mean  real , i.  e. 
valid  arguments)  whether  for  the  sake  of  refuting  an  adver- 
sary, or  of  conveying  instruction,  or  of  satisfying  our  own 
minds  on  any  point,  whatever  may  be  the  subject  we  are 
engaged  on,  a certain  process  takes  place  in  the  mind  which 
is  one  and  the  same  in  all  cases,  provided  it  be  correctly 
conducted. 

Of  course  it  c<ninot  be  supposed  that  every  one  is  even  con- 
scious of  this  process  in  his  own  mind  ; much  less,  is  compe- 
tent to  explain  the  principles  on  which  it  proceeds.  This  in- 
deed is,  and  cannot  but  be,  the  case  with  every  other  process 
respecting  which  any  system  has  been  formed  ; the  practice 
not  only  may  exist  independently  of  the  theory,  but  must  have 
preceded  the  theory.  There  must  have  been  Language  be- 
fore a system  of  Grammar  could  be  devised  ; and  musical 
compositions,  previous  to  the  Science  of  Music.  This,  by  the 
way,  will  serve  to  expose  the  futility  of  the  popular  objection 
against  Logic,  that  men  may  reason  very  well  who  know 
notning  of  it.  The  parallel  instances  adduced,  show  that 
such  an  objection  might  be  applied  in  many  other  cases,  where 
3 


26 


ELEMENT.  S OF  LOGIC. 


1‘Book  I. 


its  absurdity  would  be  obvious;  and  that  there  is  no  ground 
for  deciding  thence,  either  that  the  system  has  no  tendency  to 
improve  practice,  or  that  even  if  it  had  not,  it  might  not  stil 
be  a dignified  and  interesting  pursuit. 

One  of  the  chief  impediments  to  the  attain 
Reasoning  ment  Gf  a just  vicw  of  the  nature  and  object 

in  all  subjects.  of  LoS'c’  Is  the  not  fully  understanding,  or  not 
sufficiently  keeping  in  mind,  the  sameness  of 
the  reasoning-process  in  all  cases.  If,  as  the  ordinary  mode 
of  speaking  would  seem  to  indicate,  Mathematical  reasoning, 
and  Theological,  and  Metaphysical,  and  Political,  &c.,  were 
essentially  different  from  each  other,  i.  e.  different  kinds  of 
reasoning , it  would  follow,  that  supposing  there  could  be  at  all 
any  such  science  as  we  have  described  Logic,  there  must  be 
so  many  different  species,  or  at  least  different  branches,  of 
Logic.  And  such  is  perhaps  the  most  prevailing  notion.  Not 
is  this  much  to  be  wondered  at : since  it  is  evident  to  all,  that 
some  men  converse  and  write,  in  an  argumentative  way,  very 
justly  on  one  subject,  and  very  erroneously  on  another ; in 
which  again  others  excel,  who  fail  in  the  former.  This  error 
may  be  at  once  illustrated  and  removed,  by  considering  the 
parallel  instance  of  Arithmetic;  in  which  every  one  is  aware 
that  the  process  of  a calculation  is  not  affected  by  the  naturo 
of  the  objects,  whose  numbers  are  before  us : but  that  ( e . g.) 
the  multiplication  of  a number  is  the  very  same  operation 
whether  it  be  a number  of  'men,  of  miles,  or  of  pounds 
though  nevertheless  persons  may  perhaps  be  found  who  are 
accurate  in  the  results  of  their  calculations  relative  to  natural 
philosophy,  and  incorrect  in  those  of  political-economy,  from 
meir  different  degrees  of  skill  in  the  subjects  of  these  twe 
sciences  ; not  surely  because  there  are  different  arts  of  Arith 
metic  applicable  to  each  of  these  respectively 


•2.] 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE. 


2* 


Others  again,  who  are  aware  that  the  simple  system  of 
Logic  may  be  applied  to  all  subjects  whatever,  aie  yet  dis- 
posed to  view  it  as  a peculiar  method  of  reasoning,  and  not, 
as  it  is,  a method  of  unfolding  and  analyzing  our  reasoning: 
whence  many  have  been  led  (e.  g.  the  author  of  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Rhetoric)  to  talk  of  comparing  Syllogistic-reasoning 
with  Moral-reasoning ; taking  it  for  granted  that  it  is  possible 
to  reason  correctly  without  reasoning  logically  ; which  is,  in 
fact  as  great  a blunder  as  if  any  one  were  to  mistake  gram- 
mar for  a peculiar  language , and  to  suppose  it  possible  to 
speak  correctly  without  speaking  grammatically.  They  have 
in  short  considered  Logic  as  an  art  of  reasoning;  whereas  (so 
far  as  it  is  an  art)  it  is  the  art  of  reasoning  ; the  logician’s 
object  being,  not  to  lay  down  principles  by  which  one  may 
reason,  but,  by  which  all  must  reason,  even  though  they  are 
not  distinctly  aware  of  them  : — to  lay  down  rules,  not  which 
may  be  followed  with  advantage,  but  which  cannot  possibly  be 
departed  from  in  sound  reasoning.  These  misapprehensions 
and  objections  being  such  as  lie  on  the  very  threshold  of  the 
subject,  it  would  have  been  hardly  possible,  without  noticing 
them,  to  convey  any  just  notion  of  the  nature  and  design  of 
the  logical  system. 

§ 2. 

Supposing  it  then  to  have  been  perceived  that 
the  operation  of  Reasoning  is  in  all  cases  the 
same,  the  analysis  of  that  operation  could  not 
fail  to  strike  the  mind  as  an  interesting  matter  of  inquiry. 
And  moreover,  since  (apparent)  arguments  which  are  unsound 
and  inconclusive,  are  so  often  employed,  either  from  ertor  01 
design  ; and  since  even  those  who  are  not  misled  by  these 


Origin  t>J 
Logic 


28 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 


[Book.  1 


fallacies,  are  so  often  at  a loss  to  detect  and  expose  them  in  a 
manner  satisfactory  to  others,  or  even  to  themselves , it  could 
not  but  appear  desirable  to  lay  down  some  general  rules  of 
reasoning  applicable  to  all  cases  ; by  which  a person  might 
Ve  enabled  the  more  readily  and  clearly  to  state  the  grounds 
of  his  own  conviction,  or  of  his  objection  to  the  arguments  of 
an  opponent ; instead  of  arguing  at  random,  without  any  fixed 
and  acknowledged  principles  to  guide  his  procedure.  Such 
rules  would  be  analogous  to  those  of  Arithmetic,  which  ob- 
viate the  tediousness  and  uncertainty  of  calculations  in  the 
head ; wherein,  after  much  labor,  different  persons  might 
arrive  at  different  results,  without  any  of  them  being  able  dis- 
tinctly to  point  out  the  error  of  the  rest.  A system  of  such 
rules,  it  is  obvious,  must,  instead  of  deserving  to  be  called 
the  “ art  of  wrangling,”  be  more  justly  characterized  as  the 
“ art  of  cutting  short  wrangling,”  by  bringing  the  parties  to 
issue  at  once,  if  not  to  agreement;  and  thus  saving  a waste 
of  ingenuity. 

In  pursuing  the  supposed  investigation,  it  will 

Analysis  of  ^ found  that  every  Conclusion  is  deduced,  in 
argument. 

reality,  from  two  other  propositions ; (thence 
called  Premisses  ;)  for  though  one  of  these  may  be,  and  com 
monly  is,  suppressed,  it  must  nevertheless  be  understood  as 
admitted  ; as  may  easily  be  made  evident  by  supposing  the 
denial  of  the  suppressed  premiss;  which  will  at  once  invali 
date  the  argument ; e.  g.  if  any  one,  from  perceiving  tha. 
“ the  world  exhibits  marks  of  design,”  infers  that  “ it  must 
have  had  an  intelligent  author,”  though  he  may  not  be  aware 
his  cwn  mind  of  the  existence  of  any  other  premiss,  he  wiL 
readily  understand,  if  it  be  denied  that  “ whatever  exhibits 
marks  of  design  must  have  had  an  intelligent  author,”  tha 
die  affirmative  of  that  proposition  is  necessary  to  the  validity 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE 


2d 


2] 


ef  the  argument.*  Or  again,  if'  any  one  on  meeting  with 
• an  animal  which  has  horns  on  t.ie  head  ” infers  that  “ it  is  a 
ruminant,”  he  will  easily  perceive  that  this  would  be  no  argy 
ment  to  any  one  who  should  not  be  aware  of  the  general  fact 
that  “ all  horned  animals  ruminate.” 

An  argument  thus  stated  regularly  and  at  full  ^ ^ . 
.ength,  is  called  a Syllogism  ; which  therefore 
is  evidently  not  a peculiar  kind  of  argument , but  only  a peculiar 
form  of  expression,  in  which  every  argument  may  be  stated.f 
When  one  of  the  premisses  is  suppressed,  (which  for  brev- 
ity’s sake  it  usually  is)  the  argument  is  called  an  Enthymeme. 
And  it  may  be  worth  while  to  remark,  that  when  the  argu  ■ 


* Some  choose  to  call  this  proposition  not  a premiss  but  merely  a 
condition.  This  however  is,  substantially,  (as  has  been  formerly  re- 
marked) just  what  Logicians  mean.  Whoever  has  any  good  ground 
for  believing  his  inference  to  be  a just  one,  must  believe  this  condition 
to  exist. 

t Some  writers,  and  Locke  among  others,  who  profess  to  despise 
what  they  call  “ syllogistic  reasoning,”  distinctly  admit  — as  Locke 
does  e.  g.  in  ch.  xvii.  that  “ all  right  reasoning  may  be  reduced  to  the 
form  of  Syllogism ; ” (which  is  admitting  the  utmost  that  I conceive 
any  Logician  maintains)  only,  there  are,  he  says,  other  and  better 
“ ways  of  reasoning  that  is,  as  he  proceeds  to  explain,  people  do  not 
always,  or  usually,  express  their  reasoning  in  a syllogistic  form ; as  if 
any  one  had  ever  doubted  that ! Except  indeed  it  be  a writer  in  the 
Edinburgh  Review,  (in  1839)  who  in  deprecating  and  deriding  all 
attempts  to  adduce  evidences  of  the  truth  of  Christianity,  as  useless, 
and  even  dangerous,  for  the  mass  of  mankind,  (a  discovery,  by  the 
way,  which  its  first  promulgators  were  not  enlightened  enough  to 
make)  gives  as  a reason,  that  “the  Gospel  has  been  the  stay  of 
I ountless  millions  who  never  framed  a syllogism.”  And  very  prob 
able  it  is,  that  Nicodemus  for  instance,  and  those  who  deputed  him, 
when  he  said,  “ we  know  that  thou  art  a teacher  sent  from  God  ; for 
no  man  can  do  these  miracles  that  thou  doest  except  God  be  with 
him,”  though  he  spoke  grammatically  and  reasoned  conclusively 
may  have  never  heard  of  syllogisms,  or  even  of  nouns  and  verba. 

3 * 


ao 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  I 


ment  is  in  this  state,  the  objections  of  an  opponent  are  (oj 
father  appear  to  be)  of  two  kinds;  viz.  either  objections  to 
th.j ' jsertion  itself,  or  objections  to  its  force  as  an  argument. 
E.  G.  In  one  of  the  above  instances,  an  atheist  may  be  corn 
ceived  either  denying  * that  the  world  does  exhibit  marks  of 
design,  or  denying  t that  it  follows  from  thence  that  it  had  an 
intelligent  author.  Now  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that 
the  only  difference  in  the  two  cases  is,  that  in  the  one,  the 
expressed  premiss  is  denied,  in  the  other  the  suppressed ; for 
the  force  as  an  argument  of  either  premiss  depends  on  the 
other  premiss:  if  both  be  admitted,  the  conclusion  legiti- 
mately connected  with  them  cannot  be  denied. 

It  is  evidently  immaterial  to  the  argument 

Reason . 

whether  the  Conclusion  be  placed  first  or  last; 
but  it  may  be  proper  to  remark,  that  a Premiss  placed  after 
ls  Conclusion  is  called  the  Reason  f of  it,  and  is  introduced 
by  one  of  those  conjunctions  which  are  called  causal ; viz. 
“ since,”  “ because,”  fyc.  which  may  indeed  be  employed  to 
designate  a Premiss,  whether  it  came  first  or  last.  The  illa- 
tive conjunctions,  “ therefore,”  fyc.  designate  the  Conclusion. 

It  is  a circumstance  which  often  occasions 
Proof  and  error  and  perplexity,  that  both  these  classes 
Cause.  0f  conjunctions  have  also  another  signification, 
being  employed  to  denote,  respectively,  Cause  and  Eject , 
as  well  as  Premiss  and  Conclusion  : e.  g.  If  I say,  “ this 
ground  is  rich,  because  the  trees  on  it  are  flourishing,”  or 
“ the  trees  are  flourishing,  and  therefore  the  soil  must  be 
rich,’  I employ  these  conjunctions  to  denote  the  connection 


* As  the  ancient  atheists  did.  t As  the  modem  atheists  do, 

+ 'Jfhe  Major-premiss  is  often  called  the  Principle  ; and  the  word 
Reason  is  then  confined  to  the  Minor 


3.1 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE 


3 1 


iif  Premiss  and  Conclusion ; for  it  is  plain  that  the  luxuriance 
of  the  trees  is  not  the  cause  of  the  soil’s  fertility,  but  only 
the  cause  of  my  knowing  it.  If  again  I say,  “ the  trees  flour* 
jsh,  because  the  ground  is  rich,”  or  “the  ground  is  rich,  and 
therefore  the  trees  flourish,”  I am  using  the  very  same  con- 
junctions to  denote  the  connection  of  cause  and  effect ; for  in 
this  case,  the  luxuriance  of  the  trees,  being  evident  to  the 
eye,  would  hardly  need  to  be  proved , but  might  need  to  be 
accounted  for. 

There  are,  however,  many  cases,  in  which  the  Cause  is 
employed  to  prove  the  existence  of  its  Effect;  especially  in 
arguments  relating  to  future  events ; as  e.  g.  when  from 
favorable  weather  any  one  argues  that  the  crops  are  likely  to 
be  abundant:*  the  cause , and  the  reason , in  that  case,  coin- 
cide. And  this  contributes  to  their  being  so  often  confounded 
together  in  other  cases. 

§3. 

In  an  argument,  such  as  the  examples  above  given,  it  is,  as 
has  been  said,  impossible  for  any  one,  who  admits  both  Prem- 
isses, to  avoid  admitting  the  Conclusion. 

A man  may  perhaps  deny,  or  doubt,  and  require  proof, 
that  all  animals  that  are  horned  do  ruminate.  Nay,  it  is 
conceivable  that  he  may  even  not  clearly  understand  what 
“ ruminant  ” means  ; but  still  it  will  be  not  the  less  clear  to 
him,  that,  supposing  these  Premisses  granted,  the  Conclusion 
must  be  admitted. 

And  even  if  you  suppose  a case  where  one  or  both  of  the 
Premisses  shall  be  manifestly  false  and  absurd,  this  will  not 


* See  Appendix  No.  I.  art.  Reason.  Sse  also  Rhetoric,  Part 
L cK  2,  § iL 


32  ELEMENTS  01’  LOGIC.  |11ock  1 

alter  tlie  conchisiveness  of  the  Reasoning  ; though  the  conclu- 
sion itself  may  perhaps  be  absurd  also.  For  instance,  “ All 
the  Ape-tribe  are  originally  descended  from  Reptiles  oi 
Insects  ; Mankind  are  of  the  Ape-tribe  : therefore  Mankind 
are  originally  descended  from  Reptiles  or  Insects  : ” here, 
every  one  * would  perceive  the  falsity  of  all  three  of  these 
propositions.  But  it  is  not  the  less  true  that  the  conclusion 
follows  from  those  premises,  and  that  if  they  were  true,  it 
would  be  true  also. 

But  there  will  be  frequently  an  apparent 
Apparent  connection  of  Premisses  with  a Conclusion 

arguments.  which  does  not  in  reality  follow  from  them, 

though  to  the  inattentive  or  unskilful,  the  argument  may  appear 
to  be  valid.  And  there  are  many  other  cases  in  which 
a doubt  may  exist,  whether  the  argument  be  valid  or  not : 
i.  e.  whether  it  be  possible  or  not  to  admit  the  Premisses,  and 
yet  deny  the  Conclusion.  It  is  of  the  highest  importance, 
therefore,  to  lay  down  some  regular  form  to  which  every 
valid  argument  may  be  reduced,  and  to  devise  a rule  which 
shall  show  ihe  validity  of  every  argument  in  that  form,  and 
consequently  the  unsoundness  of  any  apparent  argument 
which  cannot  be  reduced  to  it.  E.  G.  If  such  an  argument 
as  this  be  proposed,  “ every  rational  agent  is  accountable  , 
brutes  are  not  rational  agents  ; therefore  they  are  not  account- 
able : ” or  again,  “ all  wise  legislators  suit  their  laws  to  the 
genius  of  their  nation  ; Solon  did  this : therefore  he  was  a 
wise  legislator : ” there  are  some,  perhaps,  who  would  not 
perceive  any  fallacy  in  such  arguments,  especially  if  envel- 
>ped  in  a cloud  of  words ; and  still  more,  when  the  conclu 
eion  is  true,  or  (which  comes  to  the  same  pcint)  if  they  ara 


Except  certain  French  Naturalists. 


f »1 


ANALYTICAL  OUT  LINK. 


3fc 

disposed  to  believe  it : and  others  might  perceive  indeed,  bt. 
might  be  at  a loss  to  explain,  the  fallacy.  Now  these  (appa- 
rent) arguments  exactly  correspond,  respectively,  with  the 
following,  the  absurdity  of  the  conclusions  from  which  is 
manifest  : “ every  horse  is  an  animal ; sheep  are  not  horses  ; 
therefore  they  are  not  animals  ; ” and  “ all  vegetables  grow  ; 
an  animal  grows  ; therefore  it  is  a vegetable.”  Thesa  last 
examples,  I have  said,  correspond  exactly  (considered  as  ar- 
guments) with  the  former  ; the  question  respecting  the  valid- 
ity of  an  Argument,  being,  not  whether  the  conclusion  be 
true,  but  whether  it  follows  from  the  premisses  adduced. 

This  mode  of  exposing  a fallacy,  by  bringing  forward  a 
similar  one  whose  conclusion  is  obviously  absurd,  is  often, 
and  very  advantageously,  resorted  to  in  addressing  those  who 
are  ignorant  of  Logical  rules ; * but  to  lay  down  such  rules, 
and  employ  them  as  a test,  is  evidently  a safer  and  more  com- 
pendious, as  well  as  a more  philosophical  mode  of  proceeding. 
To  attain  these,  it  would  plainly  be  necessary  to  analyze 
some  clear  and  valid  arguments,  and  to  observe  in  what  their 
conclusiveness  consists. 

Let  us  then  examine  and  analyze  such  an  Analysis  of 
example  as  one  of  those  first  given : for  in-  an  argument. 


* An  exposure  of  some  of  Hume’s  fallacies  in  his  “ Essay  on  Mir- 
acles ” and  elsewhere,  was  attempted,  on  this  plan,  a few  years  ago, 
in  a pamphlet  (published  anonymously,  as  the  nature  of  the  argu- 
ment required,  but  which  I see  no  reason  against  acknowledging) 
entitled  Historic  Doubts  relative  to  Napoleon  Buonaparte  ; ” in  which 
it  was  shown  that  the  existence  of  that  extraordinary  person  could 
not,  on  Hume’s  principles,  be  received  as  a well-authenticated  fact ; 
Binee  it  rests  on  evidence  less  strong  than  that  which  supports  tha 
Scripture-histories. 

For  a clear  development  of  the  mode  in  which  this  last  evidence 
eperates  on  most  minds,  see  “ Hinds  on  Inspiration,”  p.  30-  -46. 


J4 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  V 


stance.  “Every  animal  that  has  horns  on  the  ht/id  is  rumP 
nant ; the  Elk  has  horns  on  the  head  ; therefore  the  Elk  ia 
ruminant.”  It  will  easily  be  seen  that  the  validity  [or  " con- 
clusiveness; ” or  “soundness”]  of  the  Argument  does  not  at 
all  depend  on  our  conviction  of  the  truth  of  either  of  the  Prem- 
isses or  even  on  our  understanding  the  meaning  of  them. 
For  if  we  substitute  for  one  of  the  things  we  are  speaking 
about,  some  unmeaning  Symbol,  (such  as  a letter  of  the  alpha- 
bet,) which  may  stand  for  any  thing  that  may  be  s-greed  on, 
the  Reasoning  remains  the  same. 

For  instance,  suppose  we  say,  (instead  of  “ animal  that 
has  horns  on  the  head,”  ) “ Every  X is  ruminant ; the  Elk  is 
X ; therefore  the  Elk  is  ruminant ; ” the  Argument  is  equally 
valid. 

And  again,  instead  of  the  word  “ ruminant,”  let  us  put  the 
letter  “ Y :”  then  the  argument  “ Every  X is  Y ; the  Elk 
is  X ; therefore  the  Elk  is  Y ; ” would  be  a valid  argument  as 
before. 

And  the  same  would  be  the  case  if  you  were  to  put  “Z” 
for  “ the  Elk  : ” for  the  syllogism  “ Every  X is  Y ; Z is  X ; 
therefore  Z s Y,”  is  completely  valid,  whatever  you  suppose 
the  Symbol;'  X,  Y,  and  Z to  stand  for. 

Any  one  may  try  the  experiment,  by  substituting  for  X,  Y, 
nnd  Z,  respec 'ively,  any  words  he  pleases;  and  he  will  find 
that,  if  he  doe*  but  preserve  the  same  form  of  expression,  it 
will  be  impossible  to  admit  the  truth  of  the  Premisses,  without 
admitting  also  the  truth  of  the  Conclusion. 

And  it  is  worth  observing  here,  that  rothing 
An  Argument  ;s  so  likely  to  lead  to  that  — very  common, 
^ough  seemingly  strange  — error,  of  supposing 
Terms  are  not  ourselves  to  understand  distinctly  what  in  real 
ity  we  understand  but  very  imperfectly,  ot 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE.. 


t 3-i 


36 


Dot  at  all,  as  the  want  of  attention  to  what  has  beer,  jtisl 
explained. 

A man  reads  — or  even  writes  — many  pages,  perhaps,  of 
an  argumentative  work,  in  which  one  or  more  of  the  terms 
employed  convey  nothing  distinct  to  his  mind : and  yet  he  is 
liable  to  overlook  this  circumstance,  from  finding  that  he 
clearly  understands  the  Arguments.  He  may  be  said,  in  one 
sense,  to  understand  what  he  is  reading ; because  he  can  per- 
fectly follow  the  train  of  Reasoning , itself.  But  this , per- 
haps, he  might  equally  well  do,  if  he  were  to  substitute  for 
one  of  the  words  employed,  X,  or  Z,  or  any  other  such  un- 
known Symbol ; as  in  the  examples  above.  But  a man  will 
often  confound  together  the  understanding  of  the  Arguments 
in  themselves,  and  the  understanding  of  the  words  employed 
and  of  the  nature  of  the  things  those  words  denote. 

It  appears  then,  that  valid  Reasoning,  when  regularly  ex 
pressed,  has  its  validity  [or  conclusiveness]  made  evident  from 
the  mere  form  of  the  expression  itself,  independently  of  any 
regard  to  the  sense  of  the  words. 

In  examining  this  form,  in  such  an  example  as  that  jusi 
given,  you  will  observe  that  in  the  first  Premiss  ( “ X is  Y,”  ) 
it  is  assumed  universally  of  the  Class  of  things  (whatever  it 
may  be)  which  “ X ” denotes,  that  “ Y”  may  be  affirmed  of 
them  ; and  in  the  other  Premiss,  ( “ Z is  X ” ) that  “ Z ’ 
(whatever  it  may  stand  for)  is  referred  to  that  Class,  as  com- 
prehended in  it.  Now  it  is  evident  that  whatever  is  said  of 
the  whole  of  a Class,  may  be  said  of  any  thing  that  is  com- 
prehended [or  “included,”  or  “contained,”]  in  that  Class: 
10  that  we  are  thus  authorized  to  say  (in  the  conclusion)  that 
‘ Z ” is  “ Y.” 

Thus  also,  in  the  example  first  given,  having  assumed  uti- 
versally,  of  the  Class  of  “ Things  which  exhibit  marks  0/ 


36 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  i 


design,”  that  they  “ had  an  intelligent  maker,”  and  then,  in 
the  other  Premiss,  having  referred  “ The  world  ’ to  that 
Class,  we  conclude  that  it  may  be  asserted  of  “ The  world  ” 
that  “ it  had  an  intelligent  maker.” 

And  the  process  is  the  same  when  any  thing  is  denied  of  a 
whole  Class.  We  are  equally  authorized  to  deny  the  same, 
of  whatever  is  comprehended  under  that  Class.  For  instance, 
if  I say,  “ No  liar  is  deserving  of  trust ; this  man  is  a liar  , 
therefore  he  is  not  deserving  of  trust ; ” I here  deny  “ deserv 
ing  of  trust,”  of  the  whole  Class  denoted  by  the  word  “ liar ; ” 
and  then  I refer  “ this  man  ” to  that  Class  ; whence  it  follows 
that  “ deserving  of  trust  ” may  be  denied  of  him. 

This  argument  also  will  be  as  manifestly  valid,  if  (as  in  the 
former  case)  you  substitute  for  the  words  which  have  a known 
meaning,  any  undetermined  Symbols,  such  as  letters  of  the 
alphabet.  “ No  X is  Y ; Z is  X ; therefore  Z is  not  Y,”  is  as 
perfect  a syllogism  as  the  other  with  the  affirmative  con- 
clusion. 

And  here  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  by  “ Class  ” 

Meaning  of  jg  meant  throughout  this  treatise,  not  merely  a 
the  xoord  Class . . . 

“ Head  ” or  u general  description  to  which 

several  things  are  actually  referred,  but  one  to  which  an  indefi- 
nite number  of  things  might  conceivably  be  referred  ; viz.  as 
many  as  (in  the  colloquial  phrase)  may  “ answer  to  the  de- 
scription." E.  G.  One  may  conceive  that  when  the  first- 
created  man  existed  alone,  some  superhuman  Beings  may 
have  contemplated  him  not  merely  as  an  individual  bearing  the 
■proper-name  of  Adam  but  also,  by  Abstraction,  simply,  as 
possessing  those  attributes  wnich  we  call  collectively  “ hu- 
manity” [“human-nature;”]  ana  may  have  applied  to  him 
a name,  — such  as  “ Man,”  — implying  those  attributes,  [tha. 
description]  and  which  would  consequently  ejit  equally  we 
anv  of  h>s  descendants. 


S.j  ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE.  37 

When  then  any  thing  is  said  to  be  “ referred  to  such  and 
such  a Class,"  this  is  to  be  understood  either  of  an  actual,  or 
what  may  be  called  a potential  Class : i.  e.  the  word  Class  is 
used  whethei  there  actually  exist,  or  not,  several  things  to 
which  the  description  will  apply.  For  it  is  evident,  that  in 
any  case,  we  refer  something  to  a certain  Class  in  consequenct 
of  that  thing’s  possessing  certain  attributes,  and  not,  rice  versa. 
And  this  being  kept  in  mind,  there  is  a convenience  in  em- 
ploying the  word  “ Class,”  instead  of  introducing  circumlocu- 
tion by  always  speaking  of  “ description.” 

It  will  be  found,  then,  on  examination,  that  all  valid  argu- 
ments whatever  may  be  easily  reduced  to  such  a form  as  that 
of  the  foregoing  syllogisms : and  that  consequently  the  prin- 
ciple on  which  they  are  constructed  is  the  UNIVERSAL 
PRINCIPLE  of  Reasoning.  So  elliptical,  indeed,  is  the  ordi- 
nary mode  of  expression,  even  of  those  who  are  considered 
as  prolix  writers,  — i.  e.  so  much  is  implied  and  left  to  be 
understood  in  the  course  of  argument,  in  comparison  of  what 
is  actually  stated,  (most  men  being  impatient,  even  to  excess, 
of  any  appearance  of  unnecessary  and  tedious  formality  of 
statement,)  that  a single  sentence  will  often  be  found,  thougl 
perhaps  considered  as  a single  argument,  to  contain,  com- 
pressed into  a short  compass,  a chain  of  several  distinct  argu- 
ments. But  if  each  of  these  be  fully  developed,  and  the 
whole  of  what  the  author  intended  to  imply  be  stated  ex- 
pressly, it  will  be  found  that  all  the  steps  even  of  the  longest 
and  most  complex  train  of  reasoning,  may  be  reduced  ic  o the 
above  form.* 


* One  of  ths  ancients  is  reported  to  have  con;  pared  Logic  to  tha 
closed  fist,  and  Rhetoric  to  the  open  hand.  To  me  it  appears  thattha 
"averse  of  this  comparison  would  be  more  correct. 

4 


ELEMENTS  OE  LOGIC.  [Book  l 

It  is  a mistake  (which  migBt  appear  scarcely 
worthy  of  notice,  had  not  so  many,  even  es- 
teemed writers,  fallen  into  it)  to  imagine  that 
Aristotle  and  other  logicians  meant  to  propose 
that  this  prolix  form  of  unfolding  arguments  should  universally 
supersede,  in  argumentative  discourses,  the  common  forms  of 
expression  ; and  that,  “ to  reason  logically,”  means,  to  state 
all  arguments  at  full  length  in  the  syllogistic  form  ; and  Aris- 
totle has  even  been  charged  with  inconsistency  for  not  doing 
so.  It  has  been  said  that  “ in  his  Treatises  of  Ethics,  Poli- 
tics, <j*e.,he  argues  like  a rational  creature,  and  never  attempts 
to  bring  his  own  system  into  practice.”  * As  well  might  a 
chemist  be  charged  with  inconsistency  for  making  use  of  any 
of  the  compound  substances  that  are  commonly  employed, 
without  previously  analyzing  and  resolving  them  into  their 
simple  elements  ; as  well  might  it  be  imagined  that,  “ to  speak 
grammatically,”  means,  to  parse  every  sentence  we  utter. 
The  chemist  (to  pursue  the  illustration)  keeps  by  him  his  tests 
and  his  method  of  analysis,  to  be  employed  when  any  sub- 
stance is  offered  to  his  notice,  the  composition  of  which  has 
not  been  ascertained,  or  in  which  adulteration  is  suspected. 
Now  a fallacy  may  aptly  be  compared  to  some  adulterate*! 
compound  ; “ it  consists  of  an  ingenious  mixture  of  truth  and 
falsehood,  so  entangled,  — so  intimately  blended,  — “that  the 
falsehood  is  (in  the  chemical  phrase)  held  in  solution : one 
drop  of  sound  logic  is  that  test  which  immediately  disunites 
them,  maKes  the  Foreign  substance  visible,  and  precipitates  it 
to  the  bottom.”  t 


• Lord  Komes. 

t This  excellent  illustration  is  cited  from  a passage  in  an  anony- 
mous pamphlet,  “An  Examination  of  Kett’s  Logic.”  The  authoi 
displays,  though  in  a hasty  production,  grjat  reach  of  thought,  as  well 
as  knowledge  of  his  subject. 


38 

Meaning  of 
“ logical  rca- 
tonmg.” 


ANALYTICAL  OUT  LINK 


39 


«.» 

§ 4. 

But  to  rest  me  the  investigation  of  the  princi- 
ples of  Reasoning  : the  Maxim  resulting  from  Aristotle  j 
the  examination  of  a syllogism  in  the  foregoing 
form,  and  of  the  application  of  which,  every  valid  argumen 
is  in  reality  an  instance,  is,  “ that  whatever  is  predicated  ( i . e. 
affirmed  or  denied)  universally,  of  any  Class  of  things,  may 
be  predicated,  in  like  manner,  (viz.  affirmed  or  denied)  of  any 
thing  comprehended  in  that  Class.”  This  is  the  principle, 
commonly  called  the  dictum  de  omni  et  nullo , for  the  indica- 
tion of  which  we  are  indebted  to  Aristotle,  and  which  is  the 
ieystone  of  his  whole  logical  system. 

It  is  remarkable  that  some,  otherwise  judicious  writers, 
should  have  been  so  carried  away  by  their  zeal  against  that 
philosopher,  as  to  speak  with  scorn  and  ridicule  of  this  prin- 
ciple, on  account  of  its  obviousness  and  simplicity ; though 
they  would  probably  perceive  at  once,  in  any  other  case,  that 
it  is  the  greatest  triumph  of  philosophy  to  refer  many,  and 
seemingly  very  various,  phenomena  to  one,  or  a very  few, 
simple  principles  ; and  that  the  more  simple  and  evident  such 
a principle  is,  provided  it  be  truly  applicable  to  all  the  cases 
in  question,  the  greater  is  its  value  and  scientific  beauty.  If, 
indeed,  any  principle  be  regarded  as  not  thus  applicable,  that 
is  an  objection  to  it  of  a different  kind.  Such  an  objection 
against  Aristotle’s  Dictum,  no  one  has  ever  attempted  to  estab - 
’ ish  by  any  kind  of  proof ; but  it  has  often  been  taken  for 
granted ; it  being  (as  has  been  stated)  very  commonly  sup- 
posed, without  examination,  that  the  syllogism  is  a distinct 
kind  of  argument , and  that  the  rules  of  it  accordingly  do  not 
apply,  nor  were  intended  to  apply,  to  all  reasoning  whatever 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC, 


[Boos.  1 


40 

Dr.  Campbell  * endeavors,  under  this  misapprehension,  with 
some  ingenuity,  and  not  without  an  air  of  plausibility,  to  show 
that  every  syllogism  must  be  futile  and  worthless,  because  the 
Premisses  virtually  assert  the  Conclusion  : little  dreaming,  of 
course,  that  his  objections,  however  specious  lie  against  the 
process  of  reasoning  itself  universally  ; and  will,  therefore, 
of  course,  apply  to  those  very  arguments  wh;__.  he  is  himsell 
adducing.  He  should  have  been  reminded  of  the  story  of 
the  woodman,  who  had  mounted  a tree,  and  was  so  earnestly 
employed  in  lopping  the  boughs,  that  he  unconsciously  cut  oft 
the  bough  on  which  he  was  standing. 

It  is  still  more  extraordinary  to  find  other  eminent  authors  * 
adopting,  expressly,  the  very  same  objections,  and  yet  dis 
tinctly  admitting  the  possibility  of  reducing  every  course  of 
argument  to  a series  of  syllogisms. 

One  of  these  writers  brings  an  objection 

Mistake 

specting  the  against  the  Dictum  of  Aristotle,  which  it  may  be 
meaning  of  the  worth  while  to  notice  briefly,  for  the  sake  of  set- 
ting in  a clearer  light  the  real  character  and 
object  of  that  Principle.  Its  application  being,  as  has  been 
seen,  to  a regular  and  conclusive  Syllogism,  he  supposes  it 
intended  to  prove  and  make  evident  the  conclusiveness  of  such 
a syllogism ; and  remarks  how  unphilosophical  it  is  to  attempt 
giving  a demonstration  of  a demonstration.  And  certainly 
the  charge  would  be  just,  if  we  could  imagine  the  logician’s 
object  to  be,  to  increase  the  certainty  of  a conclusion  which 
we  are  supposed  to  have  already  arrived  at  by  the  cleareat 
possible  mode  of  proof.  But  it  is  very  strange  that  such  an 
idea  should  ever  have  occurred  to  one  who  had  even  the 

* “ Philosophy  of  Rhetoric.” 

t As  Dugald  Stewart : Philosophy,  vol.  ii. ; arid  Locke  vol  iL 
th.  17,  M- 


analytical  outline. 


41 


ii.] 


slightest  tincture  of  Natural-philosophy  ; for  it  might  L3  well 
be  imagined  that  a natural-philosopher’s  or  a chemist’s  design 
is  to  strengthen  the  testimony  of  our  senses  by  a priori  rea- 
soning, and  to  convince  us  that  a stone  when  thrown  will  fall 
te  the  ground,  and  that  gunpowder  will  explode  when  fired  ; 
because  they  show  that  according  to  their  principles  those 
phenomena  must  take  place  as  they  do.  But  it  would  be 
reckoned  a mark  of  the  grossest  ignorance  and  stupidity  not 
to  be  aware  that  their  object  is  not  to  prove  the  existence  of 
an  individual  phenomenon,  which  our  eyes  have  witnessed, 
but  (as  the  phrase  is)  to  account  for  it : i.  e.  to  show  accord 
ing  to  what  principle  it  takes  place  ; — to  refer,  in  short,  the 
individual  case  to  a general  law  of  nature.  The  object  of 
Aristotle’s  Dictum  is  precisely  analogous ; he  had,  doubtless, 
no  thought  of  adding  to  the  force  of  any  individual  syllogism  ; 
his  design  was  to  point  out  the  general  principle  on  which  that 
process  is  conducted  which  takes  place  in  each  syllogism. 
And  as  the  Laws*  of  nature  (as  they  are  called)  are  in  reality 
merely  generalized  facts , of  which  all  the  phenomena  coming 
under  them  are  particular  instances  ; so,  the  proof  drawn 
from  Aristotle’s  Dictum  is  not  a distinct  demonstration  brought 
to  confirm  another  demonstration,  but  is  merely  a generalized 
and  abstract  statement  of  all  demonstration  whatever ; and  is, 
therefore,  in  fact,  the  very  demonstration  which  ( mutatis  mu- 
tandis) accommodated  to  the  various  subject-matters,  is  actu- 
ally employed  in  each  particular  case. 

In  order  to  trace  more  distinctly  the  different  Thg 
steps  of  the  abstracting  process,  by  which  any  a statement  of 

particular  argument  may  be  brought  into  the  argument  in 

. , c a . . , ,,  the  abstract. 

most  general  form,  we  may  first  take  a svllo- 


4# 


Appendix,  No.  I,  art.  Law. 


<a 


ELEMENTS  01  LOGIC. 


|Book  1 


gtsm  ( i . e.  an  argument  stated  accurately  and  at  full  length,] 
sued  as  the  example  formerly  given,  “ whatever  exhib.ts 
marks  of  design,  and  then  somewhat  generalize  the  ex- 

pression, by  substituting  (as  in  algebra)  arbitrary  unmeaning 
symbols  for  the  significant  terms  that  were  originally  used ; 
the  syllogism  will  then  stand  thus ; “ every  B is  A ; C is  B ; 
therefore  C is  A.”  The  reasoning,  when  thus  stated,  is  no 
less  evidently  valid,  whatever  terms,  A,  B,  and  C,  respec- 
tively, may  be  supposed  to  stand  for.  Such  terms  may  indeed 
be  inserted  as  to  make  all  or  some  of  the  assertions  false , 
but  it  will  still  be  no  less  impossible  for  any  one  who  admits 
the  truth  of  the  premisses,  in  an  argument  thus  constructed, 
to  deny  the  conclusion  ; and  this  it  is  that  constitutes  the  con- 
clusiveness of  an  argument. 

Viewing  then  the  syllogism  thus  expressed,  it  appears 
clearly,  that  “ A stands  for  any  thing  whatever  that  is  af- 
firmed of  a certain  entire  Class,”  (viz.  of  every  B)  “ which 
class  comprehends  or  contains  in  it  something  else,"  viz.  C, 
(of  which  B is,  in  the  second  premiss,  affirmed  ;)  and  that, 
consequently,  the  first  term  (A)  is,  in  the  conclusion,  predi- 
cated of  die  third,  C. 

Now  to  assert  the  validity  of  this  process,  now  before  us 
is  to  state  the  very  Dictum  we  are  treating  of,  with  hardlj 
even  a verbal  alteration  : viz. : 

1.  Any  thing  whatever,  predicated  of  a whole  class, 

2.  Under  which  class  something  else  is  contained, 

3.  May  be  predicated  of  that  which  is  so  contained. 

The  three  members  into  which  the  Maxim  is  here  distrib- 
uted, correspond  to  the  three  propositions  of  the  syllogism  t« 
which  they  are  ntended  respectively  to  apply,  * 


* See  Book  iv  cl.  113  6 1. 


,*•  J 


ANALYTICAL  QLTLINIS. 


43 


The  advantage  of  substituting  for  the  terms, 

in  a regular  syllogism,  arbitrary  unmeaning  Utility  oj 

symbols,  such  as  letters  of  the  alphabet,  is  non-signifi- 
, , . „ _ . cant  symbols. 

much  the  same  as  in  Geometry  : tne  .Reasoning 

itself  is  then  considered,  by  itself,  clearly  and  without  any  risk 

of  our  being  misled  by  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  conclusion ; 

which  is,  in  fact,  accidental  and  variable  ; the  essential  point 

being,  as  far  as  the  argument  is  concerned,  the  connection 

between  the  premisses  and  the  conclusion.  We  are  thus  ena 

nled  to  embrace  the  general  principle  of  all  reasoning,  and 

to  perceive  its  applicability  to  an  indefinite  number  of  indi 

vidual  cases.  That  Aristotle,  therefore,  should  have  been 

accused  of  making  use  of  these  symbols  for  the  purpose  of 

darkening  his  demonstrations,  and  that  too  by  persons  not 

unacquainted  with  Geometry  and  Algebra,  is  truly  astonishing. 

If  a geometer,  instead  of  designating  the  four  angles  of  a 

square  by  four  letters,  were  to  call  them  north,  south,  east 

and  west,  he  would  not  render  the  demonstration  of  a theorem 

the  easier ; and  the  learner  would  be  much  more  likely  to  be 

perplexed  in  the  application  of  it. 

It  belongs  then  exclusively  to  a Syllogism,  properly  su 
called  (i.  c.  a valid  argument,  so  stated  that  its  conclusiveness 
is  evident  from  the  mere  form  of  the  expression,)  that  if  let- 
ters, or  any  other  unmeaning  symbols,  be  substituted  for  the 
several  terms,  the  validity  of  the  argument  shall  still  be  evi- 
dent. Whenever  this  is  not  the  case,  the  supposed  argument 
is  either  unsound  and  sophistical,  or  else  may  be  reduced 
(without  any  alteration  of  its  meaning)  into  the  syllogistic 
•form;  in  which  form,  the  test  just  mentioned  maybe  ap. 
plied  to  it. 

Some  persons  have  remarked  of  the  “ Dictum  ” (meaning 
u as  a disparagement)  that  it  is  merely  a somewhat  circuitous 


*4 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book 


explanation  of  what  is  meant  hy  a Class.  .1 

True  charac - is,  in  truth,  just  such  an  explanation  of  this  as 

ter  of  the  Die-  jg  neec]fu|  the  student,  and  which  must  be 
turn.  . 

kept  before  his  mind  in  reasoning.  For  we 

should  recollect  that  not  only  every  Class  [the  Sign  of  which 
is  a “ Common-term  ”]  comprehends  under  it  an  indefinite 
number  of  individuals,  — and  often  of  other  Classes  — differ- 
ing in  many  respects  from  each  other,  but  also  most  of  those 
individuals  and  classes  may  be  referred,  each,  to  an  indefi- 
nite number  of  classes  according  as  we  choose  to  abstract 
this  point  or  that,  from  each. 

Now  to  remind  one,  on  each  occasion,  that  so  and  so  is 
referable  to  such  and  such  a Class,  and  that  the  class  which 
happens  to  be  before  us  comprehends  such  and  such  things 
— this  is  precisely  all  that  is  ever  accomplished  by  Reasoning 
For  one  may  plainly  perceive,  on  looking  at  any  of  the 
examples  above,  that  when  we  assert  both  the  Premisses 
taken  in  conjunction,  we  have,  virtually,  implied  the  Conclu- 
sion. Else,  indeed,  it  would  not  be  impossible  (as  it  is)  for 
anv  one  to  deny  the  Conclusion,  who  admits  both  Premisses.* 

What  is  called  an  unsound  or  fallacious  argu- 

Detection  of  . , ■ . , , • , • 

, J ment  (*.  e.  an  apparent  argument,  which  is,  in 
unsound  argu-  0 

ments.  reality,  none)  cannot,  of  course,  be  reducec. 

into  this  form  ; but  when  stated  in  the  form 
most  nearly  approaching  to  this  that  is  possible,  its  fallacious- 

* Hence,  some  have  considered  it  as  a disparagement  to  a Syllo- 
gism (which  they  imagine  to  be  one  kind  of  Argument)  that  you  can 
gain  no  new  truth  from  it ; the  Conclusions  it  establishes  being  in  faot 
known  already,  by  every  one  who  has  admitted  the  Premisses. 

Since,  however,  a Syllogism  is  not  a certain  distinct  kind  of  argu- 
ment, but  any  argument  whatever,  stated  in  a regular  form,  the  com- 
plaint, such  as  it  is,  lies  against  Reasoning  altogether.  In  B.  iv.  ok 
2,  this  Doint  is  more  fully  explained 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE. 


45 


»*•! 

ness  becomes  more  evident,  from  its  nonconfoi  nnty  to  the 
foregoing  rule  : e.  g.  “ whoever  is  capable  of  deliberate  crime 
is  responsible  ; an  infant  is  not  capable  of  deliberate  crime  , 
therefore,  an  infant  is  not  responsible,”  (see  § 3 :)  here  the 
term  “ responsible  ” is  affirmed  universally  of  “ those  capable 
of  deliberate  crime  ; ” it  might,  therefore,  according  to  Aris- 
totle’s  Dictum,  have  been  affirmed  of  any  thing  contained 
under  that  class  ; but,  in  the  instance  before  us,  nothing  is 
mentioned  as  contained  under  that  class  ; only,  the  term 
“ infant  ” is  excluded  from  that  class ; and  though  what  is 
affirmed  of  a whole  class  may  be  affirmed  of  any  thing  that 
is  contained  under  it,  there  is  no  ground  for  supposing  that  it 
may  be  denied  of  whatever  is  not  so  contained ; for  it  is  evi- 
Jently  possible  that  it  may  be  applicable  to  a whole  class  and 
to  something  else  besides.  To  say,  e.  g.  that  all  trees  are 
vegetables,  does  not  imply  that  nothing  else  is  a vegetable , 
nor,  when  it  is  said,  that  “ all  who  are  capable  of  deliberate 
crime  are  responsible,”  does  this  imply  that  “ no  others  are 
responsible ; ” for  though  this  may  be  very  true , it  has  not 
oeen  asserted  in  the  premiss  before  us ; and  in  the  analysis 
of  an  argument,  we  are  to  discard  all  consideration  of  what 
might  be  asserted  ; contemplating  only  what  actually  is  laid 
down  in  the  premisses.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  such  an 
apparent  argument  as  the  above  does  not  comply  with  the  rule 
laid  down,  nor  can  be  so  stated  as  to  comply  with  it ; and  is 
consequently  invalid. 

Again,  in  this  instance,  “ food  is  necessary  to  life  ; rorn  is 
food  ; therefore,  corn  is  necessary  to  life  : ” the  term  “ ne- 
cessary to  life  ” is  affirmed  of  food,  but  not  universally ; for 
it  is  not  said  of  eve~y  kind  of  food:  the  meaning  of  the  as- 
sertion being  manifestly  that  “ some  food  is  necessary  to  life  ; ” 
•o  that,  expressed  in  symbols,  the  apparent  argument  might 


46 


ELEMENTS  OE  LOGIC. 


[Book  1 


Ptand  tHs  ; “ Some  X is  Y ; Z is  X ; then  fc  e Z is  Y.’ 
Here  again,  therefore,  the  rule  has  not  been  complied  with, 
s:nce  that  which  has  been  predicated,  [affirmed  or  denied] 
not  of  the  whole , but  of  a part  only  of  a certain  class,  cannot 
be,  on  that  ground,  predicated  of  whatever  is  contained  unde? 
that  class. 

There  is  an  argument  against  miracles  by  the  well-known 
Mr.  Hume,  which  has  perplexed  many  persons,  and  which 
exactly  corresponds  to  the  above.  It  may  be  stated  thus : 
“ Testimony  is  a kind  of  evidence  more  likely  to  be  false, 
than  a miracle  to  be  true  ; ” (or,  as  it  may  be  expressed  in 
other  words,  we  have  more  reason  to  expect  that  a witness 
should  lie,  than  that  a miracle  should  occur)  “ the  evidence 
on  which  the  Christian  miracles  are  believed,  is  testimony ; 
therefore  the  evidence  on  which  the  Christian  miracles  are 
believed  is  more  likely  to  be  false  than  a miracle  to  be  true.” 

Here  it  is  evident  that  what  is  spoken  of  in  the  first  of 
these  Premisses,  is,  “ some  testimony  ; ” not  “ all  testimony,” 
[or  any  whatever ,]  and  by  “ a witness  ” we  understand  “ some 
witness,”  not,  '•'•every  witness:”  so  that  this  apparent  argu- 
ment has  exactly  the  same  fault  as  the  one  above.* 

§5. 

The  fallacy  in  these  last  cases  is,  what  is  usually  described 
in  logical  language  as  consisting  in  the  “ non-distribution  of 
the  middle  term  : ” i.  e.  its  not  being  employed  to  denote  all 
the  objects  to  which  it  is  applicable.  In  order  to  understand 
this  phrase,  it  is  necessary  to  observe  that  a Proposition 
being  an  expression  in  which  one  thing  is  said,  i.  e.  affirmed 


See  Appendix  ii.  Example  No.  26. 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE. 


47 


) 6J 


Distribution 
of  terms. 


or  denied  of  another,  (e.  g.  “ A is  B,”  ) both  that  of  which 
something  is  said,  and  that  which  is  said  of  it  ( i . e.  both  A 
and  B,)  are  called  “terms;”  from  their  being  (in  their 
nature)  the  extremes  or  boundaries  of  the  Proposition  : and 
there  are,  of  course,  two,  and  but  two,  terms  in  a proposition 
(though  it  may  so  happen  that  either  of  them  may  consisi 
either  of  one  word , or  of  several  ;)  and  a term  is  said  to  be 
“ distributed,”  when  it  is  taken  universally,  so 
as  to  stand  for  every  thing  it  is  capable  of  being 
applied  to  ; and  consequently  “ undistributed,” 
when  it  stands  for  a portion  only  of  the  things  signified  by  it  : 
thus,  “ all  food,”  or  every  kind  of  food,  are  expressions  which 
imply  the  distribution  of  the  term  “ food  ; ” “ some  food  ” 
would  imply  its  non-distribution.  And  it  is  also  to  be  observed 
that  the  term  of  which,  in  one  premiss,  something  is  affirmed 
or  denied,  and  to  which,  in  the  other  premiss,  something  else 
is  referred  as  contained  in  it,  is  called  the  “ middle  ” term  in 
the  syllogism,  as  standing  between  the  other  two  (viz.  the  two 
terms  of  the  conclusion,)  and  being  the  medium  of  proof. 
Now  it  is  plain,  that  if  in  each  premiss  a part  only  of  this 
middle-term  is  employed,  i.  e.  if  it  be  not  all  distributed,  no 
conclusion  can  be  drawn.  Hence,  if,  in  the  example  formerly 
adduced,  it  had  been  merely  stated  that  “ something  ” (not 
“ whatever ,”  or  “ every  thing  ”)  “ which  exhibits  marks  of 
design,  is  the  work  of  an  intelligent  author,”  it  would  no’ 
have  followed,  from  the  world’s  exhibiting  marks  of  design, 
that  that  is  the  work  of  an  intelligent  author. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  also,  that  the  words  “ all  ” and  “ every,” 
which  mark  the  distribution  of  a term,  and  some,”  which 
marks  its  non-distribution,  are  not  always  expressed  : they  ar« 
frequently  understood,  and  left  to  be  supplied  by  the  context 
s.  g.  “food  is  necessary;”  viz.  “ some  food;”  ‘man  if 
mortal;”  viz.  “ every  man.” 


48 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  I, 


Propositions  thus  expressed  are  called  by 
Indefinite  ...  . ♦ 

Propositions  i°glcians  “ indefinite ,”  because  it  is  left  unde- 
termined by  the  form  of  the  expression  whethei 
(he  “subject”  (the  term  of  which  something  is  affirmed  a 
denied  being  called  the  “ subject  ” of  the  proposition,  and  thy 
which  is  said  of  it,  the  “ predicate  ” ) be  distributed  or  not 
Nevertheless  it  is  plain  that  in  every  proposition  the  Subjec 
either  is,  or  is  not,  meant  to  be  distributed  ; though  it  be  not  de- 
clared whether  it  is  or  not.  Consequently,  every  proposition, 
whether  expressed  indefinitely  or  not,  must  be  understood  as 
either  “ universal  ” or  “ particular ; ” those  being  called  Univer- 
sal in  which  the  predicate  is  said  of  the  whole  of  the  subject 
(or,  in  other  words,  where  the  subject  is  distributed  ;)  and  those, 
Particular,  in  which  it  is  said  only  of  a part  of  the  subject : e.  g. 
“ All  men  are  sinful,”  is  universal  ; “ some  men  are  sinful,’ 
particular.  And  this  division  of  propositions  is,  in  logical  lan- 
guage, said  to  be  according  to  their  “ quantity.''' 

But  the  distribution  or  non-distribution  of  the 

Quantity  and  preg{caie  js  entirely  independent  of  the  quantity 
quality  of  pro- 
positions. proposition  ; nor  are  the  signs  “ all  and 

“ some”  ever  affixed  to  the  predicate  ; because 
its  distribution  depends  upon,  and  is  indicated  by,  the  “ qual- 
ity" of  the  proposition  ; i.  e.  its  being  affirmative  or  negative  ; 
it  being  a universal  rule,  that  the  predicate  of  a negative 
proposition  is  distributed,  and  of  an  affirmative,  undistributed. 
The  reason  of  this  may  easily  be  understood,  by  considering 
that  a term  which  stands  for  a whole  Class  may  be  applied  to 
(i.  e.  affirmed  of)  any  thing  that  is  comprehended  under  that 
class,  though  the  term  of  which  it  is  thus  affirmed  may  be  of 
much  narrower  extent  than  that  other,  and  may,  therefore,  be 
far  from  coinciding  with  the  whole  of  it.  Thus  it  may  be  said 
with  truth,  that  ‘ the  Negroes  are  uncivilized,”  though  tha 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE. 


49 


f5J 

term  uncivilized  be  of  much  wider  extent  than  “ Negroes,’ 
comprehending,  besides  them,  Hottentots,  fy-c. ; so  that  it 
would  not  be  allowable  to  assert,  that  “ all  who  are  uncivil- 
ized are  Negroes ; ” it  is  evident,  therefore,  that  it  is  a part 
only  of  the  term  “ uncivilized  ” that  has  been  affirmed  of  “ Ne- 
groes : ” and  the  same  reasoning  applies  to  every  affirmative 
proposition  ; for  though  it  may  so  happen  that  the  subject  and 
predicate  coincide ; i.  e.  are  of  equal  extent,  as,  e.  g.  “ all 
men.  are  rational  animals ; ” “ all  equilateral  triangles  are 
equiangular ; ” (it  being  equally  true,  that  “ all  rational  ani- 
mals are  men,”  and  that  “ all  equiangular  triangles  are  equi 
lateral ; ”)  yet  this  is  not  implied  by  the  form  of  the  expres- 
sion ; since  it  would  be  no  less  true,  that  “ all  men  are  rational 
animals,”  even  if  there  were  other  rational  animals  besides 
Man. 

It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  if  any  part  of  the  predicate  is 
applicable  to  the  subject,  it  may  be  affirmed,  and,  of  course, 
cannot  be  denied,  of  that  subject ; and  consequently,  when 
the  predicate  is  denied  of  the  subject,  this  implies  that  no  part 
of  that  predicate  is  applicable  to  that  subject ; i.  e.  that  the 
whole  of  the  predicate  is  denied  of  the  subject ; for  to  say, 
e.  g.  that  “ no  beasts  of  prey  ruminate,”  implies  that  beasts 
of  prey  are  excluded  from  the  whole  class  of  ruminant  ani- 
mals, and  consequently  that  “ no  ruminant  animals  are  beasts 
of  prey.”  And  hence  results  the  above-mentioned  rule,  that 
the  distribution  of  the  predicate  is  implied  in  negative  propo- 
sitions, and  its  non-distribution,  in  affirmatives. 

The  learner  may  perhaps  be  startled  at  being 

iVow  ■ 

told  that  the  predicate  of  an  affirmative  is  never  j,ution  0j  the 
distributed  ; especially  as  Aldrich  has  admitted  predicate  in 
that  accidentally  this  may  take  place  : as  in  aJfirmatlve3- 
*«ch  a proposition  as  “ all  equilateral  triangles  are  equiangu- 
5 


60 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


IBook  1 


lar:”  but  this  is  not  accurate;  be  might  have  said  that  in 
such  a proposition  as  the  above  the  predicate  is  distributable, 
but  not  that  it  is  actually  distributed  : i.  e.  it  so  happens  thi»« 
“ all  equiangular  triangles  arc  equilateral  ; ” but  this  is  not  iir 
plied  in  the  previous  assertion  ; and  the  point  to  be  consist 
ered  is,  not  what  tnight  be  said  with  truth,  but  what  actuall 
has  been  said.  And  accordingly  mathematicians  give  distint 
d unonstrations  of  the  above  two  propositions. 

If  it  happen  to  be  my  object  to  assert  that  the  Predicate  a 
well  as  the  Subject  of  a certain  affirmative  proposition  is  to  b- 
understood  as  distributed  — and  if  I say,  for  instance,  “ ai 
equilateral  triangles,  and  no  others , are  equiangular,”  — I an 
asserting,  in  reality,  not  one  proposition,  merely,  but  two 
And  this  is  the  case  whenever  the  proposition  I state  is  under 
stood  (whether  from  the  meaning  of  the  words  employed 
or  from  the  general  drift  of  the  discourse)  to  imply  thai 
the  whole  cf  the  Predicate  is  meant  to  be  affirmed  of  the 
Subject. 

Thus,  if  I say  of  one  number  — suppose  100  — that  it  is 
the  Square  of  another,  as  10,  then,  this  is  understood  by  every 
one,  from  his  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  numbers , to  imply 
what  are,  in  reality,  the  two  propositions,  that  100  is  “ the 
Square  of  10,”  and  also  that  “ the  Square  of  10  is  100.”  So 
also,  if  I say  that  “ Romulus  was  the  first  king  of  Rome,” 
this  implies,  from  the  peculiar  signification  of  the  words , that 
“ the  first  king  of  Rome  was  Romulus.” 

Terms  thus  related  to  each  other  are  called  in  technical 
language,  “ convertible  ” [or  “ equivalent  ”]  terms.  But  then 
you  are  to  observe  that  when  you  not  only  affirm  one  terra 
of  another,  but  also  affirm  (or  imply)  that  these  a ’t  con 
terrible"  terms,  you  are  making  not  merely  one  ^j&rtiou 
but  two 


»5.1 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE. 


5i 


It  is  to  be  remembered,  then,  that  it  is  not 

sufficient  for  the  middle  term  to  occur  in  a Distribution 
rT  . , . . . „ , . . of  middle 

Universal-proposition  ; since  if  that  proposition  terms 

be  an  affirmative,  and  the  middle-term  be  the 
predicate  of  it,  it  will  not  be  distributed : e.  g.  if  in  the  exam 
pie  formerly  given,  it  had  been  merely  asserted,  that  “ all  the 
works  of  an  intelligent  author  show  marks  of  design,”  «nd 
that  “ the  universe  shows  marks  of  design,”  nothing  could 
have  been  proved ; since,  though  both  these  propositions  are 
universal,  the  middle-term  is  made  the  predicate  in  each,  and 
both  are  affirmative  ; and  accordingly,  the  rule  of  Aristotle  is 
not  here  complied  with,  since  the  term  “ work  of  an  intel- 
ligent author,”  which  is  to  be  proved  applicable  to  “ the 
universe,”  would  not  have  been  affirmed  of  the  middle-term 
(“  what  shows  marks  of  design  ”')  under  which  “ universe  ” 
is  contained  ; but  the  middle-term,  on  the  contrary,  would 
have  been  affirmed  of  it. 

If,  however,  one  of  the  premisses  be  negative,  the  middle- 
term  may  then  be  made  the  predicate  of  that,  and  will  thus, 
according  to  the  above  remark,  be  distributed  ; e.  g.  “ no  ru- 
minant animals  are  predacious  ; the  lion  is  predacious  ; there- 
fore the  lion  is  not  ruminant : ” this  is  a valid  syllogism  ; and 
the  middle  term  (predacious)  is  distributed  by  being  made 
the  predicate  of  a negative  proposition.  The  form,  indeed 
of  the  syllogism  is  not  that  prescribed  by  the  Dictum,  but  i 
may  easily  be  reduced  to  that  form,  by  stating  the  first  prop- 
osition thus  : “ no  predacious  animals  are  ruminant ; ” which 
is  manifestly  implied  (as  was  above  remarked)  in  the  asser- 
tion that  “ no  ruminant  animals  are  predacious.”  The  syllo- 
gism will  thus  appear  in  the  form  to  which  the  Dictum  applies. 

It  is  not  every  argument,  indeed,  that  can  be  reduced  t<i 
Uiis  form  by  so  short  and  simple  an  alteration  as  in  the  casi 


5£ 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  1 


before  us  : a longer  and  more  complex  pro 

The  Dictum  cess  w|[[  0ften  be  required,  and  rules  will  here- 
universally  ap- 

plicable  after  be  laid  down  to  facditate  this  process  in 

certain  cases ; but  there  is  no  sound  argument 
but  what  cati  be  reduced  into  this  form,  without  at  all  depart- 
ing from  the  real  meaning  and  drift  of  it ; and  the  form  will  be 
found  (though  more  prolix  than  is  needed  for  ordinary  use) 
the  most  perspicuous  in  which  an  argument  can  be  exhibited. 

All  Reasoning  whatever,  then,  rests  on  the  one  simple 
Principle  laid  down  by  Aristotle,  that  “ what  is  predicated, 
either  affirmatively  or  negatively,  of  a term  distributed,  may 
be  predicated  in  like  manner,  (z.  e.  affirmatively  or  negatively) 
of  any  thing  contained  under  that  term.”  So  that  when  our 
object  is  to  prove  any  proposition,  i.  e.  to  show  that  one  term 
may  rightly  be  affirmed  or  denied  of  another,  the  process 
which  really  takes  place  in  our  minds  is,  that  we  refer  that 
term  (of  which  the  other  is  to  be  thus  predicated)  to  soi.t« 
class  * (i.  e.  middle-term)  of  which  that  other  may  be  af- 
firmed, or  denied,  as  the  case  may  be. 

Whatever  the  subject-matter  of  an  argument  may  be,  the 
Reasoning  itself,  considered  by  itself,  is  in  every  case  the 
same  process;  and  if  the  writers  against  Logic  had  kept  this 
in  mind,  they  would  have  been  cautious  of  expressing  their 
contempt  of  what  they  call  “ syllogistic  reasoning,”  which  is 
in  truth  all  reasoning  ; and  instead  of  ridiculing  Aristotle’s 
Principle  for  its  obviousness  and  simplicity,  would  have  per- 
ceived that  these  are,  in  fact,  its  highest  praise : the  easiest 
shortest,  and  most  evident  theory,  provided  it  answer  the  pur 
pose  of  explanation,  being  ever  the  best. 


* That  is,  either  an  actual  or  a potential  class.  See  above,  $ 8. 


10] 


ANALYTICAL  0UTL1  <E 


53 


§6. 

If  we  conceive  an  inquirer  to  have  leached,  in  his  invest! 
gation  of  the  theory  of  Reasoning,  the  point  to  which  vva 
have  now  arrived,  a question  which  would  be  likely  next  to 
engage  his  attention,  is  that  of  Predication;  i.  e.  since  ic 
reasoning  we  are  to  find  a middle-term  which  may  be  predi- 
cated affirmatively  of  the  Subject  in  question,  we  are  led  to 
inquire  what  terms  may  be  affirmed,  and  what  denied,  of 
what  others. 

It  is  evident  that  a proper-name,  or  any  other 

term  which  denotes  but  a single  individual,  as  Common 

° and  singular 

“ Caesar,”  “ the  Thames,”  “ the  Conqueror  of  ierms. 

Pompey,”  “ this  river”  (hence  called  in  Logic 

a “ Singular-term  ”)  cannot  be  affirmed  of  any  thing  besides 

that  individual,  and  may  therefore  be  denied  of  any  thing 

else  ; we  may  say,  “ this  river  is  the  Thames,”  or  “ Caesar 

was  the  conqueror  of  Pompey  ; ” but  we  cannot  say  of  any 

thing  else  that  it  is  the  Thames,  fyc. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  terms  which  are  called  “ Com- 
mon,”  as  denoting  any  one  individual  of  a whole  class,  as 
“river,”  “conqueror,”  may  of  course  be  affirmed  of  any,  or 
all  that  belong  to  that  class : [of  any  thing  answering  to  a 
certain  description ] as,  “ the  Thames  is  a river ; ” “ the 
Rhine  and  the  Danube  are  rivers.” 

Common-terms,  therefore,  are  called  “ predicables  ” (viz 
affirmatively- predicable,)  from  their  capability  of  being  af- 
firmed of  others : a Singular-term,  on  the  contrary,  may  be 
the  Subject  of  a proposition,  but  never  the  Predicate,  unless 
it  be  of  a negative  proposition  ; (as  e.  g.  the  first-bcrn  of 
Isaac  was  not  Jacob ;)  or,  unless  the  Subject  and  PreOtcata 
5* 


54 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  I 


be  only  two  expressions  for  the  same  individual  object ; as  iu 
some  of  the  above  instances. 

The  process  by  which  the  mind  arrives  a 

Abstraction  $ ^ notjons  expressed  by  these  ‘ common  ” .oJ 

jeneratuation.  1 ' 

in  popular  language,  “ general  ”)  terms,  is 

properly  called  “ Generalization  ; ” though  it  is  usually  (and 
truly)  said  to  be  the  business  of  abstraction ; for  Generaliza- 
tion is  one  of  the  purposes  to  which  Abstraction  is  applied. 
When  we  draw  off,  and  contemplate  separately  any  part  of  an 
object  presented  to  the  mind,  disregarding  the  rest  of  it,  we 
are  said  to  abstract  that  part.  Thus,  a person  might,  when 
a rose  was  before  his  eyes  or  mind,  make  the  scent  a distinct 
object  of  attention,  laying  aside  all  thought  of  the  color,  form. 
8)-c. ; and  thus,  even  though  it  were  the  only  rose  he  had 
ever  met  with,  he  would  be  employing  the  faculty  of  Abstrac- 
tion ; but  if,  in  contemplating  several  objects,  and  finding  that 
they  agree  in  certain  points,  we  abstract  the  circumstances  of 
agreement,  disregarding  the  differences,  and  give  to  all  and 
each  of  these  objects  a name  applicable  to  them  in  respect  of 
this  agreement,  i.  e.  a common  name,  as  “ rose,”  — or  again, 
if  we  give  a name  to  some  attribute  wherein  they  agree,  as 
“ fragrance  ” or  “ redness,”  — we  are  then  said  to  generalize. 
Abstraction,  therefore,  does  not  necessarily  imply  Generali- 
zation, though  Generalization  implies  Abstraction. 

Much  needless  difficulty  has  been  raised  respecting  the 
results  of  this  process  ; many  having  contended,  and  perhaps 
more  having  taken  for  granted,  that  there  must  be  some  really- 
existing  thing,*  corresponding  to  each  of  those  “ general  ” 
[or  “common”]  terms,  and  of  which  such  term  is  the  name 
Handing  for  and  representing  it : e.  g.  that  as  there  is  a really 


See  the  subjoined  Dissertation,  Book  IV.  Chap.  ▼. 


e.j 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE 


5h 

existing  Being  corresponding  to  the  proper  name,  “ AStna,” 
and  signified  by  it,  so,  the  common-term,  “ mountain,”  must 
also  have  some  one  really  existing  thing  corresponding  to  it 
and  of  course  distinct  from  each  individual  mountain  (since 
the  term  is  not  Singular  but  Common,)  yet  existing  in  each, 
since  the  term  is  applicable  to  each  of  them.  “ When  many 
different  men,”  it  is  said,  “ are  at  the  same  t ime  thinking  or 
speaking  about  a ‘ mountain,’  i.  e.  not  any  particular  one, 
but  ‘ a mountain,  generally,’  their  minds  must  be  all  employed 
on  something ; which  must  also  be  one  thing,  and  not  several, 
and  yet  cannot  be  any  one  individual.”  And  hence  a vast 
train  of  mystical  disquisitions  about  Ideas,  fyc.  has  arisen 
which  are  at  best  nugatory,  and  tend  to  obscure  our  view  of 
the  process  which  actually  takes  place  in  the  mind. 

The  fact  is,  the  notion  expressed  by  a Com- 
mon-term is  merely  an  inadequate  [incomplete]  Notions  w 
notion  of  an  Individual;  and  from  the  very  pressed  by  com- 
circumstance  of  its  inadequacy,  it  will  apply  mon  termSm 
equally  well  to  any  one  or  an  indefinite  number  of  individuals 
of  the  same  description;  — to  any  one,  in  short,  possessing 
the  attribute  or  attributes  that  have  been  abstracted,  and  which 
are  designated  by  that  Common-term.  E G.  if  I omit  the 
mention  and  the  consideration  of  every  circumstance  which 
distinguishes  AStna  from  any  other  mountain,  I then  form  a 
notion  (expressed  by  the  Common-term  “ Mountain  ')  which 
inadequately  designates  ./Etna  (i.  e.  which  does  not  imply  any 
of  its  peculiarities,  nor  its  numerical  singleness,)  and  is 
equally  applicable  to  any  one  of  several  other  individuals. 

Generalization,  it  is  plain,  may  be  indefinitely  extended  by 
a further  abstraction  applied  to  common-terms : e.  g.  as  bj 
abstraction  from  the  term  Socrates  we  obtain  the  common 
term  “ Philosopher ; ” so,  from  “philosopher,”  by  a similar 


56 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  I 


process,  we  arrive  at  the  more  general-term  “ man  from 
“ man”  we  advance  to  “ animal,”  Sfc.  And  so  also,  you  may 
advance  from  any  “ ten  ” objects  before  you,  (for  instance, 
the  fingers  ; from  which  doubtless  arose  the  custom  of  reck 
oning  by  tens)  to  the  general-term, — the  number  “ ten  ; ” 
and  thence  again,  to  the  more  general-term,  “ number,  ” and 
ultimately  to  the  term  “ quantity.”  * 

We  are  thus  enabled,  not  only  to  separate, and 

Different  ab-  singly  one  part  0f  an  object  presented 

stractionsfrom  . . 

the  same  object.  to  the  mind,  but  also  to  fix  arbitrarily  upon  what- 
ever part  we  please,  according  as  may  suit  the 
purpose  we  happen  to  have  in  view.  E.  G.  any  individual  per- 
son to  whom  we  may  direct  our  attention,  may  be  considered 
either  in  a political  point  of  view,  and  accordingly  referred  to 
the  class  of  Merchant,  Farmer,  Lawyer,  cf-c.  as  the  case  may 
be  ; or  physiologically,  as  Negro  or  White-man  ; or  theologi- 
cally, as  Pagan,  Mahometan,  Christian,  Sfc. ; or  geographi- 
cally, as  European,  American,  4*c.  And  so,  in  respect  of 
any  thing  else  that  may  be  the  subject  of  our  reasoning:  we 
arbitrarily  fix  upon  and  abstract  that  point  which  is  essential 
to  the  purpose  in  hand  ; so  that  the  same  object  may  be 


* The  employment  of  this  faculty  at  pleasure  has  been  regarded, 
and  perhaps  with  good  reason,  as  the  characteristic  distinction  of  the 
human  mind  from  that  of  the  Brutes.  Accordingly,  even  the  most 
intelligent  Brutes  seem  incapable  of  forming  any  distinct  notion  of 
number ; to  do  which  evidently  depends  on  Abstraction.  For  in  order 
to  count  any  objects,  you  must  withdraw  your  thoughts  from  all 
differences  between  them,  and  regard  them  simply  as  units.  And 
accordingly,  the  Savage  Tribes  (who  arc  less  removed  than  we  are 
from  the  Brutes)  are  remarked  for  a great  deficiency  in  their  notions 
of  number.  Few  of  them  can  count  beyond  ten,  or  twenty  ; and 
some  of  the  rudest  Savages  have  no  words  to  express  any  number! 
oeyond  five.  See  Dr.  Taylor’s  “ Natural-history  of  Society.” 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE. 


57 


> -i 

referred  to  various  different  classes,  according  to  the  occasser. 
Not,  of  course,  that  we  are  allowed  to  refer  any  thing  to  & 
class  to  which  it  does  not  really  belong  ; which  would  be  pre* 
.ending  to  abstract  from  it  something  that  was  no  part  of  it  • 
but  that  we  arbitrarily  fix  on  any  part  of  it  which  we  choose 
to  abstract  from  the  rest. 

It  is  important  to  notice  this,  because  men  are  often  dis- 
posed to  consider  each  object  as  really  and  properly  belong 
ing  to  some  one  class  alone  ; * from  their  having  been  accus- 
tomed, in  the  course  of  their  own  pursuits,  to  consider,  in  one 
point  of  view  only,  things  which  may  with  equal  propriety  be 
considered  in  other  points  of  view  also : i.  e.  referred  to  va- 
rious Classes,  (or  predicates.)  And  this  is  that  which  chieflji 
constitutes  what  is  called  narrowness-of-mind. 

E.  G.  a mere  botanist  might  be  astonished  at  Different 
. , , , T . modes  of  daa- 

hearing  such  plants  as  Clover  and  Lucerne  in- 

eluded,  in  the  language  of  a farmer,  under  the 
term  “ grasses,”  which  he  has  been  accustomed  to  limit  to  a 
tribe  of  plants  widely  different  in  all  botanical  characteristics; 
and  the  mere  farmer  might  be  no  less  surprised  to  find  the 
troublesome  “ weed,”  (as  he  has  been  accustomed  to  call  it,) 
known  by  the  name  of  Couch-grass,  and  which  he  has  been 
used  to  class  with  nettles  and  thistles,  to  which  it  has  no  bo- 
tanical affinity,  ranked  by  the  botanist  as  a species  of  Wheat, 
( Triticum  Repens.)  And  yet  neither  of  these  classifications 
is  in  itself  erroneous  or  irrational ; though  it  would  be  absurd 
in  a botanical  treatise,  to  class  plants  according  to  th*  r agri- 
cultural use ; or,  in  an  agricultural  treatise,  according  to  the 
structure  of  their  flowers.  So  also,  a Diamond  wo  ’d  be 
classed  by  a jewellfer  along  with  the  ruby,  emerald,  &c  as  a 


See  the  subjoined  Dissertatior,  Book  IV  Chap,  v 


58 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  1 


precious  stone  ; while  the  chemist  classes  it,  along  with  p’um 
bago  and  coal,  as  one  of  the  forms  of  carbon. 

The  utility  of  these  considerations,  with  a view  to  the  pres* 
ent  subject,  will  be  readily  estimated,  by  recurring  to  the 
account  which  has  been  already  given  of  the  process  of  Rea 
Boning ",  the  analysis  of  which  shows  that  it  consists  in  refer 
ring  the  term  we  are  speaking  of  to  some  class,  viz.  a middle 
term  ; which  term  again  is  referred  to,  or  excluded  from  (as 
the  case  may  be)  another  class,  viz.  the  term  which  we  wish 
to  affirm  or  deny  of  the  Subject  of  the  Conclusion.  So  that 
the  quality  of  our  reasoning  in  any  case  must  depend  on  our 
being  able  correctly,  clearly,  and  promptly,  to  abstract  from 
the  Subject  in  question  that  which  may  furnish  a Middle-term 
suitable  to  the  occasion. 


who  are  entirely  strangers  to  the  study)  to  point  out  the  gen 
eral  drift  and  purpose  of  the  science,  and  to  render  the  details 
of  it  both  more  interesting  and  more  intelligible.  The  Ana- 
lytical form  which  has  here  been  adopted,  is,  generally  speak- 
ing, better  suited  for  introducing  any  science  in  the  plaines 
and  most  interesting  form  ; though  the  Synthetical,  which 
will  henceforth  be  employed,  is  the  more  regular,  and  the 
more  compendious  form  for  storing  it  up  in  the  memory. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  technical  terms  ana  rules 
will  be  rather  an  encumbrance  than  a help,  unless  we  take 
care  not  only  to  understand  them  thoroughly,  but  also  tc 
learn  them  so  perfectly  that  they  may  be  as  readily  and  as 
correctly  employed  as  the  names  of  the  most  fami'ia*’  objects 
around  us 


Utility  of 
the  analytical 
form. 


The  imperfect  and  irregular  sketch  which 
has  here  been  attempted,  of  the  logical  system, 
may  suffice  (even  though  some  parts  of  it 
should  not  be  at  once  fully  understood  by  those 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE. 


59 


J6/J 

Bat  if  any  one  will  take  the  trouble  to  do  this  once  for  all 
he  will  find  that  in  the  end,  much  trouble  will  have  been 
saved.  For,  the  explanations  given  of  such  technical-terms 
and  general  rules,  when  thoroughly  learnt,  once,  will  save  the 
necessity  of  going  through  nearly  the  same  explanation,  over 
and  over  again  on  each  separate  occasion. 

In  short,  the  advantage  of  technical-terms  is  just  like  what 
we  derive  from  the  use  of  any  other  Common-terms.  When 
for  instance,  we  have  once  accurately  learnt  the  definition  of 
a “ Circle,”  or  have  had  fully  described  to  us  what  sort  of 
creature  an  “ Elephant  ” is,  to  say  “ I drew  a Circle,”  or,  ‘ I 
saw  an  Elephant,”  would  be  sufficiently  intelligible,  without 
any  need  of  giving  the  description  or  definition  at  full  length 
over  and  over  again  on  every  separate  occasion 


BOOK  a 


SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM 


Chap.  I.  — Of  the  Operations  of  the  Mind  and  oj  Term » 


$ 1- 


There  are  three  operations  [or  states]  of  the 
mind  which  are  immediately  concerned  in  Ar» 
gument ; which  are  called  by  logical  writers  — 
1st.  Simple-apprehension;  2d.  Judgment;  3d.  Discourse  oi 
Reasoning.* 

1st.  Simple-apprehension  they  define  to  be 
that  act  or  condition  of  the  mind  in  which  it 
receives  a notion  of  any  object ; and  which  is 
analogous  to  the  perception  of  the  senses.  It  is  either  Incom- 


Operattons 
of  the  Mind. 


Simple- 

apprehension. 


* Logical  writers  have  in  general  begun  by  laying  down  that  there 
are,  in  all,  three  operations  of  the  mind  : (in  universum  tres)  an  asser- 
tion by  no  means  incontrovertible,  and  which,  if  admitted,  is  nothing 
to  the  present  purpose.  Our  business  is  with  argumentation,  expressed 
in  words,  and  the  operations  of  the  mind  implied  in  that ; what  others 
there  may  be,  or  whether  any  are  irrelevant  questions. 

The  opening  of  a treatise  with  a statement  respecting  the  operations 
of  the  mind  universally,  tends  to  foster  the  prevailing  error  (from 
which  probably  the  minds  of  the  writers  were  not  exempt)  of  sup- 
posing that  Logic  professes  to  teach  “ the  use  of  the  mental  faculty 
in  general;  ” — the  “ right  use  of  reason,”  according  to  Watts 


Chap.  1.  v 2.J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


bi 

plex  or  Complex  : * Incomplex-apprehension  is  of  oLe  object,  or 
of  several  without  any  relation  being  perceived  between  them 
as  of  “ a man,”  “ a horse,”  “ caids  : ” Complex,  is  of  several 
with  such  a relation,  as  of  “ a man  on  horseback,”  “ a pack 
of  cards.” 

2d.  Judgment  is  the  comparing  together  in 

Judgment . 

the  mind  two  of  the  notions  [or  ideas]  which 

are  the  objects  of  Apprehension,  whether  complex  or  incom 

plex,  and  pronouncing  that  they  agree  or  disagree  with  each 

other ; [or  that  one  of  them  belongs  or  does  not  belong 

to  the  other.]  Judgment,  therefore,  is  eithei  affirmative  or 

negative. 

3d.  Reasoning  [or  “ discourse  ”]  is  the  act  of 
proceeding  from  certain  Judgments  to  another 
founded  upon  them,  [or  the  result  of  them.] 


§ 2. 


Language  affords  the  signs  by  which  these 
operations  of  the  mind  are  not  only  expressed  Lan9ua9«- 
and  communicated  to  others,  but  even,  for  the  most  part,  car- 
ried on  by  ourselves.  The  notion  obtained  in  an  act  of  appre- 
hension,  is  called,  when  expressed  in  language,  a term;  an 
act  of  judgment  is  expressed  by  a proposition ; an  act  of 
reasoning,  by  an  argument ; (which,  when  regularly  ex 
pressed  is  a syllogism  ;)  as  e.  g. 


“ Every  dispensation  of  Providence  is  beneficial ; 
Afflictions  are  dispensations  of  Providence, 
Therefore  they  are  beneficial.” 


* With  respect  to  the  technical  terms  employed  in  this  work.  e*« 
the  Preface. 


6 


elements  of  logic. 


[Book  II 


w 


is  a Syllogism  ; the  act  of  reasoning  being  indicated  by  the 
word  “ therefore .”  It  consists  of  three  propositions , each  ol 
which  has  (necessarilv)  two  terms , as  “ beneficial,”  “ dispen- 
sations of  Providence,”  fyc. 

In  introducing  the  mention  of  language  previously  to  the 
definition  of  Logic,  I have  departed  from  established  practice, 
in  order  that  it  may  be  clearly  understood,  that  Logic  is  en- 
tirely conversant  about  language.  If  any  process  of  reason- 
ing can  take  place  in  the  mind,  without  any  employment  of 
language,  orally  or  mentally,  (a  metaphysical  question  which 
I shall  not  here  discuss)  such  a process  does  not  come  within 
the  province  of  the  science  here  treated  of.*  This  truth,  most 
writers  on  the  subject,  if  indeed  they  were  fully  aware  of  it 
themselves,  have  certainly  not  taken  due  care  to  impress  on 
their  readers. 


Purposes  for  Language  is  employed  for  various  purposes. 
which  Lan-  It  is  the  province  of  the  historian,  for  instance, 
guage  is  era-  to  convey  information  by  means  of  language, 
ployed.  — 0f  the  Poet,  to  afford  a certain  kind  of  gratijb- 

tion,  — of  the  orator,  to  persuade , &c.  &c.  ; while  it  belongs 
to  the  argumentative  writer  or  speaker,  as  such,  to  convince 
the  understanding.  And  as  Grammar  is  conversant  about  lan- 
guage universally,  for  whatever  purpose  it  is  employed,  so,  it 
is  only  so  far  as  it  is  employed  for  this  last  purpose,  viz.  that 
of  reasoning , that  it  falls  under  the  cognizance  of  Logic. 

And  whereas,  in  reasoning,  terms  are  liable 

Terms.  to  [,e  indistinct,  (i.  e.  without  any  clear,  deter- 

Propositions ■ . , ...  , . r 7 , 

Syllogisms  minate  meaning,)  propositions  to  be  false , and 

arguments  inconclusive , Logic  undertakes  di- 
rectly and  completely  to  guard  against  this  last  defect,  and, 


* See  Introduction,  § 6. 


Chap.  I.  $ 2.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


03 


incidentally,  and  in  a certain  degree,  against  the  others,  as 
as  can  be  done  by  the  proper  use  oj  language.  It  is,  there- 
fore, (when  regarded  as  an  art,)  “ the  Art  of  employing  lan- 
guage properly  for  the  purpose  of  Reasoning  , and  of  distin- 
guishing what  is  properly  and  truly  an  Argument,  from  spuri- 
ous imitations  of  it.”  The  importance  of  such  a study  no  one 
can  rightly  estimate  who  has  not  long  and  attentively  consid- 
ered how  much  our  thoughts  are  influenced  by  expressions 
and  how  much  error,  perplexity,  and  labor  ate  occasioned  by 
a faulty  use  of  language ; and  many  who  are  not  unaware  of 
that,  have  yet  failed  to  observe  that  “ signs  ” (such  as  Lan- 
guage supplies)  are  an  indispensable  instrument  of  all  Reason- 
ing, strictly  so  called. 

In  reference  however  to  the  above-mentioned  Degree  and 

defects,  two  important  distinctions  are  to  be  ob-  manner  in 

served.  1st.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  that  scv 

eral  defect s are 

which  is,  really , a Term,  may  be  indistinctly  t0  guarded 
apprehended  by  the  person  employing  it,  or  by  against. 
his  hearer ; and  so  also,  a Proposition  which  is  false , is  not 
the  less  a real  Proposition : but  on  the  other  hand,  any  ex- 
pression or  statement  which  does  not  really  prove  any  thing  is 
not , really , an  Argument  at  all,  though  it  may  be  brought  for- 
ward and  passed  off  as  such. 

2dly.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  (as  it  is  evident  from 
what  has  been  formerly  said)  no  rules  can  be  devised  that 
will  equally  guard  against  all  three  of  the  above-mentioned 
defects. 

To  arrive  at  a distinct  apprehension  of  every  thing  that  mav 
be  expressed  by  any  Term  whatever,  and  again,  to  ascertain 
the  truth  or  falsity  of  every  conceivable  Proposition,  is  mani- 
festly beyond  the  reach  of  any  system  of  rules.  But  on  the 
ether  hand,  it  is  possible  to  exhibit  any  pretended  Argument 


b4  ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC.  iBook  ii 

whatever  in  such  a form  as  to  be  able  to  pronounce  decisively 
on  its  validity  or  its  fallaciousness. 

So  that  the  last  of  the  three  defects  alluded  to  (though  not, 
.he  two  former)  may  be  directly  and  completely  obviated  by 
the  application  of  suitable  rules.  But  the  other  two  defects 
can  be  guarded  against  (as  will  presently  be  shown)  only  in- 
directly, and  to  a certain  degree. 

In  other  words,  rules  may  be  framed  that  will  enable  us 
to  decide,  what  is,  or  is  not,  really  a “Term,”  — really,  a 
“ Proposition  ” — or  really,  an  “ Argument : ” and  to  do  this, 
is  to  guard  completely  against  the  defect  of  inconclusiveness  , 
since  nothing  that  is  inconclusive,  is,  really,  an  “ Argument ; ” 
though  that  may  be  really  a “ Term  ” of  which  you  do  not 
distinctly  apprehend  the  meaning ; and  that  which  is  really  a 
“ Proposition,'1'1  may  be  a false  Proposition. 

A Syllogism  being,  as  aforesaid,  resolvable 

Analysis  of  jnto  three  Propositions,  and  each  Proposition 
syllogism  and 

Proposition.  containing  two  Terms;  of  these  terms,  that 
which  is  spoken  of  is  called  the  subject ; that 
which  is  said  of  it,  th e predicate;  and  these  two  are  called 
the  terms  [or  extremes]  because,  logically,  the  Subject  is 
placed  first,  and  the  Predicate  last ; * and,  in  the  middle,  the 
Copula,  which  indicates  the  act  of  Judgment,  as  by  it  the 
Predicate  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  the  Subject.  The  Copula 
must  be  either  is  or  is  not  ; which  expressions  indicate  sim- 
ply that  you  affirm  or  deny  the  Predicate,  of  the  Subject. 
The  substantive-verb  is  the  only  verb  recognized  by  Logic ; 
inasmuch  as  all  others  are  compound  ; being  resolvable,  by 


* In  Greek  and  in  Latin,  very  often,  and,  not  unfrequently,  in  Eng- 
lish, the  predicate  is,  actually,  put  first : as  “ great  is  Diana  of  thi 
Ephesians.” 


CHAP.  I.  § 2.] 


SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


65 


means  of  the  verb,  “to  he,”  and  a participle  or  uijective, 
e.  g.  “the  .Romans  oonqjered  the  word  conquered  is  both 
copula  and  predicate,  being  equivalent  to  “ were  (Cop.)  victo 
rious  ” (Pred.) 

It  is  proper  to  observe,  that  the  Copula,  as  such,  has  no 
relation  to  time  ; but  expresses  merely  the  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement of  two  given  terms  : hence,  if  any  other  tense  of 
the  substantive  verb  besides  the  present,  is  used,  it  is  eithei 
uuderstood  as  the  same  in  sense,  (the  difference  of  tense  be- 
ing regarded  as  a matter  of  grammatical  propriety  only  ;)  or 
else,  if  the  circumstance  of  time  really  do  modify  the  sense 
of  the  whole  proposition,  so  as  to  make  the  use  of  that  tense 
an  essential,  then  this  circumstance  is  to  be  regarded  as  a part 
of  one  of  the  terms  : “ at  that  timef  or  some  such  expres- 
sion, being  understood  : as  “ this  man  was  honest ; i.  e.  “ he 
is  one  formerly-honest.”  In  such  cases,  an  emphasis,  accom- 
panied with  a peculiar  tone,  is  usually  laid  on  the  substan- 
tive-verb.* 

Sometimes  the  substantive-verb  is  both  Copula  and  Predi- 
cate ; i.  e.  where  existence  only  is  predicated  : e.  g.  Deus  est , 
“ there  is  a God.”  “ One  of  Jacob’s  sons  is  not.”  And  ob- 
serve, that  the  Copula,  merely  as  such,  does  not  imply  real 
existence  ; e.  g.  “ a faultless  man  is  a Being  feigned  by  the 
Stoics,  and  which  one  must  not  expect  to  meet  with.” 


* Strange  to  say,  there  are  persons  who  thus  understand  our  Lord’* 
declaration  to  Pilate  : “ my  kingdom  is  not  of  this  world ; ” viz. 
“now;"  meaning  (secretly)  that  it  was  to  become  so  hekeafteb, 
when  his  followers  should  have  attained  greater  strength  ! 'What  can 
be  the  moral  sentiments  of  those  who  can  believe  such  to  have  beeg 
the  secret  sense  of  the  words  of  a divine  messenger  who  is  to  be  ouf 
model  of  truth  and  of  all  virtue  ! 

6* 


66 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  11 


Categore- 

matic. 


Syncategore- 

matic. 

Mixed. 


$3. 

It  is  evident  that  a Term  may  consist  either  of  on.*  Word 
or  of  several ; and  that  it  is  not  every  word  that 
is  categorematic,  i.  e.  capable  of  being  employed 
by  itself  as  a Term.  Adverbs,  Prepositions, 
&.c.  and  also  Nouns  in  any  other  case  besides  the  nomina- 
tive, are  syncategorematic , i.  e.  can  only  form 
part  of  a term.  A nominative  Noun  may  be 
by  itself  a term.  A Verb  (all  except  the  sub- 
stantive-verb used  as  the  copula)  is  a mixed 
word,  being  resolvable  into  the  Copula  and 
Predicate,  to  which  it  is  equivalent : and,  indeed,  is  often 
so  resolved  in  the  mere  rendering  out  of  one  language  into 
another ; as  “ ipse  adest ,”  “ he  is  present.” 

±71  TLllltlllPS 

It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  under 
“ verb,”  we  do  not  include  the  Infinitive,  which  is  prop- 
erly a Noun-substantive,  not  the  Participle,  which  is  a 
Noun-adjective.  They  are  verbals ; being  related  to  their 
respective  verbs  in  respect  of  the  things  they  signify  ; but  not 
verbs,  inasmuch  as  they  differ  entirely  in  their  mode  of  sig - 
nif  cation.  It  is  worth  observing,  that  an  Infinitive  (though  it 
often  comes  last  in  the  sentence)  is  never  the  predicate , ex- 
cept when  another  Infinitive  is  the  Subject : e.  g. 


subj.  pred. 

^ r ' < r " ■'  \ 

“ I hope  to  succeed  : ” i.  e.  “ to  succeed  is  what  I hope.” 
* Not  to  advance  is  to  fall  back.” 

It  is  to  be  observed,  also,  that  in  English  there  are  two  in- 
finitives, one  in  “ ingf  the  same  in  sound  and  spelling  as  the 
Participle-present ; from  which,  however,  it  should  be  care- 
fully distinguishsd  ; e.  g.  “ rising  early  is  healthful.,”  and  “ tl 
0 healthful  to  rise  early,”  are  equivalent 


Chap.  I.  $ 3.J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


6? 


Grammarians  have  produced  much  needless  perplexity  by 
speaking  of  the  participle  in  “ mg ,”  being  employed  so  and 
so ; when  it  is  manifest  that  that  very  employment  of  the  word 
constitutes  it,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  an  infinitive  and  not 
a participle. 

The  advantage  of  the  infinitive  in  ing , is,  that  it  may  be 
used  either  in  the  nominative  or  in  any  oblique  case : not  (as 
some  suppose)  that  it  necessarily  implies  a habit ; e.  g. 
“ Seeing  is  believing : ” “ there  is  glory  in  dying  for  one’s 
country  : ” “a  habit  of  observing,”  &c. 

If  I say  “ he  is  riding,”  and  again  “ riding  is  pleasant,”  in 
the  former  sentence  “ riding  ” is  an  Adjective,  and  is  the 
Predicate  ; in  the  latter  it  is  a Substantive  and  is  the  Subject ; 
the  sentence  being  equivalent  to  “ it  is  pleasant  to  ride.” 

In  this,  and  in  many  other  cases,  the  English  word  IT 
serves  as  a representative  of  the  Subject  when  that  is  put 
last : e.  g. 

pred.  6u  bj. 

/— \ r~  ■ —n 

“It  is  to  be  hoped  that  we  shall  succeed.” 

An  adjective  (including  participles)  cannot,  by  itself,  be 
made  the  Subject  of  a proposition  ; but  is  often  employed  as 
a Predicate  : as  “ Crassus  was  rich  ; ” though  some  choose  to 
consider  some  substantive  as  understood  in  every  such  case, 
(e.  g.  rich  man)  and  consequently  do  not  reckon  adjectives 
among  Simple-terms  ; [i.  e.  words  which  are  capable,  singly, 
of  being  employed  as  terms.]  This,  howevei,  is  a question 
of  no  practical  consequence  ; but  I have  thought  it  best  to 
adhere  to  Aristotle’s  mode  of  statement.  (See  his  Categ.) 

Of  Simple-teims,  then,  (which  are  wffiat  the 
first  part  of  Logic  treats  of)  there  are  many  Simpk-terms. 
divisions  ; c e which,  however,  one  will  be  suffi- 
cient for  tha  iresent  purpose ; viz.  into  singular  and  com 


68 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  n 


mon  : because,  though  any  term  whatever  may  be  a subject 
none  but  a common  term  can  be  affirmatively  pred icated  of 
several  offiers.  A Singular-term  stands  for  out 

Singular  and  individual,  as  « Cmsar,”  “ the  Thames : ” 
common  terms. 

these,  it  is  plain,  cannot  be  said  [predicated] 
affirmatively , of  any  thing  but  those  individuals  respectively. 
A Common-term  is  one  that  may  stand  for  any  of  an  indefinite 
number  of  individuals,  which  are  called  its  signijicates , i.  e. 
can  be  applied  to  any  of  them,  as  comprehending  them  in  its 
single  signification  ; as  “ man,”  “ river,”  “ great.” 

The  learner  who  has  gone  through  the  Analytical  Outline, 
will  now  be  enabled  to  proceed  to  the  Second  and  Third 
Chapters  either  with  or  without  the  study  of  the  remainder  of 
what  is  usually  placed  in  the  First  Chapter,  but  which  I have 
subjoined  as  a Supplement.  See  Chap.  V. 


Chap.  II.  — Ofi  Propositions. 

§ 1. 

The  second  part  of  Logic  treats  of  the  Proposition  ; which 

’«  “ Judgment  expressed  in  words." 

A Proposition  is  defined  logically  “ a Sentence 

Definition  of  indicative,"  [or  “asserting”]  i.  e.  which  “ af 
Proposition.  L ... 

firms  or  denies."  * It  is  this  that  dist.nguishei 

a Proposition  from  a Question , a Command , &c. 

Logical  Writers  are  accustomed  to  add,  in  explanation  of 


* “ Sentence  ” being,  in  logical  language,  the  Genus,  and  "indica 
five  ” the  14  Differentia,”  ror  d stinguishing-quality.]  See  Ch  V.  j 6 


Chai>.  II.  § 1.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


69 


this  definition  that  a “ Proposition”  must  not  be  ambiguous , 
inasmuch  as  .hat  which  has  more  than  one  meaning , is  in 
reality  not  one,  but  several  propositions.  And  they  also  add 
that  it  must  not  be  imperfect  or  ungrammatical ; which  is  only 
saying  that  any  combination  of  words  that  does  not  really 
form  a “ Sentence  ” cannot  be  a “ Proposition  ; ” though  one 
iray  perhaps  conjecture  from  it  what  it  was  that  the  speaker 
meant  to  assert. 

Propositions  considered  merely  as  Sentences , Categorical 

are  distinguished  into  “ Categorical  ” and  “ Hy-  and  hypotheu 
pothetical.”  ical  propo- 

The  Categorical  asserts  simply  that  the  Pred-  sltlons- 
icate  does,  or  does  not,  apply  to  the  Subject : as  “ The  world 
had  an  intelligent  maker : ” “ Man  is  not  capable  of  raising 
himself,  unassisted,  from  the  savage  to  the  civilized  state.” 
The  Hypothetical  [called  by  some  writers,  “ Compound  ”j 
makes  its  assertion  under  a Condition , or  with  an  Allerna 
tive ; as  “ If  the  world  is  not  the  work  of  chance,  it  must 
have  had  an  intelligent  maker  : ” “ Either  mankind  are  ca- 

pable of  rising  into  civilization  unassisted,  or  the  first  begin- 
ning of  civilization  must  have  come  from  above.” 

The  former  of  these  two  last  examples  is  of  that  kind 
called  “ Conditional-propositions  ; ” * the  “ condition  ” being 
denoted  by  “ if,”  or  some  such  word.  The  latter  example  is 
of  the  kind  called  “ Disjunctive ; ” the  alternative  being 
denoted  by  “ either  ” and  “ or.” 

The  division  of  Propositions  into  Categorical  and  Hypothet- 
ical, is,  as  has  been  said,  a division  of  them  considered  merely 
as  Sentences ; for  a like  distinction  might  be  extended  to  othei 
kinds  of  Sentences  also.  Thus,  “ Are  men  capable  of  r&is- 

* Or  ' hypothetical,”  according  to  those  writers  who  use  the  word 
"compound”  where  we  have  used  “ hypotheticaL’ 


ro 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOU1C. 


[Boos  II 


ing  themselves  to  civilization?”  “Go  and  •tftudy  books  of 
travels,”  are  what  might  be  called  categorical  sentences 
though  not  propositions.  “If  man  is  incapable  of  civilizing 
himself,  whence  came  the  first  beginning  of  civilization  ? ” 
might  be  considered  as  a conditional  question : and  “ Either 
admit  the  conclusion,  or  refute  the  argument,”  as  a disjunct 
tive  command. 

Categorical  propositions  are  subdivided  into  the  pure,  which 
asserts  simphj  [ purely ] that  the  subject  does  or  does  not  agree 
with  the  predicate,  and  the  modal,  which  expresses  in  what 
mode  [or  manner]  it  agrees  ; e.  g.  “ An  intemperate  man 
will  be  sickly  ; ” “ Brutus  killed  Caesar ; ” are  pure.  “ An 
intemperate  man  will  probably  be  sickly;”  “Brutus  killed 
Caesar  justly  ; ” are  modal.  At  presi  nt  we  speak  only  of 
pure  categorical  propositions. 

The  above  division  of  Propositions  (into  Cat- 
Substance  of  a , TT  , . . ,,  . . . 

„ ...  egorical  and  Hypothetical)  is  called  in  th6 

Proposition.  » J 1 ' 

phraseology  of  Logical  writers,  a “ division  of 
them  according  to  their  substance  ; ” i.  e.  considered  simply  as 
sentences. 

The  “ characteristic-guza/zty  ” [Differentia]  of  a Proposition 
being  its  “ asserting,""  — i.  e.  “ affirming  or  denying”  some- 
thing, hence  Propositions  are  divided,  according 
to  their  “ Quality,"  into  “ affirmative  ” ano 


Quality- 


* negative.”  The  division  of  them  again,  into  “ true  ” and 
“ false,”  is  also  called  a division  according  to  their  “ quality  ; ” 
namely,  the  “quality  of  the  Matter:"  (as  it  has  relation  to 
the  subject-matter  one  is  treating  of)  while  the  other  kind  of 
quality  (a  proposition’s  being  affirmative  or  negative)  is  “ tha 
quality  of  the  expression." 

The  “ quality  of  the  matter  ” is  considered  (in  relation  ta 
pur  present  inquiries)  as  accidental , and  the  “ quality  of  tha 


Chap.  II.  § 1 .J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


71 


expression”  as  essetitial.  For  though  the  truth  or  falsity  of  a 
proposition  — for  instance,  in  Natural-history,  is  the  most 
essential  point  in  reference  to  Natural-history , and  of  a math- 
ematical proposition,  in  reference  to  Mathematics , and  so  in 
other  cases, — this  is  merely  accidental  in  reference  to  an 
inquiry  (such  as  the  present)  only  as  to  forms  of  expression. 
In  reference  .to  that , the  essential  difference  is  that  between 
affirmation  and  negation. 

And  here  it  should  be  remarked  by  the  way,  that  as,  on  the 
one  hand,  every  Proposition  must  be  either  true  or  false,  so, 
on  the  other  hand,  nothing  else  can  be,  strictly  speaking,  either 
true  or  false.  In  colloquial  language  however,  “ true  ” and 
false  ” are  often  more  loosely  applied  ; as  when  men  speak 
of  the  “ true  cause  ” of  any  thing ; meaning,  “ the  real  cause  ; ” 
- - the  “ true  heir,”  that  is,  the  rightful  heir ; — a '■'•false 
prophet,”  — that  is,  a pretended  prophet,  or  one  who  utters 
falsehoods;  — a “ true  ” or  “false”  argument;  meaning  a 
valid , [real]  or  an  apparent- argument; — a man  “true,”  or 
false  ” to  his  friend  ; i.  e.  faithful  or  unfaithful,  &c. 

A Proposition,  it  is  to  be  observed,  is  Affirmative  or  Nega- 
tive, according  to  its  Copula  ; i.  e.  according  as  the  Predicate 
ts  affirmed  or  denied  of  the  Subject.  Thus,  “ Not  to  ad- 
vance, is  to  fall  back,”  is  affirmative:  “No  miser  is  truly 
rich  ” [or  “ a miser  is  not  truly  rich  ”]  is  a negative.  lLA 
few  of  the  sailors  were  saved,”  is  an  affirmative  ; “ Few  of 
the  sailors  were  saved,”  is  properly  a negative  ; for  it  would 
be  understood  that  you  werS  speaking  of  “ most  of  the  sail 
ors,”  and  denying  that  they  were  saved. 

Another  division  * of  propositions  is  accord- 
ing to  their  quantity  [or  extent.]  If  the  Predi-  Quantlty- 


See  Chap.  V.  § 3. 


72 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 


TBuor  li 


cate  is  said  of  the  whole  of  the  Subject,  the  proposition  is 
Universal : if  of  part  of  it  only,  the  proposition  is  Particular 
(or  partial:)  e.  g.  “Britain  is  an  island;”  “all  tyrants  are 
miserable;”  “no  miser  is  rich;”  are  Universal  propositions, 
and  their  s lbjects  are  therefore  said  to  be  distributed  ; being 
understood  to  stand,  each,  for  the  whole  of  its  Significates : 
but,  “ some  islands  are  fertile ; ” “ all  tyrants  arp  not  assassi- 
nated ; ” are  Particular , and  their  subjects,  consequently, 
not  distributed , being  taken  to  stand  for  a part  only  of  their 
Significates. 

As  every  proposition  must  be  either  Affirmative  or  Nega- 
tive, and  must  also  be  either  universal  or  particular , we 
reckon,  in  all,  four  kinds  of  pure  categorical  propositions, 
(i,.  e.  considered  as  to  their  quantity  and  quality  both ;)  viz. 
Universal  Affirmative,  whose  symbol  (used  for  brevity)  is 
A ; Universal  Negative,  E ; Particular  Affirmative,  I ; Par- 
ticular Negative,  O. 

§ 2. 

When  the  subject  of  a proposition  is  a Common-term,  the 
universal  signs  (“  all,  no,  every”)  are  used  to  indicate  that  it 
is  distributed,  (the  proposition  being  consequently  then  uni- 
versal ;)  the  particular  signs  (“  some,  4*c.”)  the  contrary. 
Should  there  be  no  sign  at  all  to  the  common  term,  the  quan- 
tity of  the  proposition  (which  is  called  an  Indefinite  proposi- 
tion) is  ascertained  by  the  matter;  i.  e.  the  nature  of  the  con 
nection  between  the  extremes  : which  is  either  Necessary,  Im- 
possible, or  Contingent.  In  necessary  and  in  impossible  Matter 
an  Indefinite  is  understood  as  a universal : e.  g 

Indefinite.  u birds  have  wings  ; ” i.  e.  all:  “ birds  are  not 
quadrupeds ; ” i.  e.  none : in  contingent  matter,  (i.  e.  where 


Chap.  II.  § 2.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


73 


ihe  terms  partly  [sometimes]  agree,  and  partly  not)  an  Indef- 
inite is  understood  as  a Particular;  e.  g.  “ food  is  necessary 
to  life  ; ” i.  e.  some  food  ; “ birds  sing ; ” i.  e.  some  do  ; 
“ birds  are  not  carnivorous  ; ” i.  e.  some  are  not,  or,  all  are  not. 

It  is  very  perplexing  to  the  learner,  and  needlessly  so,  to 
reckon  indefinites  as  one  class  of  propositions  in  respect  of 
quantity.*  They  must  he  either  universal  or  particular, 
though  it  is  not  declared  which.  The  person,  indeed,  who 
utters  the  indefinite  proposition,  may  be  mistaken  as  to  this 
point,  and  may  mean  to  speak  universally  in  a case  where  the 
proposition  is  not  universally  true.  And  the  hearer  may  be 
in  doubt  which  was  meant,  or  ought  to  be  meant ; but  the 
speaker  must  mean  either  the  one  or  the  other. 

Of  course  the  determination  of  a question  relating  to  the 
“matter,”  i.  e.  when  we  are  authorized  to  use  the  universal, 
and  when,  the  particular  sign,  — when,  an  affirmative,  and 
when  a negative,  — is  what  cannot  be  determined  by  Logic. 
As  for  singular  propositions,  (viz.  those  whose 

Singular 

ubject  is  either  a proper  name , or  a common  proposiiions 
erm  with  a singular  sign)  they  are  reckoned  as 
Universals,  (see  Book  IV.  Ch.  IV.  § 2.)  because  in  them  we 
speak  of  the  whole  of  the  subject ; e.  g.  when  we  say,  “ Bru- 
tus was  a Roman,”  we  mean  the  whole  of  Brutus.  This  is 
the  general  rule ; but  some  Singular-propositions  may  fairly 
be  reckoned  particular ; i.  e.  when  some  qualifying  word  is 
inserted,  which  indicates  that  you  are  not  speaking  of  the 
whole  of  the  subject ; e.  g.  “ Caesar  was  not  wholly  a tyrant ; ” 
“ this  man  is  occasionally  intemperate  ; ” “ non  omnis  moriar.” 
It  is  not  meant  that  these  may  not  be,  and  that,  the  mosl 


* Such  a mode  of  classification  resembles  that  of  some  grammari- 
ans, who,  among  the  Genders,  enumerate  the  doubtful  gender  l 

7 


74 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  I\ 


naturally,  accounted  Universals ; but  it  is  only  by  viewing 
them  in  the  other  light,  that  we  can  regularly  state  the  Con- 
tradictory to  a Singular  proposition.  Strictly  speaking,  when 
we  regard  such  propositions  as  admitting  of  a variation  in 
Quantity,  they  are  not  properly  considered  as  Singular  ; the 
subject  being,  e.  g.  not  Cccsar,  but  the  parts  of  his  character. 


tween  universal  and  particular  propositions  :)  but  the  distribu- 
tion or  non-distribution  of  the  predicate,  depends  (not  on  the 
quantity , but)  on  the  quality,  of  the  proposition  ; for,  if  any 
part  of  the  predicate  agrees  with  the  Subject,  it  must  be  af- 
firmed and  not  denied  of  the  Subject ; therefore,  for  an  Af- 
firmative-proposition to  be  true,  it  is  sufficient  that  some  part 
of  the  predicate  .agrees  with  the  Subject ; and  (for  the  same 
reason)  for  a Negative  to  be  true,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
whole  of  the  predicate  should  disagree  with  the  Subject : e.  g. 
it  is  true  that  “ learning  is  useful,”  though  the  whole  of  the 
term  “ useful  ” does  not  agree  with  the  term  “ learning  ” (for 
many  things  are  useful  besides  learning  ;)  but  “ no  vice  is 
useful,”  would  be  false  if  any  part  of  the  term  “useful” 
agreed  with  the  term  “ vice  ; ” i.  e.  if  you  could  find  any  one 
useful  thing  which  was  a vice. 

And  this  holds  good  equally  whether  the  negative  proposi- 
tion be  “ universal  ” or  “ particular.”  For  to  say  that  “ Some 
X is  not  Y ” (or  — which  is  the  same  in  sense  — that  “ All  X 
is  not  Y”)  is  to  imply  that  there  is  no  part  of  the  term  “ Y* 
[no  part  of  the  class  which  “ Y ” stands_/or]  that  is  ap  dica- 
ble to  the  whole  without  exception,  of  the  term  “ X ; ” — in 
short,  that  there  is  some  part  of  the  term  “ X ” to  whici  V 
is  wholly  inapp'icable. 


Distribution 
of  terms . 


It  is  evident  that  the  subject  is  distributed  in 
every  universal  proposition,  and  never  in  a par- 
ticular : (that  being  the  very  difference  be- 


Chap.  II.  § 2.J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


75 


Thus,  if  I say,  “some  of  the  men  found  on  that  island  ara 
not  sailors  of  the  ship  that  was  wrecked  there,”  or,  in  other 
words,  “ the  men  found  on  that  island  are  not , all  of  them , 
sailors  of  the  ship,  &c.,”  I imply  that  the  term  “sailors,  &c. 
is  wholly  inapplicable  to  some  of  the  “ men  on  the  island  ; ” 
though  it  might  perhaps  be  applicable  to  others  of  them. 

Again,  if  I say  “ some  coin  is  made  of  silver,”  and  “ some 
coin  is  not  made  of  silver,”  (or  in  other  words,  that  “ all  coin 
is  not  made  of  silver,”)  in  the  former  of  these  propositions  I 
imply,  that  in  some  portion  (at  least)  of  the  Class  of  “ things 
made  of  silver,”  is  found  [or  comprehended]  “ some  coin  : ” 
in  the  latter  proposition  I imply  that  there  is  “ some  coin  ” 
which  is  contained  in  no  portion  of  the  Class  of  “ things  made 
of  silver ; ” or  (in  other  words)  which  is  excluded  from  the 
whole  of  that  Class.  So  that  the  term  “ made  of  silver  ” is 
distributed  in  this  latter  proposition,  and  not,  in  the  former. 

The  two  practical  rules  then  to  be  observed  respecting  dis- 
tribution, are, 

1st.  All  universal  propositions  (and  no  particular)  distribute 
the  subject. 

2d.  All  negative  (and  no  affirmative)  the  predicate.* 

* Hence,  it  is  matter  of  common  remark,  that  it  is  difficult  to  prove 
a Negative.  At  first  sight  this  appears  very  obvious,  from  the  cir- 
cumstance that  a Negative  has  one  more  Term  distributed  than  the 
corresponding  Affirma.ive.  But  then,  again,  a difficulty  may  be  l'clt 
in  accounting  for  this,  inasmuch  as  any  Negative  may  be  expressed 
(as  we  shall  see  presently)  as  an  Affirmative,  and  vice  versA.  The 
proposition,  e.  g.  that  “ such  a one  is  not  in  the  To  in  ,”  might  be  ex- 
pressed by  the  use  of  an  equivalent  term,  “ he  is  absent  from  the 
Town.” 

The  fact  is,  however,  that  in  every  case  where  the  observation  as  to 
ihs  difficulty  of  proving  a Negative  holds  good,  it  will  be  found  that 
the  proposition  in  question  is  contrasted  with  one  which  has  really  s 
term  the  less,  distributed  ; or  a term  of  less  extensive  sense.  E.  O 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 


[Book  R 


rt 

L may  happen  indeed,  that  the  whole  of  the  predicate  in  an 
affirmative  may  agree  with  the  subject;  e.  g.  it  is  equulll 
true,  that  “ all  men  are  rational  animals  ; ” and  “ all  rationa. 
animals  are  men  ; ” but  this  is  merely  accidental , and  is  not 
at  all  implied  in  the  form  of  expression , which  alone  is  re 
garded  in  Logic.* * 

Of  Opposition. 

§ 3. 

Two  propositions  are  said  to  be  opposed  to  each  other 
when,  having  the  same  Subject  and  Predicate,  they  differ,  in 
quantity,  or  quality , or  both.f  It  is  evident,  that  with  any 
given  subject  and  predicate,  you  may  state  four  distinct  prop- 
ositions, viz.  A,  E,  I,  and  O ; any  two  of  which  are  said  to 
be  opposed  hence  there  are  four  different  kinds  of  oppo- 


It  is  easier  to  prove  that  a man  has  proposed  wise  measures,  than 
that  he  has  never  proposed  an  unwise  measure.  In  fact,  the  one 
would  be  to  prove  that  “ Some  of  his  measures  are  wise  ; ” the  other, 
that  “ All  his  measures  are  wise.”  And  numberless  such  examples 
are  to  be  found. 

But  it  will  very  often  happen  that  there  shall  be  Negative  proposi- 
tions much  more  easily  established  than  certain  Affirmative  ones  on 
the  same  subject.  E.  G.  That  “ The  cause  of  animal  heat  is  not  res- 
piration," is  said  to  have  been  established  by  experiments  ; but  t chat 
the  cause  is  remains  doubtful.  See  Note  to  Chap.  III.  § 5. 

* When,  however,  a Singular  Term  is  the  Predicate,  it  must,  of 
course,  be  co-extensive  with  the  Subject;  as  “Romulus  was  the 
founder  of  Rome.”  In  this  and  also  in  some  other  cases  (see  B.  I.  § 5.) 
we  judge,  not  from  the  form  of  the  expression,  but  from  the  significa- 
tion of  the  terms,  that  they  are  “equivalent”  [“convertible"]  terms. 

t For  Opposition  of  Terms,  see  Chap.  V. 

J In  ordinary  language  however,  and  in  some  logical  treatises, 
propositions  which  do  not  differ  in  Quality  (viz.  Subalterns ) are  ns* 
(reckoned  as  “ opposed.” 


17HA.P.  II  § 3.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


77 


sition,  viz  1st.  the  two  universals  (A  and  E)  are  called  con 

trarics  to  each  other ; 2d.  the  two  particular,  (I  ^ 

r ' Contraries. 

and  O)  subcontraries ; 3d.  A and  I,  or  E and  O,  Subcontraries . 
subalterns  ; 4th.  A and  O,  or  E and  I,  contra - Subalterns, 
dietaries.  Contradictories 

As  it  is  evident,  that  the  truth  or  falsity  of  any  proposition 
(its  quantity  and  quality  being  known)  must  depend  on  the 
matter  of  it,  we  must  bear  in  mind,  that,  “ in  necessary 
matter , all  affirmatives  are  true , and  negatives  false ; in  im- 
possible matter , vice  versa ; in  contingent  matter , all  uni 
versals,  false , and  particulars  true  ; ” e.  g.  “ all  islands  (or 
some  islands)  are  surrounded  by  water,”  must  be  true,  be- 
cause the  matter  is  necessary  : to  say,  “ no  islands,  or  some 
— not , SfC.f  would  have  been  false:  again,  “ some  islands 
are  fertile  ; ” “ some  are  not  fertile,”  are  both  true,  because 
it  is  Contingent  Matter : put  “ all  ” or  “ no  ” instead  of 
“ some,"  and  the  propositions  will  be  false. 

Hence  it  will  be  evident,  that  Contraries  will  be  both  falsa 
in  Contingent  matter,  but  never  both  true  : Subcontraries, 
both  true  in  Contingent  matter,  but  never  both  false  : Contra- 
dictories, always  one  true  and  the  other  false , 8fc.  with  other 
observations,  which  will  be  immediately  made  on  viewing  the 
scheme ; in  which  the  four  propositions  are  denoted  by 
their  symbols,  the  different  kinds  of  matter  by  the  in- 
itials, n,  i,  c,  and  the  truth  or  falsity  of  each  proposition  in 
each  matter,  by  the  letter  v.  for  ( verum ) true,  f.  for  ( falsum ) 
false. 

You  may  substitute  for  the  unmeaning  Symbols  X,  Y, 
I which  stand  for  the  Terms  of  the  following  Propositions! 
wnatover  significant  Terms  you  will  ; and  on  their  meaning 
of  course,  will  depend  the  truth  or  falsity  cf  each  propcsi 
tion 


7* 


78 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  n 


For  instance,  Naturalists  have  observed  that  “ animals  hav 
mg  horns  on  the  head  are  universally  ruminant ; ” that,  ol 
‘ carnivorous  animals  ” none  are  ruminant ; and  that,  of  “ ani- 
mals with  hoofs,”  some  are  ruminant,  and  some,  not.  Let  us 
take  then  instead  of  “ X,”  “ animals  with  horns  on  the  head,” 
and  for  “ Y,”  “ ruminant : ” here,  the  real  connection  of  the 
Terms  in  respect  of  their  meaning  — which  Connection  is 
called  the  “ matter  ” of  a proposition  — is  such  that  the  Pred- 
icate may  be  affirmed  universally  of  the  Subject ; and  of 
course  the  affirmatives  (whether  Universal  or  Particular)  will 
be  true,  and  the  “ negatives  ” false.  In  this  case  the  “ mat- 
ter” is  technically  called  “necessary;”  inasmuch  as  we 


Chap.  II.  i 3.1  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


7S 


cannot  avoid  believing  the  Predicate  to  be  applicable  to  the 
Subject. 

“ Again,  let  “ X ” represent  “ carnivorous-animal,”  and 
“ Y ” “ ruminant : ” this  is  a case  of  what  is  called  “ impossi- 
ble matter (i.  e.  where  we  cannot  possibly  conceive  the 
Predicate  to  be  applicable  to  the  Subject)  being  just  the  re- 
verse of  the  foregoing  ; and,  of  course,  both  the  Affirmatives 
will  here  be  false,  and  both  Negatives  true. 

And  lastly,  as  an  instance  of  what  is  called  “ contingent 
matter,”  — i.  e.  where  the  Predicate  can  neither  be  affirmed 
universally,  nor  denied  universally,  of  the  Subject,  take 
“ hoofed-animal  ” for  “ X ” and  “ ruminant  ” for  “ Y ; ” and 
of  course  the  Universals  will  both  be  false,  and  the  Particu- 
lars, true  : that  is,  it  is  equally  true  that  “ some  hoofed  ani- 
mals are  ruminant,  ” and  that  “ some  are  not.” 

By  a careful  study  of  the  above  Scheme,  bearing  in  mind 
and  applying  the  rule  concerning  matter , the  learner  will  easi- 
ly solicit  all  the  maxims  relating  to  “ Opposition  ; ” as  that,  in 
the  Subalterns,  the  truth  of  the  Particular  (which  is  called 
the  subalternate)  follows  from  the  truth  of  the  Universal 
( subalternans ),  and  the  falsity  of  the  Universal  from  the 
falsity  of  the  Particular : that  Subalterns  differ  in  quan- 
tity alone ; Contraries,  and  also  Subcontraries,  in  quality 
alone ; Contradictories,  in  both : and  hence,  that  if  any  prop- 
osition is  known  to  be  true,  we  infer  that  its  Contradictory  is 
false  ; if  false,  its  Contradictory  true,  <f*c. 

“ Contradictory-opposition  ” is  the  kind  most 
frequently  alluded  to,  because  (as  is  evident  Belief  ana 
from  what  has  been  just  said)  to  deny, — or  to  disbelief  coin- 
disbelieve,  — a proposition,  is  to  assert , or  to 
believe  its  Contradictoiy  ; and  of  course,  to  assent  to,  ol 
maintain  a proposition,  is  to  reject  its  Contradictory  Belief 


80 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  li 


theiefore,  and  Disbelief,  are  not  two  different  states  of  the 
mina,  but  the  same , only  considered  in  reference  to  two  Con 
tradictory  propositions.  And  consequently,  Credulity  and  In- 
credulity are  not  opposite  habits,  but  the  same ; in  reference 
to  some  class  of  propositions,  and  to  their  contradictories. 

For  instance,  he  who  is  the  most  incredulous  respecting  a 
lertain  person’s  guilt,  is,  in  other  words,  the  most  ready  to 
oelieve  him  not  guilty  ; he  who  is  the  most  credulous  * as  to 
certain  works  being  within  the  reach  of  Magic,  is  the  most 
incredulous  [or  “ slow  of  heart  to  believe  ”]  that  they  are  not 
within  the  reach  of  Magic ; and  so,  in  all  cases. 

The  reverse  of  believing  this  or  that  individual  proposi- 
tion, is,  no  doubt,  to  disbelieve  that  same  proposition  : but  the 
reverse  of  belief  generally,  is  (not  disbelief;  since  that  im- 
plies belief;  but)  doubt,  t 

* As  the  Jews,  in  the  time  of  Jesus,  in  respect  of  his  works, 
t And  there  may  even  be  cases  in  which  doubt  itself  may  amount  to 
the  most  extravagant  credulity.  For  instance,  if  any  one  should 
“ doubt  whether  there  is  any  such  Country  as  Egypt,”  he  would  be 
in  fact  believing  this  most  incredible  proposition  ; that  “ it  is  possible 
for  many  thousands  of  persons,  unconnected  with  each  other,  to  have 
agreed,  for  successive  Ages,  in  bearing  witness  to  the  existence  of  a 
fictitious  Country,  without  being  detected,  contradicted,  or  suspected.” 
All  this,  though  self-evident,  is,  in  practice,  frequently  lost  sight 
of : the  more,  on  account  of  our  employing,  in  reference  to  the  Chris- 
tian Religion,  the  words  “ Believer  and  Unbeliever  ; ” whence,  un- 
blinking persons  are  led  to  take  for  granted  that  the  rejection  of 
Christianity  implies  a less  easy  belief  than  its  reception. 

The  only  way  to  be  safe  from  credulity  on  a given  subject,  is,  either 
to  examine  carefully  and  dispassionately,  and  decide  according  to  the 
evidence,  or  else  to  withdraw  your  thoughts  from  it  altogether. 
E.  G.  in  some  legal  trial  which  does  not  concern  or  interest  us,  we 
neither  pronounce  that  the  plaintiff  has  a just  title  to  the  property  he 
claims,  nor  again  that  he  has  not  a just  title,  nor  yet,  that  there  is  n» 
\ufjicient  evidence  to  show  whether  his  title  is  just  or  not ; but  we  dis 
regard  the  whole  question. 


il.  { 4.  ] SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


Bl 


Of  course  the  learner  must  remember,  as  above  observed 
diat  the  determination  of  the  “ matter”  is  out  of  the  province 
of  Logic.  The  rules  of  Opposition  merely  pronounce  on  the 
truth  or  falsity  of  each  proposition,  given , the  “ matter.” 

Of  Conversion. 

4. 

A proposition  is  said  to  be  converted  when  its  Terms  are 
transposed  ; i.  e.  when  the  Subject  is  made  the  Predicate,  and 
the  Predicate  the  Subject.  When  nothing  more  is  done,  this 
is  called  simple  conversion. 

No  conversion  is  employed  for  any  logical 

purpose,  unless  it  be  illative ; * i.  e.  when  the  Motive  con 

vcTsion 

truth  of  the  converse  is  implied  by  the  truth  of 
die  Exposita,  (or  proposition  given  ;)  e.  g. 

“ No  virtuous  man  is  a rebel,  therefore 
No  rebel  is  a virtuous  man.” 


Hence  we  may  perceive  that  “ private-judgment ,”  the  right,  and  ths 
duty  of  which  have  long  been  warmly  debated,  is  a thing  unavoidable, 
in  any  matter  concerning  which  one  takes  an  interest.  For  if  a man 
resolves  that  he  will  implicitly  receive,  e.  g.  in  Religious  points,  all  the 
decisions  of  a certain  Pastor,  Church,  or  Party,  he  has,  in  so  doing, 
performed  one  act  of  private-judgment,  which  includes  all  the  rest : 
just  as  if  a man,  distrusting  his  own  skill  in  the  management  of 
property,  should  make  over  his  whole  estate  to  trustees ; in  doing 
which  he  has  exercised  an  act  of  ownership ; for  which  act,  generally, 
and  for  the  choice  of  such  and  such  particular  trustees,  he  is  respon- 
sible. (See  Essay  ii.  On  the  Kingdom  of  Christ,  § 26.) 

* The  reader  must  not  suppose  from  the  use  of  the  word  “ illative.” 
that  this  conversion  is  a process  of  reasoning  ■ it  is  in  fart  only  stating 
the  same  Judgment  in  another  form 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 


[Look  II 


tft 

“ No  Christian  is  an  astronomer,  therefore 
No  astronomer  is  a Christian.”  * 

“ Some  boasters  are  cowards,  therefore 
Some  cowards  are  boasters.” 

The  ’ conversin’’  of  such  a proposition  as  this  “ Na 
one  [is  happy  who]  is  anxious  for  change,”  would  be  effected 
by  altering  the  arrangement  of  the  words  in  brackets,  into 
‘ who  is  happy.” 

Strictly  speaking,  that  is  not  a real  “ conversion,” — but 
only  an  “ apparent  conversion” — which  is  not  “illative.” 
For,  (as  has  been  above  said)  there  is  not  a mere  transposition 
of  the  terms,  but  a new  term  introduced,  when  a term  which 
was  undistributed  in  the  “ exposita,”  is  distributed  [taken  uni- 
versally] in  the  Converse.  But  as  it  is  usual,  in  common  dis- 
course, to  speak  of  “ an  unsound  argument,”  — meaning  “ an 
apparent-argument , which  is  in  reality  not  an  argument,”  so 
in  this  case  also,  it  is  common  to  say,  for  instance,  that  “ Eu- 
clid proves  first  (hat  all  equilateral  triangles  are  equiangular, 
and  afterwards  he  proves  the  Converse , that  all  equiangular 
triangles  are  equilateral : ” or  again,  to  say,  “ It  is  true  that 
all  money  is  wealth  ; but  I deny  the  Converse , (in  reality,  the 
apparent-converse)  that  all  wealth  is  money.” 

Conversion  then,  strictly  so  called,  — that  is,  “ illative-con- 
version,”— can  only  take  place  when  no  term  is  distrib- 
uted in  the  Converse,  which  was  undistributed  in  the  “ Ex- 
posita.” 

Hence,  since  E [Universal-negative]  distributes  both  terms, 


* When  Galileo’s  persecutors  endeavored  to  bring  about  the  for- 
mer of  these,  they  forgot  that  it  implied  the  latter.  And  the  sama 
may  be  said  of  some  opponents  of  Geology  at  the  present  day. 


Chip.  II.  § 4.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


83 


and  I,  [Particular-affirmative]  neither,  these  may  both  be  sim- 
ply-converted illatively  ; as  in  the  examples  above.  But  as  A 
does  not  distribute  the  Predicate,  its  simple-conversion  would 
not  be  illative ; (e.  g.  from  “ all  birds  are  animals,”)  you 
cannot  infer  that  “ all  animals  are  birds,”)  as  there  would  be 
a term  distributed  in  the  Converse,  which  was  not  before.  We 
must  therefore  limit  its  quantity  from  universal  to  particular, 
and  the  Conversion  will  be  illative ; (e.  g.  “ some  animals  are 
birds;”)  this  might  be  fairly  named  conversion  by  limitation 
but  is  commonly  called  “ Conversion  per  acci- 

dens .”  E may  thus  be  converted  also.  But  in  Conversion 

per  accident 

O,  whether  the  quantity  be  changed  or  not, 
there  will  still  be  a term  (the  predicate  of  the  converse)  dis 
tributed,  which  was  not  before  : you  can  therefore  only  con- 
vert it  illatively,  by  changing  the  quality;  i.  e.  considering  the 
negative  as  attached  to  the  predicate  instead  of  to  the  copula , 

and  thus  regarding  it  as  I.  One  of  the  terms 

....  , . , , , Contraposition. 

will  then  not  be  the  same  as  before  ; but  the 

proposition  will  be  equipollent  ( i . e.  convey  the  same  mean- 
ing;) e.  g.  “some  who  possess  wealth  are  not  happy:”  you 
may  consider  “ not-happy  ” as  the  predicate,  instead  of 
“ happy ; ” the  proposition  will  then  be  I,  and  of  course  may 
be  simply  converted  ; “ some  who  are  not  happy  possess 
wealth  : ” or,  (as  such  a proposition  is  often  expressed)  “ one 
may  possess  wealth  without  being  happy.”  * This  may  be 

* It  is  worth  remarking  by  the  way,  that  in  such  Ambiguity  of 
examples  as  the  above,  the  words  “may,”  “can,”  the  words  '‘may," 
“ cannot,  ' &c.t  have  no  reference  (as  they  sometimes  “must,”  Sic. 
have)  to  power,  as  exercised  by  an  agent ; but  merely  to  the  distribu * 
Hon  or  non- distribution  of  Terms:  or  to  the  confidence  or  doubtfulness  w< 
feel  respecting  some  supposition. 

To  say,  for  instance,  that  “ a man  who  has  the  plague  may  re  oyer.’ 
does  not  mean  that  “ it  is  in  his  porcer  to  recover  if  he  chooses  ; ’’  bn) 


84 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


fBoos:  n 


named  conversion  by  negation ; or  as  it  is  commonly  called 
by  contraposition .* 

A may  also  be  fairly  converted  in  this  way,  e.  g 

“ Every  poet  is  a man  of  genius ; therefore 
He  who  is  not  a man  of  genius  is  not  a poet : ” 

(or,  “ None  but  a man  of  genius  can  be  a poet : ” 
or,  “ A man  of  genius  alone  can  be  a poet : ” 
or,  “ One  cannot  be  a poet  without  being  a man  af 
genius.” 


it  is  only  a form  of  stating  a particular -proposition  : [I]  namely,  that 
“ Home  who  have  the  plague  recover.”  And  again  to  say,  “ there  may 
be  a bed  of  coal  in  this  district,”  means  merely  “ The  existence  of  a 
bed  of  coal  in  this  district  — is  — a thing  which  I cannot  confidently 
deny  or  affirm.” 

So  also  to  say  “ a virtuous  man  cannot  betray  his  Country  ” [or  “ it 
is  impossible  that  a virtuous  man  should  betray,  &c.”]  does  not  mean 
that  he  lacks  the  power,  (for  there  is  no  virtue  in  not  doing  what  is  out 
of  one’s  power)  but  merely  that  ‘‘not  betraying  one’s  country”  forms 
an  essential  part  of  the  notion  conveyed  by  the  term  “virtuous.”  We 
mean  in  short  that  it  is  as  much  out  of  oar  power  to  conceive  a virtu- 
ous man  who  should  be  a traitor,  as  to  conceive  “ a Square  with  une- 
qual sides  ; ” that  is,  a square  which  is  not  a square.  The  expression 
therefore  is  merely  a way  of  stating  the  Universal-proposition  [E]  “ No 
virtuous  man  betrays  his  Country.” 

So  again  to  say,  “ a weary  traveller  in  the  deserts  of  Arabia  must 
eagerly  drink  when  he  comes  to  a Spring,”  does  not  mean  that  he  is 
compelled  to  drink,  but  that  / cannot  avoid  believing  that  he  will ; — 
that  there  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind. 

In  these  and  many  other  such  instances,  the  words  “may,”  “must,” 
“can,”  “impossible,”  &c.,  have  reference,  not  to  power  or  absence  of 
power  in  an  agent,  but  only  to  universality  or  absence  of  universality 
in  the  expression ; or,  to  doubt  or  absence  of  doubt  in  our  own  mind, 
respecting  what  is  asserted.  See  Appendix,  No.  1,  Art.  May. 

* No  mention  is  made  by  Aldrich  of  this  kind  of  conversion  ; but 
it  has  been  thought  advisable  to  insert  it,  as  being  in  frequent  use,  and 
also  as  being  employed  in  this  treatise  for  the  direct  reduction  of  Ba- 
roko  and  Bokardo. 


Chap.  II.  { 4.J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


85 


for  (since  it  is  the  same  thing  to  affirm  some  attribute  of  the 
subject,  or  to  deny  the  absence  of  that  attribute)  the  original 
proposition  [Exposita]  is  precisely  equipollent  to  this, 

Bubj.  pred. 

“ No  poet  is  not-a-man-of-genius ; ” 
which,  being  E,  may  of  course  be  simply  converted.  Thus, 
in  one  of  these  three  ways,  every  proposition  may  be  llla- 
tively  converted  : viz.  E,  I,  Simply ; A,  O,  by  Negation ; 
A,  E , — Limitation. 

Note,  that  as  it  was  remarked  that,  in  some 

affirmatives,  the  whole  of  the  Predicate  does  Convertible 

terms. 

actually  agree  with  the  Subject,  so,  when  this 
s the  case,  A being  converted  simply,  the  Converse  will  be 
true : but  still,  as  its  truth  does  not  follow  from  that  of  the 
original  proposition  [“  exposita  ”]  the  Conversion  is  not  illa- 
tive. Many  propositions  in  mathematics  are  of  this  descrip- 
tion : e.  g. 

“ All  equilateral  triangles  are  equiangular;”  and 
“ All  equiangular  triangles  are  equilateral.” 

Though  both  these  propositions  are  true,  the  one  does  not 
follow  from  the  other ; and  mathematicians  accordingly  give 
a distinct  proof  of  each. 

As  the  simple  converse  of  A can  then  only  be  true  when 
the  subject  and  predicate  are  exactly  equivalent  (or,  as  they 
are  called,  convertible  terms  ;)  and  as  this  must  always  be  the 
case  in  a just  definition , so  the  correctness  of  a definitJon 
may  be  tried  by  this  test.  E.  G.  “ A good  government  ia 
that  which  has  the  happiness  of  the  governed  for  its  object ; ” 
if  this  be  a right  definition , it  will  follow  that  “ a gov- 
ernment which  has  the  happiness  of  the  governed  for  its  oh. 
ject  is  a good  one.”  But  to  assert  a proposition,  and  tc 
8 


86 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  H 


add,  or  imply,  that  it  is  a just  definition , is  to  make,  not  ont 
assertion,  but  two 


Chap.  III.  — Of  Arguments. 


§ 1. 


Syllogisms. 


The  third  operation  of  the  mind,  viz.  reasoning , [or  “ dis- 
course ”]  expressed  in  words,  is  argument ; and  an  argument 
stated  at  full  length  and  in  its  regular  form , is  called  a syllo- 
gism. The  third  part  of  Logic  therefore  treats 
of  the  syllogism.  Every  Argument  * consists 
of  two  parts;  that  which  is  proved;  and  that  by  means  of 
which  it  is  proved.  The  former  is  called,  before  it  is  proved, 
the  question  ; when  proved,  the  conclusion  [or  inference  ;]  that 
which  is  used  to  prove  it,  if  stated  last  (as  is  often  done  in 
common  discourse ,)  is  called  the  reason , and  is  introduced  by 
‘ because ,”  or  some  other  causal  conjunction ; e.  g.  1 Ccesai 
deserved  death,  because  he  was  a tyrant,  and  all  tyrants  de- 
serve death.”  If  the  Conclusion  be  stated  last  (which  is  the 
strict  logical  form , to  which  all  Reasoning  may  be  reduced) 
then,  that  which  is  employed  to  prove  it  is  called  the  prem 
isses,  f and  the  Conclusion  is  then  introduced  by  some  illative 
conjunction,  as  “ therefore,”  e.  g. 


* I mean,  in  the  strict  technical  sense ; for  in  popular  use  the 
word  Argument  is  often  employed  to  denote  the  latter  of  these  two 
parts  alone  : e.  g.  “ This  is  an  Argument  to  prove  so  and  so  ; ” “ this 
conclusion  is  established  by  the  Argument : ” i.  e.  Premisses.  — See 
Appendix,  No.  I.  art.  Argument. 

Both  the  premisses  together  are  sometimes  called  the  antecedetd. 


Chap.  HI  5 1.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


87 


“ All  tyrants  deserve  death  : 

Caesar  was  a tyrant ; 
therefore  he  deserved  death.” *  * 

Since,  then,  an  argument  is  an  expression  in 
which  “ from  something  laid  down  and  granted 
as  true  (i.  e.  the  Premisses)  something  else  (i.  e. 
the  Conclusion)  beyond  this  must  be  admitted  to  be  true,  <13 
following  necessarily  [ resulting ] from  the  other ; ” and  since 
Logic  is  wholly  concerned  in  the  use  of  language  it  follows 
that  a Syllogism  (which  is  an  argument  stated  in  a regular 
logical  form)  must  be  “an  argument  so  ex- 
pressed, that  the  conclusiveness  of  it  is  manifest  Definition  oj 
1 Syllogism. 

from  the  mere  force  of  the  expression ,”  i.  e.  with- 
out considering  the  meaning  of  the  terms  : e.  g.  in  this  Syllo 

* It  may  be  observed  that  the  definition  here  given  of  an  argument , 
is  in  the  common  treatises  of  Logic  laid  down  as  the  definition  of  a 
syllogism;  a word  which  I have  confined  to  a more  restricted  sense. 
There  cannot  evidently  be  any  argument,  whether  regularly  or  irregu- 
larly expressed,  to  which  the  definition  given  by  Aldrich,  for  instance, 
would  not  apply  ; so  that  he  appears  to  employ  “ syllogism  ” as 
synonymous  with  “ argument.”  But  besides  that  it  is  clearer  and 
more  convenient,  when  we  have  these  two  words  at  hand,  to  emp’oy 
them  in  the  two  senses  respectively  which  we  want  to  express,  the 
truth  is,  that  in  so  doing  I have  actually  conformed  to  Aldrich’s 
practice : for  he  generally,  if  not  always,  employs  the  term  “ syllo- 
gism ” in  the  very  sense  to  which  I have  confined  it ; viz.  to  denote 
an  argument  stated  in  regular  logical  form  ; as,  e.  g.  in  a part  of  his 
work  (omitted  in  the  late  editions)  in  which  he  is  objecting  to  a cer- 
iain  pretended  syllogism  in  the  work  of  another  writer,  he  says, 

* valet  certe  arg amentum;  syllogismus  tamen  est  falsissimus,”  &c.  Now 
[waiving  the  exception  that  might  be  taken  at  this  use  of  ‘‘falsissi- 
nus,”  nothing  being,  strictly,  true  or  false,  but  a proposition t it  u 
plain  that  he  limits  the  word  “syllogism”  to  the  sense  in  which  it  is 
he’e  defined,  and  is  consequently  inconsistent  with  1 is  own  defim 
tion  of  it. 


Defintttcn  oj 
Argument . 


88 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


gism,  “ Every  "Y  is  X,  Z is  Y,  therefore  Z is  X : ” the  Con* 
elusion  is  inevitable,  whatever  terms  X,  Y,  and  Z,  respectively 
are  understood  to  stand  for.  And  to  this  form  all  legitimate 
Arguments  may  ultimately  be  brought. 

One  circumstance  which  has  misled  some  persons  into  the 
notion  that  there  may  be  Reasoning  that  is  not,  substantially, 
syllogistic,  is  this ; that  in  a Syllogism  we  see  the 

Necessary  # Conclusion  following  certainly  [or  necessarily ] 
elusions.  from  the  Premisses  ; and  again,  in  any  appar- 

ent-syllogism which  on  examination  is  found  to 
be  (as  we  have  seen  in  some  of  the  examples)  not  a real  one 
[not  “valid”]  the  Conclusion  does  not  follow  at  all;  and 
the  whole  is  a mere  deception.  And  yet  we  often  hear  of 
Arguments  which  have  some  weight,  and  yet  are  not  quite 
decisive;  of  Conclusions  which  are  rendered  probable , but 
not  absolutely  certain , &c.  And  hence  some  are  apt  to  im- 
agine that  the  conclusiveness  of  an  Argument  admits  of  de- 
grees ; and  that  sometimes  a conclusion  may,  probably  and 
partially , — though  not  certainly  and  completely — follow  from 
its  Premisses. 

This  mistake  arises  from  men’s  forgetting  that  the  Premisses 
themselves  will  very  often  be  doubtful ; and  then,  the  Conclu- 
sion also  will  be  doubtful. 

As  was  shown  formerly,  one  or  both  of  the  Premisses  of 
a perfectly  valid  Syllogism  may  be  utterly  false  and  absurd  : 
and  then,  the  Conclusion,  though  inevitably  following  from 
them,  may  be  either  true  or  false,  we  cannot  tell  which.  And 
jf  one  or  both  of  the  Premisses  be  merely  probable,  we  car 
infer  from  them  only  a probable  Conclusion  ; though  the  con 
clusiveness , — that  is,  the  connection  between  the  Premisses 
»nd  the  Conclusion  — is  perfectly  certain. 

For  instance,  assuming  that  “ every  month  has  30  days 


Chap.  III.  § 2.3  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


89 


(which  is  palpably  false)  then,  from  the  minor-premiss  that 
•*  April  is  a month,”  it  follows  (which  happens  to  be  true)  tha* 
“ April  has  30  days : ” and  from  the  minor-premiss  lhat 
“ February  is  a month,”  it  follows  that  “ February  has  30 
days  ; ” which  is  false.  In  each  case  the  conclusiveness  of 
the  Argument  is  the  same ; but  in  every  case,  when  we  have 
ascertained  the  falsity  of  one  of  the  Premisses,  we  know 
nothing  (as  far  as  that  argument  is  concerned)  of  the  truth  or 
falsity  of  the  Conclusion. 

When  however  we  are  satisfied  of  the  falsity  of  some 
Conclusion , we  may,  of  course,  be  sure  that  (at  least)  one  of 
the  Premisses  is  false  ; since  if  they  had  both  been  true,  the 
Conclusion  would  have  been  true. 

And  this — which  is  called  the  “ indirect  ” mode  of  proof 
— is  often  employed  (even  in  Mathematics)  for  establishing 
what  we  maintain:  that  is,  we  prove  th e falsity  of  some  Prop- 
osition (in  other  words,  the  truth  of  its  contradictory)  by 
showing  that  if  assumed  as  a Premiss,  along  with  another 
Premiss  known  to  be  true,  it  leads  to  a Conclusion  manifestlj 
false.  For  though,  from  a false  assumption,  either  falsehood 
or  truth  may  follow,  from  a true  assumption,  truth  only  can 
follow. 


§2. 


The  Buie  or  Maxim  (commonly  called  “ die - 
turn  de  omni  et  nullo  ”)  by  which  Aristotle  ex-  dictum. 
plains  the  validity  of  the  above  Argument, 

(every  Y is  X,  Z is  Y,  therefore  Z is  X,)  is  this  : whatever  is 
predicated  of  a term  distributed , whether  affirmatively  or 
negatively , may  be  predicated  in  like  manner  of  every  thing 
contained  under  it."  Thus,  in  the  examples  above,  X is 
Dredicated  of  Y distributed,  and  Z is  confined  under  Y (i.  e 
8 * 


90 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book.  II 


is  its  Subject;)  therefore  X is  predicated  of  Z . so  “all  ty- 
rants,” Sgc.  (§  1.)  This  Rule  may  be  ultimately  applied  to 
all  arguments ; (and  their  validity  ultimately  rests  on  theif 
conformity  thereto)  but  it  cannot  be  directly  and  immediately 
applied  to  all  even  of  pure  categorical  syllogisms ; for  the 
sake  of  brevity,  therefore,  some  other  Axioms  are  commonly 
applied  in  practice,  to  avoid  the  occasional  tediousness  of  re- 
ducing all  syllogisms  to  that  form  in  which  Aristotle’s  dictum 
is  applicable.* 

We  will  speak  first  of  pure  categorical  syllo- 
Canons  of  gjsms ; and  the  Axioms  or  Canons  by  which 
categorical  their  validity  is  to  be  explained  : viz.  first,  if  two 
terms  agree  with  one  and  the  same  third , they 
agree  with  each  other : secondly,  if  one  term  agrees,  and  an- 
other disagrees  with  one  and  the  same  third,  these  two  dis- 
agree with  each  other.  On  the  former  of  these  Canons  rests 
the  validity  of  affirmative  conclusions  ; on  the  latter,  of  neg- 
ative : for  no  categorical  syllogism  can  be  faulty  which  does 
not  violate  these  Canons ; none  correct  which  does  : hence 


* Instead  of  following  the  usual  arrangement,  in  laying  down  first 
the  Canons  which  apply  to  all  the  figures  of  categorical  syllogisms, 
and  then  going  back  to  the  “ dictum  of  Aristotle  ” which  applies  to 
only  one  of  th°m,  I have  pursued  what  appears  a simpler  and  more 
philosophical  arrangement,  and  more  likely  to  impress  on  the  learn- 
er’s mind  a just  view  of  the  science  : viz.  1st,  to  give  the  rule  (Aris- 
totle’s Dictum)  which  applies  to  the  most  clearly  and  regularly-con- 
structed argument,  the  Syllogism  in  the  first  Figure,  to  which  all 
reasoning  may  be  reduced  : then,  the  canons  applicable  to  all  categor- 
teals : then,  those  belonging  to  the  hypothetical^ ; and  lastly,  to  treat 
of  the  Sorites;  which  is  improperly  placed  by  Aldrich  before  the 
cypotheticals.  By  this  plan,  the  province  of  strict  Logic  is  extended 
a3  far  as  it  can  be  ; every  kind  of  argument  which  is  of  a syllogistic 
character,  and  accordingly,  directly  cognizable  by  the  ru'es  of  Logio 
being  enumerated  in  natural  order. 


Chap.  ill.  $ 2.J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


91 


on  these  two  Canons  are  built  the  rules  or  cautions  which  are 
to  be  observed  with  respect  to  syllogisms,  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  whether  those  Canons  have  been  strictly  observed 
or  not. 

1st.  Every  syllogism  has  three , and  only  three  terms : viz 
the  middle-term,  and  the  two  terms  (or  extremes , as  they  are 
commonly  called)  of  the  Conclusion  [or  Question.]  Of  these, 
1st,  the  subject  of  the  Conclusion  is  called  the  minor-term ; 
2d,  its  predicate , the  major-term ; and  3d,  the  middle-term 
(called  by  the  older  logicians  “ Argumentum,”)  is  that  with 
which  each  of  them  is  separately  compared,  in  order  to  judge 
of  their  agreement  or  disagreement  with  each  other.  If  there- 
fore there  were  two  middle-terms,  the  extremes  ( or  terms  oj 
conclusion)  not  being  both  compared  to  the  same , could  not  be 
conclusively  compared  to  each  other. 

2d.  Every  syllogism  has  three , and  only  three  propositions; 
viz.  1st,  the  major-premiss  (in  which  the  major  term  is  com 
pared  with  the  middle  :)  2d,  the  minor-premiss  (in  which  the 
minor -term  is  compared  with  the  middle ;)  and  3d,  the  Conclu- 
sion, in  which  the  Minor-term  is  compared  with  the  Major.* 

3d.  Note,  that  if  the  middle-term  is  ambiguous , there  are 
in  reality  two  middle-terms,  in  sense , though  but  one  in  sound. 
An  ambiguous  Middle-term  is  either  an  equivocal  term  used 
in  different  senses  in  the  two  premisses  : (e.  g. 

“ Light  is  contrary  to  darkness  ; 

Feathers  are  light ; therefore 
Feathers  are  contrary  to  darkness : ”) 


* In  some  logical  treatises  the  Major  premiss  is  called  simply 
Propositio  ; ” and  the  Minor,  “ Assumptio.”  In  ordinary  discourse, 
the  word  “Principle  ’ is  often  used  to  denote  the  Majcr-premiss,  and 
“ Reason,”  the  Minor 


92 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


or  a term  not  distributed : for  as  it  is  then  used  to  stand  for 
a part  only  of  its  significat.es,  it  may  happen  that  one  of  the 
Extremes  may  have  been  compared  with  one  part  of  it,  and 
the  other  with  another  part  of  it ; e.  g. 

“ White  is  a color, 

Black  is  a color  ; therefore 
Black  is  white.” Again, 

“ Some  animals  are  beasts 
Some  animals  are  birds  ; therefore 
Some  birds  are  beasts.” 

The  middle-term  therefore  must  he  distributed  once , at  leasts 
in  the  premisses  ; ( i . e.  by  being  the  Subject  of  a Universal, 
or  Predicate  of  a Negative,  Chap.  ii.  § 2,)  and  once  is  suffi- 
cient ; since  if  one  extreme  has  been  compared  to  a part  of 
the  middle-term,  and  another  to  the  whole  of  it,  they  must 
have  been  both  compared  to  the  same. 

4th.  No  term  must  be  distributed  in  the  conclusion , which 
was  not  distributed  in  one  of  the  premisses  ; for  that  (which  is 
called  an  illicit  process,  either  of  the  Major  or  the  Minor 
term)  would  be  to  employ  the  whole  of  a term  in  the  Conclu 
nion,when  you  had  employed  only  a part  of  it  in  the  Premiss 
and  thus,  in  reality,  to  introduce  a fourth  term  : e.  g. 

“ All  quadrupeds  are  animals, 

A bird  is  not  a quadruped  ; therefore 

It  is  not  an  animal.”  — Illicit  process  of  the  major. 

Again,  “ What  is  related  in  the  Talmud  is  unworthy  o f 
credit : Miraculous  stories  are  related  in  the  Talmud  there 


IChap.  III.  § 2.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


93 


fore  Miraculous  stories  are  unworthy  of  credit.”  If  this  con* 
elusion  be  taken  as  A,  there  will  be  an  “ illicit  process  of  the 
Minor-term  ; ” (since  every  one  would  understand  the  Minor* 
Premiss  as  particular)  but  a particular  conclusion  may  fairly  be 
inferred.  In  the  case  of  an  illicit-process  of  the  Major , on  the 
contrary,  the  premisses  do  not  warrant  any  conclusion  at  all. 

5th.  From  negative  premisses  you  can  infer  nothing.  For 
in  them  the  Middle  is  pronounced  to  disagree  with  loth 
extremes ; not,  to  agree  with  loth ; or,  to  agree  with  one,  and 
disagree  with  the  other ; therefore  they  cannot  be  compared 
together ; e.  g. 

“ A fish  is  not  a quadruped  ; ” 

“ A bird  is  not  a quadruped,”  proves  nothing. 

6th.  If  one  premiss  le  negative , the  conclusion  must  be 
negative ; for  in  that  premiss  the  middle-term  is  pronounced 
;o  disagree  with  one  of  the  Extremes,  and  in  the  other  prem- 
iss (which  of  course  is  affirmative  by  the  preceding  rule)  to 
agree  wi.h  the  other  extreme;  therefore  the  Extremes  disa- 
greeing With  each  other,  the  Conclusion  is  negative.  In  the 
same  manner  it  may  be  shown,  that  to  prove  a negative  con- 
clusion one  of  the  Premisses  must  le  a negative. 

* By  these  six  rules  all  categorical  Syllogisms  are  to  be 
tried  ; and  from  them  it  will  be  evident ; 1st,  that  nothing  can 
le  proved  from  two  particular  Premisses  ; since  you  will 


• Others  have  [,iven  twelve  rules,  which  I found  might  more  con 
veniently  be  redi  ;ed  to  six.  No  syllogism  can  be  faulty  which  vio- 
lates none  of  th  se  six  rules.  It  is  much  less  perplexing  to  a leamei 
not  to  lay  down  as  a distinct  rule,  that,  e.  g.  against  particular  premisses 
which  is  properly  a result  of  the  foregoing  ; since  a syllogism  with  twa 
particular  premisses  wc  dd  offend  against  either  It.  ft.  or  R.  4. 


94 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


| Book  II 


then  have  either  the  middle  Term  undistributed , or  an  illicit 
process.  For  if  each  premiss  were  I,  there  wou  d be  no  dis- 
tribution of  any  term  at  all : and  if  the  premisses  were  1 
and  O,  as 


there  would  be  but  one  term — the  predicate  of  O — distrib- 
uted , and  supposing  that  one  to  be  the  Middle,  then,  the  con- 
clusion (being  of  course  negative,  by  rule  6th)  would  have  its 
predicate, — the  Major-term — distributed,  which  was  undis- 
tributed in  the  premiss.  And,  for  the  same  reason,  2dly,  that 
if  one  of  the  Premisses  be  particular,  the  Conclusion  must  b« 
particular ; e.  g. 

“ All  who  fight  bravely  deserve  reward  ; 

Some  soldiers  fight  bravely  ; ” you  can  only  infer  that 
“ Some  soldiers  deserve  reward : ” 

for  to  infer  a universal  Conclusion  would  be  an  “ illicit-process 
of  the  Minor.”  But  from  two  universal  Premisses  you  cannot 
always  infer  a universal  Conclusion  ; e.  g. 


And  even  when  we  can  infer  a universal,  we  are  always  at 
liberty  to  infer  a particular  ; since  what  is  predicated  of  all 
may  of  course  be  predicated  of  some.* 

* The  memorial-lines  in  which  some  of  the  Logical- wi  ” summed 


“ Some  animals  are  sagacious  : 
Some  beasts  are  not  sagacious : 
Some  beasts  are  not  animals,” 


“ All  gold  is  precious  ; 

All  gold  is  a mineral : therefore 
Some  mineral  is  precious.” 


ttp  the  foregoing  -ules,  were, 

“ Distribus  Medium,  ncc  quartus  terminus  ads  it  „• 


VKAT  m.  i 3 ] SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


98 


Of  Moods. 

§3. 

When  we  designate  the  three  propositions  of  a syllogism  in 
Jieir  order,  according  to  their  respective  “ Quantity  ” and 
‘ Quality  ” (indicated  by  their  symbols ) we  are  said  to  deter- 
mine the  mood  of  the  syllogism.  E.  G.  the  example  just 
above,  “ all  gold,  4*c.”  is  in  the  Mood  A,  A,  I. 

As  there  are  four  kinds  of  propositions,  and  three  propo- 
sitions in  each  syllogism,  all  the  possible  ways  of  combining 
these  four,  (A,  E,  I,  O,)  by  threes,  are  sixty-four.  For,  any 
one  of  these  four  may  be  the  major-premiss;  each  of  these 
four  majors  may  have  four  different  minors ; and  of  these  six- 
teen pairs  of  premisses,  each  may  have  four  different  conclu- 
sions. 4X4  (=  16)  X 4 = 64.  This  is  a mere  arithmet- 
ical calculation  of  the  Moods,  without  any  regard  to  the  logi- 
cal rules  ; for  many  of  these  Moods  are  inadmissible  in  prac- 
tice, from  violating  some  of  those  rules  ; e.  g.  the  Mood,  E, 
E,  E,  must  be  rejected  as  having  negative  premisses  ; I,  O,  O, 
for  particular  premisses ; and  many  others  for  the  same 
faults  ; to  which  must  be  added  I,  E,  O,  for  an  “ illicit-process 
of  the  major,”  in  every  Figure  ; since  the  Conclusion,  being 
negative,  would  distribute  the  Major-term,  while  the  Major- 
premiss,  being  I,  would  distribute  no  term.  By  examination 
then  of  all,  it  will  be  found  that,  of  the  sixty-four  there  remain 
Dut  eleven  Moods  which  can  be  used  in  a legitimate  syllogism 


“ Utraque  nee  preemissa  negans,  nee  particularis ; ” 

M Sectetur  partem  Conclusio  deteriorem ; ” (i.  e.  the  Particular  being 
regarded  as  inferior  to  the  Universal ; and  the  Negative,  to  th» 
Affirmative) 

non  distribuat  nisi  cum  rrcemissa,  negetve.’ 


96 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Boos,  n 


viz.  A,  A,  A,  A,  A,  I,  A,  E,  E,  A,  E,  O,  A,  I,  I,  A,  0,0 
E A,  E,  E,  A,  O,  E,  I,  O,  I,  A,  I,  O,  A,  O. 


Cf  Figure. 

§4. 

The  Figure  of  a syllogism  consists  in  the  situation  of  the 
Middle-term  with  respect  to  the  Extremes  of  the  Conclusion, 
[i.  e.  the  major  and  minor  term .]  When  the  Middle-term  is 
made  the  subject  of  the  major  premiss,  and  the  predicate  of 
the  minor,  that  is  called  the  first  Figure ; which  is  far  the 
most  natural  and  clear  of  all,  as  to  this  alone  Aristotle’s  dic- 
tum may  be  at  once  applied.  In  the  Second-Figure  the  Mid- 
dle-term is  the  predicate  of  both  premisses  : in  the  Third,  the 
subject  of  both  : in  the  Fourth,  the  predicate  of  the  Major 
\ premiss , and  the  subject  of  the  Minor.  This  Figure  is  the 
most  awkward  and  unnatural  of  all,  being  the  very  reverse  of 
the  first. 

Note,  that  the  proper  order  * is  to  place  the  Major  premiss 
first,  and  the  Minor  second  ; but  this  does  not  constitute  the 
Major  and  Minor  premisses ; for  that  premiss  (wherever 
placed)  is  the  Major,  which  contains  the  major  term,  and  the 
Minor,  the  minor  (v.  R.  2.  § 2.) 

Each  of  the  allowable  moods  mentioned  above  will  not  be 
allowable  in  every  Figure  ; since  it  may  violate  some  of  the 


• l'yojcr,  i.  e.  in  a Treatise  on  Logic,  or  in  a logical  analysis ; not 
ncominly  in  ordinary  discourse.  This  remark  may  appear  superflu- 
ous, but  that  I have  known  a writer,  generally  acute  and  intelligent, 
fall  into  the  strange  misapprehension  alluded  to.  The  proper  colloca- 
tion of  plants  in  a botanical  herbarium,  and  in  a flower-garden,  and 
again,  on  a farm,  would  be  widely  different 


Chap.  III.  { 4.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


97 


foregoing  rules,  in  one  Figure,  though  not  in  another ; «,  g. 
I,  A,  I,  is  an  allowable  mood  in  the  third  Figure  ; but  in  the 
first  it  would  have  an  undistributed  middle*  So  A,  E,  E, 
would  "n  the  first  Figure  have  an  illicit  process  of  the  major , 
but  is  allowable  in  the  second  ; and  A,  A,  A,  which  in  the 
first  Figure  is  allowable,  would  in  the  third  have  an  illicit 
process  of  the  minor  : all  which  may  be  ascertained  by  trying 
the  different  Moods  in  each  figure,  as  pei  scheme. 

Let  X represent  the  Major  term,  Z the  Minor,  Y the 
Middle. 


1st  Fig. 

2d  Fig. 

3d  Fig. 

4th  Fig. 

Y,  X, 

x,  Y, 

Y,  X, 

X,  Y, 

Z,  Y, 

Z,  Y, 

Y,  Z, 

Y,  Z, 

z,  X, 

z,  X, 

z,  X, 

Z,  X. 

The  Terms  alone  being  here  stated,  the  quantity  and  qual- 
ity of  each  Proposition  (and  consequently  the  Mood  of  the 
whole  Syllogism)  is  left  to  be  filled  up : (z.  e.  between  Y and 
X,  we  may  place  either  a negative  or  affirmative  Copula  : and 
we  may  prefix  either  a universal  or  particular  sign  to  Y.) 
By  applying  the  Moods  then  to  each  Figure,  it  will  be  found 
that  each  figure  will  admit  six  Moods  only,  as  not  violating 
the  rules  against  undistributed  middle , and  against  illicit  pro- 
cess ; and  of  the  Moods  so  admitted,  several  (though  valid) 
are  useless , as  having  a particular  Conclusion,  when  a univer- 
sal might  have  been  drawn  ; e.  g.  A,  A,  I,  in  the  first  Figure, 


I A 

* e.  g.  Some  restraint  is  salutary  : all  restraint  is  unpleasant : 

T i 

something  unpleasant  is  salutary.  Again  : Some  herbs  are  fit  for  food : 
A I 

nightshade  is  an  herb  : some  nightshade  is  fit  for  food. 

9 


98 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


IBook  Q 


“ All  human  creatures  are  entitled  to  liberty  ) 
All  slaves  are  human  creatures ; therefore 
Some  slaves  are  entitled  to  liberty.” 


Of  the  twenty-four  Moods,  then,  (six  in  each  Figure)  fiva 
are  for  this  reason  neglected  : for  the  remaining  nineteen, 
.ogicians  have  devised  names  to  distinguish  both  the  Mood 
itself,  and  the  Figure  in  which  it  is  found  ; since  when  one 
Mood  ( i . e.  one  in  itself , without  regard  to  Figure)  occurs  in 
two  different  Figures,  (as  E,  A,  E,  in  the  first  and  second)  the 
mere  letters  denoting  the  mood  would  not  inform  us  concern- 
ing the  figure.  In  these  names,  then,  the  three  vowels  de- 
note the  propositions  of  which  the  Syllogism  is  composed : 
the  consonants  (besides  their  other  uses,  of  which  hereafter) 
serve  to  keep  in  mind  the  Figure  of  the  Syllogism. 


Fig.  1.) 
Fig.  2.  ^ 

Fig.  3. | 

Fig.  4.  ^ 


bArbArA,  cElArEnt,  dArll,  fErlOque  pri- 
oris. 

cEsArE,  cAmEstrEs,  fEstlnO,  bArOkO,* 
secundae. 

tertia,  dArAptl,  dlsAmls,  dAtlsI,  fElAptOn, 
bOkArdO,f  fErlsO,  habet : quarta  insu- 
per  addit. 

brAmAntlp,  cAmEnEs,  dlmArls,  fEsApO, 
frEsIsOn. 


By  a careful  study  of  these  mnemonic  lines  (which  must 
be  committed  to  memory)  you  will  perceive  that  A can  only 
be  proved  in  the  First-Figure,  in  which  also  every  other 
Proposition  may  be  proved  ; that  the  Second  proves  only  neg- 
atives : the  Third  only  particulars : that  the  First-Figure 


• Or,  Fakoro,  see  § 7- 


t Or,  D'jkamo,  see  § 7 . 


a hap.  III.  } 4.J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


99 


requires  the  major-premiss  to  be  universal , and  the  minor, 
affirmative,  fyc.  ; with  many  other  such  observations,  whk  b 
will  readily  be  made,  (on  trial  of  several  Syllogisms,  in  dif- 
ferent Moods)  and  the  reasons  for  which  will  be  found  in  the 
foregoing  rules.  E.  G.  to  show  why  the  Second-figure  has 
only  Negative  Conclusions,  we  have  only  to  consider,  that  in 
it  the  middle-term  being  the  predicate  in  loth  premisses , 
would  not  be  distributed  unless  one  premiss  were  negative  ; 
(Chap.  ii.  § 2.)  therefore  the  Conclusion  must  be  negative 
also,  by  Chap,  iii,  § 2,  Rule  6.  One  Mood  in  each  figure 
may  suffice  in  this  place  by  way  of  example : 

First  Barbara,  viz.  (bAr.)  “ Every  Y is  X ; (bA)  every 
Z is  Y ; therefore  (rA)  every  Z is  X:  ” e.  g.  let  the  major 
term  (which  is  represented  by  X)  be  “ one  who  possesses  all 
virtue  ; ” the  minor-term  (Z)  “ every  man  who  possesses  one 
virtue  ; ” and  the  middle-term  (Y)  “ every  one  who  possesses 
prudence  ; ” and  you  will  have  the  celebrated  argument  of 
Aristotle,  Eth.  sixth  book,  to  prove  that  the  virtues  are 
inseparable  ; viz. 

“ He  who  possesses  prudence,  possesses  all  virtue  ; 

He  who  possesses  one  virtue,  must  possess  prudence 
therefore 

He  who  possesses  one,  possesses  all.” 

Second,  Camestres,  (cAm)  “ every  X is  Y ; (Es)  no  Z is 

Y ; (trEs)  no  Z is  X.”  Let  the  major-term  (X)  be  “ true 
phi.osophers,”  the  minor  (Z)  “ the  Epicureans  ; ” the  middle 
(Y)  “ reckoning  virtue  a good  in  itself ; ” and  this  will  be  part 
ot  the  reasoning  of  Cicero,  Off.  book  first  and  third  against 
the  Epicureans. 

Third,  Darapti,  viz.  (dA)  “ every  Y is  X ; (rAp)  every 

Y is  Z ; therefore  ( tl ) some  Z is  X ; ” e.  g. 


100 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


IBook  n 


“ Prudence  has  foi  its  object  the  benefit  of  individuals 
but  prudence  is  i virtue  : therefore  some  virtue  has  fol 
its  object  the  benefit  of  the  individual,” 

b part  of  Adam  Smith’s  reasoning  ( Moral  Sentiments ) against 
Hutcheson  and  others,  who  placed  all  virtue  in  benevolence. 

Fourth,  Camenes , viz.  ( cAm ) “ Every  X is  Y ; (En)  no  Y 
is  Z ; therefore  (Es)  no  Z is  X : ” e.  g. 

“ Whatever  is  expedient,  is  conformable  to  nature  ; 

Whatever  is  conformable  to  nature,  is  not  hurtful  to 
society  ; therefore 

What  is  hurtful  to  society  is  never  expedient ; ” 

is  part  of  Cicero’s  argument  in  Off.  Lib.  iii.  ; but  it  is  an 
inverted  and  clumsy  way  of  stating  what  would  much  more 
naturally  fall  into  the  First-Figure  ; for  if  you  examine  the 
Propositions  of  a Syllogism  in  the  Fourth-Figure,  beginning 
at  the  Conclusion , you  will  see  that  as  the  major-term  is  pred- 
icated of  the  minor,  so  is  the  minor  of  the  middle,  and  that 
again  of  the  major ; so  that  the  major  appears  to  be  merely 
predicated  of  itself.  Hence  the  five  Moods  in  this  Figure 
are  seldom  or  never  used  ; some  one  of  the  fourteen  ( moods 
with  names ) in  the  first  three  Figures,  being  the  forms  into 
which  all  arguments  may  most  readily  be  thrown : but  of 
these,  the  four  in  the  First  Figure  are  the  clearest  and  most 
natural  ; as  to  them  Aristotle’s  Dictum  will  immediately 
apply 

With  respect  to  the  use  of  the  first  three  Figures  (for  the 
Fourth  is  never  employed  but  by  an  accidental  awkwardness 
of  express.on)  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the  First  is  that  into 
which  an  argument  will  be  found  to  fall  the  most  naturally 


Chap.  III.  { 4.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM 


ioi 


except  in  the  following  cases  : — First,  When  u$g  qj, 
we  have  to  disprove  something  that  has  been  Second-Fig- 
maintained,  or  is  likely  to  be  believed,  our  argu-  ure‘ 
inents  will  usually  be  found  to  take  most  conveniently  the 
form  of  the  Second  Figure  : viz.  we  prove  that  the  thing  we 
are  speaking  of  cannot  belong  to  such  a Class,  either  because 
it  wants  what  belongs  to  the  whole  of  that  Class,  (Cesare)  o» 
because  it  has  something  of  which  that  class  is  destitute  ; 
(Camestres)  e.  g.  “ No  impostor  would  have  warned  his  fol- 
lowers (as  Jesus  did)  of  the  persecutions  they  would  have  to 
submit  to;”  and  again,  “An  enthusiast  would  have  expatiated 
(which  Jesus  and  his  followers  did  not)  on  the  particulars  of  a 
future  state.” 

The  same  observations  will  apply,  mutatis  mutandis , when 
a Particular  Conclusion  is  sought ; as  in  Festino  and  Baroko. 

The  arguments  used  in  the  process  called  the  “ Abscissio 
Infiniti,”  will  in  general  be  the  most  easily  referred  to  this 
Figure.  (See  Chap.  v.  § 1.  subsection  6.)  The  phrase  was 
applied  by  some  logical  writers  to  a series  of  arguments  used 
in  any  inquiry  in  which  we  go  on  excluding,  one  by  one,  cer- 
tain suppositions,  or  certain  classes  of  things,  from  that  whose 
real  nature  we  are  seeking  to  ascertain. 

Thus,  certain  symptoms,  suppose,  exclude  “ small-pox ; ” 
that  is,  prove  this  not  to  be  the  patient’s  disorder  ; other  symp- 
toms, suppose,  exclude  “ Scarlatina ,”  &c.,  and  so  one  may 
proceed  by  gradually  narrowing  the  range  of  possible  suppo- 
sitions. Hence,  the  Second  Figure  might  be  called  the  “ ex- 
clusive ” Figure. 

The  Third  Figure  is,  of  course,  the  one  em- 
oloyed  when  the  Middle-Term  is  Singular,  Tkird^Figum 
since  a Singular  term  can  only  be  a Subject. 

This  is  also  the  form  into  which  most  arguments  wili  natural'* 
9* 


[02 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Booa  11 


fa.l  that  are  used  to  establish  an  objection  (Enstasis  of  Aris- 
totle) to  an  opponent’s  Premiss,  when  his  argument  is  such  as 
to  require  that  premiss  to  be  Universal.  It  might  be  called 
therefore,  the  “ Enstatic  ” Figure.  E.  G.  If  any  one  con- 
tends that  “ this  or  that  doctrine  ought  not  to  be  admitted., 
because  it  cannot  be  explained  or  comprehended,”  his  sup- 
pressed major-premiss  may  be  refuted  by  the  argument  that 
“ the  connection  of  the  Body  and  Soul  cannot  be  explained  or 
comprehended.”  Thus  again  you  might  prove  by  the  exam- 
ple of  a certain  individual,*  the  contradictory  of  a Proposition 
(which  would  seem  to  most  persons  a very  probable  conjec- 
ture) that  a deaf  and  dumb  person,  bom  blind,  cannot  be  taught 
language. 

A great  part  of  the  reasoning  of  Butler’s  Analogy  may  be 
exhibited  in  thia  form. 

As  it  is  on  the  Dictum  above-mentioned  that 
^SyU^gismf  ^ Reasoning  ultimately  depends,  so,  all  argu- 
ments may  be  in  one  way  or  other  brought  into 
?ome  one  of  the  four  Moods  in  the  First-Figure  : and  a Syllo- 
gism is,  in  that  case,  said  to  be  reduced : ( i . e.  to  ike  first 
figure.)  These  four  are  called  the  perfect  moods,  and  all  the 
rest  imperfect. 


Ostensive  Reduction. 

§ 5. 

In  red  icing  a Syllogism,  we  are  not,  of  course,  allowed  to 
introduce  any  new  Term  or  Proposition,  having  nothing 
granted  but  the  truth  of  the  Premisses ; but  these  Premisses 


La  xra  Bridgman,  alluded  to  above. 


Chap.  III.  § 5.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


10? 

are  allowed  to  be  illatively  converted  (because  the  truth  of 
any  Proposition  implies  that  of  its  illative  Converse)  or  trans- 
posed : by  taking  advantage  of  this  liberty,  where  there  is 
need,  we  deduce  (in  Figure  1st,)  from  the  Premisses  originally 
given,  either  the  very  same  Conclusion  as  the  original  one,  or 
another  from  which  the  original  Conclusion  follows  by  illative 
Conversion.  E.  G.  Darapti , 

“ All  wits  are  dreaded  ; 

All  wits  are  admired  ; 

Some  who  are  admired  are  dreaded,” 

is  reduced  into  Darii , by  converting  “ by  limitation”  ( pt 
accidens ) the  minor  Premiss. 

“ All  wits  are  dreaded  ; 

Some  who  are  admired  are  wits  ; therefore 
Some  who  are  admired  are  dreaded.” 

And  Camestres,  — e.  g. 

“ All  true  philosophers  account  virtue  a good  in  itself, 

The  advocates  of  pleasure  do  not  account,  4*c. 

Therefore  they  are  not  true  philosophers,” 

ts  reduced  to  Celarent,  by  simply  converting  the  Minor,  and 
then  transposing  the  Premisses. 

‘Those  who  account  virtue  a good  in  itself,  are  not  advo- 
cates of  pleasure  ; 

All  true  philosophers  account  virtue,  fyc.  : therefore 
No  true  philosophers  are  advocates  of  pleasure.” 


104 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  1.1 


This  Conclusion  may  be  illatively  converted  into  the  origi- 
nal  one. 

So,  Baroko  ; * e.  g. 

Reduction  by  “ EveiT  true  Patriot  is  a friend  to  religl0n  i 
means  of  con - Some  great  statesmen  are  not  friends  to  re- 

version  by  ne-  lio-ion  : 

gation.  Some  great  statesmen  are  not  true  patriots,” 

to  Ferio , by  converting  the  major  by  negation , [“  contrapo- 
sition,”] vide  Chap.  ii.  § 4. 

“ He  who  is  not  a friend  to  religion,  is  not  a true  parriot;  ” 
Some  great  statesmen,”  SfC. 

and  the  rest  of  the  Syllogism  remains  the  same:  cnly  that 
the  minor  Premiss  must  be  considered  as  affirmative,  because 
you  take  “ not-a-friend-to-religion,”  as  the  middle  term.  In 
the  same  manner  Bokardo  t to  Darii  ; e.  g. 

“ Some  slaves  are  not  discontented ; 

All  slaves  are  wronged  ; therefore 

Some  who  are  wronged  are  not  discontented.” 

Con  vert  the  major  “ by  negation  ” (“  contraposition  ”)  and 
then  transpose  them  ; the  Conclusion  will  be  the  converse  by 
negation  of  the  original  one , which  therefore  may  be  inferred 
from  it ; e.  g. 

-K 

* Or  Fakoro,  considered  i.  e.  as  Festino.  See  note  at  the  end  of 
th:s  chapter. 

f Or  Dokamo,  considered  i.  e.  as  Disamis.  See  note  at  the  end  ai 
tills  chapter. 


Chap  ill.  } 6.J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


105 


“ All  slaves  are  wronged  ; 

Some  who  are  not  discontented  Are  slaves ; 

Some  who  are  not  discontented  are  wronged.” 

In  these  ways  (by  what  is  called  Ostensive  Reduction,  oe- 
cause  you  prove,  in  the  first  figure,  either  the  very  same  Con- 
clusion as  before,  or  one  which  implies  it)  all  the  imperfect 
Moods  may  be  reduced  to  the  four  perfect  ones.  But  there  is 
also  another  way,  called  Indirect- reduction,  or 

Reductio  ad  impossibile. 

§ 6. 

By  which  -we  prove  (in  the  First-Figure)  not,  directly,  that 
the  original  Conclusion  is  true,  but  that  it  cannot  be  false  ; i.  e. 
that  an  absurdity  would  follow  from  the  supposition  of  its 
being  false  ; e.  g. 

“ All  true  patriots  are  friends  to  religion ; 

Some  great  statesmen  are  not  friends  to  religion  ; 

Some  great  statesmen  are  not  true  patriots : ” 

if  this  Conclusion  be  not  true,  its  contradictory  must  be  true 
viz. 

“ All  great  statesmen  are  true  patriots  : ” 

let  this  then  be  assumed,  in  the  place  of  the  minor  Premiss 
of  the  original  Syllogism,  and  a false  conclusion  will  be 
proved ; e.  g. 

bAr,  “ All  true  patriots  are  friends  to  religion ; 
bA,  All  great  statesmen  are  true  patriots  ; 
rA,  All  great  statesmen  are  friends  to  religion:  ” 


IOG 


ELEMENTS  OF  10GIC. 


[Book  II 


for  as  this  Conclusion  is  the  Contradictory  of  the  original 
minor  Premiss,  it  must  be  false,  since  the  Premisses  are  al- 
ways supposed  to  be  granted  ; therefore  one  of  the  Premisses 
(by  which  it  has  been  correctly  proved)  must  be  false  also; 
but  the  major  Premiss  (being  one  of  those  originally  granted) 
is  true ; therefore  the  falsity  must  be  in  the  minor  Premiss 
which  is  the  contradictory  of  the  original-Conclusion  ; there- 
fore the  original-Conclusion  must  be  true.  This  is  the  indi- 
rect mode  of  Reasoning.  (See  Rhetoric , Part  I.  Ch.  ii.  § 1.) 

§7- 


Significa- 
tion of  the 
names  of  the 
Moods. 


This  kind  of  Reduction  is  seldom  employed  but  for  Baroko 
and  Bokardo,  which  are  thus  reduced  by  those  who  confine 
themselves  to  simple  Conversion,  and  Conversion  by  limita- 
tion, {per  accidens ;)  and  they  framed  the  names 
of  their  Moods,  with  a view  to  point  out  the 
manner  in  which  each  is  to  be  reduced  ; viz.  B, 
C,  D,  F,  which  are  the  initial  letters  of  all  the 
Moods,  indicate  to  which  Mood  of  the  first  fig- 
ure ( Barbara , Celarent , Darii,  and  Ferio)  each  of  the  others 
is  to  be  reduced  : m indicates  that  the  Premisses  are  to  be 
transposed  ; s and  p,  that  the  Proposition  denoted  by  the  vowel 
immediately  preceding,  is  to  be  converted;  s,  simply,  p,  per 
accidens , [by  limitation :]  thus,  in  Camestres , (see  example,) 
•he  C indicates  that  it  must  be  reduced  to  Celarent;  the  two 
ss,  that  the  minor  Premiss  and  Conclusion  must  be  converted 
simply , the  m,  that  the  Premisses  must  be  transposed ; the 
P,  in  the  mood  Bramantip,  denotes  that  the  Premisses  warrant 
a Universal-conclusion  in  place  of  a Particular.  The  I, 
though  of  course  it  ca  mot  be  illatively  converted  per  accidens , 
viz. : so  as  to  become  A,  yet  is  thus  converted  in  the  Con- 
tmsion  because  as  soon  as  the  Premisses  are  transposed  (as 


fou.  iT.  $ l-J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM.  10? 

denokid  by  m,  it  appears  that  a Universal  Conclusion  follows 
from  them. 

K (which  indicates  the  reduction  ad  impossibile)  is  a sign 
that  the  Proposition,  denoted  by  the  vowel  immediately  before 
it,  must  be  left  out,  and  the  contradictory  of  the  Conclusion 
substituted ; viz.  for  the  minor  Premiss  in  Baroko  and  the 
major  in  Bokardo.  But  it  has  been  already  shown  (§  5)  that 
the  Conversion  by  “ contraposition  ” [by  “ negation  ”]  w;l' 
onable  us  to  reduce  these  two  Moods,  oslensively.* 


Chap.  IV. 

SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  III. 

Of  Modal  Syllogisms,  and  of  all  Arguments  besides  regu- 
lar and  pure- Categorical  Syllogisms. 

Of  Modals. 

§ I- 

Hitherto  we  have  treated  of  pure  categorical  Propositions, 
and  the  Syllogisms  composed  of  such.  A pure  categorical 
proposition  is  styled  by  some  logicians  a proposition  “ de 
incssef  from  its  asserting  simply  that  the  Predicate  is  or  is 
not  (in  our  conception)  contained  in  the  Subject ; as  “ John 
killed  Thomas.”  A modal  proposition  asserts  that  the  predi* 
3fite  is  or  is  not  contained  in  the  Subject  in  a certain  mode,  or 
manner;  as  “ accidentally,”  “wilfully,”  fyc. 

* If  any  one  should  choose  that  the  names  of  these  mor,<Is  should 
indicate  this,  he  might  make  K the  index  of  conversion  by  negation ; 
»nd  then  the  names  would  be,  by  a slight  change,  Fakoro  and  Dukama. 


108 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


TBook  U 


A Modal  proposition  may  be  stated  as  a pure  one,  by  at- 
taching the  mode  to  one  of  the  Terms : and  the  Proposition 
will  in  all  respects  fall  under  the  foregoing  rules  ; e.  g.  “ John 
killed  Thomas  wilfully  and  maliciously ; ” here  the  Mode  is  to 
be  regarded  as  part  of  the  Predicate.  “ It  is  probable  that 
all  knowledge  is  useful  “ probably  useful  ” is  here  the  Pred- 
icate. But  when  the  Mode  is  only  used  to  express  the  neces- 
sary, contingent,  or  impossible  connection  of  the  Terms,  it 
may  as  well  be  attached  to  the  Subject : e.  g.  a man  is  neces- 
sarily mortal  : ” is  the  same  as  “ all  men  art  mortal : ” “ in- 
justice is  in  no  case  expedient,”  corresponds  to  “ no  injustice 
is  expedient : ” and  “ this  man  is  occasionally  Intemperate,” 
has  the  force  of  a particular : (vide  Chap.  ii.  § 2.  note.)  It 
is  thus,  and  thus  only,  that  two  singular  Propositions  may  be 
contradictories  ; e.  g.  “ this  man  is  never  intemperate,”  will  be 
the  contradictory  of  the  foregoing.  Indeed  every  sign  (of 
universality  or  particularity)  may  be  considered  as  a Mode. 

Since,  however,  in  all  Modal  Propositions,  you  assert  that 
the  dictum  (i.  e.  the  assertion  itself)  and  the  Mode , agree 
together,  or  disagree,  so,  in  some  cases,  this  may  be  thr  most 
convenient  way  of  stating  a Modal,  purely  : 

subj.  cop.  pred.  subject. 

s.  g.  “ It  is  impossible  that  all  men  should  be  virtuous.” 

sub.  cop. 
/ p rp» 

Such  is  a proposition  of  the  Apostle  Paul’s : “ This  is 

pred.  subject. 

a faithful  saying,  c \c.  that  Jesus  Christ  came  into  thn 
l t 

world  to  save  sinners.”  * In  these  cases  cue  of  your  Term* 
(the  subject)  is  itself  an  entire  Proposition. 


See  Rhetoric,  Pert  iii.  Ch.  2.  § 2 


ciur  IV.  } 1]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


105 


tn  English,  the  word  IN  is  often  used  in  expressing  one 
proposition  combined  with  another  in  such  a manner  as  to 
make  the  two,  one  proposition  : e.  g.  “ You  will  have  a formi- 
dable opponent  to  encounter  in  the  Emperor  : ” this  involves 
two  propositions  ; 1st,  “ You  will  have  to  encounter  the  Em- 
peror ; ” 2d,  “ He  will  prove  a formidable  opponent : ” this 
last  is  implied  by  the  word  in,  which  denotes  (agreeably  10 
the  expression  of  Logicians  mentioned  above  when  they  speak 
of  a proposition  “ de  inesse  ”)  that  that  Predicate  is  contained 
in  that  Subject. 

It  may  be  proper  to  remark  in  this  place,  that 

we  may  often  meet  with  a Proposition  whose  Drift  of  a 
J 1 Proposition, 

drift,  and  force  will  be  very  different,  according 

as  we  regard  this  or  that  as  its  Predicate.*  Indeed,  properly 
speaking,  it  may  be  considered  as  several  different  Proposi- 
tions, each  indeed  implying  the  truth  of  all  the  rest,  but  each 
having  a distinct  Predicate  ; the  division  of  the  sentence  being 
varied  in  each  case  ; and  the  variations  marked,  either  by  the 
collocation  of  the  words,  the  intonation  of  the  voice,  or  by  the 
designation  of  the  emphatic  words,  [viz. : the  Predicate,]  as 

1 

scored  under,  or  printed  in  italics.  E.  G.  “ The  Organon 

2 3 4 5 

of  Bacon  was  not  designed  to  supersede  the  Organon  of 
6 

Aristotle  : ” this  might  be  regarded  as,  at  least,  six  different 
propositions:  if  the  word  numbered  (1)  were  in  italics,  it 
would  leave  us  at  liberty  to  suppose  that  Bacon  might  have 
designed  to  supersede  by  some  work  of  his,  the  Organon  of 


* On  the  logical  analysis  of  propositions  Mr.  Greenlaw  has  founded 
a very  ingenious,  and  as  it  appears  to  me,  correct  and  useful  gram- 
matical theory,  of  the  use  of  the  Latin  Subjunctive.  His  work  u 
well  worth  the  notice  of  Students  of  Logic  as  well  as  of  Latimtv. 

10 


MO 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  H 


Aristotle ; but  not  by  his  own  Organon ; if  No.  2 were  ir 
talics,  we  should  understand  the  author  to  be  contending, 
that  whether  or  no  any  other  author  had  composed  an  Orga 
non  with  such  a design,  Bacon  at  least  did  not : if  No.  3, 
then,  we  should  understand  him  to  maintain  that  whethet 
Bacon’s  Organon  does  or  does  not  supersede  Aristotle’s,  no 
such  design  at  least  was  entertained  : and  so  with  the  rest. 
Each  of  these  is  a distinct  Proposition ; and  though  each  of 
them  implies  the  truth  of  all  the  rest,  (as  may  easily  be  seen 
by  examining  the  example  given)  one  of  them  may  be,  in  one 
case,  and  another,  in  another,  the  one  which  it  is  important 
to  insist  on. 

We  should  consider  in  each  case  what  Question  it  is  that  is 
proposed,  and  v/hat  answer  to  it  would,  in  the  instance  before 
us,  be  the  most  opposite  or  contrasted  to  the  one  to  be  exam- 
ined. E.  G.  “ You  will  find  this  doctrine  in  Bacon,”  may  be 
contrasted  either  with,  “ You  will  find  in  Bacon  a different 
doctrine,”  or  with,  “ You  will  find  this  doctrine  in  a different 
author .” 

And  observe,  that  when  a proposition  is  con- 
w0rds  trasted  with  one  which  has  a different  predicate. 

the  Predicate  is  the  emphatic  word  ; as  “ this 
man  is  a murderer ; ” i.  e.  not  one  who  has  slain  another  ac- 
cidentally, o?  in  self-defence : “ this  man  is  a murderer,”  with 
the  Copula  for  the  emphatic  word,  stands  opposed  to  “.  he  is 
not  a murderer ; ” a proposition  with  the  same  terms , but  a 
different  Copula.* 


* Thus  if  any  one  reads  (as  manv  are  apt  to  do)  “ Thou  shalt  not 
steal,”  — “ Thou  shalt  not  commit  adultery,”  he  implies  the  question 
to  be,  whether  we  are  commanded  to  steal  or  to  forbear : but  the 
question  really  is,  what  things  are  forbidden;  and  the  answer  la 
“Thou  shalt  nd  steal"  “Thou  shalt  not  commit  adultery,”  &c. 


Chap.  IV.  $ 2.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


Ill 


ft  will  often  happen  that  several  of  the  Propositions  which 
are  thus  stated  in  a single  sentence,  may  require,  each,  to  be 
distinctly  stated  and  proved  : e.  g.  the  Advocate  may  have  to 
prove,  first  the  fact,  that  “ John  killed  Thomas  ; ” and  then 
the  character  of  the  act,  that  “ the  killing  was  wilful  and  rr.a 
Iicious.”  See  Praxis,  at  the  end  of  the  vol.  See  also  Ele,‘ 
merits  of  Rhetoric , Part  I.  Ch.  iii.  § 5. 

4- 

Of  Hypotheticals. 

§2. 

A Hypothetical *  * Proposition  is  defined  to  be  two  or  more 
categoricals  united  by  a Copula , [conjunction]  : and  the  dif- 
erent  kinds  of  Hypothetical  Propositions  are  named  from 
their  respective  conjunctions;  viz.  conditional,  disjunctive, 
causal,  fyc. 

When  a hypothetical  conclusion  is  inferred  from  a hypo- 
thetical Premiss,  so  that  the  force  of  the  Seasoning  does  not 
turn  on  the  hypothesis,  then  the  Hypothesis  (as  in  Modals) 
must  be  considered  as  part  of  one  of  the  Terms  ; so  that  the 
Reasoning  will  be,  in  effect,  categorical : e.  g. 

predicate. 

( ' ) 

“ Every  conqueror  is  either  a hero  or  a villain : 

Csesar  was  a conqueror  ; therefore 


The  connection  between  Logic  and  correct  Delivery  is  further  point- 
ed out  in  Rhet.  App.  1 . 

Strictly  speaking,  the  two  cases  I have  mentioned  coincide ; for 
when  the  “is”  or  the  “not  ” is  emphatic,  it  becomes  properly  thf. 
Predicate  : viz.  “ the  statement  of  this  man’s  being  a murderer  is 
true,”  or,  “ is  false.” 

* Compound,  according  to  some  writers. 


112 


ELEMENT.  S OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


predicate. 

ne  was  either  a hero  or  a villain 
‘ Whatever  comes  from  God  is  entitled  to  reverence  ; 

subject. 

( ; i 

If  the  scriptures  are  not  wholly  false,  they  must  come  from 

God; 

If  they  are  not  wholly  false,  they  are  entitled  to  reverence.’ 

But  when  the  Reasoning  itself  rests  on  the  hypothesis  (in 
which  way  a categorical  Conclusion  may  be  drawn  from  a 
Hypothetical  Premiss,)  this  is  what  is  called  a hypothetical 
Syllogism  ; and  rules  have  been  devised  for  ascertaining  the 
validity  of  such  Arguments  at  once,  without  bringing  them 
into  the  categorical  form.  (And  note,  that  in  these  Syllogisms, 
the  hypothetical  Premiss  is  called  the  major , and  the  categor- 
ical one  the  minor.)  They  are  of  two  kinds,  conditional  and 
disjunctive. 

Of  Conditionals. 

§ 3. 

A Conditional  * Proposition  has  in  it  an  illative  force  ; i.e 
it  contains  two,  and  only  two  categorical  Propositions,  where- 
of one  results  from  the  other  [or  follows  from  it,]  e.  g. 

antecedent. 

( ; t 

“ If  the  scriptures  are  not  wholly  false, 

consequent. 

i ; ; i 

they  are  entitled  to  respect.” 

That  from  which  the  other  results  is  called  the  Antecedent ; 

* Called  Hypothetical  by  those  writers  who  use  the  word  Conpouni 
to  denote  what  I have  called  Hypothetical. 


Chap.  IV.  $ 3.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


113 


that  which  results  from  it,  the  Consequent  ( consequens  ;)  and 
ihe  connection  between  the  two  (expressed  by  the  word  “ if”) 
•he  Consequence  ( conseouentia .) 

The  natural  order  is,  that  the  Antecedent  should  come 
before  the  Consequent ; but  this  is  frequently  reversed  : e.  g 

The  husbandman  is  well  off  if  he  knows  his  own  advan 
tages.”  (Virg.  Geor.) 

Every  Conditional-proposition  may  be  considered  as  a 
Vn'wersail-affirmative,  whether  the  members  of  which  it  con^ 
sists  be  Universal  or  Particular,  Negative  or  Affirmative. 
And  the  truth  or  falsity  of  a Conditional-Proposition  depends 
entirely  on  the  consequence ; e.  g.  “ if  Logic  is  useless,  it  de- 
serves to  be  neglected  ; here  both  Antecedent  and  Conse- 
quent are  false : yet  the  whole  Proposition  is  true  ; i.  e.  it  is 
true  that  the  Consequent  follows  from  the  Antecedent.  “ If 
Cromwell  was  an  Englishman,  he  was  a usurper,”  is  just  the 
reverse  case:  for  though  it  is  true  that  “Cromwell  was 
an  Englishman,”  and  also  that  “ he  was  a usurper,” 
yet  it  is  not  true  that  the  latter  of  these  Propositions 
depends  on  the  former  ; the  whole  Proposition,  therefore,  is 
false,  (or  at  least  absurd,  — see  next  section)  though  both  An- 
tecedent and  Consequent  are  true. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  a false,  or  at  least  nuga- 
tory, Conditional-Proposition  of  this  kind,  viz. : in  which  each 
member  is  a true  categorical, — is  such,  that,  though  itself 
absurd,  no  false  conclusion  can  be  drawn  from  it ; as  may  be 
seen  from  the  instance  just  given. 

A Conditional  Proposition,  in  short,  may  be  considered  as 
an  assertion  of  the  validity  of  a certain  Argument ; since  tc 
assert  that  an  argument  is  valid , is  to  assert  that  the  Conelu- 
Bion  necessarily  results  from  the  Premisses,  whether  tr.OM 
Premisses  be  true  or  not. 

10* 


M4 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


The  meaning,  then,  of  a Conditional  Proposition,  — which 
is,  that  the  antecedent  being  granted,  the  consequent  is  granted, 
may  be  considered  in  two  points  of  view : first,  “ if  tho 
Antecedent  he  true,  the  Consequent  must  be  true;”  hence  the 
first  rule;  the  antecedent  being  granted,  the  consequent  may 
be  inferred  : secondly,  “ if  the  Antecedent  were  true  the  Con- 
sequent would  be  true  ; ” hence  the  second  rule  ; the  con- 
sequent being  denied , the  antecedent  may  be  denied ; for  the 
Antecedent  must  in  that  case  be  false  ; since  if  it  were  true, 
ihe  Consequent  (which  is  granted  to  be  false)  would  be  true 
also.  E.  G.  “ If  this  man  has  a fever,  he  is  not  fit  to  travel ; ” 
here  if  you  grant  the  antecedent , the  first  rule  applies,  and 
you  infer  the  truth  of  the  Consequent ; “ he  has  a fever ; 

therefore  he  is  not  fit  to  travel.”  If  A is  B, 

Cum,t)  uctive  c js  D . but  A is  B,  therefore  C is  D ; and  this 

and  destructive. 

is  called  a constructive  Conditional  Syllogism. 
But  if  you  deny  the  consequent  (i.  e.  grant  its  contradictory) 
the  second  rule  applies,  and  you  infer  the  contradictory  of 
the  antecedent ; “ he  is  fit  to  travel  ; therefore  he  has  not  a 
fever  ;”  this  is  the  destructive  Conditional  Syllogism.  If  A is 
B,  C is  D ; C is  not  D,  therefore  A is  not  B.  Again,  “ If  the 
crops  are  not  bad,  corn  must  be  cheap,”  for  a major ; then, 
“ but  the  crops  are  not  bad,  therefore  corn  must  be  cheap,”  is 
Constructive.  “ Corn  is  not  cheap,  therefore  the  crops  are 
bad,”  is  Destructive.  “ If  every  increase  of  population  is 
desirable,  some  misery  is  desirable  ; but  no  misery  is  desira- 
ble ; therefore  some  increase  of  population  is  not  desirable,'1 
is  Destructive. 

But  if  you  affirm  the  consequent  or  deny  the  antecedent , you 
can  infer  nothing  ; for  the  same  Consequent  may  follow  from 
ether  Antecedents  ; e.g.  in  the  example  above,  a man  may  bo 
unfit  to  travel  from  other  disorders  besides  a fever ; therefore 


Chap.  IT  § 3.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM 


115 


it  does  not  follow,  from  his  being  unfit  to  travel,  tl  at  he  has  a 
fever ; or  (for  the  same  reason)  from  his  not  having  a fever 
that  he  is  not  unfit  to  travel. 

And  it  is  to  be  observed  that  these  fallacies  correspond 

respectively  with  those  mentioned  in  treating  of  Categorica’ 

Syllogisms.  The  assertion  of  the  Consequent, 

. . Fallacies  in 

and  inferring  thence  the  truth  of  the  Antecedent,  categoricai  ana 

answers  to  the  fallacy  of  “ undistributed-Mid-  in  hypothetica, 
die,”  or  to  that  of  “ negative-premisses.”  E.  G.  form,  corre- 
“ He  who  has  a fever  is  unfit  to  travel ; ” (or,  spond' 

“ is  not  fit  to  travel.”)  “ This  man  is  unfit  ” (or,  “ is  not  fit  ”) 
“ to  travel  ; therefore  he  has  a fever.”  The  fallacy  again  of 
denying  the  Antecedent,  and  thence  inferring  the  Contradic- 
tory of  the  Consequent,  corresponds  either  to  that  of  negative- 
premisses,  or  to  “ illicit-process  of  the  Major,”  or  that  of  intro- 
ducing, palpably,  “ more  than  three  terms.”  E.  G.  “ He  who 
has  a fever  is  unfit  to  travel ; this  man  has  not  a fever,”  &c.* 

There  are,  then,  two,  and  only  two,  kinds  of  Conditional 
Syllogisms ; the  constructive,  founded  on  the  first  rule,  and 
answering  to  direct  Reasoning;  and  the  destructive , on  the 
second,  answering  to  indirect ; being  in  fact  a mode  of  throw- 
ing the  indirect  form  of  reasoning  into  the  direct : e.  g.  If  C 
be  not  the  centre  of  the  circle,  some  other  point  must  be  ; 
which  is  impossible:  therefore  C is  the  centre.  (Euclid, 
B.  III.  Pr  1.) 

And  note,  that  a Conditional  Proposition  may 
(like  the  categorical  A)  be  converted  by  nega - Conversion  of 
lion;  t.  e.  you  may  take  the  contradictory  of 
the  consequent,  as  an  antecedent , and  the  contradictory  of  the 
antecedent , as  a consequent : e.  g.  “ If  this  man  is  fit  to  travel, 

* Virtually,  all  these  fallacies  do  really  amount  t o the  in  troduction 
»f  a fourth  term.  See  § 2.  Ch.  iii. 


116 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


tBook  II 


he  has  not  a fever.”  By  this  conversion  of  the  major  Premiss, 
a Construct, ve  Syllogism  may  be  reduced  to  a Destructive 
end  vice  versa.  (See  § 6.  Ch.  iii.) 


A Disjunctive  Proposition  is  one  that  consists  of  two  o 
more  categoricals,  connected  by  the  conjunctions  “ either  ” 
and  “ or,”  the  force  of  which  is,  to  state  an  alternative  ; i.  e. 
to  imply  that  some  one  of  the  categoricals  thus  connected 
must  be  true  : e.  g.  “ either  A is  B,  or  C is  D ” will  not  be 
a true  proposition  unless  one  of  the  two  members  of  it  be  true. 

On  the  other  hand,  one  of  the  members  may  be  true,  and 
yet  they  may  have  no  such  natural  connection  together  as  to 
warrant  their  being  proposed  as  an  alternative ; as  “ either 
Britain  is  an  island,  or  a triangle  is  a square.”  Such  a prop- 
osition would  rather  be  called  nugatory  and  absurd,  than 
false  ; since  no  false  conclusion  could  be  deduced  from  it;  as 
was  remarked  in  the  last  section  concerning  such  a Con- 
ditional as  this  might  be  reduced  to : e.  g.  “ If  Britain  is  not 
an  island,”  &c.  Such  propositions  are  often  colloquially 
uttered  in  a kind  of  jest. 

If,  therefore,  one  or  more  of  these  categoricals  be  denied  (i.  e. 
granted  to  be  false)  you  may  infer  that  the  remaining  one,  or 
(if  several)  some  one  of  the  remaining  ones,  i'j  true.  E.  G. 
“ Either  the  world  is  eternal,  or  the  work  of  chance,  or  the 
work  of  an  intelligent  Being ; it  is  not  eternal,  nor  the  work 
of  chance,  therefore  it  is  the  work  of  an  intelligent  Being.’ 

1 It  is  either  spring,  summer,  autumn,  or  winter  ; but  it  is 
neither  spring  nor  summer;  therefore  it  is  either  autumn  or  win- 
ter.”  Either  A is  B,  or  C is  D ; but  A is  not  B,  therefore  C is  D 


Of  Disjunctives. 

§4. 


Chap.  IV.  6 4 .]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


117 


Exclusive 

disjunctives. 


Observe,  that  in  these  examples  (as  well  as  in  most  others) 
it  is  implied  not  only  that  one  of  the  members  (the  categorica. 
Propositions)  must  be  true,  but  that  only  one  can  be  true ; so 
that,  in  such  cases,  if  one  or  more  members  be  affirmed,  the 
rest  may  be  denied ; [the  members  may  then  be  called  ex- 
clusive :]  e.  g.  “ It  is  summer,  therefore  it  is 
neither  spring,  autumn,  nor  winter ; ” “ either 
A is  B,  or  C is  D ; but  A is  B,  therefore  C is 
not  D.”  But  th.’s  is  by  no  means  universally  the  case ; e.  g • 
Virtue  tends  to  procure  us  either  the  esteem  of  mankind,  ot 
the  favor  of  God  : ” here  both  members  are  true,  and  conse 
quently  from  one  being  affirmed  we  are  not  authorized  tc 
deny  the  -other.  Of  course  we  are  left  to  conjecture  in  each 
case,  from  the  context,  whether  it  is  meant  to  be  implied  that 
the  members  are  or  are  not  “ exclusive.” 

It  is  evident  that  a disjunctive  Syllogism  may  Disjujictive 
easily  be  reduced  to  a conditional,  by  taking  as  reducible  to 
an  A ntecedent  the  contradictory  of  one  or  more  conditional. 
of  the  members  : e.  g.  if  it  is  not  spring  or  summer,  it  is 
either  autumn  or  winter,  &c. 

It  is  to  be  observed  of  Hypothetical  [com- 
pound] Propositions,  whether  Conditional  or  Dis- 
junctive, that  they  are  always  affirmative : i.  e. 
it  is  always  affirmed,  not  denied,  that  the  con- 
nection between  the  several  categorical  members,  denoted 
respectively,  by  the  conjunctions  employed,  does  exist.  Ac 
cordingly,  the  contradiction  of  any  hypothetical  proposition 
is  not  made  by  a hypothetical.  If  I assert  hat  “ if  A is  B 
C is  D,”  you  might  deny  that,  by  saying  “ it  does  not  follow 
til  at  if  A is  B,  C must  be  D ; ” or  in  some  such  expression. 
So  the  contradiction  of  this,  “ either  A is  B or  C is  DC' 
wo  ill  be  by  two  categorical  negatives  ; “ neither  is  A,  B,  nol 


Hypothetical 
propositions  al 
ways  affirma- 
tive. 


U8 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


is  C,  D : ” or,  it  is  possible  that  neither  A is  B,  nor  C,  D 
The  conjunctions  “ neither”  and  “ nor,”  it  should  be  observed 
do  not  correspond  in  their  nature  with  “ either  ” and  “ or  ; ' 
since  these  last  are  disjunctive,  which  the  others  are  not 


The  Dilemma , 

§ 5, 

is  a complex  kind  of  Conditional  Syllogism.  The  account 
usually  given  of  the  Dilemma  in  Logical  treatises  is  singu- 
larly perplexed  and  unscientific.  And  it  is  remarkable  that 
all  the  rules  they  usually  give  respecting  it,  and  the  faults 
against  which  they  caution  us,  relate  exclusively  to  the  Sub- 
ject-matter: as  if  one  were  to  laydown  as  rules  respect- 
ing a Syllogism  in  Barbara , “ 1st.  Care  must  be  taken  that 
the  major  Premiss  be  true  : 2dly.  that  the  minor  Premiss  be 
true  ! ” 

Most,  if  not  all,  writers  on  this  point  either  omit  to  tell  us 
whether  the  Dilemma  is  a kind  of  conditional , or  of  disjunc- 
tive argument ; or  else  refer  it  to  the  latter  class,  on  account 
of  its  having  one  disjunctive  Premiss  ; though  it  clearly  be- 
longs to  the  class  of  Conditionals. 

1st.  If  you  have  in  the  major  Premiss  several  antecedents 
all  with  the  same  consequent , then,  these  Antecedents,  being 
(in  the  minor ) disjunctively  granted  (i.  e.  it  being  granted  that 
some  one  of  them  is  true,)  the  one  common  consequent  may  be 
inferred,  (as  in  the  case  of  a simple  Constructive  Syllogism  :) 
e.  g.  if  A is  B,  C is  D ; and  if  X is  Y,  C is  D ; but  either  A 
is  B,  or  X is  Y : therefore  C is  D.  “ If  the  blest  in  heaven 
have  no  desl  res,  they  will  be  perfectly  content : so  they  s\  ill 


Chap.  IV.  §5.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


119 


if  their  desires  are  fully  gratified  ; but  either  they  will  have 
no  desires,  or  have  them  fully  gratified  ; therefore  they  will 
be  perfectly  content.”  Note,  in  this  case,  the  two  Conditionals 
which  make  up  the  major  Premiss  may  be  simple  -on- 
united  into  one  Proposition  by  means  of  the  stmctive  Di- 
word “ whether : ” e.  g.  “ whether  the  blest,  temma. 
tifc.  have  no  desires,  or  have  their  desires  gratified,  they  will 
be  content.” 

2d.  But  if  the  several  antecedents  have  each  complex  con- 
a different  consequent , then  the  Antecedents,  structive  Di- 
being,  as  before,  disjunctively  granted,  you  can  lemma- 
only  disjunctively  infer  the  consequents  : e.  g.  if  A is  B,  C is 
D ; and  if  X is  Y,  E is  F ; but  either  A is  B,  or  X is  Y ; 
.herefore  either  C is  D,  or  E is  F.  “ If  Aeschines  joined  in 
Jie  public  rejoicings,  he  is  inconsistent ; if  he  did  not,  he  is 
unpatriotic  : but  he  either  joined,  or  not : therefore  he  is  either 
inconsistent  or  unpatriotic.”  # This  case,  as  well  as  the  fore- 
going, is  evidently  constructive. 

In  the  Destructive  form,  whether  you  have 
one  Antecedent  with  several  Consequents,  or 
several  Antecedents,  either  with  one,  or  with  properly 
several  Consequents ; in  all  these  cases,  if  you  lcmmaSi 
deny  the  whole  of  the  Consequent,  or  Consequents,  you  may 
in  the  conclusion  deny  the  whole  of  the  Antecedent  or  Ante- 
cedents : e.  g.  “ If  the  world  were  eternal,  the  most  useful 
arts,  such  as  printing,  <^c.,  would  be  of  unknown  antiquity  : 
and  on  the  same  supposition,  there  would  be  records  long  prioi 
to  the  Mosaic  ; and  likewise  the  sea  and  land,  in  all  parts  of 
the  globe,  might  be  expected  to  maintain  the  same  relative  sit< 
aations  now  as  formerly  : but  none  of  these  is  the  fact : there 


Arguments 
that  are  not 
Di- 


* Demost.  For  the  Crown. 


120 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  Ii 


fore  the  woild  is  not  eternal.”  Again,  “ If  the  world  existed 
from  eternity,  there  would  be  records  prior  to  the  Mosaic ; 
and  if  it  were  produced  by  chance,  it  would  not  bear  marks 
of  design : there  are  no  records  prior  to  the  Mosaic  . and  the 
world  docs  bear  marks  of  design  : therefore  it  neither  existed 
from  eternity,  nor  is  the  work  of  chance.”  These  are  some- 
times called  Dilemmas,  but  hardly  differ  from  simple  con- 
ditional Syllogisms,  two  or  more  being  expressed  together. 

Nor  is  the  case  different  if  you  have  one  antecedent  with 
several  consequents,  which  consequents  you  disjunctively 
deny  ; for  that  comes  to  the  same  thing  as  wholly  denying 
them  ; since  if  they  be  not  all  true,  the  one  antecedent  must 
equally  fall  to  the  ground  ; and  the  Syllogism  will  be  equally 
simple  : e.  g.  “ If  we  admit  the  popular  objections  against 
Political  Economy,  we  must  admit  that  it  tends  to  an  excessive 
mcrease  of  wealth  ; and  also,  that  it  tends  to  impoverishment: 
but  it  cannot  do  both  of  these  ; (i.  e.  either  not  the  one,  or, 
not  the  other)  therefore  we  cannot  admit  the  popular  objec- 
tions,” Spc. ; which  is  evidently  a simple  Destructive. 

The  true  Dilemma  is,  “ a conditional  Syllogism  with 
several  * antecedents  in  the  major,  and  a disjunctive  minor  ; ” 


you  have  several  Antecedents  with  each  a different  Conse- 
quent ; which  Consequents  (instead  of  wholly  denying  them, 
aa  in  the  case  lately  mentioned)  you  disjunctively  deny  ; and 


* The  name  Dilemma  implies  precisely  two  antecedents  ; and  hence 
it  is  common  to  speak  of  “ the  horns  of  a dilemma  ; ” but  it  is  evident 
th»ffe  may  be  either  two  or  more. 


hence, 


Destructive 

Dilemma. 


3d.  That  is  most  properly  called  a destruc- 
tive Dilemma , which  has  (like  the  constructive 
ones)  a disjunctive  minor  Premiss ; i.  e.  when 


Crap.  IV.  { 5.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


121 


thence,  in  the  Conclusion,  deny  disjunctively  the  Antecedents: 
e.  g.  if  A is  B,  C is  D ; and  if  X is  Y,  E is  F : but  either  C 
is  not  D,  or  E is  not  F ; therefore,  either  A is  not  B,  or  X is 
not  Y.  “ If  this  man  were  wise,  he  would  not  speak  irrever- 
ently of  Scripture  in  jest ; and  if  he  were  good,  he  would  not 
do  so  in  earnest ; but  he  does  it,  either  in  jest,  or  earnest ; 
therefore  he  is  either  riot  wise,  or  not  good.”  Or  again,  you 
may  have  a Dilemma  partly  constructive  and  partly  destruc- 
tive . as  the  above  example  would  be,  if  you  were  to  convert 
one  of  the  conditionals,  (see  § 3.)  into  “ if  C is  not  D,  A is 
not  B : ” for  the  Minor-Premiss  would  then  assert  that  either 
the  Antecedent  of  one  of  the  Conditionals  is  true,  or  the  Con- 
sequent of  the  other,  false. 

Every  Dilemma  may  be  reduced  into  two  or 
more  simple  Conditional-Syllogisms  : e.  g.  “ If  Resolution  of 
Eschines  joined,  Sgc.  he  is  inconsistent ; he 
did  join,  fyc.  therefore  he  is  inconsistent;”  and  again,  “If 
Eschines  did  not  join,  ty-c.  he  is  unpatriotic  ; he  did  not , 8fc. 
therefore  he  is  unpatriotic.”  Now  an  opponent  might  deny 
either  of  the  minor  Premisses  in  the.above  Syllogisms,  but  he 
could  not  deny  both ; and  therefore  he  must  admit  one  or 
the  other  of  the  Conclusions  ; for,  when  a Dilemma  is  em- 
ployed, it  is  supposed  that  some  one  of  the  Antecedents  must 
be  true  (or,  in  the  destructive  kind,  some  one  of  the  Conse- 
quents false,)  but  that  we  cannot  tell  which  of  them  is  so  ; and 
this  is  the  reason  why  the  argument  is  stated  in  the  form  of  a 
Dilemma. 

Sometimes  it  may  happen  that  both  antecedents  may  be 
true,  and  that  we  may  be  aware  of  this ; and  yet  there  may 
be  an  advantage  in  stating  (either  separately  or  conjointly) 
both  arguments,  even  when  each  proves  the  same  conclusion, 
so  as  not  to  derive  any  additional  confirmation  from  the  other 
II 


122 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book.  U 


— still,  I say,  it  may  sometimes  be  advisable  ti  state  both 
Decause,  of  two  propositions  equally  true,  one  ma  j may  deny 
nr  be  ignorant  of  the  one,  while  he  admits  the  other;  and 
another  man,  vice  versa. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  may  easily  be  seen  that  ah 
Dilemmas  are  in  fact  conditional  syllogisms  ; and  that  Dis- 
junctive Syllogisms  may  also  be  reduced  to  the  form  of  Con- 
ditionals; but  as  it  has  been  remarked,  that  all  Reasoning 
whatever  may  ultimately  be  brought  to  the  one  test  of  Aris- 
totle’s “ Dictum,”  it  remains  to  show  how  a Conditional  Syl- 
logism may  be  thrown  into  such  i form,  that  that  test  will  at 
once  apply  to  it;  and  this  is  called  the 


Reduction  of  Hypothetical .* 


For  this  purpose  we  must  consider  every  Conditional  Prop- 
osition as  a Universal-affirmative  categorical  Proposition,  of 


* Aldrich  has  stated,  somewhat  rashly,  that  Aristotle  utterly  de  ■ 
spised  Hypothetical  Syllogisms,  and  thence  made  no  mention  of  their. 
We  cannot,  however,  considering  how  large  a portion  of  his  works  5* 
lost,  draw  any  conclusion  from  the  mere  absence  of  a treatise  on  this 
branch,  in  the  portion  which  has  come  down  to  us. 

Aldrich  observes,  that  no  hypothetical  argument  is  valid  which  can- 
not be  reduced  to  a categorical  form ; and  this  is  evidently  agreeable 
to  what  has  been  said  at  the  beginning  of  chap.  iii. ; but  then  he  has 
unfortunately  omitted  to  teach  us  how  to  reduce  Hypotheticals  to 
this  form  ; except  in  the  case  where  the  Antecedent  and  Consequent 
chance  to  have  each  the  same  Subject ; in  which  case,  he  tells  us  to 
take  the  minor  Premiss  and  Conclusion  as  an  Enthymcme,  and  Hll 
that  up  categorically ; e.  g.  “ If  Caesar  was  a tyrant,  he  deserved 
death;  he  was  a tyrant,  therefore  he  deserved  death;”  which  may 
easily  be  reduced  to  a categorical  form,  by  taking  as  a major  Premiis, 
“ all  tyrants  deserve  death.”  But  when  (as  is  often  the  case)  < ht 
Antecedent  and  Consequent  have  not  each  the  same  Subject,  (a*  a 


I'hap.  IV.  J 6.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM, 


123 


which  the  Terms  are  entire  Propositions,  viz.  the  antecedent 
answering  to  the  Subject,  and  the  consequent  to  the  Predicate 
E.  G.  The  Proposition  “ if  A is  B,  X is  Y ” may  be  consid- 
ered as  amounting  to  this ; •“  The  case  [or  supposition]  of  A 
being  B,  is  a case  of  X being  Y.”  And  then,  to  say  (as  in 
the  Minor-premiss  and  the  Conclusion  of  a constructive-con- 
ditional syllogism)  “ A is  B ; and  therefore  X is  Y,”  is  equiv- 
alent to  saying  “ the  present  [or  the  existing]  case  is  a case 
of  A being  B : therefore  this  is  a case  of  X being  Y.” 
Again,  to  say,  “ if  Louis  is  a good  king,  France  is  likely  to 
prosper,”  is  equivalent  to  saying,  “ The  case  of  Louis  being 
a good  king,  is  a case  of  France  being  likely  to  prosper  : ” 
and  if  it  be  granted  as  a minor  Premiss  to  the  Conditional 
Syllogism,  that  “ Louis  is  a good  king  ; ” that  is  equivalent  to 
saying,  “ the  present  case  is  the  case  of  Louis  being  a good 
king  ; ” from  which  you  will  draw  a conclusion  in  Barbara, 
{viz.  “ the  present  case  is  a case  of  France  being  likely  to 
prosper,”)  exactly  equivalent  to  the  original  Conclusion  of  the 


the  very  example  he  gives,  “ if  A is  B,  C is  D,”)  he  gives  no  rule  for 
reducing  such  a Syllogism  as  has  a Premiss  of  this  kind ; and  indeed 
leads  us  to  suppose  that  it  is  to  be  rejected  as  invalid,  though  he  has 
just  before  demonstrated  its  validity. 

And  this  is  likely  to  have  been  one  among  the  various  causes  which 
occasion  many  learners  to  regard  the  whole  system  of  Logic  as  a 
Btring  of  idle  reveries,  having  nothing  true,  substantial,  or  practically 
useful  in  it ; but  of  the  same  character  with  the  dreams  of  Alchymy, 
Demonology,  and  judicial- Astrology.  Such  a mistake  is  surely  the 
less  inexcusable  in  a learner,  when  his  master  first  demonstrates  the 
validity  of  a certain  argument,  and  then  tells  him  that  after  all  it  is 
good  for  nothing ; ( prorsus  repudiandum.) 

In  the  late  editions  of  Aldrich’s  Logic,  all  that  he  says  of  tha 
reduction  of  Hypotheticals  is  omitted ; which  certainly  would  havs 
been  an  imprc  vement,  if  a more  correct  one  had  been  subst-tuted 
but  as  it  is,  tl  ere  is  a complete  hiatus  in  the  system. 


i24 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 


[Bg^k  II 


Conditional  S/llogism  : viz.  “ France  is  likely  to  prosper.”  As 
the  Constructive  Conditional  may  thus  be  reduced  to  Barbara , 
bo  may  the  Destructive,  in  like  manner,  to  Celarcnt : e.  g. 
“ If  the  Stoics  are  right,  pain  is  no  evil  : but  nain  is  an  evil ; 
tnerefore  the  Stoics  are  not  right ; ” is  equivalent  to — “ The 
case  of  the  Stoics  being  right,  is  the  case  of  pain  being  no 
evil  the  present  case  is  not  the  case  of  pain  being  no  evil ; 
therefore  the  present  case  is  not  the  case  of  the  Stoics  being 
right.”  This  is  Camestres,  which,  of  course,  is  easily  reduced 
to  Celarent.  Or,  if  you  will,  all  Conditional  Syllogisms  may 
be  reduced  to  Barbara , by  considering  them  all  as  Construc- 
tive ; which  may  be  done,  as  mentioned  above,  by  “ con- 
verting by  negation”  [contraposition]  the  major  Premiss. 
(See  § 3.) 

The  reduction  of  Hypotheticals  may  always 

Abridged  be  effected  in  the  manner  above  stated  ; but 

forms  of  re-  as  ;t  procjuces  a circuitous  awkwardness  of  ex- 
iuction  of  hy-  . . . 

potheticals  pression,  a more  convenient  form  may  in  some 

cases  be  substituted.  E.  G.  in  the  example 
above,  it  may  be  convenient  to  take  “ true  ” for  one  of  the 
Terms:  “ that  pain  is  no  evil  is  not  true;  that  pain  is  no  evil 
is  asserted  by  the  Stoics ; therefore  something  asserted  by  the 
Stoics  is  not  true.”  Sometimes  again  it  may  be  better  to  un- 
fold the  argument  into  two  Syllogisms : e.  g.  in  a fermer 
example;  first,  “Louis  is  a good  king;  the  governor  of 
France  is  Louis;  therefore  the  governor  of  France  is  a good 
king.”  And  then,  second,  “ every  country  governed  by  a 
good  king  is  likely  to  prosper,”  Sfc. 

A Dilemma  may  of  course  (see  § 5,)  be  reduced  into  two 
»r  more  categorical  Syllogisms. 

When  the  Antecedent  and  Consequent  of  a Conditiona 
nave  each  the  same  Subject,  you  may  sometimes  reduce  ths 


Shap.  IV.  { 7.J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


125 


Conditional  by  merely  substituting  a categorical  Major-Premiss 
for  the  conditional  one  : e.  g.  instead  of,  “ if  Caesar  was  a 
tyrant,  he  deserved  death;  he  was  a tyrant,  therefore  he  de- 
served death  ; ” you  may  put  for  a major,  “ all  tyrants  de- 
serve death  ; ” fyc.  But  it  is  of  no  great  consequence  whethei 
flypotheticals  are  reduced  in  the  most  neat  and  concise  man- 
ner or  not ; since  it  is  not  intended  that  they  should  be 
reduced  to  Categoricals,  in  ordinary  practice , as  the  readiest 
way  of  trying  their  validity,  (their  own  rules  being  quite  suf- 
ficient for  that  purpose ;)  but  only  that  we  should  he  able , if 
required,  to  subject  any  argument  whatever  to  the  test  of  Aris- 
totle’s Dictum,  in  order  to  show  that  all  Reasoning  turns  upor, 
one  simple  principle. 

' "V 

Of  Enthymeme,  Sorites , SfC. 

§ 7. 

There  are  various  abridged  forms  of  Argument,  which  may 
be  easily  expanded  into  regular  Syllogisms  ; such  as, 

1st.  The  Enthymeme,*  which  is  a Syllo-  „ , 

Enthymeme. 

gism  with  one  Premiss  suppressed.  As  all  the 
Terms  will  be  found  in  the  remaining  Premiss  and  Conclu- 
sion, it  will  be  easy  to  fill  up  the  Syllogism  by  supplying  the 
Premiss  that  is  wanting,  whether  Major  or  Minor : e.  g. 
r‘  Caesar  was  a tyrant ; therefore  he  deserved  death.”  “ A 
free  nation  must  be  happy ; therefore  the  English  are  happy  ” 
This  is  the  ordinary  form  of  speaking  and  writing.  It  is 
evident  that  Enthymemes  may  be  filled  up  hypothetically 
It  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  Enthymeme  is  not  strictry 


* The  word  Enthymene  is  employed  in  a different  sense  from  thi^ 
by  Aristotle,  in  Rhet.  B.  i.  See  Flements  of  Rhetoric,  Part  I.  Ch.  ii.  4 2 

11* 


126 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


syllogistic ; i.  e.  its  conclusiveness  is  not  apparent  from  the 
mere  form  of  expression,  till  the  suppressed  Premi'-s  shall 
have  been,  either  actually  or  mentally,  supplied.  The  ex 
pressed  Premiss  may  be  true,  and  yet  the  Conclusion  false. 

The  Sorites,  on  the  other  hand,  is  strictly  syllogistic;  as 
may  be  seen  by  the  examples.  If  the  Premisses  stated  be 
true,  the  Conclusion  must  be  true.  For, 

2d.  When  you  have  a string  of  Syllogisms,  in  the  first  fig’ 
ure,  in  which  the  Conclusion  of  each  is  made  the  Premiss  of 
the  next,  till  you  arrive  at  the  main  or  ultimate  Conclusion  of 
all,  you  may  sometimes  state  these  briefly,  in  the  form  called 

,,  Sorites ; in  which  the  Predicate  of  the  first 

norites . 

proposition  is  made  the  Subject  of  the  next ; 
and  so  on,  to  any  length,  till  finally  the  Predicate  of  the  last 
of  the  Premisses  is  predicated  (in  the  Conclusion)  of  the 
Subject  of  the  first : e.  g.  A (either  every  A,  or  some  A)  is  B, 
every  B is  C,  every  C is  D,  every  D is  E ; therefore  A is 
E ; or  else  “no  D is  E ; therefore  A is  not  E.”  “ The 

English  are  a brave  people  ; a brave  people  are  free  ; a free 
people  are  happy ; therefore  the  English  are  happy.”  A 
Sorites,  then  has  as  many  Middle-terms  as  there  are  interme- 
diate Propositions  between  the  first  and  the  last ; and  conse- 
quently it  may  be  drawn  out  into  as  many  separate  Syllogisms  ; 
of  which  the  first  will  have,  for  its  major  Premiss , the  second , 
and  for  its  minor , the  first  of  the  Propositions  of  the  Sorites ; 
rs  may  be  seen  by  the  example.  The  reader  will  perceive 
disc  by  examination  of  that  example,  and  by  framing  others, 
that  the  first  proposition  in  the  Sorites  is  the  only  minor  prem- 
iss that  is  expressed  : when  the  whole  is  resolved  into  distinct 
sjllogisms,  each  conclusion  becomes  the  minor  premiss  of  tha 
succeeding  syllogism.  Hence,  in  a Sorites,  the  first  proposi 
non,  and  that  alone,  of  all  the  premisses,  may  be  particular 


Chap.  IV.  $ 7.]  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


127 


because  in  the  first  Figure  the  minor  may  be  particular  but 
not  the  major;  (see  Chap.  iii.  § 4.)  and  all  the  other  proposi- 
tions, prior  to  the  conclusion,  are  major  premisses.  It  is  a.se 
evident  that  there  may  be,  in  a Sorites,  one,  and  only  one, 
negative  premiss,  viz.  the  last:  for  if  any  of  the  others  were 
negative,  the  result  would  be  that  one  of  the  syllogisms  of  the 
Sorites  would  have  a negative  minor  premiss  ; which  is  (in 
the  1st  Fig.)  incompatible  with  correctness.  See  Chap.  ii\ 


which  is  self-evident.  “ Whatever  is  affirmed  t0  ^ Sorites. 
or  denied  of  a whole  Class,  may  be  affirmed 
or  denied  of  whatever  is  comprehended  in  [any  Class  that 
is  wholly  comprehended  in ] that  Class.”  This  sentence, 
omitting  tho  portion  enclosed  in  brackets,  you  will  recognize 
as  the  “ Dictum  ” originally  laid  down  ; and  the  words  in 
brackets  supply  that  extension  of  it  which  makes  it  applicable 
to  a “ Sorites,”  of  whatever  length  ; since  it  is  manifest  that 
that  clause  might  be  enlarged  as  far  as  you  will,  into  “ a Class 
that  is  wholly  comprehended  in  a Class,  which  again  is 
wholly  comprehended  in  another  Class,  &c. 

A string  of  Conditional  Syllogisms*  may  in 
like  manner  be  abridged  into  a Sorites  ; e.  g.  Synthetical 
if  A is  B,  C is  D ; if  C is  D,  E is  F ; if  E is 
F,  G is  H ; but  A is  B,  therefore  G is  H.  “ If  the  Scrip- 
tures are  tne  word  of  God,  it  is  important  that  they  should  be 


* Hence  it  is  evident  how  injudicious  an  arrangement  lias  been 
adopted  by  former  writers  ot  Logic,  who  have  treated  of  the  Soritei 
and  Enthymeme  before  they  entered  on  the  subject  of  Hypothec- 


§4. 


To  the  Sorites  the  “ Dictum  ” formerly  treat- 
ed of  may  be  applied,  with  one  small  addition, 


Application 
’ of  the  Dictum 


earn, 


128 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  11 


well  explained  ; if  it  is  important,  c fc.  ihey  deserve  to  bo 
diligently  studied  ; if  they  deserve,  fy-c.  an  order  of  men 
should  be  set  aside  for  that  purpose ; but  the  Scriptures  are 
/he  word,  <^*c. ; therefore  an  order  of  men  should  be  set  aside 
for  the  purpose,  ^-c.”  In  a destructive-  Sorites,  you,  of 
course,  go  back  from  the  denial  of  the  last  consequent  to  the 
denial  of  the  first  antecedent : “ G is  not  H ; therefore  A is 


The  foregoing  are  all  the  forms  in  which  Reasoning  can 
be  exhibited  syllogistically  ; i.  e.  so  that  its  validity  shall  be 
manifest  from  the  mere  form  of  expression. 


common  error  of  confounding  Logical  with  Rhetorical  dis- 
tinctions, and  have  wandered  from  their  subject  as  much  as  a 
writer  on  the  orders  of  Architecture  would  do  who  should  in- 
troduce the  distinction  between  buildings  of  brick  and  of  mar- 
ble. Logic  takes  no  cognizance  of  Induction,  for  instance, 
or  of  a priori  reasoning,  fyc.,  as  distinct  Forms  of  argument ; 
for  when  thrown  into  the  syllogistic  form,  and  when  letters  of 
the  alphabet  are  substituted  for  the  Terms  (and  it  is  thus  that 
an  Argument  is  properly  to  be  brought  under  the  cognizance 
of  Logic),  there  is  no  distinction  between  them.  E.  G.  “ a 
Property  which  belongs  to  the  ox,  sheep,  deer,  goat,  and  an- 
telope,  belongs  to  all  horned  animals  ; rumination  belongs  to 
these  ; therefore  to  all.”  This,  which  is  an  inductive  argu- 
ment, is  evidently  a Syllogism  in  Barbara.  The  essence  of 
an  inductive  argument,  as  well  as  of  the  other  kinds  which 
ire  distinguished  from  it,  consists  not  in  the  form  of  the  Jr- 


not  B.  ’ 


Induction. 

Example. 


Those  who  have  spoken  of  Induction  or  of 
Example,  as  a distinct  kind  of  Argument  in  a. 
Logical  point  of  view,  have  fallen  into  the 


Chap.  IV.  $ 7.J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


123 


gument , but  in  the  relation  which  the  Subject-matter  of  the 
Premisses  bears  to  that  of  the  Conclusion.* 

3d.  There  are  various  other  abbreviations 

Abbreviations . 

commonly  used,  which  are  so  obvious  as  hardly 
to  call  for  explanation  : as  where  one  of  the  Premisses  of  a 
Syllogism  is  itself  the  Conclusion  of  an  Enthymeme,  which 
ts  expressed  at  the  same  time  : e.  g.  “ All  useful  studies  de- 
serve encouragement ; Logic  is  such  ( since  it  helps  us  to 
reason  accurately ;)  therefore  it  deserves  encouragement ; ” 
here  the  Minor-premiss  is  what  is  called  an  Enthymematie 
sentenced 

And  it  may  be  added,  that  such  a sentence  Hints  sug- 

will  sometimes  be  in  the  form,  not  of  a Propo-  3estin9  argu- 
ments. 

sition , but  of  an  Exclamation,  — a Question , or 
a Command ; and  yet  will  be  such  as  readily  to  suggest  to  the 
mind  a Proposition. 

For  instance,  in  some  of  the  examples  lately  given,  one 
might  say  (in  place  of  one  of  the  propositions)  “ Choose 
which  you  will  of  these  two  suppositions ; ” or  “ Who  can 
doubt  that  so  and  so  follows  ? ” 

The  message  to  Pilate  from  his  wife  £ furnishes  an  instance 
of  a single  word  (“ just")  suggesting  a Major-premiss,  while 
,he  Conclusion  is  stated  in  the  form  of  an  exhortation : 
‘ Have  thou  nothing  to  do  with  that  just  man.”  And  the 


* See  Rhetoric,  Part  I.  Ch.  ii.  § 6.  Nothing  probably  has  tended 
more  to  foster  the  prevailing  error  of  considering  Syllogism  as  a par- 
ticular kind  of  argument,  than  the  inaccuracy  just  noticed:  which  ap- 
pears in  all  or  most  of  the  logical  works  extant.  See  Dissertation  on 
ths  Province  of  Reasoning,  Ch.  i. 

+ The  antecedent  in  that  Minor-premiss  ( [i . e.  that  which  make*  it 
Enthymematie)  is  called  hy  Aristotle  the  Prosyllogism. 

I Matt,  xxvii.  19 


130 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II. 


succeeding  sentence  must  have,  been  designed  to  convey  a 
hint  of  Arguments  for  the  Proof  jf  each  of  the  Premisses  on 
which  that  Conclusion  rested. 

And  here,  it  may  be  observed  that  the  usual  practice  of 
selecting  for  examples,  in  Logica  treatises,  such  arguments 
as  hardly  even  an  ignorant  clown,  or  a child,  would  need  to 
state  at  full  length,  and  which  the  slightest  hint  would  suf- 
ficiently suggest  to  any  one,  has  contributed  to  the  prevailing 
mistake  of  supposing  that  Syllogisms,  universally,  are  mere 
trifling ; the  fact  that  all  arguments  are,  substantially,  syllo- 
gistic, being  overlooked.  It  is  worth  remarking 

Things  need- 

ing  proof  to  however  in  this  place,  that  the  further  any  one 
one  man , may  advances,  in  intellectual  cultivation,  generally, 
he  self-evident  or  jn  ar)y  particu[ar  department,  he  will  have 
less  and  less  need  (not,  of  argumentation  alto- 
gether, but)  of  such  arguments  as  are  needful  for  a beginner. 
To  this  last,  many  propositions  may  need  to  be  proved  at 
full  length,  which,  to  one  further  advanced,  require  only  to 
have  the  proofs  hinted  at,  and  which  to  one  still  more  ad- 
vanced need  merely  to  be  stated  as  propositions,  or  ultimate- 
ly, not  even  that ; being  sufficiently  suggested  to  the  mind  by 
the  mere  mention  of  one  of  the  terms.  And  hence  the  pro- 
verbial expression,  that  “ a word  is  enough  to  the  wise.” 

It  is  evident  that  you  may,  for  brevity,  sub- 
Equivalents.  . 

stitute  for  any  term  an  equivalent : as  in  an 

example  above,  “ it  ” for  “ Logic  ; ” “ suchf  for  “ a useful 

study,”  SfC.  The  doctrine  of  Conversion,  laid  down  in  the 

Second  Chapter,  furnishes  many  equivalent  propositions,  since 

each  is  equivalent  to  its  illative  Converse.  The  division  of 

nouns  also  (for  which  see  Chap,  v.)  supplies  many  equiva> 

ents  ; e.  g.  if  A is  the  genus  of  B,  B must  be  a species  of  A' 

if  A is  the  cause  of  B,  B must  be  the  effect  of  A,  fyc 


Ch^p.  IV.  $ 7.J  SYNTHETICAL  COMPENDIUM. 


131 


4th.  And  many  Syllogisms,  which  at  first  Sj'Oogistni 
eight  appear  faulty,  will  often  be  found,  on  ex-  apparently  in- 
amination,  to  contain  correct  reasoning,  and  correct. 
consequently,  to  be  reducible  to  a regular  form  ; e.  g.  when 
you  have,  apparently , negative  Premisses,  it  may  happen,  that 
by  considering  one  of  them  as  affirmative , (see  Chap.  ii.  §4  ) 
the  Syllogism  will  be  regular : e.  g.  “ no  man  is  happy  who 
is  not  secure  ; no  tyrant  is  secure ; therefore  no  tyrant  is 
happy,”  is  a Syllogism  in  Celarent.  If  this  experiment  be 
tried  on  a Syllogism  which  has  really  negative  Premisses,  the 
only  effect  will  be  to  change  that  fault  into  another : viz.  an 
excess  of  Terms,  or  (which  is  substantially  the  same)  an  un- 
distributed Middle  ; e.  g.  “ an  enslaved  people  is  not  happy  ; 
the  English  are  not  enslaved  ; therefore  they  are  happy  : ” if 
“ enslaved”  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  Terms,  and  “ not  en- 
slaved ” as  another,  there  will  manifestly  be  four.  Hence  one 
may  see  how  very  little  difference  there  is  in  reality  between 
the  different  faults  which  are  enumerated. 

Sometimes  there  will  appear  to  be  too  many  terms  ; and  yet 
there  will  be  no  fault  in  the  Reasoning,  only  an  irregularity  in 
the  expression : e.  g.  “ no  irrational  agent  could  produce  a 
work  which  manifests  design  ; the  universe  is  a work  which 
manifests  design ; therefore  no  irrational  agent  could  have 
produced  the  universe.”  Strictly  speaking,  this  Syllogism  has 
five  terms ; but  if  you  look  to  the  meaning,  you  will  see,  that 
in  the  first  Premiss  (considering  it  as  a part  of  this  argument') 
it  is  not,  propei’ly,  “ an  irrational  agent”  that  you  are  speak- 
ing of,  and  of  which  you  predicate  that  it  could  not  produce  a 
work  manifesting  design  ; but  rather  it  is  this  “ work,”  fyc.  of 
which  you  are  speaking,  and  of  which  it  is  predicated  that  il 
could  not  be  produced  by  an  irrational  agent ; if,  then,  yqu 
Btate  the  Propositions  in  that  form,  the  Syllogism  will  be  per 
fectly  regular.  (See  above,  § i.) 


132 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


|Book  II 


Thus,  such  a Syllogism  as  this,  “ every  true  patriot  is  dis- 
interested ; few  men  are  disinterested  ; therefore  few  men  are 
true  patriots  ; ” might  appear  at  first  sight  to  be  in  the  second 
Figure,  and  faulty  ; whereas  it  is  Barbara , with  the  Premisses 
transposed : for  you  do  not  really  predicate  of  “ few  men,” 
that  they  are  “ disinterested,”  but  of  “ disinterested  persons ,” 
that  they  are  “ few.”  Again,  “ none  but  candid  men  arc 
good  reasoners  ; few  infidels  are  candid  ; few  infidels  are  good 
reasoners.”  In  this  it  will  be  most  convenient  to  considei  the 
Major-premiss  as  being,  “ all  good  reasoners  are  candid,’ 
(which  of  course  is  precisely  equipollent  to  its  illative  con 
verse  by  negation;)  and  the  Minor-premiss  and  Conclusior 
may  in  like  manner  be  fairly  expressed  thus  — “most  infi 
dels  are  not  candid  ; therefore  most  infidels  are  not  good  rea- 
soners : ” which  is  a regular  Syllogism  in  Catnestres*  Or,  if 
you  would  state  it  in  the  first  Figure,  thus:  “those  who  ars 
not  candid  [or  uncandid]  are  not  good  reasoners : most  infi- 
dels are  not  candid  ; most  infidels  are  not  good  reasoners  ” 

— 

Ciiap.  V.  • 

SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I. 

This  Supplement  may  be  studied  either  before  or  after  the  preceding  three 
Chapters .] 

§ I- 

Univocal,  The  usual  divisions  of  nouns  into  univocal, 

Equivocal,  equivocal , and  analogous , and  into  nouns  of  the 
Analogous , fpst  and  second  intention,  are  not,  strictly 

* The  reader  is  to  observe  that  the  term  employed  as  the  Subject 
of  the  Minor-premiss,  and  of  the  conclusion,  is  “ mcst-innde>  : ” he 
te  not  to  suppose  that  “ most”  is  a sign  of  distribution  ; it  i#  merely 
a eomj  endious  expression  for  “ the  greater  part  of.” 


tf^p.  V 5 l.J 


SUPPLEMENT  l'O  CHAP.  I. 


L33 


speaking,  divisions  of  words , but  divisions  of  the  manner  of 
employing  them  ; the  same  word  may  be  employed  either  univ- 
ocally,  equivocally,  or  analogously ; either  in  the  First-inten- 
tion, or  in  the  Second.  The  ordinary  logical  treatises  often  oc- 
casion great  perplexity  to  the  learner,  by  not  noticing  this  cir- 
cumstance, but  rather  leading  him  to  suppose  the  contrary. 
(See  Book  III.  § 8.)  Some  of  those  other  divisions  of  nouns, 
which  are  the  most  commonly  in  use,  though  not  appropriately 
and  exclusively  belonging  to  the  Logical  system,  — i.  e.  to  the 
theory  of  reasoning,  — it  maybe  worth  while  briefly  to  notice 
in  this  place. 

Let  it  be  observed,  then,  that  a term  expresses  the  view  we 
take  of  an  object.  And  its  being  viewed  as  an  object,  i.  e.  as 
one,  or  again  as  several,  depends  on  our  arbitrary  choice  ; 
e.  g.  we  may  consider  a “ troop  of  cavalry  ” as  one  object  ; 
or  we  may  make  any  single  “ horse  with  its  rider,”  or  any 
“ separate  man  ” or  horse,  or  any  limb  of  either,  the  subject 
of  our  thoughts. 

1.  When  then  any  one  object  is  considered  singular 
according  to  its  actual  existence , as  numerically  and  Common 
one , the  name  denoting  it  is  called  Singular ; terms • 

as  “ this  tree,”  the  “ city  of  London,”  Sfc.  When  it  is  con- 
sidered as  to  its  nature  and  character  only,  as  being  of  such  a 
description  as  might  equally  apply  to  other  single  objects,  the 
inadequate  or  incomplete  view  (see  B.  I.  § 3,  and  § 6.)  thus 
taken  of  an  individual,  is  expressed  by  a Common-term  ; as 
‘ tree,”  “ city,”  “ minister-of-state.” 

2.  When  any  object  is  considered  as  a part 

of  a whole,  viewed  in  reference  to  the  whole  Ahsolute  and 

Relative. 

or  to  another  part,  of  a more  complex  object  of 
.hought,  the  name  expressing  this  view  is  called  Relative ■' 
nd  to  Relative-term  is  opposed  Absolute;  as  denoting  an 

12 


134 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Boor  P 


object  considered  as  a whole,  and  without  reference  to  anv 
thing  of  which  it  is  a part,  or  to  any  other  part  distinguished 
from  it.  Thus,  “ Father,”  and  “ Son,”  “ Rider,”  “ Com 
munder,”  fyc.  are  Relatives;  being  regarded,  each  as  a par* 
&e  the  complex  objects,  Father-and-Son,”  c^-e. ; the  same 
ebject  designated  absolutely,  would  be  termed  a Man,  Living' 
Being,  fyc. 

Nouns  are  Correlative  to  each  other,  which 

Correlative. 

denote  objects  related  to  each  other,  and 
viewed  as  to  that  relation.  Thus,  though  a King  is  a ruler  of 
men,  “ King”  and  “ Man  ” are  not  correlative,  but  “ King  ” 
and  Subject , are. 

3.  When  there  are  two  views  which  cannot 

Compatible  jje  ta|ten  0p  one  s;ngie  object  at  the  same  time, 
and  opposite. 

the  terms  expressing  these  views  are  said  to  be 
Opposite , or  Inconsistent  [repugnantia  ;]  as,  “ black,”  and 
‘ white ; ” when  both  may  be  taken  of  the  same  object  at  the 
same  time,  they  are  called  Consistent,  or  Compatible  (conve- 
nientia  ;]  as  “ white,”  and  “ cold.”  Relative  terms  are  Oppo- 
site, only  when  applied  with  reference  to  the  same  Subject, 
ns,  one  may  be  both  Master  and  Servant ; but  not  at  the  same 
time  to  the  same  person. 

4.  When  the  notion  derived  from  the  view 

Concrete  and  taken  0f  any  object,  is  expressed  with  a refer- 
abstract.  . . . . 

ence  to,  or  as  in  conjunction  with,  the  object 

that  furnished  the  notion,  it  is  expressed  by  a Concrete  term  ; 
as,  " foolish,”  or  “ fool ; ” when  without  any  such  reference, 
by  an  Abstract  * term  ; as,  “ folly.” 

5.  When  a term  applied  to  some  object  is  such  as  to  implj 


* It  is  unfortunate  that  some  writers  have  introduced  the  fashios 
>f  calling  all  Common-terms  ” Abstract -terms 


Chap.  V.  } 1.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I. 


ViZ 


in  its  signification  some  “ attribute  ” belonging  to  that  object, 

such  a term  is  called  by  some  of  the  early  logi-  , . 

cal  writers  “ Connotative ; ” but  would  perhaps  0>- Connotative, 

be  more  conveniently  called  “ Attributive It  and,  Absolut 

“ connotes,”  i.  e.  “ notes  along  with  ” the  object  or  non-('onn6~ 

tative. 

[or  implies ] something  considered  as  inherent 
therein:  as  “The  capital  of  France;”  “The  founder  of 
Rome.”  The  founding  of  Rome,  is,  by  that  appellation, 
“ attributed  ” to  the  person  to  whom  it  is  applied. 

A term  which  merely  denotes  an  object  without  implying 
any  attribute  of  that  object,  is  called  “ Absolute ,”  or  “ Non 
connotative;”  as  “Paris;”  “Romulus.”  The  last  terms 
denote  respectively  the  same  objects  as  the  two  former  ; bu‘ 
do  not,  like  them,  connote  [ imply  in  their  signification]  any 
attribute  of  those  individuals. 

Every  Concrete-common-term  is  “ attributive,”  [connota- 
tive] whether  in  the  adjective*  or  substantive  form  ; as  “ Man,” 
‘human,”  “triangle,”  “triangular,”  “ saint,”  “ holy  : ” for, 
‘ man  ” e.  g.  or  “ human,”  are  appellations  denoting,  not 
the  attribute  itself  which  we  call  “ human-nature,”  but  a Be- 
ing to  which  such  a term  is  applied  in  reference  to,  and  by 
virtue  of,  its  possessing  that  attribute.  An  Abstract-common- 
term,  being  the  name  of  an  Attribute-itself  — as  “human- 
nature,”  “ triangularity,”  “ holiness,”  — is  “ Absolute  ” [non- 
connotative ] except  where  there  is  an  attribute  of  an  attribute 
implied  in  the  term  ; as  the  term  “ fear”  e.  g.  may  be  con- 
sidered as  implying  some  hope  of  escape ; without  which  the 
apprehension  of  evil  would  be  called  “ despair.” 


* Some  logical  writers  confine  the  word  to  adjectives ; but  mere 
seems  no  essential  difference  in  reference  to  the  present  subject.  In- 
deed, in  Greek  and  in  Latin  it  often  happens  that  a word  may  l>a 
reckoned  either  adjective  or  substantive;  as  “ stultus  ; ’ “hospes." 


>36 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  ii 


It  :s  to  he  observed  that  many  a term  is  employed  — - au< 
to  a certain  degree,  correctly  employed,  i.  e.  not  msappliet 
— by  persons  who  do  not  clearly  and  fully  take  in  its  signifi- 
cation ; — who  do  not  know,  or  do  not  bring  lefore  theii 
minds,  exactly  what  is  implied  [connoted]  by  it.  E.  G.  a 
child  learns  to  apply  the  term  “ money  ” to  the  bits  of 
metal  he  sees  pass  from  hand  to  hand,  long  before  he  has  any 
clear  notion  (which  some  never  fully  attain)  of  what  it  is  that 
constitutes  “ money,”  and  is  implied  [connoted]  by  the  term. 
So  also  it  is  conceivable  that  a person  might,  under  certain 
ctr.  umstances,  know  perfectly  what  individuals  are  Alder- 
men, Senators,  &c.  while  he  had  but  a very  vague  and  im- 
perfect notion  of  the  Office  which  such  a term  implies.  And 
such  a familiarity  as  this  with  any  term,  (together  with  one’s 
being  able  to  comprehend  processes  of  reasoning  in  which 
it  occurs)  tends  to  conceal  from  men  their  imperfect  appre- 
hension of  its  signification,  and  thus  often  leads  to  con- 
fusion of  thought,  and  error.  (See  B.  iv.  ch.  iv.  § 2.) 

6.  A term  which  denotes  a certain  view  of 

Positive,  an  object  as  being  actually  taken  of  it,  is  called 
Privative,  _ . . 

§ Negative  Positive:  as  “ speech , “a  man  speaking  : 
a term  denoting  that  this  view  might  conceiv- 
ably be  taken  of  the  object,  but  is  not,  is  Privative  ; as 
dumbness ,”  a “ man  silent ,”  fyc*  That  which  denotes  that 


* Many  Privative  epithets  are  such  that  by  a little  ingenuity  the 
application  of  them  may  be  represented  as  an  absurdity.  Thus,  Wal- 
es’s remark  (introduced  in  this  treatise)  that  a jest  is  generally  a mock 
fallacy,  i.  e.  a fallacy  not  designed  to  deceive,  but  so  palpable  as  only 
to  furnish  amusement,  might  be  speciously  condemned  as  involving  a 
contradiction  : for  “ the  design  to  deceive,”  it  might  be  said,  “ is  essen- 
tial to  a fallacy.”  In  the  same  way  it  might  be  argued  that  it  i» 
absa-  d to  speak  of  “ a dead  man  ; ” e.  g.  “ every  man  is  a living  crea> 
tore  nothing  dead  is  a living  creature;  therefore  no  man  is  dead  5 


Chai*.  V.  $ 1.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I 


137 


such  a notion  is  not  and  could  not  be  formec  of  the  object,  is 
called  Negative ; as,“  a dumb  statue, a lifeless  carcass,”  tf-c, 
Many  negative-terms  which  are  such  in  sense  only,  have 
led  to  confusion  of  thought,  from  their  real  character  being 
imperfectly  perceived.  E.  G.  “ Liberty,”  which  is  a purely 
negative  term,  denoting  merely  “ absence  of  restraint,”  is 
sometimes  confounded  with  “ Power.”  * 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  same  term  may  be  regarded 
either  as  Positive,  or  as  Privative  or  Negative,  according  to  the 
quality  or  character  which  we  are  referring  to  in  our  minds  : 
thus,  of  “ happy  ” and  “ miserable,”  we  may  regard  the  for- 
mer as  Positive,  and  the  latter  (unhappy)  as  Privative ; or 
trice  versa  ; according  as  we  are  thinking  of  enjoyment  or  of 
suffering. 


7.  A Privative  or  Negative  term  is  also  called 

. r-  n ■ . Definite  and 

Indefinite  [infinitum]  in  respect  of  its  not  de-  indefinite 

fining  and  marking  out  an  object ; in  contradis- 
tinction to  this,  the  Positive  term  is  called  Definite  [finitum] 
because  it  does  thus  define  or  mark  out.  Thus,  “ organizeo 
Being,”  or  “ Cgesar,”  are  called  Definite,  as  marking  out,  and 
limiting  our  view  to,  one  particular  class  of  Beings,  or  one 
single  person  ; “ unorganized,”  or  “ not-Caesar,”  are  called 
Indefinite,  as  not  restricting  our  view  to  any  class,  or  individ- 
ual, but  only  excluding  one , and  leaving  it  undetermined  what 
other  individual  the  thing  so  spoken  of  may  be,  or  what  other 
class  it  may  belong  to. 


* An  extension  of  a man’s  power  (as  Tucker  has  observed  in  his 
“ Light  of  Nature  ”)  may  be  tne  means  of  diminishing  his  “ liberty  ; ” 
as  the  liberty  of  a helpless  paralytic  is  not  abridged  by  locking  the 
door  of  his  room ; though  it  would  be,  if  he  were  to  recover  the  us« 
of  his  limbs.  See  a notice  of  the  word  “aperture’  in  § 5.  Essay  i 
1st  Series. 


12* 


138 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


Book  IT 


It  iu  to  be  observed,  that  the  most  perfect  opj  jsiticn  between 
terms  exists  between  any  two  wnich  differ  only 

Contra. lictory  jn  respectively  wanting  and  having  the  particle 
cpposilian  of  . 

termS'  not  (either  expressly,  or  in  sense)  attached  to 

them  ; as,  “ organized,”  and  “ not-organized 
“corporeal,”  and  “ incorporeal.”  For  not  only  is  it  impossible 
for  both  these  views  to  be  taken  at  once  of  the  same  thing, 
but  «lso,  it  is  impossible  but  that  one  or  other  should  be  appli- 
cable to  every  object ; as  there  is  nothing  that  can  be  both , so 
there  is  nothing  that  can  be  neither.  Every  thing  that  can 
be  even  conceived,  must  be  either  “ Caesar,”  or  “ not-Caesar ; ” 
— either  “ corporeal,”  or  “ incorporeal.”  And  in  this  way  a 
complete  twofold  division  may  be  made  of  any  subject,  being 
certain  (as  the  expression  is)  to  exhaust  it.  And  the  repeti- 
tion of  this  process,  so  as  to  carry  on  a subdivision  as  far  as 
there  is  occasion,  is  thence  called  by  Logicians  “ abscissio 
infiniti ; ” i.  e.  the  repeated  cutting  off  of  that  which  the  ob- 
ject to  be  examined  is  not ; e.  g.  “ 1.  This  disorder  either  is, 
or  is  not,  a dropsy ; and  for  this  or  that  reason,  it  is  not ; 2. 
Any  other  disease  either  is,  or  is  not,  gout ; this  is  not : then, 
3.  It  either  is,  or  is  not,  consumption,  fyc.”  This  procedure 
Is  very  common  in  Aristotle’s  works.  (See  B.  ii.  ch.  3.  § 4.) 

Such  terms  may  be  said  to  be  in  Contradictory-opposition 
to  each  other. 


On  the  other  hand,  Contrary  terms,  i.  e.  those 
Contrary  , . , . , , , 

which,  coming  under  some  one  class,  are  the 
terms.  ° 

most  different  of  all  that  belong  to  that  class,  as 
“ wise  ” and  “ foolish,”  both  denoting  mental  habits,  are  op- 
posed, but  in  a different  manner  : for  though  both  cannot  be 
applied  to  the  same  object,  there  may  be  other  objec.s  tc 
which  neither  can  be  applied  : nothing  can  be  at  once  noth 
1 wise  ’ and  “ foolish  ; ” but  a stone  cannot  be  e ther. 


SflAP.  V.  $ 2.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  1. 


139 


§2. 


Generaliza- 

tion. 


The  notions  expressed  by  Common-terms,  we  are  enabled 
(as  has  been  remarked  in  the  Analytical  Outline)  to  form,  by 
the  faculty  of  abstraction:  for  by  it,  in  contemplating  any 
object  (or  objects,)  we  can  attend  exclusively  to  some  partic 
ular  circumstances  belonging  to  it,  [some  certain  parts  of  its 
nature  as  it  were,]  and  quite  withhold  our  attention  from  the 
rest.  When,  therefore,  we  are  thus  contem- 
plating several  individuals  which  resemble  each 
other  in  some  part  of  their  nature,  we  can  (by 
attending  to  that  part  alone , and  not  to  those  points  wherein 
they  dilfer)  assign  them  one  common  name , which  will  ex- 
press or  stand  for  them  merely  as  far  as  they  all  agree ; and 
which,  of  course,  will  be  applicable  to  all  or  any  of  them ; 
(which  process  is  called  generalization)  and  each  of  these 
names  is  called  a common- term,  from  its  belonging  to  them  all 
alike ; or  a predicable , because  it  may  be  pred- 
icated-affirmatively  of  them,  or  of  any  of  them. 

(See  B.  i.  § 3.) 

Generalization  (as  has  been  remarked)  implies  Abstrac- 
ion  ; but  it  is  not  the  same  thing  ; for  there  may  be  abstrac- 
tion without  generalization.  When  we  are  speaking  of  an 
Individual,  it  is  usually  an  abstract  notion  that  we  form  ; e.  g. 
suppose  we  are  speaking  of  the  present  King  of  France;  he 
must  actually  be  either  at  Paris  or  elsewhere ; sitting,  stand- 
ing, or  in  some  other  posture ; and  in  such  and  such  a dress, 
fyc.  Yet  many  of  these  circumstances,  (which  are  separable 
Accidents,*  and  consequently)  which  are  regarded  as  non • 
isscntial  to  the  individual , are  quite  disregarded  by  us ; and 
we  abstract  from  them  what  we  consider  as  essential  ; thus 


Predicables. 


* See  § 6. 


I jMENTS  of  logic. 


[Book  IV 


1 40 


'jrming  an  abstract  notion  of  the  Individuate  Yet  there  is 
here  no  generalization. 


§3. 

The  following  is  the  account  usually  given  in  logical  trea- 
tises of  the  different  kinds  [heads]  of  Predicable ; but  it 
cannot  be  admitted  without  some  considerable  modifications, 
explanations  and  corrections,  which  will  be  subjoined.  ' 

Whatever  Term  can  be  affirmed  of  several 
things,  must  express  either  their  whole  essence, 
which  is  called  the  Species ; or  a part  of  their  essence  (viz. 

either  the  material  part,  which  is  called  the 
Genus , or  the  formal  and  distinguishing 
part , which  is  called  Differentia,  or  in  common 
Differentia,  discourse,  characteristic ) or  something  joined 
to  the  essence;  whether  necessarily  (i.  e.  to  the  whole  spe- 
sies,  or  in  other  words,  universally , to  every  individual  of  it), 
which  is  called  a Property ; or  contingently 
(i.  e.  to  some  individuals  only  of  the  species), 
Accident.  which  is  an  Accident. 


Genus. 


Property. 


Every  predicable  expresses  either 


The  whole  essence 
of  its  subject : 
viz. : Species 


I 

aniversal 
but  not 
peculiar 


or  part  of  its 
essence 


Genus  — Difference. 


Property 

I 


[peculiar 
but  not 
universal]  * 


universal 
and  pe- 
culiar 

r 


i 

or  something 
joined  to  its 
essence. 


I 

Accident 




inseparable  — separable 


* See  below,  § 4. 


Chap.  V.  § 3.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP  I. 


14 


Of  these  predicables,  genus  and  species  are  commonly 
said,  in  the  language  of  logicians,  to  be  predicated  in  quid 
[tI)  i.  e.  to  answer  to  the  question,  “ what  ? ” as,  “ what  i» 
Caesar  ? ” Answer,  “ a man ; ” “ what  is  a man  ? ” Answer 
“ an  animal  ; ” Difference,  in  “ quale  quid  ; ” (noiov  ti] 
Property  and  Accident  in  quale  ( noiov .) 

It  is  evident  from  what  has  been  said,  that 

Genus  ana 

the  Genus  and  Difference  put  together  make  up  Species,  each, 
the  Species.  E.  G.  “ rational  ” and  “animal”  a whole,  in 
constitute  “ man  ; ” so  that,  in  reality , the  different 
Species  contains  the  Genus  [i.  e.  implies  it ;] 
and  when  the  Genus  is  called  a whole , and  is  said  to  contain 
the  Species,  this  is  only  a metaphorical  expression,  signifying 
that  it  comprehends  the  species,  in  its  own  more  extensive  sig- 
nification. If  for  instance  I predicate  the  term  “ animal  ” of  an 
individual  man,  as  Alexander,  I speak  truth  indeed,  but  only 
such  a portion  of  the  truth  that  I might  equally  predicate 
the  same  term  of  his  horse  Bucephalus.  If  I predicate  the 
terms  “ Man  ” and  “ Horse  ” of  Alexander  and  of  Bucepha- 
lus respectively,  I use  a more  full  and  complete  expression  for 
each  than  the  term  “ animal  and  this  last  is  accordingly 
the  more  extensive , as  it  contains,  [or,  more  properly  speak- 
ing, comprehends]  and  may  be  applied  to,  several  differen 
Species  ; viz.  : “ bird,”  “ beast,”  “ fish,”  fyc. 

In  the  same  manner  the  name  of  a species  is  a more  exten- 
sive [i.  e.  comprehensive]  but  less  full  and  complete  term 
than  that  of  an  individual  (viz.  a Singular-term ;)  since  the 
Spec'es  may  be  predicated  of  each  of  these. 

‘ The  impression  produced  on  the  mind  by  a Singular 
Term,  may  be  compared  to  the  distinct  view  taken  in  by  the 
eye,  of  any  object  (suppose  some  particular  rran)  near  a. 
hand,  in  a clear  light,  which  enables  us  tc  distinguish  the 


142 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


features  of  the  individual:  in  a fainter  light  or  rather  far- 
ther off,  we  merely  perceive  that  the  object  a a man:  this 
corresponds  with  the  idea  conveyed  by  the  narr.  e of  the  Spe- 
cies : yet  farther  off,  or  in  a still  feebler  light,  we  can  distin- 
guish merely  some  living  object ; and  at  length,  merely  some 
object;  these  views  corresponding  respectively  with  the  terms 
denoting  the  Genera,  less  or  more  remote.”  * 

Hence  it  is  plain  that  when  logicians  speak  of  “ Species  ” 
as  “ expressing  the  whole  essence  of  its  subjects,”  this  is  not 
strictly  correct,  unless  we  understand  by  the  “ whole  essence” 
the  “ whole  that  any  common- term  can  express  : ” — the  “ near- 
est approach  to  the  whole  essence  of  the  individual  that  any 
term  (not  synonymous  with  the  Subject)  can  denote.”  No 
predicate  can  express,  strictly,  the  whole  essence  of  its  Sub- 
ject, unless  it  be  merely  another  name,  of  the  very  same  im- 
port, and  coextensive  with  it  ; as  “ Csesar  was  the  conqueror 
of  Pompey.” 

But  when  logicians  speak  of  Species  as  a “ whole,”  this  is 
properly  in  reference  to  the  Genus  and  the  Difference  ; each 
of  which  denotes  a “ part  ” of  that  Species  which  we  consti- 
tute by  joining  those  two  together.  But  then,  it  should  be  re- 
membered that  a Species  is  not  a predicable  in  respect  of  its 
Genus  and  Difference  (since  it  cannot  be  predicated  of  them) 
but  only  in  respect  of  the  Individuals,  or  lower  Species,  of 
which  it  can  be  predicated. 

§4. 

A Species  then,  it  is  plain,  when  predicated 

Subaltern  in(j;vj(]uaiS)  stands  in  the  same  relation  tc 

genus  and 

species.  them , as  the  Genus  to  the  Species  ; and  when 

predicated  of  other  (lower)  Species,  it  is  then 


* Iihet.  Part  III.  Chap.  ii.  § 1. 


Chap.  V.  9 4.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I. 


143 


n respect  of  these,  a Genus,  while  it  is  a Species  in  respeci 
of  a higher  Genus ; as  “ quadruped,”  which  is  a species 
of  “ animal,”  is  a Genus  in  respect  of  “ home  ; ” which  lat- 
er again  may  be  predicated  of  Bucephalus  and  of  other  in- 
dividuals. Such  a term  is  called  a subaltern  Species  or 
Genus ; being  each,  in  respect  of  different  other  terms 
respectively. 

A Genus  that  is  not  considered  as  a species 
of  any  thing,  is  called  summum  (the  highest) 

Genus  ; a Species  that  is  net  considered  as  a 
genus  of  any  thing,  — i.  e.  is  regarded  as  con- 
taining under  it  only  individuals , — is  called  infirna  (the 
lowest)  Species. 

When  I say  of  a Magnet,  that  it  is  “ a kind  of  iron-ore ,” 
that  is  called  its  proximum-genus,  because  it  is  the  closest  [or 
'owest]  genus  that  is  predicated  of  it : “ mineral  ” is  its  more 


Highest 
Genus  and 
lowest  Species. 


Specific 
Difference  § 
Property. 


When  I say  that  the  Differentia  of  a magnet 
is  its  “ attracting  iron''  and  that  its  Property 
is  “ polarity ,”  these  are  called  respectively  a 
Specific  Difference  and  Property ; because 
magnet  is  (I  have  supposed)  an  injima  species  [i.  e.  only  a 
species.] 

When  I say  that  the  Differentia  of  iron  ore  is  its  “ con- 
taining iron''  and  its  Property,  “ being  attracted  by  the 
magnet ,”  these  are  called  respectively,  a gene- 
ric Difference  and  Property,  because  “ iron- 
ore  ” is  a subaltern  Species  or  Genus ; being 
both  the  genus  of  magnet , and  a species  of 
mineral. 

It  should  be  observed  here,  that  when  logicians  sneak  of 
Property  and  Accident  as  predicables  expressing,  not  the 


Generic 
Difference  <$ 
Property. 


! 44 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


Essence,  or  part  of  the  Essence  of  a subject,  but  something 
united  to  the  Essence,  this  must  be  understood  as  having 
reference  not  to  the  nature  of  things  as  they  are  in  themselves, 
but  to  our  conceptions  of  them.  “ Polarity  ” for  instance  is 
as  much  a part  of  the  real  nature  of  the  substance  we  call 
“ Magnet,”  as  its  “ attraction  of  iron  ; ” and  again,  a certain 
rhape,  color,  or  specific  gravity,  as  much  belongs  in  reality  to 
those  magnets  which  are  of  that  description,  as  either  polarity, 
or  attraction.  But  our  modes  of  conceiving,  and  of  express- 
ing our  conceptions,  have  reference  to  the  relations  in  which 
objects  stand  to  our  own  minds ; and  are  influenced  in  each 
instance  by  the  particular  end  we  have  in  view.  That,  ac- 
cordingly, is  accounted  a part  of  the  Essence  of  any  thing, 
which  is  essential  to  the  notion  of  it  formed  in  our  minds. 
Thus,  if  we  have  annexed  such  a notion  to  the  term,  Man, 
that  “ rationality  ” stands  prominent  in  our  minds,  in  distin- 
guishing Man  from  other  Animals,  we  call  this,  the  “ Differ- 
ence,” and  a part  of  the  “ Essence  ” of  the  term  Man ; 
though  “ risibility”  be  an  attribute  which  does  not  less  really 
belong  to  Man.  So,  the  primary  and  prominent  distinction 
in  our  minds  of  a Triangle  from  other  plane  rectilineal  Fig- 
ures, is  its  having  three  sides  ; though  the  equality  of  its  three 
angles  to  two  right  angles,  be,  in  reality,  no  less  essential  to  a 
triangle.  But  that  this  last  is  the  fact,  is  demonstrated  to  the 
learner  not  till  long  after  he  is  supposed  to  have  become 
familiar  with  the  notion  of  a Triangle. 

Hence,  in  different  sciences  or  arts,  different  attributes  are 
fixed  on,  as  essentially  characterizing  each  species,  according 
as  this  or  that  is  the  most  important  in  reference  to  the  matter 
we  are  engaged  in.  In  Navigation,  for  instance,  the  polarity 
of  the  Magnet  is  the  essential  quality ; since  if  there  could  be 
any  other  substance  which  could  possess  this,  without  attract 


Ohap.  V.  $ 4.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I. 


145 


ing  iron,  it  would  answer  the  same  purpose  : but  to  those  man- 
ufacturers who  employ  Magnets  for  the  purpose  of  more 
expeditiously  picking  up  small  bits  of  iron,  and  for  shield- 
ing their  faces  from  the  noxious  steel-dust,  in  the  grinding 
of  needles,  the  attracting  power  of  the  Magnet  is  the  essen- 
tial point. 

Under  the  head  of  Property,  logicians  have  enumerated,  as 
may  be  seen  in  the  preceding  table,  not  only  such  as  are 
strictly  called  Properties,  as  belonging  each  to  the  whole  Spe- 
cies of  which  it  is  predicated,  and  to  that  alone,  but  also,  such 
as  belong  to  the  whole  Species,  and  to  others  besides  ; in  other 
words,  Properties  which  are  universal , but  not  peculiar ; as 
“ to  breathe  air  ” belongs  to  every  man ; but  not  to  man 
alone  ; and  it  is,  therefore,  strictly  speaking,  not  so  much  a 
Property  of  the  Species  “ man,”  as  of  the  higher,  (i.  e.  more 
comprehensive,)  Species,  which  is  the  Genus  of  that,  viz.  of 
“ land-animal.”  And  it  is  this  that  logicians  mean  by  generic - 
property. 

Other  Properties,  as  some  logicians  call  them, 

are  peculiar  to  a species,  but  do  not  belong  to  Peculiar 
. Accident. 

the  whole  of  it ; e.  g.  man  alone  can  be  a poet, 

but  it  is  not  every  man  that  is  so.  These,  however,  are  more 

commonly  and  more  properly  reckoned  as  accidents. 

Some  have  also  added  a fourth  kind  of  Property  ; viz.  that 
which  is  peculiar  to  a Species,  and  belongs  to  every  Individual 
of  it,  but  not  at  every  time.  But  this  is,  in  fact,  a contradic- 
tion ; since  whatever  does  not  always  belong  to  a Species, 
does  not  belong  to  it  universally.  It  is  through  the  ambiguity 
of  words  that  they  have  fallen  into  this  confusion  of  thought ; 
c.  g.  the  example  commonly  given  is,  “ homini  canescere;” 
“to  become  gray”  being,  they  say,  (though  it  is  not)  peculiar 
to  man,  and  belonging  to  every  individual,  though  not  always, 

13 


146 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Boor  II 


but  or  y in  old  age,  &c.  Now,  if  by  “ canescere  ” be  mean 
the  very  state  of  becoming  gray,  this  manifestly  does  not  be 
long  to  every  man  : if  again  it  be  meant  to  signify  the  liabil* 
ity  to  become  gray  at  some  time  or  other,  this  does  belong 
always  to  man.  And  the  same  in  other  instances.  Indeed 
the  very  Proprium  fixed  on  by  Aldrich,  “ risibility,”  is  nearly 
parallel  to  the  above.  Man  is  “ always  capable  of  laughing  ; ” 
bat  he  is  not  “ capable  of  laughing  always.'1'1 

Accidents  That  is  most  properly  called  an  “ Accident,” 
separable  and  which  may  be  absent  or  present,  the  essence 
inseparable.  Df  gpecjes  con’inuing  the  same  ; as,  for  a 

man  to  be  “ walking ,”  or  a “ native  of  Paris.’’''  Of  these 
two  examples,  the  former  is  what  logicians  call  a separable 
Accident,  because  it  may  be  separated  from  the  individual: 
(e.  g.  he  may  sit  down  ;)  the  latter  is  an  inseparable  Accident, 
being  not  separable  from  the  individual,  ( i . e.  he  who  is  a na- 
tive of  Paris  can  never  be  otherwise  ;)  “ from  the  individual,” 
I say,  because  every  accident  must  be  separable  from  the 
species , else  it  would  be  a property* 

This  seems  to  me  a clearer  and  more  correct  description 
of  the  two  kinds  of  Accident  than  the  one  given  by  Aldrich ; 
viz.  that  a Separable-Accident  may  be  actually  separated,  and 
an  Inseparable,  only  in  thought , “ ut  Mantuanum  esse,  a Vir- 
gilio.”  For  surely  “to  be  the  author  of  the  .ZEneid”  was 

* In  the  Portuguese  language  there  are  two  words,  “ ser  ” and 
' estar,”  both  answering  to  the  English  “to  be;”  and  foreigners,  I 
aave  been  told,  are  often  much  perplexed  about  the  proper  use  of 
each.  I soon  found,  however,  that  the  rule  is  a logical  one,  easily 
remembered : “ estar  ” furnishes  the  copula  when  the  predicate  is  a 
i sparable-accident,  and  “ ser,”  in  all  other  cases.  E.  G.  ‘*  Estar  in  In- 
ghilterra”  is  “to  be  in  England  ; ” “Ser  Inglez”  is  “to  be  an  Eng- 
lishman ; ” « Quern  e ? ’ who  is  he  ? ” “ Quern  esta  la  ? ” “ who  i» 
.here?”  &c. 


Chap  V.  { 4.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I. 


14, 


anotnor  Inseparable-Accident  of  the  same  individual  ; “ to  be 
a Roman  citizen  ” another ; and  “ to  live  in  the  days  of 
Augustus  ” another  ; now  can  we  in  thought  separate  all  these 
things  from  the  essence  of  that  individual  ? To  do  so  would 
be  to  form  the  idea  of  a different  individual.  We  can  indeed 
conceive  a man , and  one  who  might  chance  to  bear  the  name 
of  Virgil,  without  any  of  these  Accidents ; but  then  it  would 
plainly  not  be  the  same  man.  But  Virgil,  whether  sitting  01 
standing,  &c.  we  regard  as  the  same  man  ; the  abstract  notion 
which  we  have  formed  of  that  individual  being  unaltered  by 
the  absence  or  presence  of  these  separable  accidents.  (See 
above,  § 2.) 

Let  it  here  be  observed,  that  both  the  general  D ,.  ,, 

’ o Predicables 

name  “ Predicable,”  and  each  of  the  classes  of  relatively  so 
Predicables,  (viz.  Genus,  Species,  c^*c.)  are  called- 
relative ; i.  e.  we  cannot  say  what  predicable  any  term  is,  or 
whether  it  is  any  at  all,  unless  it  be  specified  of  what  it  is  to 
be  predicated  : e.  g.  the  term  “ red  ” would  be  considered  a 
genus , in  relation  to  the  terms  “ pink,”  “ scarlet,”  ty-c. : it 
might  be  regarded  as  the  differentia , in  relation  to  “ red  rose  ; ” 
— as  a property  of  “ blood,”  — as  an  accident  of  “ a house,” 
4*c.  And  in  all  cases  accordingly,  the  Differences  or  Proper- 
ties of  any  lower  species  will  be  Accidents  in  reference  to  the 
class  they  come  under.  E.  G.  “malleability”  is  an  “acci- 
dent” in  reference  to  the  term  “ metal ; ” but  it  is  a “ prop- 
erty *’  of  gold  and  most  other  metals  ; as  the  absence  of  it, — ■ 
brittleness, — is  of  Antimony  and  Arsenic,  and  several  others 
formerly  called  Semimetals. 

And  unuersally,  it  is  to  be  steadily  kept  ’.n 
tnind,  that  no  “common-terms”  have,  as  the 
names  of  Individuals  [“  singular-terms  ”]  have, 
nny  real  thing  existing  in  nature  corresponding 


A common 
term  not  tilt 
name  of  on4 
real  thing. 


148 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


| Book  II 


to  each  of  them,*  but  that  each  of  them  is  merely  a sign  de- 
noting a certain  inadequate  notion  which  our  minds  have 
formed  of  an  Individual,  and  which,  consequently,  not  in 
eluding  the  notion  of  “ individuality  ” [numerical- unity]  nor 
any  thing  wherein  that  individual  differs  from  certain  others, 
is  applicable  equally  well  to  all,  or  any  of  them.  Thus 
“ man  ” denotes  no  real  thing  (as  the  Sect  of  the  Realists 
maintained)  distinct  from  each  individual,  but  merely  any 
man,  viewed  inadequately , i.  e.  so  as  to  omit,  and  alstract 
from,  all  that  is  peculiar  to  each  individual  ; by  which  means 
the  term  becomes  applicable  alike  to  any  one  of  several  indi- 
viduals, or  (in  the  plural)  to  several  together. 

The  unity  [ singleness 1 or  sameness  of  what  is 

Unity  of  a J 

common-term  denoteci  by  a common- term,  does  not,  as  in  the 

belongs  to  the  case  of  a singular- term,  consist  in  the  object 

term  itself  itself  being  (in  the  primary  sense)  one  and  the 
same,t  but  in  the  oneness  of  the  Sign  itself ; 
which  is  like  a Stamp  (for  marking  bales  of  goods,  or  cattle,) 
that  impresses  on  each  a similar  mark ; called,  thence,  in  the 
secondary  sense,  one  and  the  same  mark.  And  just  such  a 
stamp , to  the  mind,  is  a Common-term  ; which  being,  itself 

one,  conveys  to  each  of  an  indefinite  number  of  minds  an 

impression  precisely  similar , and  thence  called,  in  the  trans- 
ferred sense,  one  and  the  same  Idea. 

A.nd  we  arbitrarily  fix  on  the  circumstance  which  we  in 
each  instance  choose  to  abstract  and  consider  separately,  dis- 
regarding all  the  rest ; so  that  the  same  individual  may  thus 
be  referred  to  any  of  several  different  Species,  and  the  same 


• Tode  T(,  as  Aristotle  expresses  it;  though  he  has  been,  represented 
Its  the  champion  of  the  opposite  opinion  : vide  Catag.  c.  3. 
t See  Book  IV.  Chap.  v.  § 2.  and  Append.  Art.  “ Same.” 


Chap.  V.  § D .]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP  I. 


149 


Species,  to  several  Genera,  as  suits  our  purpose.  Thus,  it 

suits  the  Farmer’s  purpose  to  class  his  oattle 

with  his  ploughs,  carts,  and  other  possessions,  Different 

. nodes  of  cla-t" 

under  the  name  of  “ stock  : ” the  Naturalist,  Sification. 
suitably  to  his  purpose,  classes  them  as  “ quad- 
rupeds,”  which  term  would  inc.ude  wolves,  deer,  $*c.,  which 
to  the  farmer  would  be  a most  improper  classification ; th< 
Commissary,  again,  would  class  them  with  corn,  cheese,  fish 
$*e.,as  “provision ; ” that  which  is  most  essential  in  one  view 
being  subordinate  in  another. 


Division. 


§ 5. 

An  individual  is  so  called  because  it  is  inca- 
pable of  logical  Division ; which  is  a meta- 
phorical expression,  to  signify  “ the  distinct  \i.  e.  separate] 
enumeration  of  several  things  signified  by  one  common 
name.” 

This  operation  is  directly  opposite  to  generalization,  (which 
is  performed  by  means  of  “ Abstraction ; ”)  for  as,  in  that, 
you  lay  aside  the  differences  by  which  several  things  are  dis- 
tinguished, so  as  to  call  them  all  by  one  common  name , so,  in 
Division,  you  add  on  the  Differences,  so  as  to  enumerate  them 
by  their  several  distinct  names.  Thus,  “ mineral  ” is  said  to 
be  divided  into  “ stones,  metals,”  Sfc. ; and  metals  again  into 
“ gold,  iron,”  fyc. ; and  these  are  called  the  Parts  [or  mem- 
bers] of  the  division. 

“ Division,”  in  its  primary  sense,  means  sep- 
arating from  each  other  (either  actually,  or  in 
enumeration)  the  parts  of  which  some  really- 
existing  single  object  consists  : as  when  you 
divide  “ an  animal  ” (that  is,  any  single  animal) 

13* 


Logical  di- 
vision, meta- 
phorically *1 
called. 


150 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


into  its  several  members;  or  again,  into  its“  bones,  mnscles, 
nerves,  blood-vessels,”  &c.  And  so,  with  any  single  Vege 
table,  &c. 

Now,  each  of  the  parts  into  which  you  thus  “ physically  ’ 
(as  it  is  called)  divide  “an  animal,”  is  strictly  and  properly  a 
“part,”  and  is  really  less  than  the  whole:  for  you  could  not 
say  of  a bone,  for  instance,  or  of  a limb,  that  it  is  “ an  Animal.” 

But  when  you  “ divide  ” — in  the  secondary  sense  of  the 
word  (or,  as  it  is  called,  “ metaphysically  ”) — “Animal,” 
that  is,  the  Genus  “ Animal,”  into  Beast,  Bird,  Fish,  Reptile, 
Insect,  &c.,  each  of  the  parts  [or  “ members  ”]  is  metaphor- 
ically called  a “ part,”  and  is,  in  another  sense,  more  than 
the  whole  [the  Genus]  that  is  thus  divided.  For  you  may 
say  of  a Beast  or  Bird  that  it  is  an  “ Animal  ; ” and  the  term 
“ Beast  ” implies  not  only  the  term  “ Animal,”  but  something 
more  besides  ; namely,  whatever  “ Difference  ” characterizes 
“ Beast,”  and  separates  it  from  “ Bird,”  “ Fish,”  &c. 

And  so  also  any  Singular-term  [denoting  one  individual] 
implies  not  only  the  whole  of  what  is  understood  by  the  Spe- 
cies it  belongs  to,  but  also  more ; namely,  whatever  distin- 
guishes that  single  object  from  others  of  the  same  Species  : 
as  ' London  ” implies  all  that  is  denoted  by  the  term  “ City,” 
and  also  all  that  distinguishes  that  individual-city. 

The  “ parts  ” [“  members  ”]  in  that  figurative  sense  with 
which  we  are  now  occupied,  are  each  of  them  less  than  the 
whole , in  another  sense ; that  is,  of  less  comprehensive  signifi- 
cation. Thus,  the  Singular-term  “ Romulus  ” embracing  only 
an  individual-king,  is  less  extensive  than  the  Species  “ King  ; ” 
and  that,  again,  less  extensive  than  the  Genus  “ Magis- 
trate,” Ac. 

An  “ /^dividual  ” then  is  so  called  from  its  being  incapibU 
tf  being  (in  this  figurative  sense)  divided. 


Chap.  V.  $ 5.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I 


151 


And  though  the  two  senses  of  the  word  “ Division  ” are 
easily  distinguishable  when  explained,  it  is  so  commonly  em- 
ployed in  each  sense,  that  through  inattention,  confusion  often 
ensues. 

We  speak  as  familiarly  of  tne  “ division  ” of  Mankind  intc 
the  several  races  of  “ Europeans,  Tartars,  Hindoos,  Negroes,” 
&c.  as  of  the  “ division  ” of  the  Earth  into  “ Europe,  Asia 
Africa,”  &c.  though  “ the  Earth  ” [or  “ the  World  ”]  is  a 
Singular-term,  and  denotes  what  we  call  one  Individual.  And 
it  is  plain  we  could  not  say  of  Europe,  for  instance,  or  of 
Asia,  that  it  is  “ a World.”  But  we  can  predicate  “ Man  ’’ 
of  every  individual  European,  Hindoo,  &c. 

And  here  observe  that  there  is  a common  colloquial  incor- 
rectness (increasing  the  liability  to  confusion)  in  the  use  of 
the  word  “ division,”  in  each  of  these  eases,  to  denote  one  of 
the  '■'•'parts  ” into  which  the  whole  is  divided.  Thus  you  will 
sometimes  hear  a person  speak  of  Europe  as  one  “ division  ” 
of  the  Earth  ; or  of  such  and  such  a “ division  ” of  an  Army  : 
meaning  “ portion.’1'1  And  so  again  a person  will  sometimes 
speak  of  “.animals  that  belong  to  the  feline  division  of  the 
Carnivora”  [flesh-eating  animals]  meaning,  that  portion  of 
the  Class  “Carnivora.” 

It  is  usual  when  a long  and  complex  course 

Schemes  of 

of  Division  is  to  be  stated,  to  draw  it  out,  for  Division 
the  sake  of  clearness  and  brevity,  in  a form  like 
that  of  a genealogical  “ Treed'  * And  by  carefully  exam 
ining  any  specimen  of  such  a “ Tree”  (going  over  it  repeat- 
edly, and  comparing  each  portion  of  it  with  the  explanations 
above  given)  you  will  be  able  perfectly  to  fix  in  your  mind 
the  technical  terms  we  have  been  explaining. 


* See  tne  Division  of  Fallacies,  Book  III.  § 4 


152 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


Take  for  instance  as  a “ Summum-genus  ” the  mathemat 
ical-term 

“ Plane-superficial-figure  ” 

! 

Mixed  Figure  Rectilinear  Curvilinear 

(of  Rect.  and  Curv.)  Figure  Figure 


Triangle  ; Quadrilateral,  &c.  Circle  ; Ellipse,  &c. 

Such  a “Tree  of  division”  the  Student  may  easily  fill  up 
for  himself.  And  the  employment  of  such  a form  will  be 
found  exceedingly  useful  in  obtaining  clear  views  in  any 
study  you  are  engaged  in. 

For  instance,  in  the  one  we  have  been  now  occupied  with, 
take  for  a Summum-Genus,  “ Expression  ; ” (i.  c.  “ expres- 
sion-in-language  ” of  any  such  mental-operation  as  those  for- 
merly noticed)  you  may  then  exhibit,  thus,  the  division  and 
ruhdivision  of — 


Cxpiemlon 


Chat.  V.  5 5 I 


SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I. 


Affirm-  Nega-  in  in  in  Condi-  Dia- 

athre.  live  1st  2d  .id  tional,  junc- 

Fig.  Fig.  Fig  »!»• 


i54 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


FBoo*  IL 


The  rules  ordinarily  given  foi  Division  are 
Ordinary  ^gg  . each  Qf  t]le  parts  or  uny  0f  them 

r’llcsfor  divis- 

i0U'  short  of  all , must  contain  less,  (i.  e.  have  a 

narrower  signification)  than  the  thing  divided. 
2d.  All  the  Parts  together  must  be  exactly  equal  to  the  thing 
divided  ; therefore  we  must  be  careful  to  ascertain  that  tho 
summum  genus  may  be  predicated  of  every  term  placed  under 
it,  and  of  nothing  else.  3d.  The  Parts  or  Members  must  be 
opposed  [contradistinguished]  i.  e.  must  not  be  contained  in 
one  another ; e.  g.  if  you  were  to  divide  “ book  ” into  “ poet- 
ical, historical,  folio,  quarto,  french,  latin,”  <^c.  the  members 
would  be  contained  in  each  other ; for  a french  book  may  be 
a quarto,  or  octavo,  and  a quarto,  french,  english,  fyc.  fyc. 
You  must  be  careful,  therefore,  to  keep  in  mind  the  principle 
of  division  with  which  you  set  out : e.  g.  whether  you  begin 
dividing  books  according  to  their  matter , their  language,  or 
their  size,  Sj-c.  all  these  being  so  many  cross- 
>0SS  divisions.  And  when  any  thing  is  capable  (as 
in  the  above  instance)  of  being  divided  in  sev- 
ral  different  ways,  we  are  not  to  reckon  one  of  these  as  the 
true,  or  real,  or  right  one,  without  specifying  what  the  object 
is  which  we  have  in  view  : for  one  mode  of  dividing  may  be 
the  most  suitable  for  one  purpose,  and  another  for  another ; 
as  e.  g.  one  of  the  above  modes  of  dividing  books  would  be 
the  most  suitable  to  a bookbinder ; another  in  a philosophical, 
and  the  other  in  a philological  view. 

It  is  a useful  practical  rule,  whenever  you  find  a discussion 
of  any  subject  very  perplexing,  and  seemingly  confused,  to  ex- 
amine whether  some  “ Cross-division  ” has  not  crept  in  unob- 
served. For  this  is  very  apt  to  take  place ; (though  of  course 
such  a glaring  instance  as  that  in  the  above  example  could 
not  occur  in  practice)  and  there  is  no  more  fruitful  source  of 
indistinctness  and  confusion  of  thought. 


Chap.  Y.  $ 5.] 


SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  ^ 


155 


When  you  have  occasion  to  divide  any  thing  in  several  dif 
ferent  ways, — that  is,  “ on  several  principles-of-division  ” — 
vou  should  take  care  to  state  distinctly  how  many  divisions 
you  are  making,  and  on  what  principle  each  proceeds. 

For  instance  in  the  “ Tree  ” above  given,  it  is  stated,  that 
“ Propositions”  are  divided  in  different  ways,  “ accenting  to  ” 
this  and  that,  &c.  And  thus  the  perplexity  of  Cross-division 
is  avoided. 

Two  other  rules  in  addition  to  those  above 

Additional 

given,  are  needful  to  be  kept  in  mind  : viz.  Caution. 
4thly,  A Division  should  not  be  “ arbitrary  ; ” 
that  is,  its  Members  should  be  distinguished  from  each  other 
by  “Differences”  either  expressed  or  readily  understood-, 
instead  of  being  set  apart  from  each  other  at  random,  or  with- 
out any  sufficient  ground.  For  instance,  if  any  one  should 
divide  “ coins  ” into  “ gold-coins,”  “ silver,”  and  “copper,” 
the  ground  of  this  distinction  would  be  intelligible  : but  if  he 
should,  in  proceeding  to  subdivide  silver-coin,  distinguish  as 
two  branches,  on  the  one  side,  “ shillings,”  and  on  the  other 
“ all  silver-coins  except  shillings,”  this  would  be  an  arbitrary 
Division. 

5thly,  A Division  should  be  clearly  arranged  as  to  its 
Members  : that  is,  there  should  be  as  much  subdivision  as  the 
occasion  may  require^  and  not  a mere  catalogue  of  the  “ low- 
est-Species,”  omitting  intermediate  classes  [“  subaltern  ”] 
between  these  and  the  “ highest-genus  : ” nor  again  an  inter- 
mixture of  the  “ subaltern,”  and  “ lowest-species,”  so  as  to 
have,  in  any  two  branches  of  the  division,  Species  contradis 
languished  and  placed  opposite,  of  which  the  one  ought  nat 
Orally  to  be  placed  higher  up  [nearer  the  “ Summum”]  and 
he  other,  lower  down  in  the  Tree. 

For  instance,  to  divide  “ plane-figure”  at  once,  into  “ equi 


156 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  IT 


lateral-triangles,  squares,  circles,  ellipses,”  &c.,  or  again 
‘ vegetable,”  into  “ Elms,  pear-trees,  turnips,  mushrooms,” 
&c.,  or  again  to  divide  “ Animal  ” into  “ Birds,  Fishes,  Rep- 
tiles, Horses,  Lions,”  &c.  would  be  a transgression  of  this 
rule. 

And  observe  that,  (as  has  been  formerly  remarked) 
although  such  glaring  cases  as  are  given  by  way  of  examples 
could  not  occur  in  practice,  errors  precisely  corresponding  to 
them,  may,  and  often  do  occur  ; and  produce  much  confusion 
of  thought  and  error. 


§ 6. 


Essential 
and  acci- 
dental defi- 
nitions. 


Definition  is  another  metaphorical  word, 
Definition.  wj1jc]1  literally  signifies,  “ laying  down  a 

boundary  ; ” and  is  used  in  Logic  to  signify  “ an  expression 
which  explains  any  term,  so  as  to  separate  it  from  every  thing 
else,”  as  a boundary  separates  fields. 

In  reference  to  the  several  modes  adopted 
for  furnishing  such  explanation,  Logicians  dis- 
tinguish [divide]  Definitions  into  essential  and 
accidental.  They  call  that  an  “ essential- 
definition  ” which  states  what  are  regarded  as 
the  “ constituent  parts  of  the  essence  ” of  that  which  is  to 
be  defined  ; and  an  “ accidental- definition  ” [or  Description'] 
one  which  lays  down  what  are  regarded  as  “ circumstances 
belonging  to  it ; ” viz.  Properties  or  Accidents  ; such  as 
causes,  effects,  &c. 

Accidents  in  the  narrowest  sense,  (as  defined  above,  § 3) 
cannot,  it  is  plain,  be  employed  in  a Description  [accidental- 
definition]  of  any  Species  ; since  no  Accident  (in  that  sense) 
can  belong  to  the  whole  of  a Species,  nor  consequently  fui 
Dish  an  adequate  Definition  thereof. 


Chap.  V.  { 6.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I. 


15' 


In  the  “ description  ” of  an  individual,  on 

the  contrary,  we  employ,  not  Properties , (which  ^ tfi^dion  of 

individuals. 

as  they  do  belong  to  the  whole  of  a Species, 
cannot  serve  to  distinguish  one  individual  of  that  Species 
from  another)  but  Accidents — generally,  inseparable  acci- 
dents — in  conjunction  with  the  Species : as  “ Philip  was  a 

Sp. 

king  of  Macedon,  who  subdued  Greece  ; ” “ Britain  is  an 

Sp. 

Island,  situated  so  ancPso,”  &c. 

The  Essential-definition  again  is  divided  into  physical  and 
physical  [natural]  and  logical  [metaphysical]  logical  defiiu- 
definition  : the  physical-definition  being  made  tl0,ls- 
by  an  enumeration  of  such  parts  as  are  actually  separable,  — 
such  as  are  the  hull,  masts,  &c.  of  a “ Ship ; ” — the  root, 
trunk,  branches,  bark,  &c.  of  a “ Tree  the  Subject,  Pred- 
icate, and  Copula  of  a “ Proposition.” 

The  “ ZogicaZ-definition  ” consists  of  the  “Genus”  and 
“ Difference  ; ” which  are  called  by  some  writers  the  “ meta- 
physical ” [ideal]  parts ; as  being  not  two  real  parts  into 
which  an  individual- object  can  (as  in  the  former  case)  be 
actually  divided,  but  only  different  views  taken  [notions 
formed]  of  a class  of  objects,  by  one  mind.  E.  G.  “ A 

Genus. 

t N 

Proposition  ” would  be  defined,  logically,  “ a sentence 

Difference.  G. 

f"-  ' r ' f ~ " 

affirming-or-denying  : ” A “ Magnet  ” “ an  Iron-ore  having 

D. 

attraction  for  iron;”  a “Square,”  a “Rectangle”  [right* 

D. 

angled  parallelogram]  having  equal  sides.  Nominal  and 

Definitions  again  have  been  divided  by  real  defini - 
Logicians  into  the  Nominal , which  explains  tl0,is' 

14 


158 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


merely  the  meaning  of  the  term  defined  ; * and  Real , which 
explains  the  nature  of  the  thing  signified  by  that  term. 

This  division  is  evidently  according  to  the  object  designed 
to  he  effected  by  each  Definition  : the  former  division,  on  tiw 
other  nand  — into  Accidental,  Physical,  and  Logical  — being 
a division  according  to  the  means  employed  by  each  to  effect 
its  object.  These  therefore  are  evidently  two  “ cross-divis- 
ions ;”ta  circumstance  which  has  been  generally  overlooked 
by  Logical  writers,  who  have  thus  introduced  confusion  and 
perplexity. 

And  here  the  question  may  naturally  occur  to  the  reader, 
whether  there  be  properly  any  distinction  between  nominal 
and  rea^-definition ; — whether  the  meaning  of  a Common- 
term,  and  the  nature  of  the  thing  signified  by  it,  are  not  one 
and  the  same ; since  the  object  of  our  thoughts  when  we  em- 
ploy a Common-term,  is  — not  any  such  “abstract  idea”  as 
some  talk  of,  but  — the  Term  itself , regarded  as  a Sign,  &c. 
as  was  formerly  explained. 

And  in  truth  there  are  many  cases  in  which  there  does  exist 
this  exact  coincidence  between  the  meaning  of  the  term  and 
the  nature  of  the  thing  ; so  that  the  same  definition  which 
would  be  rightly  styled  “ nominal,”  as  explaining  nothing  be- 
yond the  exact  meaning  of  the  term,  might  also  be  considered 
as  entitled  to  be  called  a “ real  definition,”  as  implying  every 


* Aldrich,  having  given  as  an  instance  of  a Nominal  Definition  the 
absuid  one  of  “homo,  qui  ex  humo,”  has  led  some  to  conclude  that 
the  Nominal  definition  must  be  founded  on  the  etymology  ; or  at  leas’, 
that  such  was  his  meaning.  But  that  it  was  not,  is  sufficiently  plain 
from  the  circumstance  that  Wallis  (from  whose  work  his  is  almost 
entirely  abridged)  expressly  says  the  contrary.  Be  this  as  it  may, 
however,  it  is  plain  that  the  etymology  of  a term  has  nothing  to  d« 
with  any  logical  consideration  of  it.  See  § 8,  Book  III- 
+ See  preceding  {. 


Chap  V.  § 6.] 


SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  1. 


159 


attribute  that  can  belong  to  the  thing  signified.  Such  are  all 

definitions  of  mathematical  and  logical  terms, 

and  other  technical  terms  of  Science.  There  can-  Technical 

terms. 

not  e.  g.  be  any  property  of  a “ Circle,”  or  a 
“ Square,”  that  is  not  implied  in  the  dtjinitio?is  of  those  terms. 
Some  of  these  properties  may  not  indeed  at  once  occur  to  a be- 
ginner in  Mathematics ; and  others,  not  even  to  one  somewhat 
further  advanced  : but  they  must  all  be  implied  in  the  defi- 
nitions ; and  it  would  be  reckoned  an  impropriety  to  add  e.  g.  to 
the  definition  of  a Square  that  it  is  bisected  by  its  diagonal: 
because  though  this  might  not  at  once  occur  to  a beginner,  and 
needs  to  be  demonstrated,  it  is  demonstrated  from  the  defi- 
nition : to  speak  of  “ a Square  divided  by  its  diagonal  into 
unequal  parts',”  would  be  absurd, — unmeaning,  — inconceiv- 
able. And  the  same,  with  other  mathematical  terms. 

But  it  is  otherwise  with  terms  of  a different  charactei, 
which  are  the  names  of  actually  existing  substances.  There 
may  be  attributes  of  the  thing  signified  that  are  not  at  all  im- 
plied in  the  signification  of  the  term.  E.  G.  The  term  “ lau- 
rel-water” is  used  by  us  in  the  same  sense  as  by  our  ances- 
tors, to  signify  “ a liquor  distilled  from  laurel-leaves  ; ” though 
the  poisonous  quality  of  it  was  unknown  a century  ago.  And 
so  also  many  discoveries  have  been  made,  and  others  proba- 
bly will  be  made,  respecting  several  metals,  heavenly  bodies, 
&c.  though  the  words  “ iron,”  “ gold,”  “star,”  are  employed 
in  the  same  sense  as  formerly ; — a sense  which  does  not 
imply  the  properties  that  have  been  discovered. 

And  any  Definition  which  goes  beyond  a “ nominal-defi- 
nition,” i.  e.  which  explains  any  thing  more  of  the  nature  of 
(he  thing  than  is  implied  in  the  name,  may  be  regarded, 
strictly  speaking,  as,  so  far,  a “real-definition.” 

The  very  word  “ Definition  ” however  is  not  usually  era 
ployed  in  this  sense ; but  rather,  “ Description .” 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  1L 


BO 


Logic  is  con-  Logic  is  concerned  with  nominal- definition 

temed  with  alone  ; with  a view  to  guard  against  ambiguity 

Nominal  defi-  |n  t|le  use  0f  terms.* 

nitions  alone.  m P ,,  ,,  • 

I o ascertain  fully  the  various  properties  ol 

animals  and  vegetables,  belongs  to  Physiology;  — of  metals1 

earths,  &c.  to  Chemistry  ; and  so,  with  other  things. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  word  “ Definition  ” is  some* 
times  used  to  denote  the  whole  sentence,  in  which  the  term 
defined  is  conjoined  with  the  explanation  given  of  it ; as 
when  we  say,  “ a triangle  is  a three-sided  figure  : ” some- 
times it  is  used  to  signify  merely  that  which  gives  the  expla- 
nation ; as  when  we  say  “ three-sided  figure  ” is  the  definition 
of  “ triangle.” 

In  the  former  case,  the  sentence  has  the  form  of  a Propo- 
sition : but  what  it  is  that  such  a proposition  asserts,  is  no' 
always  implied  in  the  mere  expression,  but  is  left  to  be  col- 
lected from  the  supposed  intention  of  the  speaker. 

Real  existence  is  not  necessarily  implied  : 

Real  exist- 
ence not  assert-  e • S-  “ A Phoenix  is  a bird  fabled  to  live  a thou- 

ed  by  a deji-  sand  years,”  &c.  implies  merely  that  this  is  the 

meaning  in  which  the  word  Phoenix  has  been 

used  ; not  that  any  such  bird  ever  did  or  could  exist. 

Sometimes  again  it  is  not  implied  even  that  the  universal, 
or  the  ordinary,  sense  of  the  term  is  such  as  corresponds  to 
the  definition  given  ; but  merely  that  such  is  the  sense  in 
which  the  author  intends  to  employ  it. 


* And  for  this  purpose  it  will  often  happen  that  a definition  will  be 
sufficient  in  reference  to  the  existing  occasion,  even  though  it  may  fall 
short  of  expressing  all  that  is  implied  by  the  term  See  Book  III. 
\ 10. 

We  should  however  carefully  guard  against  the  common  mistake, 
of  supposing  that  any  one  who  applies  a term  correctly  in  several  in- 
stances,  must  of  course  understand  fully  its  signification. 


Chap.  V.  } 6.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I. 


161 


And  in  this  case,  the  definition  is  sometimes  stated  in  the 

imverative  instead  of  the  indicative  form  ; as  is 

frequently  done  in  the  works  of  Aristotle,  who  Imperativ a 

. . . form  of  defi- 

is  accustomed  thus  to  waive,  in  some  cases,  all  nitions. 

questions  as  to  the  ordinary  employment  of  a 

term  by  others;  saying  “ Let  so  and  so  be  taken  to  signify 

this  or  that.” 

In  mathematical  and  other  scientific  definitions,  whether 
expressed  in  the  form  of  Propositions,  or  in  the  Imperative 
(or,  as  it  might  be  called,  Postulate ) form,  it  is  understood  to 
be  implied  that  the  definition  involves  no  self-contradiction 
— no  absurdity ; but  that  the  thing  denoted  by  the  term  de- 
fined — whether  believed  actually  to  exist  or  not  — is  con- 
ceivable, and  may,  not  irrationally,  be  made  a subject  of 
thought.  E.  G.  Though  a “mathematical-line”  cannot  be 
conceived  to  be  actually  drawn  on  paper,  — though  noti  ng 
could  be  exhibited  to  the  senses  as  having  length  anc"  no 
breadth,  every  one  can  make  the  distance  e.  g.  between  wo 
towns,  a separate  subject  of  his  thoughts,  having  his  i <nd 
wholly  withdrawn  from  the  width  of  the  road. 

A mathematical  Definition  accordingly  may  be  consio  .’'ed 
as  involving  a Postulate ; and  it  would  be  very  easy  to  ex- 
press any  of  them  in  the  form  of  Postulates.  E.  G.  “ L jt  a 
plane-figure  bounded  by  a curve-line  every  where  equid-^'int 
from  a certain  point  within  it,  be  called  a Circle ; ” this  would 
be  understood  to  imply  that  such  a figure  is  conceivable , t id 
that  the  writer  intended  to  employ  that  term  to  signify  r .cl  a 
figure;  which  is  precisely  ad  that  is  meant  to  be  asse' ..si‘  m 
the  Definition  of  a Circle. 

The  Rules  or  Cautions  usually  laid  down  by 
Logical  writers  for  framing  a Definition,  are  Uejin  or. 
rerv  obvious  : viz.  1st.  The  definition  must  be 
14* 


162 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  11 


adequate ; i.  e.  neither  too  extensive  nor  too  narrow  for  the 
thing  defined  ; e.  g.  to  define  “ fish  ” “ an  animal  that  lives  in 
the  water,”  would  be  too  extensive,  because  many  insec  ts, 
five  in  the  water ; to  define  it,  “ an  animal  that  has  an  air- 
bladder,”  would  be  too  narrow ; because  many  fish  are  with 
out  any.  Or  again,  if  in  a definition  of  “ Money  ” you 
should  specify  its  being  “ made  of  metal,”  that  would  be  too 
narrow , as  excluding  the  shells  used  as  money  in  some  parts 
of  Africa  : if  again  you  would  define  it  as  an  “ article  of 
value  given  in  exchange  for  something  else,”  that  would  be 
too  wide , as  it  would  include  things  exchanged  by  barter;  as 
when  a shoemaker  who  wants  coals,  makes  an  exchange  with 
*i  collier  who  wants  shoes. 

And  observe,  that  such  a defect  in  a Defini- 

Arbitrary  . 

exceptions.  tlon  cannot  ae  remedied  by  making  an  arbitrary 
exception ; (such  as  was  alluded  to  above,  § 5) 
as  if  for  instance  (and  it  is  an  instance  which  actually  oc- 
curred) a person  should  give  such  a Definition  of  “Capital” 
as  should  include  (which  he  did  not  mean  to  do)  “ Land  ; ” 
and  should  then  propose  to  remedy  this  by  defining  “ Capital,” 
any  “ property  of  such  and  such  a description  except  Land." 

2d.  The  Definition  must  be  in  itself  plainer  than  the  thing 
defined,  else  it  would  not  explain  it : I say  “ in  itself,”  ( i . e. 
generally)  because,  *o  some  particular  person,  the  term  de- 
fined may  happen  to  be  even  more  familiar  and  better  under- 
stood, than  the  language  of  the  Definition. 

And  this  rule  may  be  considered  as  including  that  which  is 
usually  given  by  Logicians  as  a third  rule ; viz.  that  a Defini- 
tion should  be  couched  in  a convenient  number  of  appropriate 
words  (if  such  can  be  found  suitable  for  the  purpose  :)  since 
figurative  words  (which  are  opposed  to  appropriate)  are  apt 
to  produce  ambiguity  or  indistinctness  ; too  great  brevity  may 


Uh  a.p.  V § 6.J 


SUPPLEMENT  IO  CHAP.  1. 


163 


occasion  obscurity  ; and  too  great  prolixity , confusion.  Bu" 
this  perhaps  is  rather  an  admonition  with  respect  to  Style 
than  a strictly  logical  rule  ; nor  can  we  accordingly  determine 
with  precision,  in  each  case,  whether  it  has  been  complied 
with  or  not ; there  is  no  drawing  the  line  between  “ too  long1' 
and  “too  concise,”  4*c.  Nor  would  a definition  unnecessa- 
rily prolix  be  censured  as  incorrect , but  as  inelegant , incon- 
venient, fyc. 

If,  however,  a definition  be  chargeable  with  „ 

Tautology. 

Tautology , (which  is  a distinct  fault  from  pro- 
lixity or  verbosity)  it  may  justly  be  called  incorrect,  though 
without  offending  against  the  first  two  rules.  Tautology  con- 
sists in  inserting  too  much,  not  in  mere  words,  but  in  sense ; 
yet  not  so  as  too  much  to  narrow  the  definition  (in  opposition 
to  Rule  1.)  by  excluding  some  things  which  belong  to  the 
class  of  the  thing  defined  ; but  only,  so  as  to  state  something 
which  has  been  already  implied.  Thus,  to  define  a Parallel- 
ogram “ a four-sided  figure  whose  opposite  sides  are  parallel 
and  equal''  would  be  tautological ; because,  though  it  is  true 
that  such  a figure,  and  such  alone,  is  a parallelogram,  the 
equality  of  the  sides  is  implied  in  their  being  parallel , and 
may  be  proved  from  it.  Now  the  insertion  of  the  words 
“ and  equal,”  leaves,  and  indeed  leads,  a reader  to  suppose 
that  there  may  be  a four-sided  figure  whose  opposite  sides  are 
parallel  but  not  equal.  Though  therefore  such  a definition 
asserts  nothing  false,  it  leads  to  a supposition  of  what  is 
false ; and  consequently  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  incorrect 
definition. 

The  inference  just  mentioned,  — viz. : that  you  implied 
that  a quadrangle  might  have  its  opposite  sides  parallel,  and 
not  equal,  — would  be  drawn  from  such  a definition,  accord- 
ing to  the  principle  of  “ exceptio  probat  regulam,”  an  except 


164 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Look  xL 


lion  proves  a rule*  The  force  of  the  maxim  (which  is  no 
properly  confined  to  the  case  of  an  exception , strictly  sc 
called)  is  this  ; that  “ the  mention  of  any  circumstance  intro* 
duced  into  the  statement  either  of  a definition,  or  of  a pre- 
cept, law,  remark,  8fc.  is  to  be  presumed  necessary  to  be  in- 
serted ; so  that  the  precept,  &c.  would  not  hold  good  if  t;  9 
circumstance  were  absent.”  In  short,  the  word  “ on/i/,”  or 
some  such  expression,  is  supposed  to  be  understood.  If  e.  g.  it 
be  laid  down  that  he  who  breaks  into  an  empty  house  shall  re- 
ceive a certain  punishment,  it  would  be  inferred  that  this  pun- 
ishment would  not  be  incurred  by  breaking  into  an  occupied 
house  : if  it  were  told  us  that  some  celestial  phenomenon  could 
not  be  seen  by  the  naked  eye,  it  would  be  inferred  that  it  would 
or  might  be  visible  through  a telescope  : if  we  are  told  that  we 
are  not  to  teach  doctrines  unwarranted  by  Scripture,  and  which 
were  not  held  by  the  early  Fathers , this  would  usually  be  under- 
stood to  imply  that  any  doctrine  they  did  hold,  might  be  taught, 
on  their  authority,  even  though  not  scriptural : t Q-c. 

* Thus  it  has  been  inferred,  — and  not  without  reason,  — that  the 
occasional  Forms  of  Prayer  and  Thanksgivings  which  are  put  forth 
from  time  to  time  under  the  authority  of  “ Orders  in  Council,”  are 
illegal,  and  at  variance  with  the  “ Act  of  Uniformity  ; ” inasmuch  as 
in  that  Act  (prefixed  to  our  Prayer-books)  not  only  is  conformity  to 
the  Book  of  Common-prayer  enjoined,  and  no  authority  to  make 
iterations  or  additions  to  the  Service  recognized  ; but  there  is  an 
Exception,  which,  it  is  maintained,  proves  the  rule  : the  King  in  Coun- 
cil being  expressly  authorized  to  insert  and  alter  from  time  to  time  the 
“ names  of  such  of  the  Royal- family  as  are  to  be  prayed  for  : ” which 
plainly  implies  that  no  other  alterations  made  by  that  authority  were 
contemplated  as  allowable.  See  “ Appeal  on  behalf  of  Church  Gov- 
ernment.” Iloulston  and  Co. 

f “ The  maxim  of  ‘ abundans  cautela  nocet  nemini  ’ is  by  no  means 
a safe  one  if  applied  without  limitation.  It  is  sometimes  imprudent 
(and  some  of  our  Divines  have,  I think,  committed  this  imprudence) 
to  attempt  to  ‘ make  assurance  doubly  sure  ’ by  bringing  forward  con- 


Chap.  V.  $ 6.] 


SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I. 


165 


And  much  is  often  inferred  in  this  manner,  v\  ich  was  by 
no  means  in  the  Author’s  mind ; from  his  having  inaccurately 
inserted  what  chanced  to  be  present  to  his  thoughts.  Thus, 
he  who  says  that  it  is  a crime  for  people  to  violate  the  prop- 
erty of  a humane  Landlord  who  lives  among  them , may  per- 
haps not  mean  to  imply  that  it  is  no  crime  to  violate  the 
property  of  an  absentee-landlord,  or  of  one  who  is  not 
humane ; but  he  leaves  an  opening  for  being  so  under- 
stood. Thus  again  in  saying  that  “ an  animal  which  breathes 
through  gills  and  is  scaly , is  a fish,”  though  nothing  false 
is  asserted,  a presumption  is  afforded  that  you  mean  to 
give  a definition  such  as  would  be  too  narrow  ; in  violation  of 
Rule  1. 

And  Tautology , as  above  described,  is  sure  to  mislead  any 
one  who  interprets  what  is  said,  conformably  to  the  maxim 
that  “ an  exception  proves  a rule.” 

It  often  happens  that  one  or  more  of  the 
above  rules  is  violated  through  men’s  prone-  Accidental 
ness  to  introduce  into  their  definitions,  along  mista^m  jor 
with,  or  instead  of,  essential  circumstances,  essential. 
such  as  are  in  the  strict  sense,  accidental.  I 
mean,  that  the  notion  they  attach  to  each  term,  and  the  ex- 
planation they  would  give  of  it,  shall  embrace  some  circum- 
stances, generally , but  not  always , connected  with  the  thing 
they  are  speaking  of ; and  which  might,  accordingly,  (by  the 


firmatory  reasons,  which,  though  in  themselves  perfectly  fair,  may  be 
interpreted  unfairly,  by  representing  them  as  an  acknowledged  indis- 
pensable foundation  ; — by  assuming  for  instance,  that  an  appeal  to 
such  and  such  of  the  ancient  Fathers  or  Councils,  in  confirmation  of 
some  doctrine  or  practice,  is  to  be  understood  as  an  admission  that  it 
would  fall  to  the  ground  if  not  so  confirmed  ” — Kingdom  of  Chiirt, 
Essay  II.  § 23,  note. 


166 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


'Book  11 


strict  account  of  an  “ Accident  ’)  be  “ absent  or  present,  the 
essential  character  of  the  subject  remaining  the  same.”  A 
definition  framed  from  such  circumstances,  though  of  course 
incorrect,  and  likely  at  some  time  or  other  to  mislead 
us,  will  not  unfrequently  obtain  reception,  from  its  answer- 
ing the  purpose  of  a correct  one,  at  a particular  time  and 
place. 

“ For  instance,  the  Latin  word  Mcridies , to  denote  the 
southern  quarter,  is  etymologically  suitable  (and  so  would  a 
definition  founded  on  that  etymology)  in  our  hemisphere ; 
while  in  the  other,  it  would  be  found  just  the  reverse.  Or  if 
any  one  should  define  the  North  Pole,  that  which  is  ‘ inclined 
towards  the  sun,’  this  would,  for  half  the  year , answer  the 
purpose  of  a correct  definition  ; and  would  be  the  opposite  of 
the  truth  for  the  other  half. 

“ Such  glaring  instances  as  these,  which  are  never  likely  to 
occur  in  practice,  serve  best  perhaps  to  illustrate  the  character 
of  such  mistakes  as  do  occur.  A specimen  of  that  introduc- 
tion of  accidental  circumstances  which  I have  been  describing, 
may  be  found,  I think,  in  the  language  of  a great  number  of 
writers,  respecting  Wealth  and  Value ; who  have  usual!} 
made  Labor  an  essential  ingredient  in  their  definitions.  Now 
it  is  true,  it  so  happens , by  the  appointment  of  Providence, 
that  valuable  articles  are  in  almost  all  instances  obtained  by 
Labor;  but  still,  this  is  an  accidental,  not  an  essential  circum- 
stance. If  the  aerolites  which  occasionally  fall,  were  dia- 
monds and  pearls,  and  if  these  articles  could  be  obtained  in 
no  other  way,  but  were  casually  picked  up,  to  the  same 
amount  as  is  now  obtained  by  digging  and  diving,  they 
would  be  of  precisely  the  same  value  as  now.  In  this, 
as  in  many  other  points  in  Political  Economy,  men  are  prone 


CHAr.  V.  $ 6.]  SUPPLEMENT  TO  CHAP.  I. 


167 


to  confound  cause  and  effect.  It  is  not  that  pearls  fetch  s 
high  price  because  men  have  dived  for  them  ; but  on 
the  contrary,  men  dive  for  them  because  they  fetch  a high 
price.”  * 


* PoL  Sror.  Lett.  IX.  pp.  461 —24#. 


BuOR.  Hi. 


OF  FALLACIES 
Introduction. 

Although  sundry  instances  of  Fallacies  have  been  from 
time  to  time  noticed  in  the  foregoing  Books,  it  will  be  worth 
while  to  devote  a more  particular  attention  to  the  sub 
ject. 

By  a Fallacy  is  commonly  understood,  “ an) 

Definition  of  j j r • u • i_ 

plla  unsound  mode  of  arguing,  which  appears  tc 

demand  our  conviction,  and  to  be  decisive  of 
the  question  in  hand,  when  in  fairness  it  is  not.”  Considering 
the  ready  detection  and  clear  exposure  of  Fallacies  to  be  both 
more  extensively  important,  and  also  more  difficult,  than 
many  are  aware  of,  I propose  to  take  a Logical  view  of  the 
subject ; referring  the  different  Fallacies  to  the  most  con- 
venient heads,  and  giving  a scientific  analysis  of  the  procedure 
which  takes  place  in  each. 

After  all,  indeed,  in  the  practical  detection  of  each  indi 
vidual  Fallacy,  much  must  depend  on  natural  and  acquired 
acuteness  ; nor  can  any  rules  be  given,  the  mere  learning  of 
which  will  enable  us  to  apply  them  with  mechanical  certainty 
and  readiness : but  still  we  shall  find  that  to  take  correct  gen- 
eral views  of  the  subject,  and  to  be  familiarized  with  scientific 


Intro.] 


OF  FALLACIES. 


169 


discussions  of  it,  will  tend,  above  all  things,  to  engender  such 
a habit  of  mind , as  will  best  fit  us  for  practice. 

Indeed  the  case  is  the  same  with  respect  to  Logic  in  gen- 
eral. Scarcely  any  one  would,  in  ordinary  practice,  state  to 
himself  either  his  own  or  another’s  reasoning,  in  Syllogisms 
in  Barbara  at  full  length  ; yet  a familiarity  with  Logical  prin- 
ciples tends  very  much  (as  all  feel,  who  are  really  well  ac- 
quainted with  them)  to  beget  a habit  of  clear  and  sound 
reasoning.  The  truth  is,  in  this,  as  in  many  other  things, 
there  are  processes  going  on  in  the  mind  (when  we  are  prac- 
tising any  thing  quite  familiar  to  us)  with  such  rapidity  as  to 
leave  no  trace  in  the  memory;  and  we  often  apply  principles 
which  did  not,  as  far  as  we  are  conscious,  even  occur  to  us  at 
the  time. 

It  would  be  foreign,  however,  to  the  present  T 

0 ’ ’ 1 Inaccurate 

purpose,  to  investigate  fully  the  manner  in  language  of 
which  certain  studies  operate  in  remotely  produ-  former  wri- 
ting certain  effects  on  the  mind  : it  is  sufficient  ters' 
to  establish  the  fact , that  habits  of  scientific  analysis  (besides 
the  intrinsic  beauty  and  dignity  of  such  studies)  lead  to  prac- 
tical advantage.  It  is  on  Logical  principles  therefore  that  I 
propose  to  discuss  the  subject  of  Fallacies , and  it  may, 
indeed,  seem  to  have  been  unnecessary  to  make  any  apology 
for  so  doing,  after  what  has  been  formerly  said,  generally,  in 
defence  of  Logic  ; but  that  the  generality  of  Logical  writers 
have  usually  followed  so  opposite  a plan.  Whenever  they 
have  to  treat  of  any  thing  that  is  beyond  the  mere  elements 
of  Logic,  they  totally  lay  aside  all  reference  to  the  principles 
they  have  been  occupied  in  establishing  and  e.\pla:ning,  and 
have  recourse  to  a loose,  vague,  and  popular  kind  of  lan 
guage  ; such  as  would  be  the  best  suited  indeed  to  an  exoter 
(cal  discourse,  but  seems  strangely  incongruous  in  a professed 

15 


tro 


ELEMENTS  OF  LC  TIC. 


[Book  III 


Logical  tieatise.  What  should  we  think  of  a Gcometrica. 
writer,  who,  after  having  gone  through  the  Elements,  witn 
strict  definitions  and  demonstrations,  should,  on  proceeding  to 
Mechanics,  totally  lay  aside  all  reference  to  scientific  princi- 
ples,— all  use  of  technical  terms,  — and  treat  of  the  subject 
.n  undefined  terms,  and  with  probable  and  popular  arguments? 
It  would  be  thought  strange,  if  even  a Botanist,  when  address- 
ing those  whom  he  had  been  instructing  in  the  principles  and 
the  terms  of  his  system,  should  totally  lay  these  aside  when 
he  came  to  describe  plants,  and  should  adopt  the  language  of 
the  vulgar.  Surely  it  affords  but  too  much  plausibility  to  the 
cavils  of  those  who  scoff  at  Logic  altogether,  that  the  very 
writers  who  profess  to  teach  it  should  never  themselves  make 
any  application  of,  or  reference  to,  its  principles,  on  those 
very  occasions,  when,  and  when  only , such  application  and 
reference  are  to  be  expected.  If  the  principles  of  any  sys- 
tem are  well  laid  down, — if  its  technical  language  is  judi- 
ciously framed,  — then,  surely,  those  principles  and  that  lan- 
guage will  afford  (for  those  who  have  once  thoroughly  learned 
them)  the  best,  the  most  clear,  simple,  and  concise  method 
of  treating  any  subject  connected  with  that  system.  Yet  even 
writers  generally  acute,  in  treating  of  the  Dilemma  and  of 
the  Fallacies,  have  very  much  forgotten  the  Logician,  and 
assumed  a loose  and  rhetorical  style  of  writing,  without  mak- 
ing any  application  of  the  principles  they  had  formerly  laid 
down,  but,  on  the  contrary,  sometimes  departing  widely  from 
them.* 


* Aldrich  (and  the  same  may  be  said  of  several  other  writers)  ia 
far  more  confused  in  his  discussion  of  Fallacies  than  in  any  other  part 
of  his  treatise  ; of  which  this  one  instance  may  serve  : after  having 
distinguished  Fallacies  into  those  in  the  expression,  and  those  in  ths 


Intro.] 


OF  FALLACIES. 


171 


The  most  experienced  teachers,  when  addressing  thosfl 
who  are  familiar  with  the  elementary  principles  of  Logic, 
think  it  requisite,  not  indeed  to  lead  them,  on  each  occasion 
through  the  whole  detail  of  those  principles,  when  the  process 
is  quite  obvious,  but  always  to  put  them  on  the  road , as  il 
were,  to  those  principles,  that  they  may  plainly  see  their  own 
way  to  the  end,  and  take  a scientific  view  of  the  subject ; in 
the  same  manner  as  mathematical  writers  avoid  indeed  the 
occasional  tediousness  of  going  all  through  a very  simple 
demonstration,  which  the  learner,  if  he  will,  may  easily  sup* 
ply  ; but  yet  always  speak  in  strict  mathematical  language, 
and  with  reference  to  mathematical  principles,  though 
they  do  not  always  state  them  at  full  length.  I would  not 
profess,  therefore,  any  more  than  they  do,  to  write  (on  sub- 
jects connected  with  the  science)  in  a language  intelligible  to 
those  who  are  ignorant  of  its  first  rudiments.  To  do  so,  in- 
deed, would  imply  that  one  was  not  taking  a scientific  view 
of  the  subject,  nor  availing  one’s-self  of  the  principles  that 
had  been  established,  and  the  accurate  and  concise  technical 
language  that  had  been  framed. 

The  rules  already  given  enable  us  to  de- 
velop the  principles  on  which  all  reasoning 

to  the  office  oj 

is  conducted,  whatever  be  the  Subject-matter  p0(jic 
of  it,  and  to  ascertain  the  validity  or  fallacious- 
ness of  any  apparent  argument,  as  far  as  the  form  of  expi'es- 
sion  is  concerned  ; that  being  alone  the  proper  province  of 
Logic. 


matter  (“  in  diet  one,”  and  “ extra  dictionem,”)  he  observes  of  one  ot 
two  of  these  last , that  they  are  not  properly  called  Fallacies,  as  not  be 
ing  Syllogisms  faulty  in  form;  ( “ Sjdlogismi  forma  peccantes  ’)  as  il 
Rnv  one,  that  was  such,  cow.d  >e  “ Fallacia  extra  dictionem 


172 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  III 


But  it  is  evident  that  vve  may  nevertheless  remain  liable  to 
i>e  deceived  or  perplexed  in  Argument  by  the  assumption  of 
false  or  doubtful  Premisses , or  by  the  employment  of  indis 
tinct  or  ambiguous  Terms ; and,  accordingly,  many  Logical 
writers,  wishing  to  make  their  systems  appear  as  perfect  as 
Dossible,  have  undertaken  to  give  rules  “ for  attaining  deal 
ideas,”  and  for  “ guiding  the  judgment ; ” and  fancying  or  pro- 
fessing themselves  successful  in  this,  have  consistently  enough 
denominated  Logic,  the  “ Art  of  using  the  Reason  ; ” which  in 
truth  it  would  be,  and  would  nearly  supersede  all  other 
studies,  if  it  could  of  itself  ascertain  the  meaning  of  every 
Term , and  the  truth  or  falsity  of  every  Proposition ; in  the 
same  manner  as  it  actually  can,  the  validity  of  every  Argu- 
ment. And  they  have  been  led  into  this,  partly  by  the  con- 
sideration that  Logic  is  concerned  about  the  “ three  Opera- 
tions ” of  the  mind  — simple  Apprehension,  Judgment,  and 
Reasoning ; not  observing  that  it  is  not  equally  concerned 
about  all  : the  last  Operation  being  alone  its  appropriate 
province  ; and  the  rest  being  treated  of  only  in  reference  to 
that. 


The  contempt  justly  due  to  such  pretensions 

Discredit  most  unjustly  fallen  on  the  Science  itself ; 

brought  upon 

Logic  much  in  the  same  manner  as  Chemistry  was 

brought  into  disrepute  among  the  unthinking, 
by  the  extravagant  pretensions  of  the  Alchemists.  And  those 
Logical  writers  have  been  censured,  not  (as  they  should  have 
been)  for  making  such  professions,  but  for  not  fulfilling  them. 


It  has  been  objected,  especially,  that  the  rules  of  Logic  leave 
us  still  at  a loss  as  to  the  most  important  and  difficult  point  in 
reasoning ; viz.  the  ascertaining  the  sense  of  the  terms  cm 
ployed,  an  1 removing  their  ambiguity:  a complaint  resem 


OF  FALLACIES. 


173 


} ij 

blmg  that  made  (according  to  a story  told  by  Warburton  * and 
before  alluded  to)  by  a man  who  found  fault  with  all  the 
reading-glasses  presented  to  him  by  the  shopkeeper  ; the  fact 
heing,  that  he  had  never  learnt  to  read.  In  the  present  case, 
the  complaint  is  the  more  unreasonable,  inasmuch  as  there 
neither  is,  nor  ever  can  possibly  be , any  such  system  devised 
as  will  effect  the  proposed  object  of  clearing  up  the  ambiguity 
of  terms.  It  is,  however,  no  small  advantage,  that  the  rules 
of  Logic,  though  they  cannot,  alone,  ascertain  and  clear  up 
ambiguity  in  any  Term,  yet  do  point  out  in  which  Term  of 
an  argument  it  is  to  be  sought  for  : directing  our  attention  to 
the  middle- Term,  as  the  one  on  the  ambiguity  of  which  a 
Fallacy  is  likely  to  be  built. 

It  will  be  useful,  however,  to  class  and  describe  the  differ- 
ent kinds  of  ambiguity  which  are  to  be  met  with  , and  also 
the  various  ways  in  which  the  insertion  of  false,  or,  at  least, 
unduly  assumed,  Premisses,  is  most  likely  to  elude  observa- 
tion. And  though  the  remarks  which  will  be  offered  on 
these  points  may  not  be  considered  as  strictly  forming  a part 
of  Logic,  they  cannot  be  thought  out  of  place,  when  it  is  con- 
sidered how  essentially  they  are  connected  with  the  applied 
tion  of  it. 


§ L 


The  division  of  Fallacies  into  those  in  the 
words  (IN  DICTIONE,)  and  those  in  the 
matter  (EXTRA  DICTION  EM)  has  not 
besn,  by  any  writers  hitherto,  grounded  on  any  distinct  pnn 


Division  of 
Fallacies. 


* In  his  Div.  Leg. 


15* 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Eook  III 


IT  4 

ciple  : at  least,  not  on  any  that  they  have  themselve  f adherea 
to.  The  confounding  together,  however,  of  these  two  classes 
is  highly  detrimental  to  all  clear  notions  concerning  Logic  ; 
being  obviously  allied  to  the  prevailing  erroneous  views  which 
make  Logic  the  art  of  employing  the  intellectual  faculties  in 
general , having  the  discovery  of  truth  for  its  object,  and  ail 
kinds  of  knowledge  for  its  proper  subject-matter  ; with  all 
that  train  of  vague  and  groundless  speculations  which  have 
led  to  such  interminable  confusion  and  mistakes,  and  afford- 
ed a pretext  for  such  clamorous  censures. 

It  is  important,  therefore,  that  rules  should  be  given  for  a 
division  of  Fallacies  into  Logical  and  Non-logical,  on  such  a 
principle  as  shall  keep  clear  of  all  this  indistinctness  and  per- 
plexity. 

If  any  one  should  object,  that  the  division  about  to  be 
adopted  is  in  some  degree  arbitrary,  placing  under  the  one 
head,  Fallacies  which  many  might  be  disposed  to  place 
under  the  other,  let  him  consider  not  only  the  indistinctness  of 
all  former  divisions,  but  the  utter  impossibility  of  framing  any 
that  shall  be  completely  secure  from  the  objection  urged,  in  a 
case  where  men  have  formed  such  various  and  vague  notions, 
from  the  very  want  of  some  clear  principle  of  division.  Nay, 
from  the  elliptical  form  in  which  all  reasoning  is  usually  ex- 
pressed, and  the  peculiarly  involved  and  oblique  form  in 
which  Fallacy  is  for  the  most  part  conveyed,  it  must  of  course 
be  often  a matter  of  doubt,  or  rather,  of  arbitrary  choice , not 
only  to  which  genus  each  kind  of  fallacy  should  be  referred, 

but  even  to  which  kind  to  refer  any  one  indi - 

Tndetermi-  ? ndual  Fallacy.  For,  since,  in  any  Argument, 
nate  character  J . 

of  Fallacies.  one  Premiss  is  usually  suppressed,  it  frequently 

happens,  in  the  case  of  a Fallacy,  that  tin 
nearers  are  left  to  the  alternative  of  supplying  either  a Premiss 


<JF  FALLACIES. 


175 


f2.j 

wliicli  is  not  true,  or  else,  one  which  docs  not  prove  the  (’on 
elusion.  E.  G.  if  a man  expatiates  on  the  distress  of  th? 
country,  and  thence  argues  that  the  government  is  tyrannical, 
we  must  suppose  him  to  assume  either  that  “ every  distressed 
country  is  under  a tyranny,”  which  is  a manifest  falsehood, 
or,  merely  that  “ every  country  under  a tyranny  is  distressed, ’* 
which,  however  true,  proves  nothing,  the  Middle  Term  being 
undistributed.  Now,  in  the  former  case,  the  Fallacy  would 
be  referred  to  the  head  of  “ extra  dictionem;”  in  the  latter 
to  that  of  “ in  dictione.”  Which  are  we  to  suppose  the 
speaker  meant  us  to  understand  ? Surely  just  whichever  each 
of  his  hearers  might  happen  to  prefer  : some  might  assent  to 
the  false  Premiss  ; others,  allow  the  unsound  Syllogism  ; to 
the  Sophist  himselfit  is  indifferent,  as  long  as  they  can  but  be 
brought  to  admit  the  Conclusion. 

Without  pretending,  then,  to  conform  to  every  one’s  mode 
of  speaking  on  the  subject,  or  to  lay  down  rules  which  shall 
be  in  themselves  (without  any  call  for  labor  or  skill  in  the 
person  who  employs  them)  readily  applicable  to,  and  decisive 
on,  each  individual  case,  I shall  propose  a division  which  is  at 
least  perfectly  clear  in  its  main  principle,  and  coincides,  per- 
haps, as  nearly  as  possible,  with  the  established  notions  of 
Logicians  on  the  subject. 


§ 2. 

In  every  Fallacy,  the  Conclusion  either  does 

or  does  not  follow  from  the  Premisses.  Where  Logical 

Fallacies « 

the  Conclusion  does  not  follow  from  the  Prem- 
isses, it  is  manifest  that  the  fault  is  in  the  Reasoning,  and  in 
that  alone  ; these,  therefore,  we  call  Logical  Fallacies,*1  aa 

* In  the  same  manner  as  we  call  that  a crim vial  court  in  which 
erimes  are  judged. 


176 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Look  III 


being  properly,  violations  of  those  rules  of  Reasoning  which 
it  is  the  province  of  Logic  to  lay  clown. 

Of  these,  however,  one  kind  are  more  purely  Logical , a* 
exhibiting  their  fallaciousness  by  the  bare  form  of  the  ex 
pression,  without  any  regard  to  the  meaning  of  the  Terms', 
to  which  class  belong:  1st.  Undistributed  Middle;  2d.  Illici 
Process  ; 3d.  Negative  Premisses,  or  Affirmative  Conclusion 
from  a Negative  Premiss,  and  vice  versa  : to  which  may  be 
added  4th.  those  which  have  palpably  (i.  e.  expressed)  more 
than  three  Terms. 

The  other  kind  may  be  most  properly  called 

Semi- Logical  semi-logical ; viz.  all  the  cases  of  ambiguous 

Fallacies.  _ _ ... 

middle-Term  except  its  non-distribution  : for 

though  in  such  cases  the  conclusion  does  not  follow,  and 
though  the  rules  of  Logic  show  that  it  does  not,  as  soon  as  iht 
ambiguity  of  the  middle  Term  is  ascertained , yet  the  discovery 
and  ascertainment  of  this  ambiguity  requires  attention  to  the 
sense  of  the  Term , and  knowledge  of  the  Subject-matter  ; so 
that  here,  Logic  teaches  us  not  how  to  find  the  Fallacy, 
but  only  where  to  search  for  it,  and  on  what  principles  to  con- 
demn it. 

Accordingly  it  has  been  made  a subject  of  bitter  complaint 
against  Logic,  that  it  presupposes  the  most  difficult  point  to  be 
already  accomplished,  viz.  the  sense  of  the  Terms  to  be  as- 
certained. A similar  objection  might  be  urged  against  every 
other  art  in  existence ; e.  g.  against  Agriculture,  that  all  the 
precepts  for  the  cultivation  of  land  presuppose  the  possession 
af  a farm  ; or  against  Perspective,  that  its  rules  are  useless  to 
^blind  man.  The  objection  is  indeed  peculiarly  absurd  when 
urged  against  Logic,  because  the  object  which  it  is  blamed  fot 
not  accomplishing  cannot  possibly  be  within  the  province  of 
my  one  art  whatever.  Is  it  indeed  possible  or  conceivable 


OF  FALLACIES 


177 


> 3] 

.hat  there  should  be  any  method,  science,  or  system,  tha 
should  emble  one  to  know  the  full  and  exact  meaning  of 
every  term  in  existence  ? The  utmost  that  can  be  done  is  ta 
give  some  general  rules  that  may  assist  us  in  this  work ; 
which  is  done  in  the  first  two  chapters  of  Book  II.* 

Nothing  perhaps  tends  more  to  conceal  from  Familiarity 
men  their  imperfect  conception  of  the  meaning  witfl  a term 
of  a term,  than  the  circumstance  of  their  being  distinct  fro,u 
able  fully  to  comprehend  a process  of  reasoning  hension  of  its 
in  which  it  is  involved,  without  attaching  any  meaning. 
distinct  meaning  at  all  to  that  term  ; as  is  evident  when  X Y 25 
are  used  to  stand  for  Terms,  in  a regular  Syllogism.  Thus  a 
man  may  be  familiarized  with  a term,  and  never  find  him- 
self at  a loss  from  not  comprehending  it ; from  which  he  will 
be  very  likely  to  infer  ■ ,*at  he  does  comprehend  it,  when  per- 
haps he  does  not,  bur  employs  it  vaguely  and  incorrectly; 
which  leads  to  faiLci'.us  Reasoning  and  confusion.  It  must 
be  owned,  howr  ?er,  that  many  Logical  writers  have,  in  great 
measure,  brought  on  themselves  the  reproach  in  question,  by 
calling  Logic  “ the  right  use  of  Reason,”  laying  down  “ rules 
for  gaining  clear  ideas,”  and  such-like  dla^aveia,  as  Aristotle 
calls  it ; ( Rhct . Book  I.  Chap,  ii.) 


§ 3. 

The  remaining  class  (viz.  where  the  Conclu-  Material 
sion  does  follow  from  the  Premisses)  may  be  Fallacies. 

* The  very  author  of  the  objection  says,  “ This  (the  comprehension 
of  the  meaning  of  general  Terms)  is  a study  which  every  individual 
must  carry  on  for  himself ; and  of  which  no  rules  of  Logic  (how  use- 
ful soever  they  may  he  in  directing  our  labors)  can  supersede  thr 
necessity."  D.  Stewart,  Phil.  Yol  II.  chap.  ii.  s.  2. 


178 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book.  Ill, 


called  the  Materia),  or  Non-logical  Fallacies : of  these 
there  are  two  kinds  ; * 1st.  when  the  Premisses  are  such 
as  ought  not  to  have  been  assumed  ; 2d.  when  the  Con- 
clusion is  not  the  one  required,  but  irrelevant ; which  Fallacy 
is  commonly  called  “ ignoratio  elenchi ,”  because  your  Argu- 
ment is  not  the  “ elenchus”  (i.  e.  proof  of  the  contradictory ) 
of  your  opponent’s  assertion,  which  it  should  be  ; but  proves, 
instead  of  that,  some  other  proposition  resembling  it.  Hence, 
since  Logic  defines  what  Contradiction  is,  some  may  choose 
rather  to  range  this  with  the  Logical  Fallacies,  as  it  seems,  so 
far,  to  come  under  the  jurisdiction  of  that  Art.  Nevertheless 
it  is  perhaps  better  to  adhere  to  the  original  division,  both  or 
account  of  its  clearness,  and  also  because  few  would  be  in 
dined  to  apply  to  the  Fallacy  in  question  the  accusation  of 
being  inconclusive,  and  consequently  “illogical”  reasoning; 
besides  which,  it  seems  an  artificial  and  circuitous  way  of  speak- 
ing, to  suppose  in  all  cases  an  opponent  and  a contradiction  ; the 
simple  statement  of  the  matter  being  this,  — I am  required, 
by  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  (no  matter  why)  to  prove  a 
certain  Conclusion  ; I prove,  not  that,  but  one  which  is  likely 
to  be  mistaken  for  it ; — in  this  lies  the  Fallacy. 

It  might  be  desirable  therefore  to  lay  aside 

Ignoratio  ^ name  0f  u ignoratio  elenchi ,”  but  that  it  is 
elenchi 

so  generally  adopted  as  to  require  some  men- 
tion to  be  made  of  it.  The  other  kind  of  Fallacies  in  the 
Matter  will  comprehend  (as  far  as  the  vague  and  obscure  lan- 
guage of  Logical  writers  will  allow  us  to  con- 

Non  causa  jecture)  t]ie  fallacy  of  “ non  tausa  pro  causa'1 
pro  causa.  . . , 

and  that  of  “ petitio  principle.  Of  these,  the 

• For  it  is  manifest  that  the  fault,  if  there  bn  any,  must  be  either 
lit,  it  the  Premisses,  or  2dly.  in  the  Conclusion,  or  3dly  in  the  Cone 
xeaion  between  them. 


OF  FALLACIES. 


179 


former  is  by  them  distinguished  into  “ a non  vera  pro  vera 
and  “ a non  tali  pro  tali ; ” this  last  would  appear  to  mean 
arguing  from  a case  not  parallel  as  if  it  were  so  ; which,  in 
Logical  language,  is,  having  the  suppressed  Premiss  false  5 
for  it  is  in  that  the  parallelism  is  affirmed  ; and  the  “ non  vera 
pro  vera  ” will  in  like  manner  signify  the  expressed  Premiss 
being  false ; so  that  this  Fallacy  will  turn  out  to  be,  in  plain 
terms,  nc'ther  more  nor  less  than  falsity  (or  unfair  assump- 
tion) of  a Premiss. 

The  remaining  kind,  “ petitio  principii ,” 

[“  begging  the  question,”]  takes  place  when  ^question  ? 
one  of  the  Premisses  (whether  true  or  false)  is 
either  plainly  equivalent  to  the  conclusion,  or  depends  on  that 
for  its  own  reception.  1 have  said  “ one  of  the  Premisses,” 
because  in  all  correct  reasoning  the  two  Premisses  taken  to- 
gether must  imply  and  virtually  assert  the  conclusion.  It  is 
not  possible,  however,  to  draw  a precise  line,  generally,  be- 
tween this  Fallacy  and  fair  argument;  since,  to  one  person, 
that  might  be  fair  reasoning,  which  would  be,  to  another, 
“ begging  the  question  ; ” inasmuch  as,  to  the  one,  the  Prem- 
iss might  be  more  evident  than  the  Conclusion  ; while,  by  the 
other,  it  would  not  be  admitted,  except  as  a consequence  of 
the  admission  of  the  Conclusion.  The  most 


plausible  form  of  this  Fallacy  is  arguing  in  a Arguing  m 


There  ts  no  Fallacy  that  may  not  properly  be  includes 
under  some  of  the  foregoing  heads : those  which  in  the  Log- 
ical treatises  are  separately  enumerated,  and  con‘radistiq- 
guished  from  these,  being  in  reality  instances  of  them,  ana 
therefore  more  properly  enumerated  in  the  subdivision  thereof 
as  ip  the  scheme  annexed  : — 


circle  ; and  the  greater  the  circle,  the  harder  to 
detect. 


§4. 


[Boo*  IU 


(«  17.)  ($  16.)  («  15.)  (5  15.) 

Fallary  of  Fallacy  of  shifting  ground.  Fallacy  of  using  com-  Fallacy  of  appeals  to  the  passions ; ad 

- bjections;  &c.  | Dlex  and  general  terms.  hmmncm ; ad  veruundiam,  $r. 


OF  FALLACIES. 


181 


6j 


§ 5. 

On  each  of  the  Fallacies  which  have  been  th'js  enumerate! 
md  distinguished,  I propose  to  offer  some  more  particulai 
remarks ; but  before  I proceed  to  this,  it  will  be  proper  to 
premise  two  geneial  observations,  1st.  on  the  importance , and 
2d.  the  difficulty,  of  detecting  and  describing  Fallacies.  Both 
have  been  already  slightly  alluded  to ; but  it  is  requisite  that  they 
should  here  be  somewhat  more  fully  and  distinctly  set  forth. 

1st.  It  seems  by  most  persons  to  be  taken 
for  granted  that  a Fallacy  is  to  be  dreaded  Importance  of 
merely  as  a weapon  fashioned  and  wielded  by  lacies 
a skilful  sophist ; or,  if  they  allow  that  a man 
may  with  honest  intentions  slide  into  one  unconsciously,  in 
the  heat  of  argument , still  they  seem  to  suppose  that  where 
there  is  no  dispute , there  is  no  cause  to  dread  Fallacy  ; 
whereas  there  is  much  danger,  even  in  what  may  be  called 
solitary  reasoning , of  sliding  unawares  into  some  Fallacy,  by 
which  one  may  be  so  far  deceived  as  even  to  act  upon 
the  conclusion  thus  obtained.  By  “solitary  .reasoning”  1 
mean  the  case  in  which  one  is  not  seeking  for  arguments  to 
prove  a given  question , but  laboring  tc  elicit  from  one’s  pre 
vious  stock  of  knowledge  some  useful  inference* 

To  select  one  from  innumerable  examples  influence  0f 
that  might  be  cited,  and  of  which  some  more  words  on 
will  occur  in  the  subsequent  part  of  this  essay;  thoughts. 
it  is  not  improbable  that  many  indifferent  sermons  have  been 
produced  by  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  ’■'■plain.'"  A young 
divine  perceives  the  truth  of  the  maxim,  that  “ for  the  lowel 


* See  the  chapter  on  “ inferring  and  proving,”  (Bool  [Y.  cb  <ii. ' 
in  the  Dissertation  on  the  Province  of  Reasoning. 

16 


182 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


I Cock  III 


orders  one’s  language  cannot  be  too  plain  : ” ( i . e.  clear  and 
perspicuous , so  as  to  require  no  learning  nor  ingenuity  to  un- 
derstand it,)  and  when  he  proceeds  to  practice,  hie  word 
"plain  ” indistinctly  flits  before  him,  as  it  were,  and  often 
checks  him  in  the  use  of  ornaments  of  style,  such  as  meja 
phor,  epithet,  antithesis,  fyc.,  which  are  opposed  to  plain 
ness  ” in  a totally  different  sense  of  the  word  : being  by  no 
means  necessarily  adverse  to  perspicuity , but  rather,  in  many 
cases,  conducive  to  it ; as  may  be  seen  in  several  of  the 
clearest  of  our  Lord’s  discourses,  which  are  the  very  onea 
that  are  the  most  richly  adorned  with  figurative  language. 
So  far  indeed  is  an  ornamented  style  from  being  unfit  for  the 
vulgar,  that  they  are  pleased  with  it  even  in  excess.  Yet  the 
desire  to  be  “ plain,”  combined  with  that  dim  and  confused 
notion  which  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  produces  in  such  as 
do  not  separate  in  their  minds,  and  set  before  themselves,  the 
two  meanings,  often  causes  them  to  write  in  a dry  and  bala 
style,  which  has  no  advantage  in  point  of  perspicuity,  and  is 
least  of  all  suited  to  the  taste  of  the  vulgar.  The  above 
instance  is  not  drawn  from  mere  conjecture,  but  from  actual 
experience  of  the  fact. 

Another  instance  of  the  strong  influence  of  words  on  oui 
ideas  may  be  adduced  from  a widely  different  subject:  most 
persons  feel  a certain  degree  of  surprise  on  first  hearing  of 
the  result  of  some  late  experiments  of  the  Agricultural- 
Chemists,  by  which  they  have  ascertained  that  universally 
what  are  called  heavy  soils  are  specifically  the  lightest ; and 
vice  versa.  Whence  this  surprise  1 for  no  one  ever  distinctly 
believed  the  established  names  to  be  used  in  the  literal  and 
primary  sense,  in  consequence  of  the  respective  soils  having 
been  weighed  together ; indeed  it  is  obvious  on  a moment’s 
reflection  that  tenacious  clay-soils  (as  well  as  muddy  roads) 


I £>j 


OF  FALLACIES. 


183 


are  figuratively  called  heavy,  from  the  difficulty  of  ploughing 
or  passing  over  them,  which  produces  an  effect  like  that  of 
bearing  or  dragging  a heavy  weight ; yet  still  the  terms 
“ light  ” and  “ heavy,”  though  used  figuratively,  have  most 
undoubtedly  introduced  into  men’s  minds  something  of  the 
ideas  expressed  by  them  in  their  primitive  sense.  The  same 
words,  when  applied  to  articles  of  diet,  have  pncduced  impor- 
tant errors ; many  supposing  some  article  of  food  to  be  light 
of  digestion  from  its  being  specifically  light.  So  true  is  the 
ingenious  observation  of  Hobbes,  that  “ words  are  the  coun- 
ters of  wise  men,  and  the  money  of  fools.” 

“ Men  imagine,”  says  Bacon,  “ that  their  minds  have  the 
command  of  Language  ; but  it  often  happens  that  Language 
bears  rule  over  their  mind.”  Some  of  the  weak  and  absurd 
arguments  which  are  often  urged  against  Suicide  may  be 
traced  to  the  influence  of  words  on  thoughts.  When  a Chris- 
tian moralist  is  called  on  for  a direct  Scriptural  precept 
against  suicide,  instead  of  replying  that  the  Bible  is  not  meant 
for  a complete  code  of  laws , but  for  a system  of  motives  and 
principles , the  answer  frequently  given  is  “ thou  shalt  do  no 
murder and  it  is  assumed  in  the  arguments  drawn  from 
Reason,  as  well  as  in  those  from  Revelation,  that  Suicide  is 
a species  of  Murder  ; viz.  because  it  is  called  self -murder , 
and  thus,  deluded  by  a name,  many  are  led  to  rest  on  an  un- 
sound argument;  which,  like  all  other  fallacies,  does  more 
harm  than  good,  in  the  end,  to  the  cause  of  truth.  Suicide, 
if  any  one  considers  the  nature  and  not  the  name  of  it,  evi« 
dently  wants  the  most  essential  characteristic  of  murder,  viz 
the  hurt  and  injury  done  to  one’s  neighbor,  in  depriving  hint 
of  life,  as  well  as  to  others  by  the  insecurity  they  are  in  con 
lequence  liable  to  feel.  And  since  no  one  can,  strictly  speak 
tng,  do  injustice  to  himself,  he  cannot  in  the  literal  and  prr 


184 


ELEMENTS  UF  LOGIC. 


[Book  III 


mary  act  eptation  of  the  words,  be  said  either  to  rob  or  t« 
murder  himself.  He  who  deserts  the  post  to  which  he  is 
appointed  by  his  great  Master,  and  presumptuously  cuts  short 
the  state  of  probation  graciously  allowed  him  for  “ working 
out  his  salvation,”  (whether  by  action  or  by  patient  endurance,) 
is  guilty  indeed  of  a grievous  sin,  but  of  one  not  the  least 
analogous  in  its  character  to  murder.  It  implies  no  inhuman- 
ity. It  is  much  more  closely  allied  to  the  sin  of  wasting  life 
in  indolence,  or  in  trifling  pursuits,  — that  life  which  is  be- 
stowed as  a seed-time  for  the  harvest  of  immortality.  What 
is  called  in  familiar  phrase  “ killing  time,”  is,  in  truth,  an 
approach,  as  far  as  it  goes,  to  the  destruction  of  one’s  own 
life  : for  “ Time  is  the  stuff  life  is  made  of.” 

“Time  destroyed 

Is  suicide,  where  more  than  blood  is  spilt.” — Young.* 

More  especially  deserving  of  attention  is  the 

Errors  aris-  jnfluence  0f  Analogical  Terms  in  leading  men 
ing  from  the  . , , , 

. , . into  erroneous  notions  in  theology;  where  the 

useoj  analogi-  ’ 

cal  terms.  most  important  terms  are  analogical;  and  yel 
they  are  continually  employed  in  Reasoning, 
without  due  attention  (oftener  through  want  of  caution  than 
by  unfair  design)  to  their  analogical  nature ; and  most  of  the 


* It  is  surely  wiser  and  safer  to  confine  ourselves  to  such  argu 
ments  as  will  bear  the  test  of  a close  examination,  than  to  resort  tu 
such  as  may  indeed  at  the  first  glance  be  more  specious  and  appeal 
stronger,  but  which,  when  exposed,  will  too  often  leave  a man  a dupa 
to  the  fallacies  on  the  opposite  side.  But  it  is  especially  the  error  of 
controversialists  to  urge  every  thing  that  can  be  urged;  to  snatch  up 
'he  first  weapon  that  comes  to  hand ; (“  furor  arma  ministrat ; ”)  wit  b 
»ut  waiting  to  consider  what  is  TRUE. 


OF  FALLACIES 


185 


f&] 


errors  into  which  theologians  have  fallen  ma\  be  traced,  in 
pait,  to  this  cause.* 

In  speaking  of  the  importance  of  refuting  TwofoL. 

Fallacies,  (under  which  name  I include,  as  will  danger  from 
be  seen,  any  false  assumption  employed  as  a any  false  04 
Premiss)  this  consideration  ought  not  to  be  1 
overlooked  ; that  an  unsound  Principle,  which  has  been  em- 
ployed to  establish  some  mischievously  false  Conclusion,  does 
not  at  once  become  harmless,  and  too  insignificant  to  be  worth 
refuting,  as  soon  as  that  Conclusion  is  given  up,  and  the  false 
Principle  is  no  longer  employed  for  that  particular  use.  It 
may  equally  well  lead  to  some  other  no  less  mischievous  re- 
sult. “ A false  premiss,  according  as  it  is  combined  with 
this,  or  with  that,  true  one,  will  lead  to  two  different  false  con- 
clusions. Thus,  if  the  principle  be  admitted,  that  any  im- 
portant religious  errors  ought  to  be  forcibly  suppressed,  this 
may  lead  either  to  persecution  on  the  one  side,  or  to  latitudi- 
narian  indifference  on  the  other.  Some  may  be  led  to  justify 
the  suppression  of  heresies  by  the  civil  sword  ; and  others, 
whose  feelings  revolt  at  such  a procedure,  and  who  see  per- 
secution reprobated  and  discountenanced  by  those  around 
them,  may  be  led  by  the  same  principle  to  regard  religious 
errors  as  of  little  or  no  importance,  and  all  religious 
persuasions  as  equally  acceptable  in  the  sight  of  God.”f 

It  ought  however  to  be  observed  on  the  other 

hand,  that  such  effects  are  often  attributed  to  O^er-esUmatt 

of  the  effect  of 

some  fallacy  as  it  does  not  in  fact  produce.  It  some  faiiad^, 

shall  have  been  perhaps  triumphantly  urged, 

and  repeated  again  and  again,  and  referred  to  by  many  a* 


• See  the  notes  to  Ch.  v.  § 1 of  the  Dissertation  subjoined, 
t See  Essays,  3d  Series,  Ch.  v.  § 2.  p.  228. 

16  * 


1815  ELEMENTS  OF  LOOIC.  [Boo*  HI 

irrefragable  ; and  yet  shall  have  never  convince<  any  one  ; bu 
have  been  merely  assented  to  by  those  alre;  dy  convinced 
To  many  perso  is  at  y two  well-sounding  phrases,  which  have 
a few  words  th  3 same,  and  are  in  some  manner  connectec 
with  the  same  subject,  will  serve  for  Premiss  and  Con 
elusion:  and  when  we  hear  a man  profess  to  derive  convic- 
tion from  such  arguments,  we  are  naturally  disposed  to  re- 
gard his  case  as  hopeless.  But  it  will  often  happen  that  in 
reality  his  reasoning  faculties  shall  have  been  totally  dormant : 
and  equally  so  perhaps  in  another  case,  where  he  gives  his  as- 
sent to  a process  of  sound  reasoning,  leading  to  a conclusion 
which  he  has  already  admitted.  “ The  puerile  fallacies 
which  you  may  sometimes  hear  a man  adduce  on  some  sub- 
jects, are  perhaps  in  reality  no  more  his  own  than  the  sound 
arguments  he  employs  on  others  ; he  may  have  given  an  indo- 
lent unthinking  acquiescence  to  each  ; and  if  he  can  be  ex- 
cited to  exertion  of  thought,  he  may  be  very  capable  of  dis- 
tinguishing the  sound  from  the  unsound.”* 

Thus  much,  as  to  the  extensive  practical  influence  of  Fal- 
lacies, and  the  consequent  high  importance  of  detecting  anl 
exposing  them. 

§6. 

2dly.  The  second  remark  is,  that  while 
sound  reasoning  is  ever  the  more  readily  admit* 
ted,  the  more  clearly  it  is  perceived  to  be  such, 
Fallacy,  on  the  contrary, being  lejected  as  soon 
rs  perceived,  will,  of  course,  be  the  more  .likely  to  obtain 
reception,  the  more  it  is  obscured  and  disguised  by  obliquity 


Difficulty 

detecting 

Fallacies. 


* PoL  Econ.  Lect.  I.  p.  15. 


OF  FALLACIES 


187 


*«] 

and  complexity  of  expression.  It  is  thus  that  it  is  the  mos 
likely  either  to  slip  accidentally  from  the  careless  reasoner 
or  to  be  brought  forward  deliberately  by  the  Sophist.  No. 
that  he  ever  wishes  this  obscurity  and  complexity  to  be  per 
ceived ; on  the  contrary,  it  is  for  his  purpose  that  the  expres- 
sion should  appear  as  clear  and  simple  as  possible,  while  in 
reality  it  is  the  most  tangled  net  he  can  contrive. 

Thus,  whereas  it  is  usual  to  express  our  rea- 
soning elliptically , so  that  a Premiss  (or  even 
two  or  three  entire  steps  in  a course  of  argument) 
which  may  be  readily  supplied,  as  being  per- 
fectly obvious,  shall  be  left  to  be  understood,  the 
Sophist  in  like  manner  suppresses  what  is  not  obvious,  but  is 
in  reality  the  weakest  part  of  the  argument : and  uses  every 
other  contrivance  to  withdraw  our  attention  (his  art  closely 
resembling  the  juggler’s)  from  the  quarter  where  the  Fallacy 
lies.  Hence  the  uncertainty  before  mentioned,  to  which  class 
any  individual  Fallacy  is  to  be  referred  : and  hence  it  is  that 
the  difficulty  of  detecting-  and  exposing  Fallacy,  is  so  much 
greater  than  that  of  comprehending  and  developing  a pro- 
cess of  sound  argument.  It  is  like  the  detection  and  ap- 
prehension of  a criminal  in  spite  of  all  his  arts  of  conceal- 
ment and  disguise ; when  this  is  accomplished , and  he  is 
brought  to  trial  with  all  the  evidence  of  his  guilt  produced,  his 
conviction  and  punishment  are  easy  ; and  this  is  precisely 
the  case  with  those  Fallacies  which  are  given  as  examples  in 
Logical  treatises  ; they  are  in  fact  already  detected,  by  being 
stated  in  a plain  and  regular  form,  and  are,  as  it  were,  only 
brought  up  to  receive  sentence.  Or  again,  fallacious  reason- 
ing may  be  compared  to  a perplexed  and  entangled  mass  of 
accounts , which  it  requires  much  sagacity  and  close  attention 
to  clear  up,  and  display  in  a regular  and  intelligible  form 


Fallacies 
concealed  by 
elliptical 
language. 


188 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  111 


though  when  this  is  once  accomplished,  the  whole  appears  sc 
perfectly  simple , that  the  unthinking  are  apt  to  undervalue  the 
skill  and  pains  which  have  been  employed  upon  it. 

Moreover,  it  should  be  remembered,  that  a 
Fallacies  very  long  discussion  is  one  of  the  most  effectua 
Tnply^di'f  ve^s  Fallacy-  Sophistry,  .ike  poison,  is  at 
cussion.  once  detected,  and  nauseated,  when  presented 

to  us  in  a concentrated  form  ; but  a Fallacy 
which  when  stated  barely,  in  a few  sentences,  would  not  de- 
ceive a child,  may  deceive  half  the  world,  if  diluted  in  a 
quarto  volume.  For,  as  in  a calculation,  one  single  figure 
incorrectly  stated  will  enable  us  to  arrive  at  any  result  what- 
ever, though  every  other  figure,  and  the  whole  of  the  opera- 
tions, be  correct,  so,  a single  false  assumption  in  any  process 
of  reasoning,  though  every  other  be  true,  will  enable  us  to 
draw  what  conclusion  we  please ; and  the  greater  the  number 
of  true  assumptions,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  the  false  one 
will  pass  unnoticed.  But  when  you  single  out  one  step  in  the 
course  of  the  reasoning,  and  exhibit  it  as  a Syllogism  with  one 
Premiss  true  and  the  other  false,  the  sophistry  is  easily  per- 
ceived. I have  seen  a long  argument  to  prove  that  the  potato 
is  not  a cheap  article  of  food  ; in  which  there  was  an  elabo- 
rate, and  perhaps  correct,  calculation  of  the  produce  per  acre, 
of  potatoes,  and  of  wheat,  — the  quantity  lost  in  bran  — ex- 
pense of  grinding,  dressing,  4*c.,  and  an  assumption  slipped 
in,  as  it  were  incidentally,  that  a given  quantity  of  potatoes 
contains  but  one-tenth  part  of  nutritive  matter  equal  to  bread: 
from  all  which  (and  there  is  probably  but  one  groundless  as- 
sertion in. the  whole)  a most  triumphant  result  was  deduced.® 


* This,  however,  gained  the  undoubting  assent  of  a Review  by  n® 
means  friendly  to  the  author,  and  usually  noted  more  for  scepticism 


OF  FALLACIES 


189 


♦ «•] 


To  use  another  illustration  ; it  js  true  in  a course  of  argu- 
ment, as  in  Mechanics,  that  “ nothing  is  stronger  than  its 
weakest  part ; ” and  consequently  a chain  wmch  has  one 
faulty  link  will  break  : but  though  the  number  of  tbe  souna 
links  adds  nothing  to  the  strength  of  the  chain,  it  adds  much 
to  the  chance  of  the  faulty  one’s  escaping  observation.  In 
such  cases  as  I have  been  alluding  to,  one  may  often  hear  it 
observed  that  “ there  is  a great  deal  of  truth  in  what  such 
a one  has  said  : ” i.  e.  perhaps  it  is  all  true,  except  one  essen- 
tial point. 

To  speak,  therefore,  of  all  the  Fallacies  that 
, , , ...  Error  of  sup • 

have  ever  been  enumerated  as  too  glaring  and  . „ r , 

& ° posing  all  Fal~ 

obvious  to  need  even  being  mentioned,  because  lades  to  be 
the  simple  instances  given  in  logical  treatises,  easV  °f  detec- 
and  there  stated  in  the  plainest  and  conse- 
quently most  easily  detected  form,  are  such  as  would  (in  that 
form)  deceive  no  one;  — this,  surely,  shows  extreme  weak- 
ness, or  else  unfairness.  It  may  readily  be  allowed,  indeed, 
that  to  detect  individual  Fallacies,  and  bring  them  under  the 
general  rules,  is  a harder  task  than  to  lay  down  those  general 
rules  ; but  this  does  not  prove  that  the  latter  office  is  trifling 
or  useless,  or  that  it  does  not  essentially  conduce  to  the  per- 
formance of  the  other.  There  may  be  more  ingenuity 
shown  in  detecting  and  arresting'  a malefactor,  and  con- 
victing him  of  the  fact,  than  in  laying  down  a law  for  the  trial 
and  punishment  of  such  persons  ; but  the  latter  office,  i.  e 
that  of  a legislator,  is  surely  neither  unnecessary  nor  trifling. 


thar.  for  ready  assent ! “ All  things,”  says  an  apocryphal  writer, 

“ are  double,  one  against  another,  and  nothing  is  made  in  vain : ” un- 
blushing assertors  of  falsehood  seem  to  have  a race  of  easy  believers 
provided  on  purpose  for  their  use  ; men  who  will  not  indeed  believe 
the  best  established  truths  of  religion,  but  are  ready  to  believe  arcf 
thing  else. 


190 


ELEMENTS  (.  L<  LOGIC. 


[Look  III 


It  sho.ild  be  added  that  a close  observation  and  Logical 

analysis  of  Fallacious  arguments,  as  it  tends  (according  U 

what  has  been  already  said)  to  form  a habit  of  mind  well 

suited  for  the  practical  detection  of  Fallacies ; so,  for  that 

very  reason,  it  will  make  us  the  more  careful  in  making  allou> 

ance  for  them  : i.  e.  to  bear  in  mind  how  much  men  in  fen- 

© 

eral  are  liable  to  be  influenced  by  them.  E.  G.  a refuted 
argument  ought  to  go  hr  nothing,  (except  where  there  is  some 
ground  for  assuming  that  no  stronger  one  could  be  adduced  .)  * 
but  in  fact  it  will  generally  prove  detrimental  to  the  cause, 
from  the  Fallacy  which  will  be  presently  explained.  Now,  no 
one  is  more  likely  to  be  practically  aware  of  this,  and  to  take 
precautions  accordingly,  than  he  who  is  most  versed  in  the 
whole  theory  of  Fallacies  ; for  the  best  Logician  is  the  least 
likely  to  calculate  on  men  in  general  being  such. 

§ 7. 

Of  Fallacies  in  form, 

enough  perhaps  has  already  been  said  in  the  preceding  Com- 
pendium : and  it  has  been  remarked  above,  that  it  is  often 
left  to  our  choice  to  refer  an  individual  Fallacy  to  this  head  or 
to  another. 

It  may  be  worth  observing,  however,  that  to  the  present 
class  we  may  the  most  conveniently  refer  those  Fallacies,  so 
common  in  practice,  of  supposing  the  Conclusion  false,  be- 
cause the  Premiss  is  false,  or  because  the  Argument  is 
unsound ; and  of  inferring  the  truth  of  the  Premiss  from  that 
of  the  Conclusion.  E.  G.  if  any  one  argues  for  the  exist- 


* See  Essay  II.  on  Kingdom  of  Christ,  § 22,  note. 


17.] 


OF  FALLACIES. 


191 


ence  of  a God,  from  its  being  universally  believed,  a man 
might  perhaps  be  able  to  refute  the  argument  by  producing  a® 
instance  of  some  nation  destitute  of  such  belief ; the  argumenl 
wight  then  (as  has  been  observed  above)  to  go  for  nothing . 
but  many  would  go  further,  and  think  that  this  refutation  had 
disproved  the  existence  of  a God  ; in  which  they  would  be 
guilty  of  an  illicit  process  of  the  Major-term  : viz.  “ whatever 
is  universally  believed  must  be  true  ; the  existence  of  a God 
is  not  universally  believed  ; therefore  it  is  not  true.”  Other 
again,  from  being  convinced  of  the  truth  of  the  Conclusion 
would  infer  that  of  the  Premisses ; which  would  amount  to  the 
Fallacy  of  an  undistributed  Middle  : viz.  “ what  is  universally 
believed  is  true ; the  existence  of  a God  is  true  ; therefore  it 
is  universally  believed.”  Or,  these  Fallacies  might  be  stated 
in  the  hypothetical  form  ; since  the  one  evidently  proceeds 
from  the  denial  of  the  Antecedent  to  the  denial  of  the  Conse- 
quent ; and  the  other  from  the  establishing  of  the  Consequent 
to  the  inferring  of  the  Antecedent : which  two  Fallacies  will 
usually  be  found  to  correspond  respectively  with  those  of 
illicit  process  of  the  major,  and  Undistributed  Middle. 

Fallacies  of  this  class  are  very  much  kept  T„  , 

J 1 Weak  argu 

out  of  sight,  being  seldom  perceived  even  by  ments  practi 
those  who  employ  them;  but  of  their  practical  cally detrimen 
importance  there  can  be  no  doubt,  since  it  is  ta'“ 
notorious  that  a weak  argument  is  always,  in  practice,  detri- 
mental ; and  that  there  is  no  absurdity  so  gross  which  men 
will  not  readily  admit,  if  it  appears  to  lead  to  a conclusion  of 
which  they  are  already  convinced.  Even  a candid  and  sen- 
sible writer  is  not  unlikely  to  be,  by  this  means,  misled,  when 
ne  is  seeking  for  arguments  to  support  a conclusion  which  he 
has  long  been  fully  convinced  of  himself ; i.  e.  he  will  often 
use  such  arguments  as  would  never  have  convinced  himself 


192 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  III 


tmd  are  not  likely  to  convince  others,  but  rather  (by  the 
operation  of  the  converse  Fallacy)  to  confirm  in  their  dissent 
those  who  before  disagreed  with  him. 

It  is  best  therefore  to  endeavor  to  put  yourself  in  the  place 
of  an  opponent  to  your  own  arguments,  and  consider  whether 
you  could  not  find  some  objection  to  them.  The  applause  of 
one  s own  party  is  a very  unsafe  ground  tor  judging  of  the 
real  force  of  an  argumentative  work,  and  consequently  of  its 
teal  utility.  To  satisfy  those  who  were  doubting,  and  to  con- 
vince those  who  were  opposed,  are  much  better  tests ; * but 
these  persons  are  seldom  very  loud  in  their  applause,  or  verv 
forward  in  bearing  their  testimony. 


Of  Ambiguous  Middle. 

§ 8. 


That  case  in  which  the  Middle  is  undistributed  belongs  o! 
course  to  the  preceding  head  ; the  fault  being  perfectly  man- 
ifest from  the  mere  form  of  the  expression  : in  that  case  the 
Extremes  are  compared  with  two  parts  of  the  same  term  ; 
but  in  the  Fallacy  which  has  been  called  semi-logical,  (which 
we  are  now  to  speak  of ) the  Extremes  are  compared  with 
tioo  different  terms,  the  Middle  being  used  in  two  different 
senses  in  the  two  Premisses. t 

And  here  it  may  be  remarked  that  when  the  argument  is 
fraught  into  the  form  of  a regular  Syllogism , the  contrast 

* The  strongest,  perhaps,  of  all  external  indications  of  the  strength 
of  an  argument,  is,  the  implied  admission  of  those  who  nevertheless 
tesolve  not  to  admit  the  conclusion.  See  Appendix;  Art.  Person , last 
clause. 

f For  some  instances  of  important  ambiguities,  see  Appendix. 


OF  FALLACIES. 


l93 


I 8] 


between  these  two  sense*  will  usually  appear  very  sti  iking 
from  the  two  Premisses  being  placed  together ; and  hence  the 
scorn  with  which  many  have  treated  the  very  mention  of  the 
Fallacy  of  Equivocation,  deriving  their  only  notion  of  it  from 
the  exposure  of  it  in  Logical  treatises;  whereas,  in  practice  it 
is  common  for  the  two  Premisses  to  be  placed  very  fai  apart, 
and  discussed  in  different  parts  of  the  discourse  ; by  which 
means  the  inattentive  hearer  overlooks  any  ambiguity  that 
may  exist  in  the  Middle-term.  Hence  the  advantage  of  Logi- 
cal habits,  in  fixing  our  attention  strongly  and  steadily  on  the 
important,  terms  of  an  argument. 

And  here  it  should  be  observed,  that  when  we  mean  to 
charge  any  argument  with  the  fault  of  “ equivocal-middle,” 
it  is  not  enough  to  say  that  the  Middle-term  is  a word  or 
phrase  which  admits  of  more  than  one  meaning  ; (for  there 
are  few  that  do  not)  but  we  must  show,  that  in  order  for  each 
premiss  to  be  admitted,  the  Term  in  question  must  be  under- 
stood in  one  sense  (pointing  out  wliat  that  sense  is)  in  one  of 
the  premisses,  and  in  another  sense,  in  the  other. 

And  if  any  one  speaks  contemptuously  of  T 

J 1 r j Importance 

“ over  exactness  ” in  fixing  the  precise  sense  0f  minute  dis- 
in  which  some  term  is  used,  — of  attending  to  Unctions. 
minute  and  subtle  distinctions,  &c.  we  may  reply  that  these 
minute  distinctions  are  exactly  those  which  call  for  careful 
attention;  since  it  is  only  through  the  neglect  of  these  that 
Fallacies  ever  escape  detection. 

For,  a very  glaring  and  palpable  equivocation  could  never 
mislead  any  one.  To  argue  that  “ feathers  dispel  darkness 
because  they  are  light,"  or  that  “ this  man  is  agreeable,  be 
cause  he  is  riding , and  riding  is  agreeable,”  is  an  equivoca- 
tion which  could  never  be  employed  but  in  jest.  And  yet 
however  slight  in  any  case  may  be  the  distinction  betv/eea  the 
17 


194 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  IIa 


two  senses  of  a Middle-term  in  the  two  premisses,  the  appar 
ent-argument  will  be  equally  inconclusive  ; though  its  falla- 
ciousness will  be  more  likely  to  escape  notice. 

Even  so,  it  is  for  want  of  attention  to  minute  points,  that 
bouses  ar;  robbed,  or  set  on  fire.  Burglars  do  not  in  general 
come  and  batter  down  the  front-door;  but  climb  in  at  some 
window  whose  fastenings  have  been  neglected.  And  an 
incendiary,  or  a careless  servant,  does  not  kindle  a tar-barrel 
in  the  middle  of  a room,  but  leaves  a lighted  turf,  or  a candle 
snuff,  in  the  thatch,  or  in  a heap  of  shavings. 

In  many  cases,  it  is  a good  maxim,  to  “ take  L.re  of  littlo 
things,  and  great  ones  will  take  care  of  themselves.” 

One  case  which  may  be  regarded  as  coming 

Paronymous  unc|er  t[,e  head  of  Ambiguous  middle,  is,  (what 
words.  _ 

I believe  logical  writers  mean  by  “ Fallacia 

Figurce  Dictionis ,”)  the  Fallacy  built  on  the  grammatical 
structure  of  language,  from  men’s  usually  taking  for  granted 
that  paronymous  [or  conjugate]  words  — i.  e.  those  belonging 
to  each  other,  as  the  substantive,  adjective,  verb,  fyc.  of  the 
same  root,  ha/e  a precisely  correspondent  meaning;  which  is 
by  no  means  universally  the  base.  Such  a fallacy  could  not 
indeed  be  even  exhibited  in  strict  Logical  form,  which  would 
preclude  even  the  attempt  at  it,  since  it  has  two  middle  terms 
in  sound  as  well  as  sense.  But  nothing  is  more  common  in 
practice  than  to  vary  continually  the  terms  employed,  with  a 
view  to  grammatical  convenience  ; nor  is  there  any  thing  un- 
fair in  such  a practice,  as  long  as  the  meaning  is  preserved 
unaltered:  e.  g.  “murder  should  be  punished  with  death, 
this  man  is  a murae  er;  therefore  he  deserves  to  die,”  SfC.  ire. 
Here  we  proceed  on  the  assumption  (in  this  case  just)  that  \ 
commit  murder  and  to  be  a murderer,  — to  deserve  death  and 
to  be  one  who  ought  to  die,  are,  respectively,  equ  valen 


5 8.1  OF  FALLACIES.  11)5 

expressions  . and  it  would  frequently  prove  a heavy  incor.verj* 
ence  to  be  debarred  this  kind  of  liberty  ; out  the  abuse  of  it 
gives  rise  to  the  Fallacy  in  question  : e.  g.  '•'■projectors  ara 
unfit  to  be  trusted  ; this  man  has  formed  a project , therefore 
he  is  unfit  to  be  trusted  : ” * here  the  Sophist  proceeds  on  the 
hypothesis  that  he  who  forms  a project  must  be  a projector : 
whereas  the  bad  sense  that  commonly  attaches  to  the  latter 
word,  is  not  at  all  implied  in  the  former. 

This  Fallacy  may  often  be  considered  as  lying  not  in  the 
Middle,  but  in  one  of  the  terms  of  the  Conclusion ; so  that 
the  Conclusion  drawn  shall  not  be,  in  reality,  at  all  warranted 
by  the  Premisses,  though  it  will  appear  to  be  so,  by  means  of 
the  grammatical  affinity  of  the  words  : e.  g.  “ to  be  acquainted 
with  the  guilty  is  a presumption  of  guilt ; this  man  is  so  ac- 
quainted ; therefore  we  may  presume  that  he  is  guilty : ” this 
argument  proceeds  on  the  supposition  of  an  exact  correspond- 
ence between  '•'•presume'1''  and  “ presumption  f which,  how- 
ever, does  not  really  exist;  for  “ presumption  ” is  commonly 
used  to  express  a kind  of  slight  suspicion;  whereas  “ to  pre- 
sume” amounts  to  actual  belief . 

The  above  remark  will  apply  to  some  other  cases  of  ambi- 
guity of  term ; viz.  the  Conclusion  will  often  contain  a term 
which  (though  not,  as  here,  different  in  expression  from  the 
corresponding  one  in  the  Premiss,  yet)  is  liable  to  be  under- 
stood in  a sense  different  from  what  it  bears  to  the  Premiss; 
though,  of  course,  such  a Fallacy  is  less  common,  because 
less  likely  to  deceive,  in  those  cases  than  in  this ; where  the 
term  used  in  the  Conclusion,  though  professing  to  correspond 
with  one  in  the  Premiss,  is  net  the  very  same  in  expression 


* Adam  Smith’s  Wealth  of  Nations:  Usury. 


% 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book.  Ul 


*nd  therefore  is  more  certain  to  convey  a different  sense ; 
which  is  what  the  Sophist  wishes. 

There  are  innumerable  instances  of  a non-correspondence 
in  paronymous  words,  similar  to  that  above  instanced  ; as 
between  art  and  artful , design  and  designing,  faith  and  faith- 
ful, $c.  > and  the  more  slight  the  variation  of  meaning,  the 
more  likely  is  the  Fallacy  to  be  successful;  for  when  the 
words  have  become  so  widely  icmoved  in  sense  as  “ pity  ” 
and  “ pitiful,”  every  one  would  perceive  such  a Fallacy,  nor 
could  it  be  employed  but  in  jest. 

This  Fallacy  cannot  in  practice  be  refuted,  (except  when 
you  are  addressing  regular  logicians,)  by  stating  merely  the 
impossibility  of  reducing  such  an  argument  to  the  strict  logi- 
cal form.  You  must  find  some  way  of  pointing  out  the  non- 
correspondence of  the  terms  in  question  ; e.  g.  with  respect 
to  the  example  above,  it  might  be  remarked,  that  we  speak  of 
strong  or  faint  “ presumption,”  but  we  use  no  such  expres- 
sion in  conjunction  with  the  verb  “ presume,”  because  the 
word  itself  implies  strength. 

No  fallacy  is  more  common  in  controversy  than  the  pres- 
ent ; since  in  this  way  the  Sophist  will  often  be  able  to  mis- 
interpret the  propositions  which  his  opponent  admits  or  main- 
tains, and  so  employ  them  against  him.  Thus  in  the  examples 
just  given,  it  is  natural  to  conceive  one  of  the  Sophist’s  Prem- 
isses to  have  been  borrowed  from  his  opponent.* 

The  present  Fallacy  is  nearly  allied  to,  or 

Etymology. 

rather  perhaps  may  be  regarded  as  a branch  of 
that  founded  on  etymology ; viz.  when  a term  is  used  at  one 


• Perhaps  a dictionary  of  such  paronymous  [conjugate]  words  at 
lo  net  regularly  correspond  in  meaning,  would  he  nearly  as  useful  sf 
one  of  synonymes  ; i.  e.  properly  speaking,  of  pseudo -synonymes. 


OF  FALLACIES 


197 


} 9.1 


time,  in  its  customary,  and  at  another,  in  itc  etymological 
sense.  Perhaps  no  example  of  this  can  be  found  that  is  more 
extensively  and  mischievously  employed  than  in  the  case  of 
the  word  representative : assuming  that  its  right  meaning  mu; 
correspond  exactly  with  the  strict  and  original  sense  of  the 
verb,  “ represent,”  the  Sophist  persuades  the  multitude  that  a 
member  of  the  House  of  Commons  is  bound  to  be  guided  in 
all  points  by  the  opinion  of  his  constituents  : and,  in  short,  to 
be  merely  their  spokesman:  whereas  law,  and  custom,  which 
in  this  case  may  be  considered  as  fixing  the  meaning  of  the 
Term,  require  no  such  thing,  but  enjoin  the  representative  to 
act  according  to  the  best  of  his  own  judgment,  and  on  his 
awn  responsibility. 

Horne  Tooke  has  furnished  a whole  magazine  of  such 
weapons  for  any  Sophist  who  may  need  them  ; and  has  fur- 
nished some  specimens  of  the  employment  of  them.  He 
contends,  that  it  is  idle  to  speak  of  eternal  or  immutable 
‘ Truth,"  because  the  word  is  derived  from  to  “ trow,”  i.  e. 
believe.  He  might  on  as  good  grounds  have  censured  the 
absurdity  of  speaking  of  sending  a letter  by  the  '■'■post"  be- 
cause a post,  in  its  primary  sense,  is  a pillar ; or  have  insisted 
that  “Sycophant”  can  never  mean  any  thing  but  “Fig- 
shower.” 

§ 9.  / 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  to  the  head  of  Am- 
biguous middle  should  be  referred  what  is  called  interrogations 
*'  Fallacia  plurium  Interrogationum"  which 
may  be  named  simply,  “ the  Fallacy  of  Interrogation  viz. 
the  Fallacy  of  asking  several  questions  which  appear  to  be 
but  one ; so  that  whatever  one  answer  is  given,  being  of  course 
applicable  to  one  only  of  the  implied  questions,  may  be  inter* 

17* 


198 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  ITt 


preted  as  applied  to  the  other:  the  refutation  is,  of  course,  to 
reply  separately  to  each  question,  i.  e.  to  detect  the  ambiguity 

I have  said,  several  “ questions  which  appear  to  be  but  one 
for  else  there  is  no  Fallacy ; such  an  example,  therefore,  as 
‘ estne  homo  animal  et  lapis  7"  which  Aldrich  gives,  is  for- 
eign ;o  the  matter  in  hand  ; for  there  is  nothing  unfair  in  ask- 
ing two  distinct  questions  (any  more  than  in  asserting  twc 
distinct  propositions)  distinctly  and  avowedly. 

This  Fallacy  may  be  referred,  as  has  been  said,  to  the  head 
of  Ambiguous  middle.  In  all  Reasoning  it  is  very  common 
to  state  one  of  the  Premisses  in  form  of  a question,  and  when 
that  is  admitted,  or  supposed  to  be  admitted,  then  to  fill  up  the 
rest : if  then  one  of  the  Terms  of  that  question  be  ambigu- 
ous, whichever  sense  the  opponent  replies  to,  the  Sopnist 
assumes  the  other  sense  of  the  Term  in  the  remaining  Prem- 
iss. It  is  therefore  very  common  to  state  an  equivocal  argu- 
ment, in  form  of  a question  so  worded,  that  there  shall  be 
little  doubt  which  reply  will  be  given  ; but  if  there  be  such 
doubt,  the  Sophist  must  have  two  Fallacies  of  equivocation 
ready  ; E.  G.  the  question  “ whether  any  thing  vicious  is  ex- 
pedient,” discussed  in  Cic.  Off.  Book  III.  (where,  by  the  bye, 
he  seems  not  a little  perplexed  with  it  himself)  is  of  the  char- 
acter in  question,  from  the  ambiguity  of  the  word,  “ expe- 
dient," which  means  sometimes  “ conducive  to  temporal 
prosperity,”  sometimes  “conducive  to  the  greatest  good:” 
whichever  answer  therefore  was  given,  the  Sophist  might 
have  a Fallacy  of  equivocation  founded  on  this  term  ; viz. 
if  the  answer  be  in  the  negative,  his  argument,  Logically 
developed,  will  stand  thus,  — “ what  is  vicious  is  not  expedi- 
ent ; whatever  conduces  to  the  acquisition  of  wealth  and 
aggrandizement  is  expedient ; therefore  it  cannot  be  vicious  . ” 
if  in  the  affirmative,  then  thus,  — “ whatever  is  expedient  if 


OF  FALLACIES. 


197 


I 9] 


desirable  ; something  vicious  is  expedient,  therefore  de 
sirable.”  * 

Again,  a witness  was;  once  asked  hv  a Parliamentary  Com.' 
mittee  (in  1832)  whether  he  knew  “how  long  the  practice 
had  ceased  in  Ireland  of  dividing  the  tithes  into  four  portions, 
one  for  the  poor,”  4'c-  This  resembles  the  hackneyed  in- 
stance of  asking  a man  “ whether  he  had  left  off  beating  his 
father.”  [See  Vol.  of  Charges  and  Tracts,  p.  379.]  King 
Charles  II.’s  celebrated  inquiry — of  the  Royal  Society  (no- 
ticed below,  § 14)  may  be  referred  to  this  head.  He  asked 
the  cause  why  a dead  fish  does  not  (though  a live  fish  does) 
add  to  the  weight  of  a vessel  of  water.  This  implies  two 
questions  ; the  first  of  which  many  of  the  philosophers  for  a 
time  overlooked  : viz.  1st.  is  it  a fact  ? 2dly.  if  it  be  a fact, 
what  can  cause  it  ? t 

This  kind  of  Fallacy  is  frequently  employed 
in  such  a manner,  that  the  uncertainty  shall  be, 
not  about  the  meaning , but  the  extent  of  a 
Term,  i.  e.  whether  it  is  distributed  or  not : 

*.  g.  “ did  A B in  this  case  act  from  such  and  such  a mo- 
tive ? ” which  may  imply  either,  “ was  it  his  sole  motive  ? ” 
or  “ was  it  one  of  his  motives  ? ” in  the  former  case  the  term 
[“  that-which-actuated-A  B ”]  is  distributed  ; ir  the  latter, 
not:  now  if  he  acted  from  a mixture  of  motives,  whichever 
answer  you  give,  may  be  misrepresented,  and  your  conclusion 
thus  disproved. 


Distribution 
and  non-dis- 
tribution. 


* Much  of  the  declamation  by  which  popular  assemblies  are  . fieri 
misled,  against  what  is  called,  without  any  distinct  meaning,  the 
“ doctrine  of  expediency,”  (as  if  the  “ right  ” and  the  “ expedient 
were  in  opposition)  might  he  silenced  by  asking  the  simple  question, 
“Do  you  then  admit  that  the  course  you  recommrud  is  mexpe< 
dient  ? ” 

"*  See  Historic  Doubts  relative  to  Napoleon. 


200 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  III 


Again,  those  who  dispute  the  right  ot  a State  to  enforce 
the  profession  of  a certain  religion,  have  been  met  by  the 
question,  “ has  a State  a right  to  enforce  Laws  ?”  If  we  an- 
swer in  the  negative,  we  may  be  interpreted  as  denying  tha‘ 
any  laws  can  rightfully  be  enforced ; which  would  of  course 
go  to  destroy  the  very  existence  of  a Political-community ; if, 
in  the  affirmative,  we  may  be  interpreted  as  sanctioning  tho 
enforcement  of  any  laws  whatever  that  the  Legislature  may 
aee  fit  to  enact : whether  enjoining  men  to  adore  a Crucifix, 
or  to  trample  on  it  ; — to  reverence  Christ  or  Mahomet,  <^c. 
The  ambiguity  of  the  question  lies  in  “Laws;”  understood 
either  as  “ some  laws,”  or,  as  “ any  laivs  without  exception. ” * 

§ 10. 

, . . In  some  cases  of  ambiguous  Middle,  the 

Intrinsic 

and  hidden-  Term  in  question  may  be  considered  as  having 

tal  equivoca-  in  itself, , from  its  own  equivocal  nature,  two 
significations  ; (which  apparently  constitutes  the 
‘ Fallacm  equivocationis  ” of  Logical  writers ;)  others  again 
lave  a Middle-term  which  is  ambiguous  from  the  context,  i.  e. 
from  what  is  understood  in  conjunction  with  it.  This  division 
will  be  found  useful,  though  it  is  impossible  to  draw  the  line 
accurately  in  it. 

The  elliptical  character  of  ordinary  discourse  causes  many 
Terms  to  become  practically  ambiguous,  which  yet  are  not 
themselves  employed  in  different  senses , but  with  different 
applications , which  are  understood.  Thus,  “ The  Faith  ” 
tvould  be  used  by  a Christian  writer  to  denote  the  Christian 
faith,  and  by  a Mussulman,  the  Mahometan  ; yet  the  word 

• Dea  “ Essays  on  the  Kingdom  of  Christ.”  N<  te  A.  to  Essay  I 


OF  FALLACIES. 


201 


1 10.] 

Faith,  lias  not  in  these  cases,  of  itself,  two  different  signiflca 
tions.  So  ixlexxol,  “ elect,”  or  “ chosen,”  is  sometimes  ap- 
plied to  such  as  are  “chosen,”  to  certain,  privileges  and 
advantages ; (as  the  Israelites  were,  though  “they  were  over- 
thrown  in  the  wilderness”  for  their  disobedience;  and  as 
a’C  Christians  are  frequently  called  in  the  New  Testament) 
sometimes  again  to  those  who  are  “ chosen,”  as  fit  to  re- 
ceive a final  reward , having  made  a right  use  of  those 
advantages  ; as  when  our  Lord  says,  “ many  are  called,  but 
few  chosen.” 

What  Logicians  have  mentioned  under  the 
• i _ Amphibolia. 

title  or  “ ballacia  ampmbouse  is  referable  to 

this  last  class  ; though  in  real  practice  it  is  not  very  likely  to 
occur.  An  amphibolous  sentence  is  one  that  is  capable  of 
two  meanings,  not  from  the  double  sense  of  any  of  the  words, 
but  from  its  admitting  of  a double  construction:  as  in  the 
instance  Aldrich  gives,  which  is  untranslatable  ; “ quod  tan 
gitur  a Socrate,  illud  sentit ; ” where  “ illud  ” may  be  taken 
either  as  the  nominative  or  accusative.  So  also  the  celebrated 
response  of  the  oracle  ; “ Aio  te,  iEacida,  Romanos  vincere 
posse  : ” “ Pyrrhus  the  Romans  shall,  I say,  subdue  : ” which 
closely  resembles  (as  Shakspeare  remarks)  the  witch-proph- 
ecy, “The  Duke  yet  lives  that  Henry  shall  depose.”  This 
effect  is  produced  by  what  the  French  call  “construction 
louche,”  a squinting  construction  ; i.  e.  where  some  word  or 
words  may  be  referred  either  to  the  former  or  latter  clause  of 
the  sentence ; of  which  an  instance  occurs  in  the  rubric  pre- 
fixel  to  the  service  for  the  30th  January.  “If  this  day  shall 
happen  to  be  Sunday  [this  form  of  prayer  shah  be  used]  and 
the  fast  kept  the  next  day  following  : ” the  clause  in  brackets 
may  belong  either  to  the  former  or  the  latter  part  of  the  sen- 
tence. In  the  Nicene  Creed,  the  words,  “ by  whom  all  things 


202 


ELEMENTS  OE  LOGIC. 


[Look  ilL 


were  made,”  are  grammatically  referable  either  t the  Fathet 
or  the  Son.  And  in  the  2d  Commandment,  the  clause  “ of 
them  that  hate  me,”  is  a genitive  governed  either  by  “ chib 
dren,”  or  by  “ generation  : ” the  latter  being  indicated  by  the 
ordinary  mode  of  punctuation  and  of  reading;  which  totally 
changes  the  real  sense.*  The  following  clause  of  a sentence 
from  a newspaper,  is  a curious  specimen  of  Amphibolia  : — 
‘ For  protecting  and  upholding  such  electors  as  refused, 
contrary  to  their  desires  and  consciences,  to  vote  for  Messrs. 
A and  B,  regardless  of  threats,  and  unmindful  of  intimida- 
tion.” 


There  are  various  ways  in  which  words  conn 
Accidental  , 

to  have  two  meanings  : 

equivocation.  ° 

1st.  By  accident ; (i.  e.  when  there  is  no  per 
ceptible  connection  between  the  two  meanings)  as  “ light  ” sig 
nifies  both  the  contrary  to  “heavy”  and  the  contrary  to 
‘ dark.”  Thus,  such  Proper-names  as  John  or  Thomas,  fyc. 
which  happen  to  belong  to  several  different  persons,  are 
ambiguous,  because  they  have  a different  signification  in  each 
case  where  they  are  applied.  Words  which  fall  under  this 
first  head  are  what  are  the  most  strictly  called  equivocal. 

First  and  2dly.  There  are  several  terms  in  the  use  of 
second  inten-  which  it  is  necessary  to  notice  the  distinction 
il0,u  between  first  and  second  intention,  t The 


* See  Rhetoric,  Appendix. 

t I am  aware  that  there  exists  another  opinion  as  tc  the  meaning 
of  the  phrase  “ second  intention  ; ” and  that  Aldrich  is  understood  by 
seme  persons  to  mean  (as  indeed  his  expression  may  very  well  be  un- 
derstood to  imply)  that  every  predicable  must  necessarily  be  employed 
in  the  Second-intention.  I do  not  undertake  to  combat  the  doctrine 
alluded  to,  because  I must  confess  that,  after  the  most  patient  atten- 
tion devoted  to  the  explanations  given  of  it,  I have  never  been  able  tl 


♦ 10] 


OF  FALLACIES. 


203 


“ first-intention  ” of  a T nun,  (according  to  the  usual  accej  ta- 
tion  of  this  phrase)  is  a certain  vague  and  general  signification 
of  it,  as  opposed  to  one  more  precise  and  limited , which  it 
bears  in  some  particular  art,  science,  or  system,  and  which 
is  called  its  “ second-intention.”  Thus,  among  farmers,  in 
some  parts,  the  word  “ beast”  is  applied  particularly  and  es- 
pecially to  the  ox  kind  ; and  “ bird,”  in  the  language  of 
many  sportsmen,  is  in  like  manner  appropriated  to  the  par- 
tridge : the  common  and  general  acceptation  (which  every 
one  is  well  acquainted  with)  of  each  of  those  two  words,  is 
the  First-intention  of  each ; the  other  its  Second-intention. 

For  some  remarks  on  the  Second-intention  of  the  word 
“ Species,”  when  applied  to  organized  beings  (viz.  as  denot- 
ing those  plants  or  animals,  which  it  is  conceived  may  have 
descended  from  a common  stock),  see  the  subjoined  Disser- 
tation, Book  IV.  Chap.  v.  § 1. 

It  is  evident  that  a Term  may  have  several  Second-inten 
tions,  according  to  the  several  systems  into  which  it  is  intro- 
duced, and  of  which  it  is  one  of  the  technical  Terms  : thus 
“ line  ” signifies,  in  the  Art-military,  a certain  form  of  draw- 
ing up  ships  or  troops:  in  Geography,  a certain  division  of 
the  earth ; to  the  fisherman,  a string  to  catch  fish,  <^c.  <^*c.  , 
all  which  are  so  many  distinct  Second-intentions,  in  each  of 
which  there  is  a certain  signification  “ of  extension  in  length  ” 
which  constitutes  the  First-intention,  and  which  corresponds 
pretty  nearly  with  the  employment  of  the  Term  in  Mathe- 
matics. 


comprehend  what  it  is  that  is  meant  by  it.  It  is  one,  however,  which, 
whether  sound  or  unsound,  appears  not  to  be  connected  with  anj 
Logical  processes,  and  therefore  may  be  safely  passed  by  on  the  pres' 
tat  occasion. 


204 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book.  Ill 


In  a kw  instances  the  Second-intention,  or  philosophical 
employment  of  a Term,  is  more  extensive  than  the  First-inten- 
tion, or  popular  use:  thus  “ affection  ” is  limited  in  popular 
use  to  14  love  ; ” “ charity,”  to  “ almsgiving  ; ” “ flower,”  to 
those  flowers  which  have  conspicuous  petals  ; and  fruit,  to  such 
as  are  eatable. 

It  will  sometimes  happen,  that  a Term  shall  be  employed 
always  in  some  one  or  other  of  its  second  intentions  ; and 
never,  strictly  in  the  first,  though  that  first  intention  is  a part 
of  its  signification  in  each  case.  It  is  evident,  that  the  utmost 
care  is  requisite  to  avoid  confounding  together,  either  the  first 
and  second  intentions,  or  the  different  second  intentions  with 
each  other. 


of  grass,”  and  the  contrivance  in  building  called  a “ dove-tail ,” 
are  so  called  from  their  resemblance  to  the  blade  * of  a sword, 
and  the  tail  of  a real  dove.  But  two  things  may  be  con- 
nected by  analogy , though  they  have  in  themselves  no  re - 
semblance:  for  analogy  is -the  resemblance  of  ratios  (or  rela- 
tions :)  thus,  as  a sweet  taste  gratifies  the  palate,  so  does 
a sweet  sound  gratify  the  ear  ; and  hence  the  same  word 
u sweet  ” is  applied  to  both,  though  no  flavor  can  resemble  a 
sound  in  itself.  So,  the  leg  of  a table  does  not  resemble  that 
of  an  animal ; nor  the  foot  of  a mountain  that  of  an  animal ; 
but  the  leg  ansivers  the  same  purpose  to  the  table,  as  the  leg 


* Unless,  indeed,  the  primary  application  of  the  Term  be  to  the 
leaf  of  grass,  and  the  secondary  to  cutting  instruments,  which  is  per- 
haps more  probable ; but  the  question  is  unimportant  in  the  present 

sase. 


Resemblance 
and  Analogy. 


3dly.  When  two  or  more  things  are  con- 
nected by  resemblance  or  analogy , they  will  fre- 
quently have  the  same  name.  Thus  a “ blade 


} 10.] 


OF  FALLACIES. 


205 


of  an  animal  to  .hat  animal ; the  foot  of  a mountain  has  ths> 
same  situation  relatively  to  the  mountain,  as  the  foot  cf  an 
animal  to  the  animal.  This  analogy  therefore  may  be  ex> 
pressed  like  a mathematical  analogy  (or  proportion) ; “ leg  : 
animal  : : supporting-stick  : table.” 

The  words  pertaining  to  Mind  may  in  general  be  traced  jp, 
as  borrowed  (which  no  doubt  they  all  were,  originally)  oy 
Analogy,  from  those  pertaining  to  Matter : though  in  many 
cases  the  primary  sense  has  become  obsolete. 

Thus,  “ edify  ” # in  its  primary  sense  of  “ build  up”  1 is 
disused,  and  the  origin  of  it  often  forgotten  ; although  the 
substantive  “ edifice  ” remains  in  common  use  in  a corre- 
sponding sense. 

When  ' however  we  speak  of  “ weighing  ” the  reasons 
on  both  sides, — of  “ seeing,”  or  “ feeling”  the  force  of  an 
argument,  — “imprinting”  any  thing  on  the  memory,  &c.  wo 
are  aware  of  these  words  being  used  analogically. 

In  all  these  cases  (of  this  3d  head)  one  of  the 

meanings  of  the  word  is  called  by  Logicians  Primary 

...  . , , and  secondary 

proper,  i.  e.  original  or  primary ; the  other  an- 
r 1 J ° 1 J 7 senses, 

proper , secondary,  or  transferred ; thus,  sweet 
is  originally  and  properly  applied  to  tastes;  secondarily  and 
improperly  ( i . e.  by  analogy)  to  sounds  ; thus  also  dove-tail  is 
applied  secondarily  (though  not  by  analogy,  but  by  direct  re 
semblance)  to  the  contrivance  in  building  so  called. 

When  the  secondary  meaning  of  a word  is  founded  on  sons 
fanciful  analogy,  and  especially  when  it  is  introduced  for 
ornament’s  sake,  we  call  this  a metaphor  , as  when  we  speak 
nf  “ a ship’s  ploughing  the  deep  ; ” the  turning  up  of  the 


• See  l Peter  ii.  5. 

18 


t See  Johnson  s Dictionary 


806 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  III 


surface  being  essential  indeed  to  the  plougn,  but  aceiden 
tal  only  to  the  ship.  But  if  the  analogy  be  a more  important 
and  essential  one,  and  especially  if  we  have  no  other  word 
to  express  our  meaning  but  this  transferred  one,  we  then  call 
it  merely  an  analogous  word  (though  the  metaphor  is  analo« 
gous  also)  e.  g.  one  would  hardly  call  it  metaphorical  or  fig- 
urative language  to  speak  of  the  “ leg  of  a table,”  or  “ mouth 
of  a river.”  * 

There  are  two  kinds  of  error,  each  very  common  — which 
lead  to  confusion  of  thought  in  our  use  of  analogical  words  : 

i.  The  error  of  supposing  the  things  themselves  to  be  simi- 
lar,  from  their  having  similar  relations  to  other  things. 

ii.  The  still  commoner  error  of  supposing  the  Analogy  to 
extend  further  than  it  does  ; [or,  to  be  more  complete  than  it 
really  is ;]  from  not  considering  in  what  the  Analogy  in  each 
case  consists. 

For  instance,  the  “ Servants  ” that  we  read  of  in  the  Bible, 
and  in  other  translations  of  ancient  books,  are  so  called  by 
Analogy  to  servants  among  us  : and  that  Analogy  consists  in 
the  offices  which  a “ servant  ” performs,  in  waiting  on  his 
master,  and  doing  his  bidding.  It  is  in  this  respect  that  the 
one  description  of  “ servant”  “ corresponds  ” [“  answers  ”]  to 
the  other.  And  hence  some  persons  have  been  led  to  apply 
all  that  is  said  in  Scripture  respecting  Masters  and  Servants 
to  these  times,  and  this  Country  : forgetting  that  the  Analogy 
is  not  complete,  and  extends  no  further  than  the  point  above- 
mentioned.  For  the  ancient  “ servants  ” (except  when  ex- 
pressly spoken  of  as  /tz'rerf-servants)  were  Slaves  ; a part  of 
the  Master’s  possessions. 


* See  Bp.  Copleston’s  account  of  Analogy  in  the  notos  to  hi* 
‘ Four  Discourses.” 


10.1 


OF  FALLACIES. 


20? 


4thlv.  Several  things  may  be  called  by  the 

same  name  (though  they  have  no  connection  of  Connection 
, , „ of  time  or 

resemblance  or  analogy)  from  being  connected  ^ 

by  vicinity  of  time  or  place  ; under  which  head 
will  come  the  connection  of  cause  and  effect , or  of  part  and 
whole,  Sfc.;  and  the  transference  of  words  in  this  way  from 
the  primary  to  a secondary  meaning,  is  what  Grammarians 
cal  Metonymy.  Thus,  a door  signifies  both  an  opening  in 
the  wall  (more  strictly  called  the  door-way ) and  a board  which 
closes  it ; which  are  things  neither  similar  nor  analogous 
When  1 say,  “ the  rose  smells  sweet ; ” and  “ I smell  the 
rose  ; ” the  word  “ smell  ” has  two  meanings : in  the  latter 
sentence,  I am  speaking  of  a certain  sensation  in  my 
own  mind  ; in  the  former,  of  a certain  quality  in  the  flower, 
which  produces  that  sensation,  but  which  of  course  cannot  in 
the  least  resemble  it ; and  here  the  word  smell  is  applied  with 
equal  propriety  to  both.  On  this  ambiguity  have  been  founded 
the  striking  paradoxes  of  those  who  have  maintained  that 
there  is  no  heat  in  fire,  no  cold  in  ice,  fyc.  The  sensations  of 
heat,  cold,  Sfc.  can  of  course  only  belong  to  a Sentient  Being. 
Thus  again  the  word  “ certainty,”  denotes  either,  primarily, 
the  state  of  our  own  mind  when  we  are  free  from  doubt,  or 
secondarily,  the  character  of  the  event  about  which  we  feel 
certain.  [See  Appendix,  No.  I.]  Thus,  we  speak  of  Homer, 
for  “ the  works  of  Homer  ; ” and  this  is  a secondary  or  trans- 
ferred meaning  : and  so  it  is  when  we  say,  “ a good  shot,” 
for  a good  marksman  : but  the  word  “ shot  ” has  two  other 
meanings,  which  are  both  equally  proper ; viz.  the  thing  put 
into  a gun  in  order  to  be  discharged  from  it,  and  the  act  of 
discharging  it. 

Thus  “ learning  ” signifies  either  the  act  of  acquiring 
knowledge,  or  the  knowledge  itself ; e.  g.  “ he  neglects  his 


208 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 


[Boor  III 


teaming;”  “ Johnson  was  a man  of  learning.’'  “ Posset* 
sion”  is  ambiguous  in  the  same  manner;  and  a mutfftude  ot 
others.  A remarkable  and  most  important  instance  is  tha 
ambiguity  of  such  words  as  “ same ,”  “ one,”  &c.  (See  tha 
Articles  on  those  words  in  Appendix,  and  also  Book  IV.  Ch, 
v.  § 1 & 2.) 

Much  confusion  often  arises  from  ambiguity  of  this  kind, 
when  unperceived  ; nor  is  there  any  point  in  which  the  copi- 
ousness and  consequent  precision  oc  the  Greek  language,  is 
more  to  be  admired  than  in  its  distinct  terms  for  expressing 
an  act,  and  the  result  of  that  act ; e.  g.  nyaS.iq,  “ the  doing 
of  any  thing;”  nyaypa,  the  “thing  done;”  so,  doacg  and 
Sugar  — L]tpig  and  h]ppu,  fyc. 

It  will  very  often  happen,  that  two  of  the  meanings  of  a 
word  will  have  no  connection  with  one  another,  but  will  each 
have  some  connection  with  the  third.  Thus,  “ martyr”  origi- 
nally signified  a witness ; thence  it  was  applied  to  those  whe 
suffered  in  bearing  testimony  to  Christianity ; and  thence 
again  it  is  often  applied  to  “ sufferers”  in  general  : the  first 
and  third  significations  are  not  the  least  connected.  Thus 
'•'■post  ” signifies  originally  a pillar,  ( postum , from  pono ) then, 
a distance  marked  out  by  posts  ; and  then,  the  carriages, 
messengers,  &yc.  that  travelled  over  this  distance.  Thus 
“ Clerk,”  originally  one  in  Holy  Orders,  came  to  be  used  as 
it  is  at  present,  from  the  “Clergy”  having  been,  during  the 
dark  Ages,  almost  the  only  persons  who  could  read. 

It  would  puzzle  any  one,  proceeding  on  mere  conjecture, 
to  make  out  how  the  word  “ premises  ” should  have  come  to 
signify  “ a building.” 

Ambiguities  of  this  kind  belong  practically  to  the  first 
head  : there  being  no  perceived  connection  between  tha 
different  senses. 


OF  FALLACIES 


20$ 


1 10.] 

Another  source  of  practical  ambiguity  (as  has  been  just 
observed)  “ is,  that,  in  respect  of  any  subject 

Elliptical 

concerning  which  the  generality  of  men  are  ac-  , 

c J language. 

custoined  to  speak  much  and  familiarly,  in  their 
conversation  relative  to  that,  they  usually  introduce  ellipticai 
expressions  ; very  clearly  understood  in  the  outset,  but  whose 
elliptical  character  comes,  in  time,  to  be  so  far  lost  sight  of, 
that  confusion  of  language,  and  thence,  of  thought,  is  some- 
times the  result.  Thus,  the  expression  of  a person’s  possessing 
a fortune  of  10,000Z.  is  an  elliptical  phrase  : meaning,  at  full 
length,  that  all  his  property  if  sold  would  exchange  for  that 
sum  of  money.  And  in  ninety-nine  instances  out  of  a hun 
dred,  no  error  or  confusion  of  thought  arises  from  this  lan- 
guage ; but  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  mainly  contributed  tc 
introduce  and  foster  the  notion  that  Wealth  consists  especially 
of  gold  and  silver  (these  being  used  to  measure  and  express 
its  amount ;)  and  that  the  sure  way  to  enrich  a country  is  ta 
promote  the  importation,  and  prevent  the  export,  of  the  pre- 
cious metals  ; with  all  the  other  absurdities  of  what  is  com 
monly  called  ‘ the  mercantile  System.’  So  also  we  speak 
commonly  of  ‘ the  example  of  such  a one’s  punishment  serv- 
ing to  deter  others  from  crime.’  And  usually,  no  misappre- 
hension results  from  this,  which  is,  in  truth,  an  elliptical 
expression.  But  sometimes  sophistical  reasoners  take  advan- 
tage of  it,  and  men  who  are  rot  clear-headed  are  led  into 
confusion  of  thought.  Strictly  speaking,  what  deters  a man 
from  crime  in  such  cases  as  those  alluded  to,  is,  the  appre- 
hension of  himself  suffering  punishment.  That  apprehension 
may  be  excited  by  the  example  of  another’s  being  punished ; 
or  it  may  be  excited  without  that  example,  if  punishment  be 
denounced,  and  there  is  good  reason  to  expect  that  the  threat 
will  not  be  an  empty  one.  And  on  tl  ^ other  hand,  ;ha 


210 


ELEMENTS  OE  LOGIC. 


[Book  111 


example  of  others’  suffering  punishment  does  not  deter  any 
one,  if  it  fail  to  excite  this  apprehension  for  himself;  if 
for  instance  he  consider  himself  as  an  exempt  person,  as  is 
the  case  with  a despot  in  barbarian  countries,  or  with  a mad 
man  who  expects  to  be  acquitted  on  the  plea  of  insanity. 

“ Again,  when  a man  complains  of  being  ‘ out  of  work' — 
is  ‘ looking  out  for  employment,’  — and  hopes  for  subsistence 
by  labor,  this  is  elliptical  language ; well  enough  understood 
in  general.  We  know  that  what  man  lives  on,  is  food  ; and 
that  he  who  is  said  to  be  looking  out  for  work,  is  in  want  of 
food  and  other  necessaries,  which  he  hopes  to  procure  in  ex- 
change for  his  labor,  and  has  no  hope  of  obtaining  without  it. 
But  there  is  no  doubt  that  this  elliptical  language  has  contrib- 
uted to  lead  those  who  were  not  attentive  to  the  character  of 
the  expression,  to  regard  every  thing  as  beneficial  to  the 
laboring  classes  which  furnishes  employment , i.  e.  gives 
trouble  ; even  though  no  consequent  increase  should  take  place 
in  the  Country,  of  the  food  and  other  commodities  destined 
for  their  support.”  * A snow-drift  which  obstructs  a road, 
and  a vein  of  valuable  ore,  may  conceivably  each  furnish  em- 
ployment for  an  equal  number  of  laborers. 

The  remedy  for  ambiguity  is  a Definition  of  the  Term 
which  is  suspected  of  being  used  in  two  senses ; viz.  a Nomi- 
nal!,  not  necessarily  a Real  Definition:  as  was  remarked  in 
Book  II.  Chap.  v. 


ployed  that  are  not  familiarly  introduced  into  ordinary  dis 


Definition 
when  most 
needed. 


It  is  important  to  observe  that  the  very  cir- 
cumstance which  in  any  case  “ makes  a defini- 
tion the  more  necessary,  is  apt  to  lead  to  the 
omission  of  it : for  when  any  terms  are  em< 


* Pol.  Econ.  Lect.  IX. 


OF  FALLACIES 


211 


10  j 

Bourse,  such  as  ‘ parallelogram,’  or  ‘ sphere,’  or  ‘ tangent, 
pencil  of  rays,’  or  ‘refraction,’  — ‘oxygen,’  or  ‘alkali,’ — . 
the  learner  is  ready  to  inquire,  and  the  writer  to  anticipate 
the  inquiry,  what  is  meant  by  this  or  that  term?  And 
though  in  such  cases  it  is  undoubtedly  a correct  procedure 
to  answer  this  inquiry  by  a definition,  yet  of  the  two 
cases,  a definition  is  even  more  necessary  in  the  other, 
where  it  is  not  so  likely  to  be  called  for;  — where  the 
word,  not  being  new  to  the  student,  but  familiar  to  his  ear, 
from  its  employment  in  every-day  discourse,  is  liable  to  the 
ambiguity  which  is  almost  always  the  result.  For  in  respect 
of  words  that  sound  something  new  and  strange,  though  it  is, 
as  I have  said,  much  better  to  define  them  in  the  outset, 
yet  even  without  this,  the  student  would  gradually  collect 
their  meaning  pretty  correctly  as  he  proceeded  in  his  study 
of  any  treatise;  from  having  nothing  to  mislead  him, — • 
nothing  from  which  to  form  his  notions  at  all,  except  the 
manner  in  which  the  terms  were  employed  in  the  work  itself 
that  is  before  him.  And  the  very  desire  he  had  felt  of  a 
definition  would  lead  him  in  this  way  to  form  one,  and  gen- 
erally a sufficiently  correct  one,  for  himself.  . 

“ It  is  otherwise  with  terms  to  which  we  are  familiarly 
accustomed  Of  these,  the  student  does  not  usually  crave 
definitions,  from  supposing,  for  that  reason,  that  he  understands 
them  well  enough:  though  perhaps  (without  suspecting  it) 
he  has  in  reality  been  accustomed  to  hear  them  employed  in 
various  senses,  and  to  attach  but  a vague  and  inaccurate  notion 
to  them.  If  you  speak  to  an  uninstructed  hearer,  of  anything 
that  is  spherical,  or  circular , or  cylindrical , he  will  probably 
beg  for  an  explanation  of  your  meaning  ; but  if  you  tell  him 
of  any  thing  that  is  round , it  will  not  strike  him  that  any  ex- 
Dlanatic.  is  needed  : though  he  has  been  accustomed  ‘a 


212 


uLEifiiiNTS  OF  I/'GIC. 


[Be  * III 


employ  the  word,  indiscriminately,  in  all  the  senses  denoted 
by  the  otner  three.”  # 

Definitions,  ^ut  here  may  be  proper  to  remark, t thai 
how  fxr  to  be  for  the  avoiding  of  Fallacy  or  of  Verbal-con- 
troversy, it  is  only  requisite  that  the  term  should 
be  employed  uniformly  in  the  same  sense,  as  far  as  the  existing 
question  is  concerned.  Thus,  two  persons  might,  in  discussing 
the  question  whether  Augustus  was  a great  man,  have  some 
such  difference  in  their  acceptation  of  the  epithet  “ great,” 
as  would  be  non-essential  to  that  question ; e.  g.  one  of  them 
might  understand  by  it  nothing  more  than  eminent  intellectual 
and  moral  qualities  ; while  the  other  might  conceive  it  to  im- 
ply the  performance  of  splendid  actions  : this  abstract  differ- 
ence of  meaning  would  not  produce  any  disagreement  in  the 
existing  question,  because  both  those  circumstances  are  united 
in  the  case  of  Augustus ; but  if  one  (and  not  the  other)  of 
the  parties  understood  the  epithet  “ great  ” to  imply  pure  pa- 
triotism, — generosity  of  character,  fyc.,  then  there  would  be 
a disagreement  as  to  the  application  of  the  Term,  even  be- 
tween those  who  might  think  alike  of  Augustus’s  character, 
as  wanting  in  those  qualities. \ Definition,  the  specific  for 
ambiguity,  is  to  be  employed,  and  demanded,  with  a view  to 
this  principle  ; it  is  sufficient  on  each  occasion  to  define  a 
Term  as  far  as  regards  the  question  in  hand. 

If,  for  example,  we  were  remonstrating  with  any  one  far 
quitting  the  church  of  which  he  was  a member,  wantonly,  and 
not  from  strong  and  deliberate  conscientious  conviction,  bu« 
from  motives  of  taste  or  fancy,  and  he  were  to  reply  by  ask« 
mg,  how  do  you  define  a Church  ? the  demand  would  be  quite 


* Pol.  Econ  Lect.  IX.  t See  Book  II.  Ch.  v.  j 6. 

X See  Book  iv.  Ch.  4 $ 1. 


OF  FALLACIES. 


213 


511.1 

irrelevant,  unless  he  meant  to  deny  that  the  Community  he 
quits  is  a Ch  urch.  But  if  we  were  to  insist  on  designating 
any  one  religious-community  on  earth  to  which  we  might 
belong,  as  the  universal  or  Catholic  Church, — in  demand- 
ing from  all  Christians  submission  to  its  ordinances  and 
decisions,  and  denouncing  all  who  should  not  belong  to  it, 
as  being  out  of  the  pale  of  Christ’s  Church,  then  indeed 
we  might  fairly  be  called  on  to  give  a definition,  and  one 
which  should  be  consistent  with  facts.* 

§ 11- 

Of  those  cases  where  the  ambiguity  arises  f rom  the  con- 
text, there  are  several  species  ; some  of  which  Logicians 
have  enumerated,  but  have  neglected  to  refer  them,  in  the 
first  place,  to  one  common  class  (viz.  the  one  under  which 
they  are  here  placed ;)  and  have  even  arranged  soma 
under  the  head  of  Fallacies  “in  dictione,"  and  others 
under  that  of  “ extra  dictionem.” 

We  may  consider,  as  the  first  of  these  spe- 
cies, the  Fallacy  of  “ Division”  and  that  of  Fallacy  of 
. . , Division  am 

“ Composition,”  taken  together;  since  in  each  Composition. 

of  these  the  Middle-term  is  used  in  one  Premiss. 
collectively,  in  the  other,  distributive ly : if  the  former  of 
these  is  the  major  Premiss,  and  the  latter,  the  minor,  this  ii 
called  the  “Fallacy  of  Division;”  the  Term  which  is  first 
taken  collectively  being  afterwards  divided;  and  nice  versd. 
The  ordinary  examples  are  such  as  these:  “All  the  angles 
of  a triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles.  A B C is  an  angle 


See  Appendix,  Article  “Truth.’ 


214 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Boa  III 


of  a tiiungle  ; therefore  A B C is  equal  to  two  right  angles.” 
“ Five  is  oue  number ; three  and  two  are  five  : therefore 
three  and  two  are  one  number ; ” or,  “ three  and  two  are  two 
numbers,  five  is  three  and  two,  therefore  five  is  two  num- 
bers : ” it  is  manifest  that  the  Middle-term,  three  and  two 
(in  this  last  example)  is  ambiguous,  signifying,  in  the  lns-jor 
Premiss,  “ taken  distinctly  ; ” in  the  minor,  “ taken  together  : ” 
and  so  of  the  rest. 

To  this  head  may  be  referred  the  common  Fallacy  of 
over-rating,  where  each  premiss  of  an  argument  is  only 
probable,  the  probability  of  the  conclusion  ; which,  in  that 
case,  is  less  than  that  of  the  less  probable  of  the  premisses.* 

6 

For,  suppose  the  probability  of  one  of  these  to  be  — , and 
7 

of  the  other  — (each  more  likely  than  not)  the  probability  of 

42  2 

the  conclusion  will  be  only  — - ora  little  more  than  - ; which 

luU  o 

is  less  than  an  even  chance.  This  Fallacy  may  be  most  easi- 
ly stated  as  a conditional ; a form  in  which  any  Fallacy  of 
ambiguous  middle  may  easily  be  exhibited.  E.  G.  “ If  it  is 


* See  below,  § 14.  Some  persons  profess  contempt  for  all  such 
calculations,  on  the  ground  that  we  cannot  be  quite  sure  of  the  exact 
degree  of  probability  of  each  premiss.  And  this  is  true ; but  this  un- 
avoidable uncertainty  is  no  reason  why  we  shall  not  guard  against  an 
additional  source  of  uncertainty  which  can  be  avoided.  It  is  some 
advantage  to  have  no  more  doubt  as  to  the  degree  of  probability  of  the 
Conclusion,  than  we  have  respecting  that  of  the  premisses. 

And  in  fact  there  are  Offices,  kept  by  persons  whose  trade  it  is, 
in  which  calculations  of  this  nature  are  made,  in  the  purchase  of  con- 
tingent reversions,  depending,  sometimes,  on  a great  variety  of  risks, 
which  can  only  be  conjecturally  estimated  ; and  in  Insurances,  not 
only  against  ordinary  risks  (the  calculations  of  which  are  to  be  drawn 
from  Statistical-tables)  but  also  against  every  variety  and  degree  of 
p xttaordinarg  risk  ; the  exact  amount  of  which,  no  one  can  confidently 
oronounce  upon.  But  the  calculations  are  based  on  the  best  estimate 
chat  can  be  formed. 


OF  FALLACIES. 


215 


» 1*1 

more  likely  than  not,  that  these  premisses  are  true:  (i.  e.  thas 
they  are  both  true)  it  is  more  likely  than  not,  that  the  conclu- 
sion is  true  : but  it  is  more  likely  than  not  that  the  premisses 
are  true  : (i.  e.  that  each  of  them  is  so)  therefore  it  is  more 
likely  than  not  that  the  conclusion  is  true.”  Here,  a term  in 
the  antecedent,  viz.  — “ that  the  premisses  are  more  likely  than 
not  to  be  true  ” — is  taken  jointly  in  the  Major,  and  dividedly 
in  the  Minor. 

To  the  same  class  we  may  refer  the  Fallacy  by  wnich  men 
have  sometimes  been  led  to  admit,  or  pretend  to  admit,  the 
doctrine  of  Necessity  ; e.  g.  “ he  who  necessarily  goes  or 
stays  ( i . e.  in  reality,  6 who  necessarily  goes , or  who  necessa- 
rily stays  ’)  is  not  a free  agent ; you  must  necessarily  go  or 
stay  (i.  e.  ‘ you  must  necessarily  take  the  alternative  ’),  there- 
fore you  are  not  a free  agent.”  Such  also  is  the  Fallacy 
which  probably  operates  on  most  adventurers  in  lotteries  ; e.  g. 
“ the  gaining  of  a high  prize  is  no  uncommon  occurrence ; 
and  what  is  no  uncommon  occurrence  may  reasonably  be 
expected  ; therefore  the  gaining  of  a high  prize  may  reason- 
ably be  expected  ; ” the  Conclusion,  when  applied  to  the  in- 
dividual (as  in  practice  it  is),  must  be  understood  in  the  sense 
of  “ reasonably  expected  by  a certain  individual ; ” therefore 
for  the  Major-Premiss  to  be  true,  the  middle-Term  must  be 
understood  to  mean,  “ no  uncommon  occurrence  to  some  one 
•particular  person  ; ” whereas  for  the  Minor  (which  has  been 
placed  first)  to  be  true,  you  must  understand  it  of  “ no  un- 
:ommon  occurrence  to  some  one  or  other ; ” and  thus  you  will 
lave  the  Fallacy  of  Composition. 

There  is  no  Fallacy  more  common,  or  more  likely  to 
deceive,  than  the  one  now  before  us.  The  form  in  which  it 
s most  usually  employed,  is  to  establish  some  truth,  separate- 
y,  concerning  each  single  member  of  a certain  class,  and 


B16 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book.  Ill 


thence  to  infer  the  same  of  the  whole  collectively.  Thus, 
some  infidels  have  labored  to  prove  concerning  some  one  of 
our  Lord’s  miracles,  that  it  might  have  been  the  result  of  an 
accidental  conjuncture  of  natural  circumstances;  next,  they 
endeavor  to  prove  the  same  concerning  another;  and  so  on  ; 
and  thence  infer  that  all  of  them  occurring  as  a series  might 
have  been  so.  They  might  argue  in  like  manner,  that 
because  it  is  not  very  improbable  one  may  throw  sixes  in 
any  one  out  of  a hundred  throws,  therefore  it  is  no  more 
improbable  that  one  may  throw  sixes  a hundred  times  run- 
ning. 


disguised  by  a rapid  and  frequent  transition  from  the  one  to  the 
other  alternately.  E.  G.  You  may  prove  that  I00Z.  would 
accomplish  this  object ; and  then,  that  it  would  accomplish 
that:  and  then,  you  recur  to  the  former;  and  back  again: 
till  at  length  a notion  is  generated  of  the  possibility  of  accom- 
plishing hath  by  this  100/.  “Two  distinct  objects  may,  by 
being  dexterously  presented,  again  and  again  in  quick  suc- 
cession, to  the  mind  of  a cursory  reader,  be  so  associated 
together  in  his  thoughts , as  to  be  conceived  capable,  when  in 
fact  they  are  not,  of  being  actually  combined  in  practice. 
The  fallacious  belief  thus  induced  bears  a striking  resemolance 
(o  the  optical  illusion  effected  by  that  ingenious  and  philosophi- 
cal toy  called  the  Thaumatrope  ; in  which  two  objects  painted 
cn  opposite  sides  of  a card,  — for  instance  a man,  and  a 
horse,  — a bird,  and  a cage,  — are,  by  a quick  rotatory  motion, 
made  to  impress  the  eye  in  combination,  so  as  to  form  one 
nicture,  of  the  man  on  the  horse’s  back,  the  bird  in  the  cage 
&■:  As  soon  as  the  card  is  allowed  to  remain  at  rest,  the 


Thaumatrope- 

fallacy. 


It  will  often  happen  that  when  two  objects 
are  incompatible , though  either  of  them,  sepa- 
rately, may  be  attained,  the  incompatibility  is 


» H-l 


OF  FALLACIES. 


217 


figures,  of  course,  appear  as  they  really  are,  separate  and  on 
opposite  sides.  A mental  illusion  closely  analogous  to  this,  is 
produced,  when  by  a rapid  and  repeated  transition  from  one 
subject  to  another  alternately,  the  mind  is  deluded  into  an  idea 
of  the  actual  combination  of  things  that  are  really  incompati 
ble.  The  chief  part  of  the  defence  which  various  writers 
nave  advanced  in  favor  of  the  system  of  Penal-Colonies , con- 
sists, in  truth,  of  a sort  of  intellectual  Thaumatrope.  The 
prosperity  of  the  Colony , and  the  repression  of  crime , are,  by 
a sort  of  rapid  whirl,  presented  to  the  mind  as  combined  in 
one  picture.  A very  moderate  degree  of  calm  and  fixed 
attention  soon  shows  that  the  two  objects  are  painted  on  oppo- 
site sides  of  the  card.”  * 

The  Fallacy  of  Division  may  often  be  consid-  Ambiguity 
ered  as  turning  on  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  of  the  word 
“all;”  which  may  easily  be  dispelled  by  sub-  “ AlL 
stituting  for  it  the  word  “ each  ” or  “ every,”  where  that  is  its 
signification;  e.  g.  “ all  these  trees  make  a thick  shade,”  is 
ambiguous  ; meaning,  either,  “ every  one  of  them,”  or  “ all 
together.” 

This  is  a Fallacy  with  which  men  are  extremely  apt  to  de- 
ceive themselves  : for  when  a multitude  of  particulars  are  pre- 
sented to  the  mind,  many  are  too  weak  or  too  indolent  to  take, 
a comprehensive  view  of  them  ; but  confine  their  attention 
to  each  single  point,  by  turns  ; and  then  decide,  infer,  and  act 
accordingly  ; e.  g.  the  imprudent  spendthrift,  finding  that  he 
is  able  to  afford  this,  or  that,  or  the  other  expense,  forgets  that 
all  of  them  together  will  ruin  him. 

To  the  same  head  maybe  reduced  that  fallacious  reasoning 
by  which  men  vindicate  themselves  to  their  own  conscience 


* Remarks  on  Transportation,  pp.  25,  26. 
1*1 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  IT) 


fcl.8 


and  to  ox\ttA,  fur  the  neglect  of  those  undefined  duties,  whicfi 
though  indispensable,  and  therefore  not  left  to  our  choica 
whether  we  will  practise  them  or  not,  are  left  to  our  discretion 
as  to  the  mode , and  the  particular  occasions,  of  practising 
them  ; e.  g.  “ I am  not  bound  to  contribute  to  this  charitj  in 
particular ; nor  to  that ; nor  to  the  other : ” the  practical 
conclusion  which  they  draw,  is,  that  all  charity  may  be  dis- 
pensed with. 

As  men  are  apt  to  forget  that  any  two  circumstances  (not 
naturally  connected)  are  more  rarely  to  be  met  with  com- 
bined than  separate,  *hough  they  he  not  at  all  incompatible , 
so  also  they  are  apt  to  imagine,  from  finding  that  they  are 
rarely  combined,  tha.  there  is  an  incompatibility  ; e.  g.  if  the 
chances  are  ten  to  one  against  a man’s  possessing  strong  rea- 
soning powers,  and  ten  to  one  against  exquisite  taste,  the 
chances  against  the  combination  of  the  two  (supposing  them 
neither  connected  nor  opposed)  will  be  a hundred  to  one. 
Many,  therefore,  from  finding  them  so  rarely  united,  will  infer 
that  they  are  in  some  measure  incompatible  ; which  Fallacy 
may  easily  be  exposed  in  the  form  of  Undistributed  middle  : 
“ qualities  unfriendly  to  each  other  are  rarely  combined  ; ex 
cellence  in  the  reasoning  powers,  and  in  taste,  are  rarely 
combined  ; therefore  they  are  qualities  unfriendly  to  each 
other.” 


§ 12. 


Fallacia 

accidentis, 

iccidentis  ; ' 


The  other  kind  of  ambiguity  arising  from  the 
context,  and  which  is  the  last  case  of  Aml  igu* 
ous  middle  that  I shall  notice,  is  the  '■'•fallacia 
together  with  its  converse,  '■'•fallacia  a dicta 


tecundum  quid  ad  dictum  simpliciter  ; ” in  each  of  w hieh  th« 


OF  FALLACIES. 


219 


« 12.J 

Middle-Term  is  used,  in  one  Premiss  to  signify  something  con- 
sidered simply,  in  itself,  and  as  to  its  essence  ; and  in  the 
other  Premiss,  so  as  to  imply  that  its  Accidents  are  taken  into 
account  with  it : as  in  the  well-known  example,  “ what  » 
bought  in  the  market  is  eaten  ; raw  meat  is  bought  in  the 
market ; therefore  raw  meat  is  eaten.”  Here  the  Middle  has 
understood  in  conjunction  with  it,  in  the  Major-Premiss,  “ as  to 
its  substance  merely  : ” in  the  Minor,  “ as  to  its  condition  and 
circumstances .” 

To  this  head,  perhaps,  as  well  as  to  any,  may  be  referred 
the  Fallacies  which  are  frequently  founded  on  the  occasional, 
partial,  and  temporary  variations  in  the  acceptation  of  some 
Term,  arising  from  circumstances  of  person,  time,  and  place, 
which  will  occasion  something  to  be  understood  in  conjunction 
with  it  beyond  its  strict  literal  signification.  E.  G.  The  word 
“loyalty,”  which  properly  denotes  attachment  to. lawful  gov- 
ernment,— whether  of  a king,  president,  senate,  fyc.,  accord- 
ing to  the  respective  institutions  of  each  nation,  — has  often 
been  used  to  signify  exclusively,  attachment  to  regal  author- 
ity ; and  that,  even  when  carried  beyond  the  boundaries  of 
law.  So,  “reforrher”  has  sometimes  been  limited  to  the 
protestant  reformers  of  religion ; sometimes,  to  the  advocates 
of  some  particular  parliamentary  reform,  Sj-c.  And  whenever 
any  phrase  of  this  kind  has  become  a kind  of  watch-word  or 
gathering-cry  of  a party,  the  employment  of  it  would  corn 
monly  imply  certain  sentiments  not  literally  expressed  by  the 
words.  To  assume  therefore  that  one  is  friendly  or  unfriendly 
to  “ Loyalty  ” or  to  “ Reform  ” in  one  sense,  because  he  has 
declared  himself  friendly  or  unfriendly  to  it  in  another  sense, 
when  implying  and  connected  with  such  and  such  other  senti- 
ments, is  a Fallacy,  such  as  may  fairly  be  referred  to  m* 
present  head. 


220 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 


[Book  III. 


§ 13. 

On  the  non-logical  (or  material)  Fallacies  : and  first,  of 
k*  begging  the  question  ; 11  Petitio  Principii. 

The  indistinct  and  unphilosophical  accounl 

Begging  the  bas  been  given  by  Logical  writers  of  the 

question. 

Fallacy  of  '■'■non  causa,"  and  that  of  ‘•'■petitio 
prxncipii makes  it  very  difficult  to  ascertain  wherein  they 
conceived  them  to  differ,  and  what  they  understood  to  be  the 
distinctive  character  of  each.  I shall  not  therefore  undertake 
to  conform  exactly  to  their  language,  but  merely  to  express 
myself  distinctly,  without  departing  more  than  is  necessary 
for  that  purpose,  from  established  usage. 

Let  the  name  then  of  “ petitio  principii  ” ( begging  the  ques- 
tion) be  confined  to  those  cases  in  which  one  of  the  Premisses 
either  is  manifestly  the  same  in  sense  with  the  Conclusion,  or 
is  actually  proved  from  it,  or  is  such  as  the  persons  you  are 
addressing*  are  not  likely  to  know,  or  to  admit,  except  as  an 
inference  from  the  Conclusion  : as,  e.  g.  if  any  one  should 
infer  the  authenticity  of  a certain  history,  from  its  recording 
such  and  such  facts,  the  reality  of  which  rests  on  the  evidence 
of  that  history. 

All  other  cases  in  which  a Premiss  (whether  the  ex 
pressed  or  the  suppressed  one)  has  no  sufficient  claim  to  be 
admitted,  I shall  designate  as  the  “ Fallacy  of  undue  assump- 
tion of  a Premiss.” 

Let  it  however  be  observed,  that  in  such  cases  (apparently) 
as  this,  we  must  not  too  hasti  y pronounce  the  argument  falla- 
cious ; for  it  may  be  perfect'  y fair  at  the  commencement  of  an 


* For  of  two  propositions,  the  one  may  be  the  more  evident  ta 
jome,  and  the  ether,  to  others. 


»•] 


OF  FALLACIES. 


22 : 

argument  to  assume  a Piemiss  that  is  not  more  evident  than 
the  Conclusion,  or  is  even  ever  so  paradoxical,  provided  you 
proceed  to  prove  fairly  that  Premiss  ; and  in  like  manner  it  is 
both  usual  and  fair  to  begin  by  deducing  your  Conclusion  from 
a Premiss  exactly  equivalent  to  it;  which  is  merely  throwing 
the  proposition  in  question  into  the  form  in  which  it  will  b< 
most  conveniently  proved. 

Arguing  in  a circle,  however,  must  necessa- 
rily be  unfair ; though  it  frequently  is  practised 
undesignedly  ; e.  g.  some  Mechanicians  attempt 
to  prove,  (what  they  ought  to  have  laid  down  as  a probable 
but  doubtful  hypothesis,)  that  every  particle  of  matter  gravi- 
tates equally  ; “ why  ? ” because  those  bodies  which  contain 
more  particles  ever  gravitate  more  strongly,  i.  e.  are  heavier  : 
“ but  (it  may  be  urged)  those  which  are  heaviest  are  not 
always  more  bulky  ; ” “ no,  but  still  they  contain  more  parti- 
cles, though  more  closely  condensed  ; ” “ how  do  you  know 
that  ? ” “ because  they  are  heavier ; ” “ how  does  that  prove 
it  ? ” ‘ because  all  particles  of  matter  gravitating  equally, 
that  mass  which  is  specifically  the  heavier  must  needs  have 
the  more  of  them  in  the  same  space.” 

Of  course  the  narrower  the  Circle,  the  less  likely  it  is  to 
escape  the  detection,  either  of  the  reasoner  himself,  (for  men 
often  deceive  themselves  in  this  way)  or  of  his  hearers.  When 
there  is  a long  circuit  of  many  intervening  propositions  before 
you  come  back  to  the  original  Conclusion,  it  will  often  not  be 
perceived  that  the  arguments  really  do  proceed  in  a “ Circle  : ” 
just  as  when  any  one  is  advancing  in  "a  straight  lint  (as  we 
are  accustomed  to  call  it)  along  a plain  on  this  Earth’s  sur- 
face, it  escapes  our  notice  that  we  are  really  moving  along 
the  circumference  of  a Circle , (since  the  earth  is  a globe)  and 
that  if  we  could  go  on  without  interruption  in  the  same  line, 
19* 


B22 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  III 


we  should  at  length  arrive  at  the  very  spot  we  set  out  from. 
But  this  we  readily  perceive  when  we  are  walking  round  a 
small  hill. 

For  instance,  if  any  one  argues  that  you  ought  to  submit  to 
the  guidance  of  himself,  or  his  leader,  or  his  party,  &c.  be- 
cause these  maintain  what  is  right ; and  then  argues  that  what 
is  so  maintained  is  right,  because  it  is  maintained  by  persons 
whom  you  ought  to  submit  to  ; and  that  these  are,  himself  and 
his  party  ; or  again,  if  any  one  maintains  that  so  and  so  must 
be  a thing  morally  wrong,  because  it  is  prohibited  in  the  moral 
portion  of  the  Mosaic-law,  and  then,  that  the  prohibition  of  it 
does  form  a part  of  the  moral  (not  the  ceremonial,  or  the 
civil)  portion  of  that  Law,  because  it  is  a thing  morally  iorong , 
• — either  of  these  would  be  too  narrow  a Circle  to  escape 
detection,  unless  several  intermediate  steps  were  interposed 
And  if  the  form  of  expression  of  each  proposition  be  varied 
every  time  it  recurs,  — the  sense  of  it  remaining  the  same, — ■ 
this  will  greatly  aid  the  deception. 

Of  course,  the  way  to  expose  the  Fallacy,  is  to  reverse  this 
procedure  : to  narrow  the  Circle,  by  cutting  off  the  interme- 
diate steps;  and  to  exhibit  the  same  proposition,  — when  it 
comes  round  the  second  time,  — in  the  same  words. 


general  either  have  recourse  to  the  “ Circle,”  or  eise  not  ven- 
ture to  state  distinctly  his  assumption  of  the  point  in  question 
but  will  rather  assert  some  other  proposition  which  implis » 
it;*  thus  keeping  out  of  sight  (as  a dexterous  thief  does 

* Gibbon  affords  the  most  remarkable  instances  of  this  kind  of 
ityle.  That  which  he  really  means  to  speak  of  is  hardly  ever  mada 
the  Subject  of  his  Proposition.  His  way  of  writing  reminds  one  of 
those  persons  who  never  dare  look  you  full  in  the  face. 


Obliquity  of 
expression. 


Obliquity  and  disguise  being  of  course  most 
important  to  the  success  of  the  pctitio  principii 
as  well  as  of  other  Fallacies,  the  Sophist  will  in 


OF  FALLACIES. 


223 


f 14. 

stolen  goods)  the  point  in  question,  at  the  very  moment  when 
he  is  taking  it  for  granted.  Hence  the  frequent  union  of  this 
Fallacy  with  “ ignoratio  elenchi  : ” [vide  § 15.]  The  Eng. 
lish  language  is  perhaps  the  more  suitable  for  the  Fallacy  of 
petitio  principii , from  its  being  formed  from  two  distinct 
languages,  and  thus  abounding  in  synonymous  expressions, 
which  have  no  resemblance  in  sound,  and  no  connection  in 
etymology  ; so  that  a Sophist  may  bring  forward  a proposition 
expressed  in  words  of  Saxon  origin,  and  give  as  a reason 
it  the  very  same  proposition  stated  in  words  of  Norman  origin ; 
e.  g.  “ to  allow  every  man  an  unbounded  freedom  of  speech 
must  always  be,  on  the  whole,  advantageous  to  the  State  ; for 
it  is  highly  conducive  to  the  interests  of  the  Community,  that 
each  individual  should  enjoy  a liberty  perfectly  unlimited,  of 
expressing  his  sentiments.” 

§ 14. 

The  next  head  is,  the  falsity,  or,  at  least, 

, . Undue  as- 

undue  assumption,  of  a Premiss  that  is  not 

r sumption. 

equivalent  to,  or  dependent  on,  the  Conclusion; 
which,  as  has  been  before  said,  seems  to  correspond  nearly 
with  the  meaning  of  Logicians,  when  they  speak  of  “ non 
causa  pro  causa."  This  name  indeed  would  seem  to  imply  a 
much  narrower  class  : there  being  one  species  of  arguments 
which  are  from  cause  to  effect ; in  which,  of  course,  two 
things  are  necessary  ; 1st,  the  sufficiency  of  he  cause  ; 2d.  its 
establishment ; these  are  the  two  Premisses ; if  therefore  the 
former  be  unduly  assumed,  we  are  arguing  from  that  which 
is  not  a sufficient  cause  as  if  it  were  so : e.  g.  as  if  one 
should  contend  from  such  a man’s  having  been  unjust  or  cruel, 
that  he  will  certainly  be  visited  with  some  leavy  temporal 
judgment,  and  come  to  an  untimely  end.  In  this  instanca 


824 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II 


the  Sophist,  from  having  assumed,  in  the  Premiss,  the  (granted; 
existence  of  a pretended  cause,  infers,  in  the  Conclusion,  the 
existence  of  the  pretended  effect,  which  we  have  supposed  to 
be  the  Question.  Or  vice  versa , the  pretended  effect  may  be 
employed  to  establish  the  cause;  e.  g.  inferring  sinfulness 
from  temporal  calamity.  But  when  both  the  pretended  cause 
and  effect  are  granted,  i.  e.  granted  to  exisi  then  the  Sophist 
will  infer  something  from  their  pretended  connection ; i.  e.  he 
will  assume  as  a Premiss,  that  “of  these  two  admitted  facts 
the  one  is  the  cause  of  the  other : ” as  Whitefield  attributed 
his  being  overtaken  by  a hail-storm  to  his  having  not  preached 
at  the  last  town ; or  as  the  opponents  of  the  Reformation  as- 
sumed  that  it  was  the  cause  of  the  troubles  which  took  place 
at  that  period,  and  thence  inferred  that  it  was  an  evil. 

Many  are  the  cases  in  which  a Sign  (see 

Sign  put  R]lct.  Part  I.)  from  which  one  might  fairly  infet 
for  Cause.  ' J 

a certain  phenomenon,  is  mistaken  for  the  Cause 

of  it:  (as  if  one  should  suppose  the  falling  of  the  mercury 
to  be  a cause  of  rain  ; of  which  it  certainly  is  an  indication) 
whereas  the  fact  will  often  be  the  very  reverse.  E.  G.  a 
great  deal  of  money  in  a country  is  a pretty  sure  proof  of  its 
wealth ; and  thence  has  been  often  regarded  as  the  cause 
of  it ; whereas  in  truth  it  is  an  effect.  The  same,  with  a 
numerous  and  increasing  population.  Again,  The  labor  be- 
stowed on  any  commodity  has  often  been  represented  as  the 
cause  of  its  value  ; though  every  one  would  call  a fine  pearl 
an  article  of  value,  even  though  he  should  meet  with  it  acci- 
dentally in  eating  an  oyster.  Pearls  are  indeed  generally 
obtained  by  laborious  diving  : but  they  do  not  fetch  a high 
price  from  that  cause ; but  on  the  contrary,  men  dive  for 
them  because  they  fetch  a high  price.*  So  also  exposure  te 


* Pol.  Econ.  Leot.  IX.  p.  253. 


14.] 


OF  FALLACIES 


225 


want  and  hardship  in  youth,  has  been  regarded  as  a cause  of 
the  hardy  constitution  of  those  men  and  brutes  which  have 
been  brought  up  in  barren  countries  of  uncongenial  climate. 
Yet  the  most  experienced  cattle-breeders  know  that  animals 
are,  cceteris  paribus,  the  more  hardy  for  having  been  well  fed 
and  sheltered  in  youth  ; but  early  hardships,  by  destroying  all 
the  tender,  insure  the  hardiness  of  the  survivors;  which  is 
the  cause,  not  the  effect,  of  their  having  lived  through  such  a 
training.  So,  loading  a gun-barrel  to  the  muzzle,  an  1 firing 
k,  does  not  give  it  strength  ; though  it  proves , if  it  escape 
that  it  was  strong. 

In  like  manner,  nothing  is  more  common  than  Appeal  to 
to  hear  a person  state  confidently,  as  from  his  supposed  ex - 
own  experience,  that  such  and  such  a patient  Perienca- 
was  cured,  by  this  or  that  medicine  : whereas  all  that  he  ab- 
solutely knows,  is  that  he  took  the  medicine,  and  that  he 
recovered. 

Similar  is  the  procedure  of  many  who  are  no  theorists  for- 
sooth, but  have  found  by  experience  that  the  diffusion  of  educa- 
tion disqualifies  the  lower  classes  for  humble  toil.  They  have 
perhaps  experienced  really  a deterioration  in  this  last  respect , 
and  having  a dislike  to  education,  they  shut  their  eyes  to  the 
increase  of  pauperism  ; i.  e.  of  the  mbit  of  depending  on 
parish-pay,  rather  than  on  independer  exertions  ; which,  to 
any  unprejudiced  eye  would  seem  the  most  natural  mode  of 
explaining  the  relaxation  of  those  exertions.  But  such  men 
require  us,  on  the  ground  that  they  are  practical  men,  to  adopt 
the  results  of  their  experience  ; i.  e.  to  acquiesce  in  their 
irude  guesses  as  to  cause  and  effect,  (like  that  of  the 
rustic  who  made  Tenterden-steeple  d e cause  of  Good- 
win Sands,)  precisely  because  they  r re  not  accustomed  Ui 


reason 


226 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  III 


Hurtful  1 believe  we  may  refer  to  the  same  head  the 
changes  attnb-  apprehensions  so  often  entertained,  thai  a change , 

vied  to  harm-  however  small,  and  however  in  itself  harmless, 

less  ones.  . ..  , , . , 

is  necessarily  a dangerous  thing,  as  tending  to 

produce  extensive  and  hurtful  innovations.  Many  instances 
may  be  found  of  small  alterations  being  followed  by  great 
and  mischievous  ones ; * but  I doubt  whether  all  history  can 
furnish  an  instance  of  the  greater  innovation  having  been, 
properly  speaking,  caused  by  the  lesser.  Of  course  the  first 
change  will  always  precede  the  second  ; and  many  mischiev- 
ous innovations  have  taken  place  ; but  these  may  all  I think 
be  referred  to  a mistaken  effort  to  obtain  some  good,  or  get  rid 
of  some  evil  ; not  to  the  love  of  innovation  for  its  own  sake 
The  mass  of  mankind  are,  in  the  serious  concerns  of  life 
wedded  to  what  is  established  and  customary  ; and  when  the., 
make  rash  changes,  this  may  often  be  explained  by  the  too 
long  postponement  of  the  requisite  changes  ; which  allows  (as 
in  the  case  of  the  Reformation)  evils  to  reach  an  intolerable 
height,  before  any  remedy  is  thought  of.  And  even  then,  the 
remedy  is  often  so  violently  resisted  by  many,  as  to  drive 
others  into  dangerous  extremes.  And  when  this  occurs,  wo 
are  triumphantly  told  that  experience  shows  what  mischievous 
excesses  are  caused  by  once  beginning  to  innovate.  “ I told 
you  that  if  once  you  began  to  repair  your  house,  you  would 
have  to  pull  it  all  down.”  “Yes;  but  you  told  me  wrong; 
for  if  I had  begun  sooner,  the  replacing  of  a few  tiles  might 
have  sufficed.  The  mischief  was,  not  in  taking  down  the  first 
itone,  but  in  letting  it  stand  too  long.” 

Cause  and  Such  an  argument  as  any  of  these  might 

reason  con-  str;ct[y  |3e  called  “ non  causa  pro  causa ; ” but 
founded  to- 

t!  r it  is  not  probable  that  the  Logical  writers  in* 


* Post  Ikw  : ergo,  propter  hoc.” 


OF  FALLACIES. 


227 


*4.] 

fended  any  such  limitation  (which  indeed  would  bis 
wholly  unnecessary  and  impertinent,)  but  rather  that  they 
were  confounding  together  cause  and  reason;  the  sequence 
of  Conclusion  from  Premisses  being  perpetually  mistaken  for 
that  of  effect  from  physical  cause*  It  may  be  better,  there- 
fore, to  drop  the  name  which  tends  to  perpetuate  this  con- 
fusion, and  simply  to  state  (when  such  is  the  case)  that  the 
premiss  is  “ unduly  assumed  ; ” i.  e.  without  being  either  self- 
evident,  or  satisfactorily  proved. 

The  contrivances  by  which  men  may  deceive  themselves 
or  others,  in  assuming  Premisses  unduly,  so  that  that  undue 
assumption  shall  not  he  perceived , (for  it  is  in  this  the  Fallacy 
consists)  are  of  course  infinite.  Sometimes  (as  was  before 
observed)  the  doubtful  Premiss  is  suppressed , as  if  it  were  too 
evident  to  need  being  proved,  or  even  stated,  and  as  if  the 
whole  question  turned  on  the  establishment  of  the  other 
premiss.  Thus  Horne  Tooke  proves,  by  an  immense  induc- 
tion, that  all  particles  were  originally  nouns  or  verbs  ; and 
thence  concludes,  that  in  reality  they  are  so  still,  and  that 
the  ordinary  division  of  the  parts  of  speech  is  absurd  ; keep- 
ing out  of  sight,  as  self-evident,  the  other  premiss,  which  is 
absolutely  false  ; viz.  that  the  meaning  and  force  of  a word, 
now,  and  forever,  must  be  that,  which  it,  or  its  root,  originally 
bore. 

Sometimes  men  are  shamed  into  admitting  an 

unfounded  assertion,  by  being  confidently  told,  n irec 

assumption. 

that  it  is  so  evident,  that  it  would  argue  great 
weakness  to  doubt  it.  In  general,  however,  the  more  skilful 
Sophist  will  avoid  a direct  assertion  of  what  he  means  unduly 
o assume  ; because  that  might  direct  the  reader’s  attention  ta 


* See  Appendix,  No.  I.  article  Reason. 


228 


ELEMENTS  UF  LOUIC. 


[Boor.  in 


the  consideration  of  the  question  whether  it  be  true  or  not 
since  that  which  is  indisputable  does  not  so  often  need  to  be 
asserted.  It  succeeds  better,  therefore,  to  allude  to  the  prop- 
osition, as  something  curious  and  remarkable ; just  as  the 
Royal  Society  were  imposed  on  by  being  asked  to  account  for 
the  fact  that  a vessel  of  water  received  no  addition  to  its 
weight  by  a live  fish  put  into  it;  while  they  were  seeking  for 
the  cause , they  forgot  to  ascertain  the  fact ; and  thus  admitted 
without  suspicion  a mere  fiction.  Thus  an  eminent  Scotch 
writer,*  instead  of  asserting  that  the  “ advocates  of  Logic 
have  been  worsted  and  driven  from  the  field  in  every  contro- 
versy,” (an  assertion  which,  if  made,  would  have  been  tha 
more  readily  ascertained  to  be  perfectly  groundless,)  mere  y 
observes,  that  “ it  is  a circumstance  not  a little  remarkable .” 
Again,  any  one  who  is  decrying  all  appeal  to  evidence  in 
jehalf  of  Christianity,  (see  Appendix  iii.  Note)  will  hardly 
venture  to  assert  plainly  that  such  was  the  practice  of  the 
Apostles,  and  that  they  called  on  men  to  believe  what  they 
preached,  without  any  reason  for  believing.  That  would 
present  too  glaring  a contrast  to  the  truth.  He  will  succeed 
better  b_,  merely  dwelling  on  the  earnest  demand  of  “ faith  ’ 
made  by  the  Apostles;  trusting  that  the  inadvertent  reader 
will  forget  that  the  basis  on  which  this  demand  vas  made  to 
rest,  was,  the  evidence  of  miracles  and  prophecies  ; and  will 
thus  be  led  to  infer  that  we  are  to  imitate  the  Apostles  by  a 
procedure  which  is  in  fact  the  opposite  of  theirs. 

One  of  the  many  contrivances  employed  for 

Fallacy  of  pUrp0se,  is  what  may  be  called  the  “ Fal- 

References.  ......  , , 

lacy  of  rejerences ; which  is  particularly 

common  in  popular  theological  works.  It  i?  cf  course  a 


* Dugald  Stewart. 

..  u 


OF  FALLACIES. 


229 


f w] 

circumstance  which  adds  great  weight  to  any  assertion,  that 
it  shall  seem  to  be  supported  by  many  passages  of  Scripture 
or  of  the  Fathers  and  other  ancient  writers,  whose  works  are 
not  in  many  people’s  hands.  Now  when  a writer  can  find 
few  or  none  of  these,  .hat  distinctly  and  decidedly  favor  his 
opinion,  he  may  at  least  find  many  which  may  be  conceived 
capable  of  being  so  understood,  or  which,  in  some  way  or 
other,  remotely  relate  to  the  subject ; but  if  these  texts  were 
nserted  at  length,  it  would  be  at  once  perceived  how  little 
they  bear  on  the  question  ; the  usual  artifice  therefore  is,  to 
give  merely  references  to  them  ; trusting  that  nineteen  out  of 
twenty  readers  will  never  take  the  trouble  of  turning  to  the 
passages,  but,  taking  for  granted  that  they  afford,  each,  some 
degree  of  confirmation  to  what  is  maintained,  will  be  overawed 
by  seeing  every  assertion  supported,  as  they  suppose,  by 
five  or  six  Scripture-texts,  — as  many  from  the  Fathers,  4*c. 

Great  force  is  often  added  to  the  employment  in  a declam- 
atory work,  of  the  fallacy  now  before  us,  by  bitterly  reproach - 
ing  or  deriding  an  opponent,  as  denying  some  sacred  truth, 
or  some  evident  axiom  ; assuming,  that  is,  that  he  denies  the 
true  premiss,  and  keeping  out  of  sight  the  one  on  which  the 
question  really  turns.  E.  G.  a declaimer  who  is  maintaining 
some  doctrine  as  being  taught  in  Scripture,  may  impute  to 
his  opnonents  a contempt  for  the  authority  of  Scripture,  and 
reproach  them  for  impiety ; when  the  question  really  is, 
whether  *he  doctrine  be  scriptural  or  not. 

Frequently  the  Fallacy  of  irrelevant  conclu- 
sion [ignoraiio  elenchi\  is  called  in  to  the  aid  of  Combination 

lhi3  ' i.  e.  the  Premiss  is  assumed  on  the  ground  ^us  *allacy 

with  the  fol- 

of  another  pnposition,  somewhat  like  it,  having  ^wing . 
been  proved.  Thus,  in  arguing  by  example, 

Sj-c.  the  varaVelism  of  two  cases  is  often  assumed  from 
20 


830 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


flOOK  III 


their  being  in  so,ne  respects  aliite,  though  perhaps  thej 
differ  in  the  -very  point  which  is  essential  to  the  argu- 
ment. E.  G.  From  the  circumstance  that  some  men  of 
humble  station,  who  have  been  well  educated,  are  apt  to  think 
themselves  above  low  drudgery,  it  is  argued,  that  universal 
education  of  the  lower  orders  would  beget  general  idleness: 
this  argument  rests,  of  course,  on  the  assumption  of  parallel- 
ism in  the  two  cases,  viz.  the  past  and  the  future  ; whereas 
there  is  a circumstance  that  is  absolutely  essential,  in  which 
they  differ;  for  when  education  is  universal , it  must  cease  to 
be  a distinction  : which  is  probably  the  very  circumstance 
that  renders  men  too  proud  for  their  work. 

Again,  parallels  have  been  drawn  by  Hume,  (in  his  Essay 
on  Miracles)  and  by  Christian  writers,  between  the  mira- 
cles recorded  in  the  New  Testament,  and  those  in  the  Le- 
gends of  pretended  Saints;  which  last  were  received  just  as 
counterfeit  coin  is,  from  its  resemblance  to  genuine. 

This  very  same  Fallacy  is  often  resorted  to  on  the  opposite 
side  : an  attempt  is  made  to  invalidate  some  argument  from 
Example,  by  pointing  out  a difference  between  the  two  cases , 
though  they  agree  in  every  thing  that  is  essential  to  the  ques- 
tion. 

It  should  be  added  that  we  may  often  be  de- 

Calculation  ce;veci?  not  onjy  by  admitting  a premiss  which 
of  probabili-  ....  , , , , ... 

ties  is  absolutely  unsupported,  but  also,  by  attributing 

to  one  which  really  is  probable,  a greater  de- 
gree of  probability  than  rightly  belongs  to  it.  And  this  effecl 
will  often  be  produced  by  our  omitting  to  calculate  the  proba- 
bility in  each  successive  step  of  a long  chain  of  argument, 
and  being  in  each,  (see  §11,)  deceived  by  the  fallacy  of 
Division.  Each  premiss  successively  introduced,  may  have 
as  was  above  explained,  an  excess  of  chances  ;n  its  favor,  anq 


OF  FALLACIES. 


231 


\ HJ 

yet  the  ultimate  conclusion  may  have  a great  preponderance 
against  it;  e.  g.  “All  Y is  (probably)  X : all  Z is  (probably) 
Y : therefore  Z is  (probably)  X : ” now  suppose  the  truth  of 
the  major  premiss  to  be  more  probable  than  not ; in  othei 

1 4 

words,  that  the  chances  for  it  are  more  than  - ; say  - ; and  foi 

Z I 

2 

ihe  truth  of  the  minor,  let  the  chances  be  greater  still  ; say  - 1 

then  by  multiplying  together  the  numerators,  and  also  the 

4 2 .8 

denominators  of  these  two  fractions,  =■  X ,,  we  obtain  as 

indicating  the  degree  of  probability  of  the  conclusion ; 

which  is  less  than  * ; i.  e.  the  conclusion  is  less  likely  to  be 

true  than  not.  E.  G.  “ The  reports  this  author  heard  are 
(probably)  true  ; this  (something  which  he  records)  is  a re- 
port which  (probably)  he  heard;  therefore  it  is  true;”  sup- 
pose, first,  The  majority  of  the  reports  he  heard,  — as  4 out 
of  7,  (or  12  of  21,)  — to  be  true;  and,  next,  That  he  gener- 
ally, — as  twice  in  three  times,  — (or  8 in  12,) — repeats 
faithfully  what  he  heard  ; it  follows  that  of  21  of  his  reports, 
only  8 are  true. 

Of  course,  the  results  are  proportionably  striking  when 
there  is  a long  series  of  arguments  of  this  description.  And 
yet  weak  and  thoughtless  reasoners  are  often  influenced  by 
hearing  a great  deal  urged,  — a great  number  of  probabilities 
brought  forward,  — in  support  of  some  conclusion;  i.  e.  a 
tong  chain,  of  which  each  successive  link  is  weaker  than  the 
foregoing  ; instead  of  (what  they  mistake  it  for)  a cumula 
tion  of  arguments,  each,  separately , proving  the  certainty  oi 
probability,  of  the  same  conclusion.* 


* The  converse  fallacy  is  treated  of  below  in  § 18. 

When  there  really  are  several  distinct  and  independent  arguments 


232 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  III 


Lastly,  it  may  be  here  remarked,  conformably  with  wha 
has  been  formerly  said,  that  it  will  often  be  left  to  your  choice 
whether  to  refer  this  or  that  fallacious  argument  to  the  present 


not  incompatible,  and  not  connected,  each  separately  proving  the 
probability  of  the  same  conclusion,  we  compute,  from  our  estimate  of 
the  degree  of  probability  of  each,  the  joint  [ cumulative ] force  of  them, 
by  the  same  sort  of  calculation  as  the  above,  only  reversed : viz.  as,  in 
the  case  of  two  probable  premisses,  the  conclusion  is  not  established 
except  on  the  supposition  of  their  being  both  true,  so  in  the  case  of 
two  (and  the  like  holds  good  with  any  number)  distinct  and  independ- 
ent indications  of  the  truth  cf  some  proposition,  unless  both  of  then) 
fail,  the  proposition  must  be  true  : we  therefore  multiply  together 
the  fractions  indicating  the  probability  of  failure  of  each,  — the 
chances  against  it ; — and  the  result  being  the  total  chances  against 
the  establishment  of  the  conclusion  by  these  arguments,  this  fraction 
being  deducted  from  unity,  the  remainder  gives  the  probability  for  it. 
E.  G.  a certain  book  is  conjectured  to  be  by  such  and  such  an  author, 
partly,  1st.  from  its  resemblance  in  style  to  his  know*  works,  partly 
(2dly)  from  its  being  attributed  to  him  by  some  one  likely  to  be  pretty- 
well  informed  : let  the  probability  of  the  Conclusion,  as  deduced 

9 

from  one  of  these  arguments  by  itself,  be  supposed  -j,  and,  in  the 

3 . 3 

other  case  - ; then  the  opposite  probabilities  will  be,  respectively,  - and 

4 12 

y ; which  multiplied  together  give  as  the  probability  against  the 

Conclusion  ; i.  e.  the  chance  that  the  work  may  not  be  his,  notwith- 
standing those  reasons  for  believing  that  it  is' : and  consequently  the 

23  2 

probability  in  favor  of  that  Conclusion  will  be  ; or  nearly 

Observe  however  that,  in  some  cases,  a perfectly  distinct  argument 
arises  from  the  combination  of  certain  circumstances,  which  have,  each 
separately,  no  force  at  all,  or  very  little,  towards  establishing  a con- 
clusion which  yet  may  be  inferred,  perhaps  with  a moral  certainty, 
from  that  combination,  when  those  circumstances  are  such  that  the 
chances  are  very  great  against  their  accidental  concurrence.  E.  G.  when 
two  or  more  persons,  undeserving  of  credit,  coincide  (where  collusion 
would  be  impossible)  in  a full  and  circumstantial  detail  of  some 
transaction.  C3ee  Rhet.  Part  I.  Ch.  ii.  § 4.) 


.3] 


OF  FALLACIE? 


233 


nead,  oi  [hat  of  Ambiguous-Middle  ; “ if  the  middle  term  ia 
here  used  in  this  sense,  there  is  an  ambiguity  ; if  in  that 
sense,  the  proposition  is  false 


§ 15. 

The  last  kind  of  Fallacy  to  be  noticed  is  that  r , 

J Irrelevant 

of  Irrelevant-Conclusion,  commonly  called  igno-  Conclusion 
ratio  elenchi. 

Various  kinds  of  propositions  are,  according  to  the  occa- 
sion, substituted  for  the  one  of  which  proof  is  required. 
Sometimes,  the  Particular  for  the  Universal  ; sometimes 
a proposition  with  different  Terms : and  various  are  the 
contrivances  employed  to  effect  and  to  conceal  this  sub 
stitution,  and  to  make  the  Conclusion  which  the  Sophist 
has  drawn,  answer,  practically,  the  same  purpose  as  the  ou« 
lie  ought  to  have  established.  I say,  “ practically  the  same 
purpose,”  because  it  will  very  often  happen  that  some  emotion 
will  be  excited — some  sentiment  impressed  on  the  mind  — 
(by  a dexterous  employment  of  this  Fallacy)  such  as  shall 
bring  men  into  the  disposition  requisite  for  your  purpose, 
though  they  may  not  have  assented  to,  or  even  stated  distinct- 
ly in  their  own  minds,  the  proposition  which  it  was  your 
business  to  establish.*  Thus  if  a Sophist  has  to  defend  one 
tvho  has  been  guilty  of  some  serious  offence,  which  he  wishes 
to  extenuate,  though  he  is  unable  distinctly  to  prove  that  it  is 
not  such,  yet  if  he  can  succeed  in  making  the  audience  laugn 
at  some  casual  matter,  he  has  gained  practically  the  same 
point 


* See  Rhetoric,  Part  II. 

20* 


B34 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book.  Ill 


So  also  if  any  one  has  pointed  out  the  extenuating  circum- 
stances in  some  particular  case  of  offence,  so  as  to  show  that 
it  differs  widely  from  the  generality  of  the  same  class,  the 
Sophist,  if  he  find  himself  unable  to  disprove  these  circum- 
stances, may  do  away  the  force  of  them,  by  simply  referring 
the  action  to  that  very  class , which  no  one  can  deny  that  it 
belongs  to,  and  the  very  name  of  which  will  excite  a feeling 
cf  disgust  sufficient  to  counteract  the  extenuation  ; e.  g.  let  it 
be  a case  of  peculation  ; and  that  many  mitigating  circum- 
stances have  been  brought  forward  which  cannot  be  denied ; 
the  sophistical  opponent  will  reply,  “ Well,  but  after  all,  the 
man  is  a rogue , and  there  is  an  end  of  it  ; ” now  in  reality  this 
was  (by  hypothesis)  never  the  question  ; and  the  mere  asser- 
tion of  what  was  never  denied,  ought  not,  in  fairness,  to  be 
regarded  as  decisive ; but  practically,  the  odiousness  of  the 
word,  arising  in  great  measure  from  the  association  of  those 
very  circumstances  which  belong  to  most  of  the  class,  but 
which  we  have  supposed  to  be  absent  in  this  particular  in- 
stance, excites  precisely  that  feeling  of  disgust,  which  in 
effect  destroys  the  force  of  the  defence.  In  like  manner  we 
may  refer  to  this  head,  all  cases  of  improper  appeals  to  the 
passions,  and  every  thing  else  which  is  mentioned  by  Aristotle 

extraneous  to  the  matter  in  hand  ((?w  tov  nQ&yyaiog.) 

In  all  these  cases,  as  has  been  before  observed,  if  the  fal- 
lacy we  are  now  treating  of  be  employed  for  the  apparent 
establishment,  not  of  the  ultimate  Conclusion,  but  (as  it  very 
commonly  happens)  of  a Premiss,  (i.  e.  if  the  Premiss  re- 
quired be  assumed  on  the  ground  that  some  proposition 
Resembling  it  has  been  proved)  then  there  will  be  a combina- 
tion af  this  Fallacy  with  the  last  mentioned. 

For  instance,  instead  of  proving  that  “ this  Prisoner  has 
committed  an  atrocious  fraud,”  you  prove  that  “the  fra'id 


OF  FALLACIES. 


235 


H5j 


he  is  accused  of  is  atrocia  s : ” instead  of  proving  (as  in 

the  well-known  tale  of  Cyrus  and  the  two  coats)  „ 

J ' Combination 

that  “ the  taller  boy  had  a right  to  force  the  other  0j  t^s  ya\. 
boy  to  exchange  coats  with  him,”  you  prove  that  lacy  with  tfle 
“the  exchange  would  have  been  advantageous  f0,e90in9- 
to  both  : ” instead  of  proving  that  “ a man  has  not  a right  to 
educate  his  children  or  to  dispose  of  his  property,  in  the  way 
he  thinks  best,"  you  show  that  the  way  in  which  he  educates 
his  children,  or  disposes  of  his  property  is  not  really  the  best : 
instead  of  proving  that  “ the  poor  ought  to  be  relieved  in  this 
way  rather  than  in  that,”  you  prove  that  “ the  poor  ought  to 
be  relieved:"  instead  of  proving  that  “ an  irrational-agent  — 
whether  a brute  or  a madman  — can  never  be  deterred  from 
any  act  by  apprehension  of  punishment,”  (as  for  instance  a 
dog  from  sheep-biting,  by  fear  of  being  beaten)  you  prove 
that  “ the  beating  of  one  dog  does  not  operate  as  an  example 
to  other  dogs,”  &c.  and  then  you  proceed  to  assume  as  prem- 
isses, conclusions  different  from  what  have  really  been  estab- 
lished. 

A good  instance  of  the  employment  and  exposure  of  this 
Fallacy  occurs  in  Thucydides,  in  the  speeches  of  Cleon  and 
Diodotus  concerning  the  Mitylenaeans : the  former  (over  and 
above  his  appeal  to  the  angry  passions  of  his  audience)  urges 
the  justice  of  putting  the  revolters  to  death ; which,  as  the 
latter  remarked,  was  nothing  to  the  purpose,  since  the  Athe- 
nians were  not  sitting  in  judgment , but  in  deliberation  ; of 
which  the  proper  end  is  expediency.  And  to  prove  that  they 
nad  a right  to  put  them  to  death,  did  not  prove  this  to  be  an 
advisable  step. 

It  is  evident,  that  ignoralio  elenclii  may  be  This  fallacy 

employed  as  well  for  the  apparent  refutation  of  used,  in  refuua 
your  opponent’s  proposition,  as  for  the  apparent  ilon‘ 


836 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book.  Ill 


establishment  of  your  own  ; for  it  is  substantially  tile  same 
thing,  to  prove  what  was  not  denied,  or  to  disproie  what 
was  not  asserted.  The  latter  practice  is  not  less  com 
m®n  ; and  it  is  more  offensive,  because  it  frequently  amounts 
to  a personal  affront,  in  attributing  to  a person  opinions,  <^-c 
which  he  perhaps  holds  in  abhorrence.  Th«s  when  in  a dis- 
cussion one  party  vindicates,  on  the  ground  of  general  expe- 
diency, a particular  instance  of  resistance  to  Government  in  a 
case  of  intolerable  oppression,  the  opponent  may  gravely 
maintain,  that  “ we  ought  not  to  do  evil  tha*  good  may  come  : ” 
a proposition  which  of  course  had  never  been  denied ; the 
point  in  dispute  being  “ whether  resistance  in  this  particular 
case  were  doing  evil  or  not.”  Or  again,  by  way  of  disprov- 
ing the  assertion  of  the  “ right  of  private-judgment  in  reli- 
gion,” one  may  hear  a grave  argument  to  prove  that  “ it  is 
impossible  every  one  can  be  right  in  his  judgment."  In  these 
examples,  it  is  to  be  remarked,  (as  well  as  in  some  given  just 
above,)  that  the  Fallacy  of  petilio  principii  is  combined  with 
that  of  ignoratio  elenchi ; which  is  a very  common  and  often 
successful  practice  ; viz.  the  Sophist  proves,  or  disproves,  not 
the  proposition  which  is  really  in  question,  but  one  which  is  so 
dependent  on  it  as  to  proceed  on  the  supposition  that  it  is 
already  decided,  and  can  admit  of  no  doubt;  by  this  means 
his  “ assumption  of  the  point  in  question”  is  so  direct  and 
oblique,  that  it  may  easily  escape  notice  ; and  he  thus  estab- 
lishes, practically,  his  Conclusion,  at  the  very  moment  he  is 
withdrawing  your  attention  from  it  to  another  question.  E.  G. 
An  advocate  will  prove,  and  dwell  on  the  high  criminality  of 
a certain  act,  and  the  propriety  of  severely  punishing  it;  as- 
suming (instead  of  proving)  the  commission. 

There  are  certain  kinds  of  argument  recounted  and  named 
by  Logical  writers,  which  we  should  by  no  means  universally 


} 13.  J 


OF  FALLACIES. 


237 


call  Fallacies ; but  which  when  unfairly  jsed,  und  so  far  a» 
then  are  fallacious,  may  very  well  be  referred  to  the  present 
head  ; such  as  the  “ argumentum  ad  hominem," 

[or  “ personal  argument,”]  “ argumentum  ad  ^ 
verecundiam,"  “ argumentum  ad  populum ,”  8fC.  nem^  ^ 
all  of  them  regarded  as  contradistinguished 
from  “ argumentum  ad  rem  ; ” or,  according  to  others  (mean, 
ing  probably  the  very  same  thing)  “ ad  judicium."  These 
have  alt  been  described  in  the  lax  and  popular  language  before 
alluded  to,  but  not  scientifically  : the  “ argumentum  ad  horn- 
incm ,”  they  say,  “ is  addressed  to  the  peculiar  circumstances, 
character,  avowed  opinions,  or  past  conduct  of  the  individual, 
and  therefore  has  a reference  to  him  only,  and  does  not  bear 
directly  and  absolutely  on  the  real  question,  as  the  ‘ argumen- 
tum ad  rem ' does : ” in  like  manner,  the  “ argumentum  ad 
verecundiam  ” is  described  as  an  appeal  to  our  reverence  for 
some  respected  authority,  some  venerable  institution,  Sf-c.  and 
the  “ argumentum  ad  populum,"  as  an  appeal  to  the  prejudices, 
passions,  fyc.  of  the  multitude  ; and  so  of  the  rest.  Along 
with  these  is  usually  enumerated  “ argumentum  ad  ignoran- 
tiam ,”  which  is  here  omitted,  as  being  evidently  nothing  mere 
than  the  employment  of  some  kind  of  Fallacy,  in  the  widest 
sense  of  that  word,  towards  such  as  are  likely  to  be  de- 
ceived by  it. 

It  appears  then  (to  speak  rather  more  techni- 
cally) that  in  the  “ argumentum  ad  hominem  ” 
the  conclusion  which  actually  is  established,  is 
aot  the  absolute  and  general  one  in  question, 
but  relaive  and  particular  ; viz.  not  that  “such 
and  such  is  the  fact,”  but  that  “ this  man  is  bouno  to  admit  iq 
in  jonformity  to  his  principles  of  Reasoring,  or  in  .’.onsistenci 


Technical 
analysis  of 
personal  ar - 

§c. 


238 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Look  III 


with  his  own  conduct,  situation,”  fyc*  Such  a conch  sion  1 
is  often  both  allowable  and  necessary  to  establish,  in  order  to 
silence  those  who  will  not  yield  to  fair  general  argument ; 01 
to  convince  t.iose  whose  weakness  and  prejudices  would  not 
allow  them  to  assign  o it  its  due  weight.  It  is  thus  that  out 
Lord  on  many  occasions  silences  the  cavils  of  the  Jews  as 
in  the  vindication  of  healing  on  the  Sabbath,  which  is  par 
alleled  by  the  authorized  practice  of  drawing  out  a beast  that 
has  fallen  into  a pit.  All  this,  as  we  have  said,  is  perfectly 
fair,  provided  it  be  done  plainly,  and  avowedly  ; but  if  you 
attempt  to  substitute  this  partial  and  relative  Conclusion  for  a 
more  general  one — if  you  triumph  as  having  established  your 
proposition  absolutely  and  universally,  from  having  established 


* The  “ argumentum  ad  hominem  ” will  often  have  the  effect  of 
shifting  the  burden  of  proof,  not  unjustly,  to  the  adversary.  (See  Rhet. 
Part  I chap.  iii.  § 2.)  A common  instance  is  the  defence,  certainly 
the  readiest  and  most  concise,  frequently  urged  by  the  Sportsman, 
when  accused  of  barbarity  in  sacrificing  unoffending  hares  or  trout  to 
his  amusement : he  replies,  as  he  may  safely  do,  to  most  of  his  assail- 
ants, “ why  do  you  feed  on  the  flesh  of  the  harmless  sheep  and  ox  ? ” 
and  that  this  answer  presses  hard,  is  manifested  by  its  being  usually 
opposed  by  a palpable  falsehood ; viz.  that  the  animals  which  are  killed 
for  food  are  sacrificed  to  our  necessities ; though  not  only  men  can , 
but  a large  proportion  (probably  a great  majority)  of  the  human 
race  actually  do,  subsist  in  health  and  vigor  without  flesh-diet ; and 
the  earth  would  support  a much  greater  human  population  were 
such  a practice  universal. 

When  shamed  out  of  this  argument  they  sometimes  urge  that  the 
orute  creation  would  overrun  the  earth,  if  we  did  not  kill  them  for 
food;  an  argument,  which,  if  it  were  valid  at  all,  would  not  justify 
their  feeding  on  fish ; though,  if  fairly  followed  up,  it  would  justify 
Swift’s  proposal  for  keeping  down  the  excessive  population  of  Ireland. 
The  true  reason,  viz.  that  they  eat  flesh  for  the  gratification  of  thfl 
palate,  and  have  a tast  3 for  the  pleasures  of  the  table,  though  net  foi 
the  sports  of  the  field  is  one  which  they  do  not  like  to  assign. 


OF  FALLACIES. 


239 


t i&.j 

it,  in  reality,  only  as  far  as  it  relates  to  your  opponent,  then 
you  are  guilty  of  a Fallacy  of  the  kind  which  we  are  now 
treating  of : your  Conclusion  is  not  in  reality  that  which  was, 
by  your  own  account,  proposed  to  be  proved.  The  falla- 
ciousness depends  upon  the  deceit , or  attempt  to  deceive 
The  same  observations  will  apply  to  “ argumentum  ad  vcrecuvr 
diam ,”  and  the  rest. 

It  is  very  common  to  employ  an  ambiguous 

Ambvjuou » 

Term  for  the  purpose  of  introducing  the  Fal-  termsemphyed 
lacy  of  irrelevant  conclusion  : i.  e.  when  you  in  this  Fal- 
cannot  prove  your  proposition  in  the  sense  in 
which  it  was  maintained,  to  prove  it  in  some  other  sense ; e.  g. 
those  who  contend  against  the  efficacy  of  faith , usually  em- 
ploy that  word  in  their  arguments  in  the  sense  of  mere  belief, 
unaccompanied  with  any  moral  or  practical  result,  but  consid- 
ered as  a mere  intellectual  process ; and  when  they  have  thus 
proved  their  conclusion,  they  oppose  it  to  one  in  which  the 
word  is  used  in  a widely  different  sense.* 


* “ When  the  occasion  or  object  in  question  is  not  such  as  calls  for, 
or  as  is  likely  to  excite  in  those  particular  readers  or  hearers,  the  emo- 
tions required,  it  is  a common  Rhetorical  artifice  to  turn  their  atten- 
tion to  some  object  which  will  call  forth  these  feelings  ; and  when  they 
are  too  much  excited  to  be  capable  of  judging  calmly,  it  will  not  be 
difficult  to  turn  their  Passions,  once  roused,  in  the  direction  required, 
and  to  make  them  view  the  case  before  them  in  a very  different  light. 
When  the  metal  is  heated  it  may  easily  be  moulded  into  the  desired 
form.  Thus  vehement  indignation  against  some  crime,  may  be  directed 
against  a person  who  has  not  been  proved  guilty  of  it ; and  vague 
leclamations  against  corruption,  oppression,  $c.  or  against  the  mis- 
chiefs of  anarchy ; with  high-flown  panegyrics  on  liberty,  rights  of 
man,  $e.  or  on  social-order,  justice,  the  constitution,  law,  religion,  & -,c 
will  gradually  lead  the  hearers  to  take  for  granted,  without  proof,  that 
the  measure  proposed  will  lead  to  these  evils,  or  to  these  advantages ; 
and  it  will  in  consequence  become  the  object  of  groundless  abhor- 
rence or  admiration.  For  the  very  utterance  of  such  words  is  have  a 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC  [Boon  in 

§ 16. 

The  Fallacy  of  “ irrelevant-conclusion”  \ig- 
noratio  elenchi]  is  nowhere  more  common  than 
in  protracted  controversy,  when  one  of  the  par 
ties,  after  having  attempted  in  vain  to  maintain  his  position, 
shifts  his  ground  as  covertly  as  possible  to  another,  instead  of 
honestly  giving  up  the  point.  An  instance  occurs  in  an  attack 
made  on  the  system  pursued  at  one  of  our  Universities.  The 
objectors,  finding  themselves  unable  to  maintain  their  charge 
of  the  present  neglect  {viz.  in  the  year  1810)  of  Mathematics 
in  that  place,  (to  which  neglect  they  attributed  the  “ late  gen- 
eral decline  ” in  those  studies)  shifted  their  ground,  and  con- 
tended that  that  University  “ was  never  famous  for  Mathema- 
ticians : ” which  not  only  does  not  establish,  but  absolutely 
overthrows,  their  own  original  assertion  ; for  if  it  never  suc- 
ceeded in  those  pursuits,  it  could  not  have  caused  their  late 
decline. 

A practice  of  this  nature  is  common  in  oral  controversy 
especially  ; viz.  that  of  combating  loth  your  opponent’s  Prem- 
isses alternately , and  shifting  the  attack  from 
Fallacy  of  the  one  to  the  other,  without  waiting  to  have 

vmbating  the  e;ther  of  them  decided  upon  before  you  quit  it. 
two  Premisses 

alternately.  “ Awa  besides , is  an  expression  one  may  often 
hear  from  a disputant  who  is  proceeding  to  a 


240 


Shifting 

ground. 


multitude  of  what  may  be  called  stimulating  ideas  associated  with 
them,  will  operate  like  a charm  on  the  minds,  especially  of  the  igno- 
rant and  unthinking,  and  raise  such  a tumult  of  feeling,  as  will  effect- 
ually  blind  their  judgment ; so  that  a string  of  vague  abuse  or  pane- 
gyric will  often  have  the  effect  of  a train  of  sound  Aigument.” 
Rhetoric , Part  II.  Chap.  ii.  § 6. 


i 17.] 


of  fallacies. 


241 


fre«h  argument,  when  he  cannot  establish,  and  yet  will  not 
abandon,  his  first. 

It  has  been  remarked  above,  that  one  class  of  the  propo- 
sitions that  may  be,  in  this  Fallacy,  substituted  for  the  one 
required,  is  the  particular  for  the  universal : similar  to  this, 
is  the  substitution  of  a conditional  with  a universal  antecedent, 
for  one  with  a particular  antecedent ; which  will  usually  be 
the  harder  to  orove  : e.  g.  you  are  called  on,  suppose,  to  prove 
that  if  any  yi.  e.  some)  private  interests  are  hurt  by  a pro- 
posed measure,  it  is  inexpedient : ” and  you  pretend  to  have 
done  so  by  showing  that  “ if  all  private  interests  are  hurt  by 
it,  it  must  be  inexpedient.”  Nearly  akin  to  this  is  the  very 
common  case  of  proving  something  to  be  possible  when  it 
ought  to  have  been  proved  highly  probable  ; or  probable, 
when  it  ought  to  have  been  proved  necessary ; or,  which 
comes  to  the  very  same,  proving  it  to  be  not  necessary , when 
it  should  have  been  proved  not  probable  ; or  improbable,  when 
it  should  have  been  proved  impossible.  Aristotle  {in  Rhct. 
Book  II.)  complains  of  this  last  branch  of  the  Fallacy,  as  giv- 
ing an  undue  advantage  to  the  respondent;  many  a guilty 
person  owes  his  acquittal  to  this  ; the  jury  considering  that  the 
evidence  brought  does  not  demonstrate  the  complete  impossi- 
bility of  his  being  innocent;  though  perhaps  the  chances  are 
innumerable  against  it. 

§ 17. 

Similar  to  this  case  is  that  which  may  be 

called  the  Fallacy  of  objections  : i.  e.  showing  °f 

f ° Objections. 

that  there  are  objections  against  some  plan,  the- 
ory, or  system,  and  thence  inferring  that  it  should  be  rejected  • 
when  that  which  ought  to  have  been  proved  is,  that  there  ai« 
21 


242 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  II L 


more,  oi  stronger  objections,  against  the  receiving  than  tha 
i ejecting  of  it.  Tins  is  the  main,  and  almost  universal  Fal- 
lacy of  anti-christians ; and  is  that  of  which  a young  Chris- 
tian should  be  first  and  principally  warned.*  They  find  nu- 
merous “ objections  ” against  various  parts  of  Scripture ; to 
some  of  which  no  satisfactory  answer  can  be  given  ; and  the 
incautious  hearer  is  apt,  while  his  attention  is  fixed  on  these, 
to  forget  that  there  are  infinitely  more,  and  stronger  objec- 
tions against  the  supposition  that  the  Christian  Religion  is  of 
human  origin ; and  that  where  we  cannot  answer  all  objec- 
tions, we  are  bound  in  reason  and  in  candor  to  adopt  the  hy- 
pothesis which  labors  under  the  least.  That  the  case  is  as  I 
have  stated,  I am  authorized  to  assume,  from  this  circum- 
stance ; that  7io  complete  and  consistent  account  has  ever  been 
given  of  the  manner  in  which  the  Christian  Religion,  sup- 
posing it  a human  contrivance,  could  have  arisen  and  pre- 
vailed as  it  did.  And  yet  this  may  obviously  be  demanded 
with  the  utmost  fairness,  of  those  who  deny  its  divine  origin. 
The  Religion  exists  : that  is  the  phenomenon  ; those  who  will 
not  allow  it  to  have  come  from  God,  are  bound  to  solve  the 
phenomenon  on  some  other  hypothesis  less  open  to  objections. 
They  are  not  indeed  called  on  to  prove  that  it  actually  did 
arise  in  this  or  that  way ; but  to  suggest  (consistently  with  ac 
knowledged  facts)  some  prfebable  way  in  which  it  may  have 
arisen,  reconcilable  with  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
That  infidels  have  never  done  this,  though  they  have  had  1800 
years  to  try,  amounts  to  a confession  that  no  such  hypothesis 
can  be  devised,  which  will  not  be  open  to  greater  objections 
than  lie  against  Christianity.f 

* See  note  at  the  end  of  Appendix,  No.  III. 

T In  an  “ Essay  on  the  Omissions  of  our  Sacred  Writers,”  I have 
pointed  out  some  circumstances  which  no  one  has  ever  attempted  U 


OF  FALLACIES. 


24?. 


I 17.] 


The  Fallacy  of  Objections  is  also  the  strong-  Reforms  an 
hold  of  bigoted  anti-innovators,  who  oppose  ail  °Pen  t0  obJec ' 
reforms  and  alterations  indiscriminately ; for  Uo,ls' 
there  never  was,  or  will  be,  any  plan  executed  or  proposed, 
against  which  strong  and  even  unanswerable  objections  may 
not  be  urged  ; so  that  unless  the  opposite  objections  be  set  in 
the  balance  on  the  other  side,  we  can  never  advance  a step. 
E G.  The  defenders  of  the  Transportation-system,  — a sys- 
tem which,  as  an  eminent  writer  has  observed,  was  “ begun  in 
defiance  of  all  Reason,  and  persevered  in,  in  defiance  of  all 
Experience  ” — are  accustomed  to  ask  “ what  kind  of  Second- 
ary-punishment would  you  substitute  ? ” and  if  any  one  is 
suggested,  they  adduce  the  objections,  and  difficulties,  real 
and  apparent,  to  which  it  is  exposed  ; if  another  is  proposed, 
they  proceed  in  the  same  manner  ; and  so  on,  without  end.  For 
of  all  the  other  plans  of  Secondary-punishment  that  have  ever 
been  tried,  or  imagined,  the  best  must  be  open  to  some  objections, 
though  the  very  worst  is  much  less  objectionable  than  Trans- 
portation.* * “ There  are  objections,”  said  Dr.  Johnson, 
“ against  a plenum , and  objections  against  a vacuum ; but  one 
of  them  must  be  true.” 

The  very  same  Fallacy  indeed  is  employed  (as  has  been 
said)  on  the  other  side,  by  those  who  are  for  overthrowing 
whatever  is  established  as  soon  as  they  can  prove  an  objection 
against  it;  without  considering  whether  more  and  weightier 
objections  may  not  lie  against  their  own  schemes  ; but  their 
opponents  have  this  decided  advantage  over  them,  that  they 
can  urge  with  great  plausibility,  “ we  do  not  call  upon  you  to 
reject  at  once  whatever  is  objected  to,  but  merely  to  suspend 

uccount  for  on  any  supposition  of  their  being  other  thar  not  orJ  y inn 
witnesses,  but  supernaturally  inspired. 

* See  Letters  to  Earl  Grey  on  Transportation. 


244 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 


[Book  TIL 


your  judgment,  and  not  come  to  a decision  as  long  as  there 
are  reasons  on  both  sides  : ” now  since  there  always  will  It 
reasons  on  both  sides,  this  won-decision  is  practically  the  very 
same  thing  as  a decision  in  favor  of  the  existing  state  cf 
things.  “ Not  to  resolve,  is  to  resolve.”  * The  delay  of  trial 
becomes  equivalent  to  an  acquittal .t 

§ 18. 

Fallacy  of  Another  form  of  ignoratio  clcnchi,  which  is 
proving  a part  also  rather  the  more  serviceable  on  the  side  of 
of  the  question.  tjje  respondent^  is,  to  prove  or  disprove  some 
part  of  that  which  is  required,  and  dwell  on  that,  suppressing 
all  the  rest. 

Thus,  if  a University  is  charged  with  cultivating  only  the 
mere  elements  of  Mathematics,  and  in  reply  a list  of  the 
books  studied  there  is  produced,  should  even  any  one  of  those 
books  be  not  elementary , the  charge  is  in  fairness  refuted  ; 
but  the  Sophist  may  then  earnestly  contend  that  some  of  those 
books  are  elementary  ; and  thus  keep  out  of  sight  the  real 
question,  viz.  whether  they  are  all  so.f 

So,  also,  one  may  maintain  (with  perfect  truth)  that  mere 
intellectual  ability — the  reasoning  powers  alone  — are  insuf- 
ficient for  the  attainment  of  truth  in  religious  questions ; 
(see  Appendix  III.  note)  and  may  thence  proceed  to  assume 

* Bacon. 

t How  happy  it  is  for  mankind  that  in  many  of  the  most  moment- 
ous concerns  of  life  their  decision  is  generally  formed  for  them  by 
external  circumstances  : which  thus  saves  them  not  only  from  the  per- 
plexity of  doubt  and  the  danger  of  delay,  but  also  from  the  pain  of 
regret ; since  we  acquiesce  much  more  cheerfully  in  that  which  is 
unavoidable. 

J “ Reply  to  calumnies  of  Edinb.  Review  against  Oxford  ' 1810. 


18.] 


OF  FALLACIES. 


245 


;usifitwere  the  same  proposition)  that  all  employment  ot 
reasoning  — all  intellectual  cultivation  — are  perfectly  useless 
on  such  questions,  and  are  to  be  discarded  as  foreign  from  the 
subject. 

This  is  the  great  art  of  the  answerer  of  a 

nook;  suppose  the  main  positions  in  any  work  Art  °f  f’am~ 

. . . ln(J  « Reply . 

to  be  irrefragable,  it  will  be  strange  if  some 

illustration  of  them,  or  some  subordinate  part,  in  short,  will 
not  admit  of  a plausible  objection ; the  opponent  then  joins 
issue  on  one  of  these  incidental  questions,  and  comes  forward 
with  “ a Reply  ” to  such  and  such  a work.  And  such  a 
“ Reply  ” is  still  easier  and  more  plausible,  when  it  happens  — • 
as  it  often  will  — that  a real  and  satisfactory  refutation  can  be 
found  of  some  one,  or  more,  of  several  arguments,  each, 
singly,  proving  completely  the  same  conclusion  ; (as  many  a 
theorem  of  Euclid  admits  of  several  different  demonstrations) 
or  an  answer  to  one  or  more  of  several  objections,  each,  sepa- 
rately, decisive  against  a certain  scheme  or  theory  ; though  it 
is  evident  on  reflection,  that  if  the  rest,  or  any  one  of  them, 
remain  unrefuted  and  unanswerable,  the  conclusion  is  estab- 
lished, and  stands  as  firm  as  if  the  answerer  had  urged 
nothing. 

He  who  thus  replies  to  the  arguments  urged,  is  in  the  con- 
dition of  a commander  defending  all  the  practicable  breaches 
in  a fortification  except  one.  This  kind  of  partial  “ reply  ” is 
properly  available  only  in  a case  where  each  of  the  argu- 
ments does  not  go  to  establish  the  certainty , but  only  the 
probability  of  the  conclusion.  Then  indeed,  the  conclusion 
resting  not  wholly  on  the  force  of  any  one  of  the  arguments, 
but  on  the  combination  of  them,  is  proportionably  weakened 
by  the  refutation  of  any  of  them.  The  fallacy  I am  now 
sneaking  of  consists  in  the  confounding  ot  the  preceding  case 
21* 


246 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  111 


either  with  this  latter,  or  with  the  case  formerly  noticed  [§  14" 
of  a chain  of  arguments,  each  proving,  not,  the  same  oonclu 
sion,  but  a premiss  of  the  succeeding. 

Hence  the  danger  of  ever  advancing  more 

Damjn  of  ^y,an  can  [je  vve][  maintained,  since  the  refuta- 
maintammg 

too  much.  tion  of  that  will  often  quash  the  whole.  The 
Quakers  would  perhaps  before  now  have  sue 
ceeded  in  doing  away  our  superfluous  and  irreverent  oaths, 
if  they  had  not,  besides  many  valid  and  strong  arguments, 
adduced  so  many  that  are  weak  and  easily  refuted. 

Thus,  also,  a guilty  person  may  often  escape  by  having  too 
much  laid  to  his  charge ; so  he  may  also,  by  having  too 
much  evidence  against  him,  i.  e.  some  that  is  not  in  itself  sat- 
isfactory. Accordingly,  a prisoner  may  sometimes  obtain 
acquittal  by  showing  that  one  of  the  witnesses  against  him  is 
an  infamous  informer  and  spy  ; though  perhaps  if  that  part 
of  the  evidence  had  been  omitted,  the  rest  would  have  been 
sufficient  for  conviction. 

Cases  of  this  nature  might  very  well  be  referred  also  to  the 
Fallacy  formerly  mentioned,  of  inferring  the  Falsity  of  the 
Conclusion  from  the  Falsity  of  a Premiss  ; which  indeed  is 
very  closely  allied  to  the  present  Fallacy  : the  real  question 
is,  “ whether  or  not  this  Conclusion  ought  to  he  admitted;'" 
the  Sophist  confines  himself  to  the  question,  “ whether  or  not 
it  is  established  by  this  particular  argument ; ” leaving  it  to 
be  inferred  by  the  audience,  if  he  has  carried  his  point  as  to 
the  latter  question,  that  the  former  is  thereby  decided  ; which 
is  then,  and  then  only,  a correct  inference,  when  there  is 
good  reason  for  believing  that  other  and  better  arguments 
would  have  been  adduced,  if  there  had  been  any.  (See  above 
pt  the  end  of  § 6.) 


OF  FALLACIES. 


24? 


( 19] 


§ 19. 

It  will  readily  be  perceived  that  nothing  Is  less 

conducive  to  the  success  of  the  Fallacy  in  ques-  Suppressed 

Conclusion. 

tion,  than  to  state  clearly,  in  the  outset,  either 
the  proposition  you  are  about  to  prove,  or  that  which 
you  ought  to  prove.  It  answers  best  to  begin  with  the 
Premisses,  and  to  introduce  a pretty  long  chain  of  argu- 
ment before  you  arrive  at  the  Conclusion.  The  careless 
hearer  takes  for  granted,  at  the  beginning,  that  this  chain 
will  lead  to  the  Conclusion  required  ; and  by  the  time  you 
are  come  to  the  end,  he  is  ready  to  take  for  granted  that 
the  Conclusion  which  you  draw  is  the  one  required  ; his 
idea  of  the  question  having  gradually  become  indistinct. 
This  Fallacy  is  greatly  aided  by  the  common  practice  of  sup- 
pressing the  Conclusion  and  leaving  it  to  be  supplied  by  the 
hearer;  who  is  of  course  less  likely  to  perceive  whether  it 
be  really  that  “ which  was  to  be  proved,”  than  if  it  were  dis- 
tinctly stated.  The  practice  therefore  is  at  best  suspicious  ; 
and  it  is  better  in  general  to  avoid  it,  and  to  give  and  require 
a distinct  statement  of  the  Conclusion  intended. 

The  Fallacy  now  before  us  is,  perhaps,  the  most  common 
form  of  that  conclusion  of  thought  to  which  those  are  liable 
who  have  been  irregularly  and  unskilfully  educated  ; — who 
have  collected  perhaps  a considerable  amount  of  knowledge, 
without  arrangement,  and  without  cultivation  of  logical  habits  ; 
— who  have  learned  (as  I have  heard  it  expressed)  a good 
many  answers  without  the  questions.  Most  of  the  erroneous 
views  in  Morals,  and  in  other  subjects,  which  prevail  among 
such  persons,  may  be  exhibited  in  the  form  of  Fallacies  of 


e48 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  III 


Irrelevant-conclusion.”  * E.  G.  The  well-known  wrong  de- 
cision respecting  the  two  boys  and  their  coats,  for  which  Cy- 
rus was  punished  by  his  preceptor,  was  a mistake  of  the  real 
question , which  was,  not,  “ which  coat  fitted  each  boy  the 
best,’  but  “ who  had  the  right  to  dispose  of  them.  ’ Anj! 
similar  cases  to  this  occur  every  day.  An  exact  parallel  is  to 
be  found  in  the  questions  relative  to  the  imposition  of  restric- 
tions or  other  penalties  on  those  of  a different  creed  from  our 
own.  They  are  usually  argued  as  if  the  point  to  be  decided 
were  “ which  religion  is  the  better,”  or,  “ whether  the  differ- 
ences between  them  are  important ; ” instead  of  being, 
“ whether  one  man  has  a right  to  compel  others  to  profess  his 
religion,”  or,  “ whether  the  professors  of  the  true  Faith  have 
a right  to  monopolize  secular  power  and  civil  privileges.”  Or 
attain  (to  put  the  same  principles  into  another  form)  the  ques- 
tions “ whether  it  be  allowable  for  a Christian  to  fight  in  de- 
fending himself  from  oppression  and  outrage,”  t and  “ wheth- 


♦ “ The  fallacy  consists  in  confounding  together  the  unbroken 
Apostolical  succession  of  a Christian  Ministry,  generally,  and  the  same 
succession  in  an  unbroken  line,  of  this  or  that  individual  Minister. 
******  If  each  man’s  Christian  hope  is  made  to  rest  on 
his  receiving  the  Christian  Ordinances  at  the  hands  of  a Minister  to 
whom  the  sacramental  virtue  ” [of  ordination]  “ that  gives  efficacy 
to  those  ordinances,  has  been  transmitted  in  unbroken  succession  from 
hand  to  hand,  every  thing  must  depend  on  that  particular  Ministei  ; 
and  his  claim  is  by  no  means  established  from  our  merely  establishing 
the  uninterrupted  existence  of  such  a class  of  men  as  Christian  Ministers. 
You  teach  me,  — a man  might  say, — that  my  salvation  depends  on 
the  possession  by  you  — the  particular  Pastor  under  whom  I am 
placed  — of  a certain  qualification  ; and  when  I ask  for  the  proof  that 
you  possess  it,  you  prove  to  me  that  it  is  possessed  generally  by  a cer - 
vain  class  of  persons  of  whom  you  are  one.  and  probably  by  a large  ma 
jority  of  them  ! ” — On  the  Kingdom  of  Christ,  Essay  II.  § 30. 
t See  Essay  1st,  on  the  Kingdom  of  Christ. 


20.] 


OF  FALLACIES. 


249 


er  a Christian  magistrate  may  employ  physical  coercion  and 
inflict  secular  punishment  on  evil-doers,”  — these,  are  perpet- 
ually confounded  with  the  questions  “ whether  Christians  are 
allowed  to  fight  as  such;  i.  e.  to  fight  for  their  Religion, 
against  those  who  corrupt  or  reject  the  faith ; ” and,  “ whether 
a Christian  magistrate  may  employ  coercion  on  behalf  of 
Christianity,  and  inflict  punishment  on  Heretics  as  evil- 
doers.” * 

Again,  such  propositions  as  the  following,  one  may  often 
hear,  sophistically  or  negligently,  confounded  together  : “ The 
Apostles  held  religious  assemblies  on  the  first  day  of  the 
week,”  with  “ They  transferred  the  Sabbath  from  the  seventh 
day  to  the  first : ” t “A  Jew,  Mahometan,  or  Roman  Catholic, 
is  not  the  most  eligible  person  to  hold  Office  in  a Protestant- 
christian  country,”  with  “ Such  persons  ought  not  to  be  legally 
eligible  : ” “ The  Apostles  established  such  and  such  a form 
of  government  in  the  Churches  they  founded,”  with  “ They 
designed  this  form  to  be  binding  on  all  Christians  as  an  Ordi- 
nance forever,"  &c.  $ 


§ 20. 

Before  we  dismiss  the  subject  of  Fallacies,  j 
it  may  not  be  improper  to  mention  the  just  and 
ingenious  remark,  that  Jests  are  mock- Fallacies  ; i,  e.  Falla- 
cies so  palpable  as  not  to  be  likely  to  deceive  any  one,  but 
yet  bearing  just  that  resemblance  of  Argument  which  is  cal- 


* See  Essays  on  the  Dangers,  &c.  Notes  E.  and  F 
] See  Thoughts  on  the  Sabbath. 

See  Kingdom  of  Christ,  Essay  II.  § 9. 


250 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  IIL 


eu'.at&ti  to  amuse  by  tbc  contrast ; in  the  same  manner  that  a 
parody  does,  by  the  contrast  of  its  levity  with  the  serious  pro- 
duction which  it  imitates.  There  is  indeed  something  k ugh- 
able  even  in  Fallacies  which  are  intended  for  serious  convic- 
tion, when  they  are  thoroughly  exposed.* 

There  are  several  different  kinds  of  joke  and  raillery, 
which  will  be  found  to  correspond  with  the  different  kinds  of 
Fallacy.  The  Pun  (to  take  the  simplest  and  most  obvious 
case)  is  evidently,  in  most  instances,  a mock-argument  founded 
on  a palpable  equivocation  of  the  Middle-Term;  and  others 
in  like  manner  will  be  found  to  correspond  to  the  respective 
Fallacies,  and  to  be  imitations  of  serious  argument. 

It  is  probable  indeed  that  all  jests,  sports,  or  games  ( naiSial ) 
properly  so  called,  will  be  found,  on  examination,  to  be  imi- 
tative of  serious  transactions ; as  of  War,  or  Commerce. t 
But  to  enter  fully  into  this  subject  would  be  unsuitable  to  the 
present  occasion. 

I shall  subjoin  some  general  remarks  on  the  legitimate 
province  of  Reasoning,  and  on  its  connection  with  Inductive 
philosophy,  and  with  Rhetoric ; on  which  points  much  misap- 
prehension has  prevailed,  tending  to  throw  obscurity  over  the 
design  and  use  of  the  Science  under  consideration. 

A treatise  on  what  are  called  the  “ laws  of  evidence  ” 
the  different  kinds , strictly  speaking,  of  arguments  — and  the 
occasions  for  which  they  are  respectively  suited,  die.,  which 
i3  what  some  would  expect  in  a Logical  Work,  will  be  found 
in  the  1st  part  of  the  “ Elements  of  Rhetoric.” 


* See  Wallis’s  Logic,  and  also  Rhetoric,  Part  I.  Ch.  iii.  j>  7,  p.  131 
t See  some  excellent  remarks  on  “ Imitation,”  in  I'r.  A.  Smith 
posthum  ms  Essays. 


BOOK  IY. 


DISSERTATION  ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING, 


Logic  being  concerned  with  the  theory  of  Reasoning,  it  is 
evidently  necessary,  in  order  to  take  a correct  view  of  this 
Science,  that  all  misapprehensions  should  be  removed  relative 
to  the  occasions  on  which  the  Reasoning-process  is  employed, 
— the  purposes  it  has  in  view,  — and  the  limits  within  which 
it  is  confined. 

Simple  and  obvious  as  such  questions  may  appear  to  those 
who  have  not  thought  much  on  the  subject,  they  will  appear 
on  further  consideration  to  be  involved  in  much  perplexity 
and  obscurity,  from  the  vague  and  inaccurate  language  of 
many  popular  writers.  To  the  confused  and  incorrect  notions 
that  prevail  respecting  the  Reasoning-process  may  be  traced 
most  of  the  common  mistakes  respecting  the  Science  of  Logic, 
and  much  of  the  unsound  and  unphilosophical  argumenta- 
tion which  is  so  often  to  be  met  with  in  the  works  of  ingenious 
writers. 

These  errors  have  been  incidentally  adverted  to  in  the  fore- 
going part  of  this  work  ; but  it  may  be  desirable,  before  we 
dismiss  the  subject,  to  offer  on  these  points  some  further  re- 
marks, which  could  not  have  been  there  introduced  withoul 
100  great  an  interruption  to  the  development  of  the  systera 


*52 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


Little  or  nothing  indeed  remains  to  be  said  that  is  not  implied 
in  th:  principles  which  have  been  already  laid  down  ; but  the 
results  and  applications  of  those  principles  are  liable  in  many 
instances  to  be  overlooked,  if  not  distinctly  pointed  out 
These  supplementary  observations  will  neither  require,  noi 
admit  of,  so  systematic  an  arrangement  as  has  hitherto  been 
aimed  at : since  they  will  be  such  as  are  suggested  principally 
by  the  objections  and  mistakes  of  those  who  have  misunder- 
stood, partially  or  entirely,  the  nature  of  the  Logical  system. 

Let  it  be  observed,  however,  that  as  I am  not  writing  a re- 
view or  commentary  on  any  logical  works,  but  an  introduc- 
tion to  the  science,  I shall  not  deem  it  necessary  to  point  out  in 
all  cases  the  agreement  and  disagreement  between  other  writers 
and  myself,  in  respect  of  the  views  maintained,  or  the  terms 
employed,  by  each. 


Chap.  I.  — Of  Induction. 

§ 1. 

Much  has  been  said  by  some  writers  of  the 

Mistake  of  SUperiority  0f  the  Inductive  to  the  Syllogistic 
opposing  In- 

auction  to  Syl-  method  of  seeKing  truth  ; as  if  the  two  stood  op- 
fogism.  posed  to  each  other  ; and  of  the  advantage  of 

substituting  the  Organon  of  Bacon  for  that  of 
Aristotle,  8pc.  which  indicates  a total  misconception  of  the  na- 
ture of  both.  There  is,  however,  the  more  excuse  for  the  con- 
fusion of  thought  which  prevails  on  this  subject,  because  emi- 
nent Logical  writers  have  treated,  or  at  least  have  appeared 
to  treat,  of  Induction  as  a kind  of  Argument  distinci  from  the 


Chap.  I.  } l.J 


OF  INDUCTION. 


25  i 

Syllogism ; which  if  it  were,  it  certainly  might  by  contrasted 
with  the  Syllogism  : or  rather,  the  whole  Syllogistic  theory 
would  fall  to  the  ground,  since  one  of  the  very  first  principles 
it  establishes,  is  that  all  Reasoning,  on  whatever  subject,  is 
one  and  the  same  process,  which  may  be  clearly  exhibited  in 
the  form  of  Syllogisms.  It  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  theie- 
fore,  that  was  the  deliberate  meaning  of  those  writers  ; though 
it  must  be  admitted  that  they  have  countenanced  the  error  in 
question,  by  their  inaccurate  expressions. 

This  inaccuracy  seems  chiefly  to  have  arisen 
from  a vagueness  in  the  use  of  the  word  Indue-  Tlv°  sense> 

' % of  the  word 

tion  ; which  is  sometimes  employed  to  designate  induction. 

the  process  of  investigation  and  of  its  collect- 
ing facts  ; - sometimes,  the  deducing  of  an  inference  from 
those  facts.  The  former  of  these  processes  (viz.  that  of  ob- 
servation and  experiment)  is  undoubtedly  distinct  from  that 
which  takes  place  in  the  Syllogism  ; but  then  it  is  not  a pro- 
cess of  argumentation  ; the  latter  again  is  an  argumentative 
process  ; but  then  it  is,  like  all  other  arguments,  capable  of 
being  Syllogistically  expressed.  And  hence  Induction  has 
come  to  be  regarded  as  a distinct  kind  of  argument  from  the 
Syllogism.  This  Fallacy  cannot  be  more  concisely  or  clear- 
ly stated,  than  in  the  technical  form  with  which  we  may  now 
presume  our  readers  to  be  familiar. 

“Induction  is  distinct  from  Syllogism  : 

Induction  is  a process  of  Reasoning  ; ” therefore 
“ There  is  a process  of  Reasoning  distinct  from  SyllogisT1. ' 

Here  “ Induction,”  which  is  the  Middle-Term,  is  used  in 
different  senses  in  the  two  Premisses. 

induction,  so  far  forth  as  it  is  an  argument , may,  of  course 
22 


254 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


be  stated  Syllogistically  : but  so  far  forth  as  it  is  a process  oj 
inquiry  with  a view  to  obtain  the  Premisses  of  that  argument, 
it  is,  of  course,  out  of  the  province  of  Logic : and  the  latter 
is  the  original  and  strict  sense  of  the  word.  Induction  mean* 
properly,  no‘.  the  inferring  of  the  conclusion,  but  the  bringing 
in,  one  by  one,  of  instances,  bearing  on  the  point  in  question, 
till  a sufficient  number  has  been  collected.  The  ambiguity 
therefore,  above  alluded  to,  and  which  has  led  to  much  con- 
fusion, would  be  best  avoided  by  saying  that  we  do  not,  strictly 

speaking,  reason  by  Induction,  but  reason  from 

r>opa  sense  jnc|uction  . ^ e.  from  our  observations  on  one 
of  Induction. 

or  on  several  individuals,  {lx  rcJr  xuO'  sxuvtoi') 
we  draw  a conclusion  respecting  the  Class  (r6  xti&olov)  they 
come  under : or,  in  like  manner,  from  several  Species,  to  the 
Genus  which  comprehends  them  : — in  logical  language,  what 
we  have  predicated  of  certain  singular- terms,  we  proceed  to 
predicate  of  a common- term  which  comprehends  them; — or 
proceed  in  the  same  manner  from  Species  to  Genus.  E.  G. 
“ The  Earth  moves  round  the  Sun  in  an  elliptical  orbit ; so 
Ices  Mercury;  and  Venus;  and  Mars,  Sfc. : therefore  a 
Planet  (the  common-term  comprehending  these  singulars} 
moves  round,”  fyc.  “ Philip  was  reckless  of  human  life  ; so 
was  Alexander  ; and  J.  Cajsar ; and  Augustus,  8pc. .'  there- 
fore this  is  the  general  character  of  a Conqueror.’’'1 

Now  it  appears  as  if  the  most  obvious  and  simplest  way  of 
filling  up  such  enthymemes  as  these,  expressed  as  they  are, 
would  be  in  the  third  figure  ; having  of  course  a particulat 
Conclusion  : 


Inductive 
Argument  ex- 
pressed in  a 
Syllogism. 


“ Earth,  Mercury,  Venus,  fyc.  move,  fyc 
Mi.  These  are  planets  ; therefore 
Some  planets  move,  fyc." 


JiiAJ*.  I.  $ l.j 


OF  INDUCTION. 


255 


Jut  when  we  argue  from  Induction  we  generally  mean  to 

nfer  more  than  a particular  conclusion  ; and  accordingly  most 

iogical  writers  present  to  us  the  argument  in  the  form  of  a 

syllogism  in  Barbara;  inserting,  of  course,  a different  mino’ 

premiss  from  the  foregoing,  viz. : the  simple 

converse  of  it.  And  if  I am  allowed  to  assume,  the  ^rst 

figure. 

not  merely  that  “ Mercury,  Venus,  and  what- 
ever others  I may  have  named,  are  Planets,”  but  also,  that 
“ All  Planets  are  these,”  — that  these  are  the  whole  of  the 
individuals  comprehended  under  the  Term  Planet,  — I am  ro 
doubt,  authorized  to  draw  a universal  conclusion.  But  such 
an  assumption  would,  in  a very  great  majority  of  cases  where 
Induction  is  employed,  amount  to  a palpable  falsehood,  if  un- 
derstood literally.  For  it  is  but  seldom  that  we 

I*  erfiect~ 

find  an  instance  of  what  Logicians  call  a “ per-  ducnon 
fect-induction  ; ” viz.  where  there  is  a complete 
enumeration  of  all  the  individuals,  respecting  which  we  assert 
collectively  what  we  had  before  asserted  separately ; as 
“ John  is  in  England  ; and  so  is  Thomas  ; and  so  is  William  ; 
and  all  the  sons  of  such  a one  are  John,  Thomas,  and  Wil- 
liam; therefore  all  his  sons  are  in  England.”  Such  cases,  I 
say,  seldom  occur;  and  still  more  rarely  can  such  an  Induc- 
tion (which  Bacon  characterizes  as  “ res  puerilis  ” *)  — since 
it  does  not  lead  the  mind  from  what  is  better-known  to  what  is 
less-known  — serve  any  important  purpose. 

But  in  such  Inductions  as  are  commonly  employed,  the 
assumption  of  such  a minor-premiss  as  in  the  above-example 


* It  may  very  well  happen  too,  that  (as  in  the  example  above)  a 
certain  circumstance  may,  in  fact,  belong  to  each  individual  of  a cer- 
tain class,  and  yet  may  have  no  connection,  except  accidentally,  with 
the  Class  itself,  as  such ; i.  e.  with  the  description  of  it,  and  that  which 
wnsttiutes  it  a Hass.  (See  Appen.  II.  Ex  118.) 


256 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


premiss  sup 
pressed. 


would  be,  as  I have  said,  strictly  speaking,  a false  assumption 
And  accordingly  those  logicians  who  state  an  argument  from 
Induction  in  the  above  form,  mean,  I apprehend,  that  it  is  to 
be  understood  with  a certain  latitude  ; i.  e.  that,  in  such  prop- 
ositions as  “ all  planets  are  Mercury,  Venus,  or  “ al' 
conquerors  are  Philip,  Alexander,  and  Caesar,”  they  mean 
(by  a kind  of  logical  fiction)  to  denote  that  “all  Conquerors 
are  adequately  represented  by  Philip,  Alexander,  c )-c.”  — that 
these  individual  persons  or  cases  are  a sufficient  sample , in 
respect  of  the  matter  in  question,  of  the  Class  they  belong  to. 

I think  it  clearer,  therefore,  to  state  simply 
The  Major  an(j  precjse]y  what  it  is  that  we  do  mean  to 
assert.  And  in  doing  this,  we  shall  find  that 
the  expressed  premiss  of  the  enthymeme,  viz. : 
that  which  contains  the  statement  respecting  the  individuals — ■ 
is  the  Minor ; and  that  it  is  the  Major  that  is  suppressed,  as 
being  in  all  cases  substantially  the  same : viz.  that  what,  be - 
lonprs  to  the  individual  or  individuals  we  have  examined, 
belongs  (certainly,  or  probably,  as  the  case  may  be)  to  the 
whole  class  under  which  they  come.  E.  G.  From  finding  on 
examination  of  several  sheep,  that  they  each  ruminate,  we 
conclude  that  the  same  is  the  case  with  the  whole  Species  of 
sheep  : and  from  finding  on  examination  of  the  sheep,  ox 
deer,  and  other  animals  deficient  in  upper  cutting-teeth,  that 
they  each  ruminate,  we  conclude  (with  more  or  less  certainty) 
that  quadrupeds  thus  deficient  are  ruminants:  the  hearer 
readily  supplying,  in  sense,  the  suppressed  major  premiss  • 
viz.  tnat  “ what  belongs  to  the  individual  sheep  we  have  ex- 
amined, is  likely  to  belong  to  the  whole  species  Spc. 

Whether  that  which  is  properly  called  Induction  (viz.  the 
inquiry  respecting  the  sev«ral  individuals  or  species)  be  suffi- 
c'ently  ample,  i.  e.  takes  in  a sufficient  number  of  individual 


CHAP.  I.  $ 1.] 


OF  INDUCTION. 


257 


or  of  specific  cases,  — whe  her  the  character  of  those  cases 
has  been  correctly  ascertained  — and  how  far  the  individuals 
we  have  examined  are  likely  to  resemble , in  this  or  that  cir- 
cumstance, the  rest  of  the  class,  fyc.  fyc.,  are  points  that 
require  indeed  great  judgment  and  caution;  but  this  judgment 
and  caution  are  not  to  be  aided  by  Logic  ; because  they  are, 
in  reality,  employed  in  deciding  whether  or  not  it  is  fair  and 
allowable  to  lay  down  your  Premisses  ; i.  e.  whether  you  are 
authorized  or  not,  to  assert,  that  “ what  is  true  of  the  individ- 
uals you  have  examined,  is  true  of  the  whole  class : ” and 
that  this  or  that  is  true  of  those  individuals.  Now,  the  rules 
of  Logic  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the 
Premisses  ; except,  of  course,  when  they  are  the  conclusions 
of  former  arguments  ; but  merely  teach  us  to  decide,  not, 
whether  the  Premisses  are  fairly  laid  down , but  whether  the 
Conclusion  follows  fairly  from  the  Premisses  or  not. 

It  has  however  been  urged  that  what  are  de- 
scribed as  the  Major-premisses  in  drawing  infer-  Necessity  oj 

T i .ill-  i assuming  a 

ences  Irom  Inductions,  are  resolvable  ultimately  „r  . 

J Major  - Frem- 

into  an  assertion  of  the  “ Uniformity  of  the  laws  ^s. 

of  Nature,”  or  some  equivalent  proposition ; 

and  that  this  is,  itself,  obtained  by  Induction ; whence  it  is 

concluded  that  there  must  be  at  least  one  Induction  — and 

that,  the  one  on  which  all  others  depend  — incapable  of  being 

exhibited  in  a Syllogistic  form 

But  it  is  evident,  and  is  universally  admitted,  that  in  every 
case  where  an  inference  is  drawn  from  Induction  (unless  that 
name  is  to  be  given  to  a mere  random  guess  without  any 
grounds  at  all)  we  must  form  a judgment  that  the  instance  ol 
instances  adduced  are  “ sufficient  to  authorize  the  Conclu- 
sion ; ” — that  it  is  “ allowable  ” to  take  these  instances  as  a 
sample  warranting  an  inference  respecting  the  whole  Class 
22  * 


258 


jN  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


Now  tli?  expression  of  this  judgment  in  words,  is  the 
Major-premiss  alluded  to.  To  acknowledge  this,  therefore 
is  to  acknowledge  that  all  reasoning  from  Induction  without 
exception  does  admit  of  being  exhibited  in  a syllogistic  form 
and  consequently  that  to  speak  of  one  Induction  that  does  no 
admit  of  it,  is  a contradiction. 

Whether  the  belief  in  the  constancy  of  Nature’s  laws,  — a 
belief  of  which  no  one  can  divest  himself — be  intuitive  and 
a part  of  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind,  as  some  emi- 
nent metaphysicians  hold,  or  acquired,  and  in  what  way  ac- 
quired, is  a question  foreign  to  our  present  purpose.  For  that, 
it  is  sufficient  to  have  pointed  out  that  the  necessity  of  assum- 
ing a universal  Major-premiss,  expressed  or  understood,  in 
order  to  draw  any  legitimate  inference  from  Induction,  is  vir- 
tually acknowledged  even  by  those  who  endeavor  to  dispute  it. 

§ 2. 

Whether  then  the  Premiss  may  fairly  be  as- 

Assumption  sume(i  or  not5  ;s  a p0;nt  which  cannot  be  de- 
of  Premisses 

m Induction.  cided  without  a competent  knowledge  of  the 
nature  of  the  subject.  E.  G.  in  most  branches 
of  Natural  Philosophy,  in  which  the  circumstances  that  in 
any  case  affect  the  result,  are  usually  far  more  clearly  ascer- 
tained than  in  human  affairs,  a single  instance  is  usually  ac- 
counted a sufficient  Induction  ; e.  g.  having  once  ascertained 
that  an  individual  magnet  will  attract  iron,  we  are  authorized 
to  conclude  that  this  property  is  universal.  In  Meteorology, 
how'ever,  and  some  other  branches  of  Natural-philosophy,  in 
which  less  advancement  has  been  made,  a much  more  copious 
Induction  would  be  required.  And  in  respect  of  the  affairs 
of  human  life,  an  inference  from  a single  instance  would 
hardly  ever  be  deemed  allowable. 


Cuap.  I.  § 2.] 


OF  INDUCTION. 


259 


But  it  is  worth  remarking,  that  in  all  cases  alike,  of  reason- 
ing from  Induction,  the  greater  or  less  degree  of  confidence 
we  feel  is  always  proportioned  to  the  belief  of  our  having 
more  or  less  completely  ascertained  all  the  circumstances  that 
bear  upon  the  question.  All  men  practically  acknowledge 
this  to  hold  good  in  all  cases  alike,  physical  or  moral,  by  inva- 
riably attributing  any  failure  in  their  anticipations  in  any  cas', 
to  some  ignorance  or  miscalculation  respecting  some  circum- 
stances connected  with  the  case.  (See  Append.  I.  Art.  “ Im- 
possible.”) 

In  some  subjects,  however,  there  will  usually  be  more  of 
these  circumstances  difficult  to  be  accurately  ascertained, 
than  in  others ; and  the  degree  of  certainty  belonging  to 
the  Major-premiss,  will  vary  accordingly.  But  universally, 
the  degree  of  evidence  for  any  proposition  we  set  out  with 
as  a Premiss  (whether  the  expressed  or  the  suppressed  one) 
is  not  to  be  learned  from  mere  Logic,  nor  indeed  from  any 
one  distinct  Science  ; but  is  the  province  of  whatever  Science 
furnishes  the  subject-matter  of  your  argument.  None  but 
a Politician  can  judge  rightly  of  the  degree  of  evidence 
of  a proposition  in  Politics ; a Naturalist,  in  Natural  His- 
tory, Sfc. 

E.  G.  from  examination  of  many  horned 

, , c ,T  , Investigation. 

animals,  as  sheep,  cows,  <yc.,  a Naturalist  finds 

that  they  have  cloven  feet ; now  his  skill  as  a Naturalist  is  to 
be  shown  in  judging  whether  these  animals  are  likely  to  re- 
semble in  the  form  of  their  feet  all  other  horned  animals  ; 
and  it  is  the  exercise  of  this  judgment,  together  with  the 
examination  of  individuals,  that  constitutes  what  is  usually 
meant  by  the  Inductive  process  , which  is  that  by  which  w« 
gain,  what  are  properly,  new  truths ; and  which  is  not  con 
nected  with  Logic  ; being  not  what  is  strictly  c-aded  Reason 


260 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  TBook  IV. 


ing,  hut  Investigation  But  when  this  major  Premiss  is 
granted  him,  and  is  combined  witli  the  minor,  viz.  that  the 
animals  he  has  examined  have  cloven  feet,  then  he  draws  the 
Conclusion  logically  ; viz.  that.  “ the  feet  of  all  horned  ani- 
mals are  cloven.”*  Again,  if  from  several  times  meeting 
with  ill-luck  on  a Friday,  any  one  concluded  that  Friday 
universally,  is  an  unlucky  day,  one  would  object  to  his  Indue 
tion  ; and  yet  it  would  not  be,  as  an  argument,  illogical , 
since  the  Conclusion  follows  fairly,  if  you  grant  his  implied 
Premiss  ; viz.  that  the  events  which  happened  on  those  partic- 
ular Fridays  are  such  as  must  happen,  or  are  especially  likely 
to  happen,  on  all  Fridays : but  we  should  object  to  his  laying 
down  this  Premiss  ; and  therefore  should  justly  say  that  his 
Induction  is  faulty,  though  his  argument  is  correct. 

And  here  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the  ordi- 

The  move  • 

, , . , „ nary  rule  for  fair  argument,  viz.  that  in  an 
doubtful  Pre-  J 

miss  suppress-  Enthymeme  the  suppressed  Premiss  should  be 
ed  in  Indue-  always  the  one  of  whose  truth  least  doubt,  can 
exist,  is  not  observed  in  Induction  : for  the  Prem- 
iss which  is  usually  the  more  doubtful  of  the  two,  is,  in  this 
case,  the  major ; it  being  in  many  cases  not  quite  certain  that 
the  individuals,  respecting  which  some  point  has  been  ascer- 
tained, are  to  be  fairly  regarded  as  a sample  of  the  whole 
class  : and  yet  the  major-Premiss  is  seldom  expressed  ; for 
the  reason  just  given,  that  it  is  easily  understood  ; as  bei.,g 
(: mutatis  mutandis)  the  same  in  every  Induction. 

What  has  been  said  of  Induction  will  equally  apply  to  Ex- 
ample ; which  differs  from  it  only  in  having  a singular , 


* I have  selected,  an  Instance  in  which  Induction  is  the  only  ground 
we  nave  to  rest  on  ; no  reason,  that  I know  of,  having  ever  been  as 
signed  that  could  have  led  us  to  conjecturr  this  curious  fact  a,  priori. 


Chat.  J.  § 2 J 


OF  INDUCTION. 


261 


instead  of  a general,  conclusion ; and  that,  from  a singlt 
case.  E.  G.  in  one  of  the  instances  above,  if  the  conclusion 
had  been  drawn,  not  respecting  conquerors  in  general,  hut  re 
specting  this  or  that  conqueror,  that  he  was  not  likely  to  be 
careful  of  human  life,  each  of  the  cases  adduced  to  prove  this 
would  have  been  called  an  Example.  (See  Elements  of 
Rhetoric , Part  I.  ch.  ii.  § 6.) 

Some  have  maintained  that  in  employing  an  Example  we 
proceed  at  once  from  one  individual  case  to  another,  without 
the  intervention  of  any  universal  premiss.  But  whether  we 
are  fairly  authorized  or  not  to  draw  an  inference  from  any 
example,  must  depend  on  what  is  called  the  parallelism  of 
the  two  cases ; i.  e.  their  being  likely  to  agree  in  respect  of 
the  point  in  question  : and  the  assertion,  in  words,  of  this  par- 
allelism, is  a universal  proposition.  He  who  has  in  his  mina 
this  proposition,  has  virtually  asserted  such  a major-premiss  as 
I have  been  speaking  of : and  he  who  has  it  not,  if  he  should 
be  right  in  the  inference  itself  that  he  draws,  is,  confessedly 
right  only  by  chance. 

From  what  has  been  said  in  this,  and  in  the  preceding  sec 
tion,  it  will  be  seen,  1 trust,  how  untenable  are  the  objections 
which  have  of  late  years  been  urged,  with  an  air  of  triumph, 
against  the  above  explanations  of  the  process  of  reasoning 
from  Induction  and  Example.  Those  objections,  though  hav- 
ing, at  the  first  glance,  an  air  of  philosophical  ingenuity,  are 
found,  on  a closer  examination,  utterly  unmeaning  and  self- 
destructive; since  they  imply  a complete  admission,  though 
ai  different  words,  of  the  very  princij  f objected  to. 


262 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


[Book  IV 


Chap.  II.  — On  the  Discovery  oj  Truth. 

§ 1. 

Whether  it  is  by  a process  of  Reasoning  that  New  Truths 
are  brought  to  light,  is  a question  which  seems  to  be  decided 
in  the  negative  by  what  has  been  already  said  ; though  many 
eminent  writers  seem  to  have  taken  for  gran.cd  the  affirma- 
tive. It  is,  perhaps,  in  a great  measure,  a dispute  concerning 
the  use  of  words ; but  it  is  not,  for  that  reason,  either  uninter- 
esting or  unimportant ; since  an  inaccurate  use  of  language 
may  often,  in  matters  of  Science,  lead  to  confusion  of  thought, 
and  to  erroneous  conclusions.  And,  in  the  present  instance, 
much  of  the  undeserved  contempt  which  has  been  bestowed 
on  the  Logical  system  may  be  traced  to  this  source.  For 
when  any  one  has  laid  down,  that  “ Reasoning  is  important 
in  the  discovery  of  Truth,”  and  that  “ Logic  is  of  no  service 
in  the  discovery  of  Truth,”  (each  of  which  propositions  is 
true  in  a certain  sense  of  the  terms  employed,  but  not  in  the 
same  sense,)  he  is  naturally  led  to  conclude  that  there  are  pro- 
cesses of  Reasoning  to  which  the  Syllogistic  theory  does  not 
apply  ; and,  of  course,  to  misconceive  altogether  the  nature 
of  the  Science. 

In  maintaining  the  negative  side  of  the  above 

Different  uses  -ugg^Qn  three  things  are  to  be  premised  : first, 
if  the  words  1 

M discovery  ” that  it  is  not  contended  that  discoveries  of  any 
and  “ new ” kind  of  Truth  beyond  what  actually  falls  under 
as  applied  to  tjie  senseg5  can  be  made  for  at  least  are  usuall]’ 
made;  without  Reasoning  ; only,  that  Reason- 
ing is  no',  the  whole  of  the  process,  nor  the  whole  of  that 
which  is  important  tnerein  ; secondly,  that  Reasoning  shut!  be 


Chap.  II.  j I.]  DISCOVERY  OF  TRUTH.  2<)3 

taken  in  the  sense,  not  of  every  exercise  of  the  Reason,  but 
of  Argumentation , in  which  we  have  all  along  used  it,  and  in 
which  it  has  been  defined  by  all  the  Logical  writers,  viz. 
“ from  certain  granted  propositions  to  infer  another  propo- 
sition as  the  consequence  of  them  : ” thirdly,  that  by  a “ New 
Truth,”  be  understood,  something  neither  expressly  nor  vir- 
tually asserted  before,  — not  implied  [involved]  in  any  thing 
already  known. 

To  prove,  then,  this  point  demonstratively,  becomes,  on 
these  data,  perfectly  easy ; for  since  all  Reasoning  (in  the 
sense  above  defined)  may  be  resolved  into  Syllogisms  ; and 
since  even  the  objectors  to  Logic  make  it  a subject  of  com- 
plaint, that  in  a Syllogism  the  Premisses  do  virtually  assert 
the  Conclusion,  it  follows  at  once  that  no  New  Truth  (as  above 
defined)  can  be  elicited  by  any  process  of  Reasoning. 

It  is  on  this  ground,  indeed,  that  the  justly-celebrated  author 
of  the  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric , and  many  others,  have  ob- 
jected to  the  Syllogism  altogether,  as  necessarily  involving  a 
pelitio  principii ; an  objection  which,  of  course,  he  would 
not  have  been  disposed  to  bring  forward,  had  he  perceived 
that,  whether  well  or  ill-founded,  it  lies  against  all  arguments 
whatever.  Had  he  been  aware  that  a Syllogism  is  no  distinct 
kind  of  argument  otherwise  than  in  form,  but  is,  in  fact,  any 
argument  whatever,*  stated  regularly  and  at  full  length,  he 
would  have  obtained  a more  correct  view  of  the  object  of  all 
Reasoning  ; which  is  merely  to  expand  and  unfold  the  asser- 
tions wrapt  up,  as  it  were,  and  implied  in  those  with  which  we 
set  out,  and  to  bring  a person  to  perceive  and  acknowledge 


* Which  llugald  Stewart  admits,  though  he  adopts  Campbell'i 
o ejection 


2(5  1 ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 

the  full  force  of  that  which  he  has  admitted  ; — to  contemplate 
it  in  various  points  of  view;  — to  admit  in  one  shape  what  he 
has  already  admitted  in  another,  — and  to  give  up  and  dis- 
allow whatever  is  inconsistent  with  it. 

Nor  is  it  always  a very  easy  task  to  bring 
Development  before  the  mind  the  several  bearings,  — the  va- 
ofthe  meaning  rjoug  applications,  — of  even  anyone  proposi- 
tion. A common  Term  comprehends  an  indef- 
inite — sometimes  a very  great  — number  of  individuals,  and 
often  of  Classes;  and  these,  often,  in  some  respects,  widely 
differing  from  each  other:  and  no  one  can  be,  on  each  occa- 
sion of  his  employing  such  a Term,  attending  to  and  fixing 
his  mind  on  each  of  the  Individuals,  or  even  of  the  Species, 
so  comprehended.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  too,  that  both 
Division  and  Generalization  are  in  a great  degree  arbitrary, 
i.  e.  that  we  may  both  divide  the  same  genus  on  several  differ- 
ent principles,  and  may  refer  the  same  individuals  or  species 
to  several  different  classes,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  dis- 
course and  drift  of  the  argument ; each  of  which  classes  will 
furnish  a distinct  Middle-Term  for  an  argument,  according  to 
the  question.  E.  G.  If  we  wish  to  prove  that  “ a horse  feels,” 
(to  adopt  an  ill-chosen  example  from  the  above  writer,)  we 
might  refer  it  to  the  genus  “ animal ; ” to  prove  that  “ it  has 
only  a single  stomach,”  to  the  genus  of  “ non-ruminants  ; ” to 
prove  that  it  is  “ likely  to  degenerate  in  a very  cold  climate,” 
we  should  class  it  with  “ original  productions  of  a hot  cli- 
mate,” 4*c.  <^c.  Now,  each  of  these,  and  numberless  others 
to  which  the  same  thing  might  be  referred,  are  implied  by  the 
very  term,  “ horse  ; ” yet  it  cannot  be  expected  that  they  can 
rII  be  at  once  present  to  the  mind  whenever  that  term  is 
altered.  Much  less,  when,  instead  of  such  a Term  as  that 


Chap.  II.  4 2.] 


DISCOVERY  OF  TRUTH. 


265 


we  are  employing  Terms  of  a very  abstract  and,  perhaps, 
complex  signification,*  as  “ government,  justice,”  fyc. 

When  then  we  say  “ Every  Y is  Z,  and  X is  Y,”  then  may 
be  an  indefinite,  and  perhaps  a great  number  of  other  terms 
of  which  “ Z ” might  be  affirmed  ; but  we  fix  our  minds  on 
one,  viz.  “ Y ; ” of  which  again  an  indefinite  number  of  other 
predicates  besides  “ Z ” might  be  affirmed;  and  then  again 
out  of  an  indefinite  number  of  things  of  which  “ Y ” might 
be  affirmed,  we  fix  on  “ X ; ” thus  bringing  before  the  mind, 
— where  it  is  needful  to  express  both  premisses,  — what  must 
in  every  case  be  assumed, — whether  stated  in  words,  or  un- 
derstood— in  order  to  draw  the  Conclusion.  And  usually 
this  process  has  to  be  repeated  for  the  proof  of  one  or  botn 
of  the  premisses ; and  perhaps  again,  for  the  premisses  by 
which  they  are  proved  ; Sgc.  '■  • 

But  one  cause  which  has  led  the  above-mentioned  writers 

into  their  error,  is,  their  selecting  examples  (such  as,  it  must 

be  owned,  are  abundant  in  Logical  treatises)  in  which  the 

Conclusion  is  merely  a portion  of  what  one  of  the  Premisses 

by  itself  has  already  implied  in  the  very  signification  of  the 

term  that  is  taken  as  its  Subject,  so  plainly  as 

to  be  present  to  the  mind  of  every  one  who  E Vl ^ eonse- 

utters  it:  as,  in  the  above  example,  the  very  1fience  °f  se~ 

lectmg  trifling 

term  “horse”  implies  [“connotes”]  “animal”  examples. 
to  every  one  who  utters  those  words  and  under- 
stands their  meaning.f  And  hence  it  is  that  some  writers  not 
destitute  of  intelligence  have  been  led  to  imagine  that  in  Rea- 
soning we  draw  a Conclusion  from  a single  Premiss. 


* On  this  point  there  are  some  valuable  remarks  in  the  Philosophy 
vf  Rhetoric  itself,  Book  IV.  Chap.  vii. 
t See  Book  II.  Chap.  v.  § 1. 

23 


266 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


But  suppose,  instead  of  such  an  example  as  Campbell,  &c. 
fix  on,  we  take  that  of  the  inference  drawn  by  some  Natu- 
ralist  respecting  a fossil-animal,  which  he  concludes  to  be  a 
; ruminant”  from  its  having  horns  on  the  skull.  The  labor- 
ers perhaps  who  dug  up  the  remains,  may  be  ignorant  that 
“ all  horned  animals  are  ruminant ; ” and  a naturalist  again 
who  is  not  on  the  spot,  and  has  heard  but  an  imperfect  ac- 
count of  the  skeleton,  may  be  ignorant  that  “ this  animal  was 
horned.”  Now  neither  of  these  parties  could  arrive  at  the  con- 
clusion that  “ it  was  a ruminant.”  But  when  the  two  premisses 
are  combined , they  do,  jointly  imply  and  virtually  assert  the 
conclusion  ; though,  separately,  neither  of  them  does  so. 


which  they  cannot  afterwards  escape.  But  a man  can  escape 
admitting  the  truth  of  a conclusion  : he  may  perceive  its 
falsity  ; and  may  thus  be  taught  the  falsity  of  one  of  the  Prem- 
isses. But  in  a case  where  neither  of  these  alternatives  is 
necessary — where,  after  admitting  the  whole  of  what  is  as- 
sumed to  be  certain  or  probable,  you  are  left  free  to  admit  or 
deny  what  is  inferred,  and  have  no  more  knowledge  of  its 
certainty  or  of  its  probability  than  you  had  before,  — this, 
every  one  would  perceive  to  be  no  real,  but  only  an  apparent 
argument. 

But,  as  I have  said,  the  flat  truisms  commonly  given  as 
examples  by  logical  writers,  have  led  those  who  have  not 
carefully  analyzed  the  reasoning- process  generally,  into  the 
notion  that  a Syllogism  is  necessarily  of  that  trifling  character. 
He  who  has  asserted  that  the  two  items  of  a certain  account 
are  3 and  2,  has  virtually  asserted  that  the  sum-total  is  5 : and 


Syllogism 
represented,  as 
a snare. 


And  hence  a Syllogism  has  been  represented 
(even  by  those  who  acknowledge  that  all  sound 
Reasoning  may  be  exhibited  in  that  form)  as  a 
contrivance  for  ensnaring  men  in  a trap  fron 


Chap  II.  (I] 


DISCOVERY  OF  TRUTH. 


2L” 

of  this  few  would  need  even  to  be  reminded : but  it  is  eqund) 
certain  that  he  who  has  stated  the  items^when  they  amount  to 
some  hundreds,  has,  virtually  asserted  that  the  sum-total  is  so 
and  so  ; and  yet  the  readiest  accountant  requires,  in  this  case, 
some  time  to  bring  these  items  together  before  his  mind. 

A Subject  concerning  which  something  is  to  be  proved,  is 
teferred,  as  has  been  above  remarked,  to  this  or  to  that  Class, 
according  to  what  it  is  that  is  to  be  proved. 

The  Categories  * or  Predicaments,  which 
Aristotle  and  other  Logical  writers  have  treated  CatefforiM- 
of,  being  certain  general-heads  or  summa  genera , to  one  or 
more  of  which  every  Term  may  be  referred,  serve  the  pur- 
pose of  marking  out  certain  tracks,  as  it  were,  which  are  to 
be  pursued  in  searching  for  middle  Terms,  in  each  argument 
.esp-'ctively  ; it  being  essential  that  we  should  generalize  on  a 
right  principle,  with  a view  tc  the  question  before  us  ; or,  in 
other  words,  that  we  should  abstract  that  portion  of  any  ob- 
ject presented  to  the  mind,  which  is  important  to  the  argu- 
ment in  hand.  There  are  expressions  in  common  use  which 
have  a reference  to  this  caution : such  as,  “ this  is  a question, 
not  as  to  the  nature  of  the  object,  but  the  magnitude  of  it : ” 
* this  is  a question  of  time,  or  of  place,"  ^-c.,  i.  e.  “ the  sub- 
ject must  be  referred  to  this  or  to  that  Category.” 


* The  Categories  enumerated  by  Aristotle,  are  ovala,  noauv,  noior, 
tiqooti , 7iov,  7ZUT& , xsCa&ai,  c/ttv,  Tionir,  naa/tiv;  which  are  usually 
rendered,  as  adequately  as,  perhaps,  they  can  be  in  our  language,  Sub 
stance,  Quantity,  Quality,  Relation,  Place,  Time,  Situation,  Posses 
sion,  Action,  Suffering.  The  Catalogue  (which  certainly  is  hut  a very 
crude  one)  has  been  by  some  writers  enlarged,  as  it  is  evident  may 
easily  be  done  by  subdividing  some  of  the  heads  ; and  by  others  cur 
tailed,  as  it  is  no  less  evident  that  all  may  ult.mately  be  referred  to  th< 
two  heads  of  Substance,  and  Attribute,  or  (in  the  language  of  some  Lo- 
gicians) Accident. 


268 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  01  REASONING  [Boob.  IV 


With  respect  to  the  meaning  of  the  Terms  in  Question 

“ Discovery,”  and  “ New  Truth  ; ” it  matters  not  whether  wa 

confine  ourselves  to  the  narrowest  sense,  cr  admit  the  widest, 

provided  we  do  but  distinguish.  There  certainly  ait  two 

kinds  of  “New  Truth”  and  of  “ Discovery,’1 
Ttco  kinds  of  . 

Discovery  11  we  ta*e  taose  vvords  in  the  widest  sense  in 
which  they  are  ever  used.  First,  such  Truths 
as  were,  before  they  were  discovered,  absolutely  unknown, 
being  not  implied  by  anything  we  previously  knew,  though  we 
might  perhaps  suspect  them  as  probable.  Such  are  all  mat- 
ters of  fact  strictly  so  called,  when  first  made  known  to  one 
who  had  not  any  such  previous  knowledge,  as  would  enable 
him  to  ascertain  them  a priori ; i.  e.  by  Reasoning;  as  if  we 
inform  a man  that  we  have  a colony  in  New-South-Wales  ; or 
that  the  Earth  is  at  such  a distance  from  the  sun  ; or  that  plat- 
ina  is  heavier  than  gold.  The  communication  of  this  kind 
of  knowledge  is  most  usually,  and  most  strictly, 
called  information.  We  gain  it  from  observa- 
tion, and  from  testimony.  No  mere  internal  workings  of 
our  own  minds  (except  when  the  mind  itself  is  the  very  object 
to  be  observed),  or  mere  discussions  in  words,  will  make  a 
fact  known  to  us ; though  there  is  great  room  for  sagacity  in 
judging  what  testimony  to  admit , and  in  the  forming  of  con- 
jectures that  may  lead  to  prof  table  observation , and  to  exper- 
iments with  a view  to  it. 

The  other  class  of  Discoveries  is  of  a very 
different  nature.  That  which  may  be  elicited 
by  Reasoning,  and  consequently  is  implied  in  that  which  we 
already  know,  we  assent  to  on  that  ground,  and  not  from 
observation  or  testimony.  To  take  a Geometrical  truth  upon 
trust,  or  to  attempt  to  ascertain  it  by  observation,  would  betraj 
a total  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  the  Sc'erre.  In  the  longes 


Information. 


Instruction. 


Chap.  ll.  $ 1.] 


DISCOVERY  OF  TROTH. 


26* 


demonstration,  the  Mathematical  teacher  seems  only  to  lead 
us  to  make  use  of  our  own  stores,  and  point  out  to  us  how 
much  we  had  already  admitted  ; and  in  the  case  of  many 
Ethical  propositions,  we  assent  at  first  hearing,  though  per* 
hap 3 we  had  never  heard  or  thought  of  the  proposition  before, 
So  also  do  we  readily  assent  to  the  testimony  of  a respecta- 
ble man  who  tells  us  that  our  troops  have  gained  a victory  ; 
but  how  different  is  the  nature  of  the  assent  in  the  two  cases. 
In  the  latter  we  are  disposed  to  thank  the  man  for  his  in- 
formation, as  being  such  as  no  wisdom  or  learning  would 
have  enabled  us  to  ascertain  ; in  the  former,  we  usually  ex- 
claim '•'•very  true /”  “that  is  a valuable  and  just  remark; 
that  never  struck  me  before ! ” implying  at  once  our  practi- 
cal ignorance  of  it,  and  also  our  consciousness  that  we  pos 
sess,  in  what  we  already  know,  the  means  to  ascertain  the 
truth  of  it ; that  we  have  a right,  in  short,  to  bear  our  testi- 
mony to  its  truth. 

To  all  practical  purposes,  indeed,  a Truth  of  this  descrip- 
tion may  be  as  completely  unknown  to  a man  as  the  other 
but  as  soon  as  it  is  set  before  him,  and  the  argument  by  which 
it  is  connected  with  his  previous  notions  is  made  clear  to  him, 
he  recognizes  it  as  something  conformable  to,  and  contained 
in,  his  former  belief. 

It  is  not  improbable  that  Plato’s  doctrine  of 

. . , . . - e Plato’s  theory. 

Reminiscence  arose  from  a hasty  extension  ot 

what  he  had  observed  in  this  class,  to  all  acquisition  of  know1- 

edge  whatever.  His  Theory  of  ideas  served  to  confound 

together  matters  of  fact  respecting  the  nature  of  things,  (which 

may  be  perfectly  new  to  us)  with  propositions  relating  to  out 

own  notions , and  modes  of  thought:  (or  to  speak,  perhaps, 

more  correctly,  our  own  arbitrary  Signs)  which  propositions 

must  be  contained  and  implied  in  those  very  complex  notion* 

23  * 


270 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [B>o&  IV 


themselves  ; and  whose  tnr.h  is  a conformity,  not  to  the  na- 
ture of  things,  but  to  our  own  hypothesis.  Such  arc  all  prop* 
ositions  in  pure  Mathematics,  and  many  in  Ethics,  viz.  those 
which  involve  no  assertion  as  to  real  matters  of  fact.  It  has 
been  rightly  remarked,*  that  Mathematical  propositions  are 
not  properly  true  or  false,  in  the  same  sense  as  any  propo- 
sition respecting  real  fact  is  so  called.  And  hence,  the  truth 
(such  as  it  is)  of  such  propositions  is  necessary  and  eternal : 
since  it  amounts  only  to  a conformity  with  the  hypothesis  w: 
set  out  with.  The  proposition,  that  “the  belief  in  a futire 
state,  combined  with  a complete  devotion  to  the  present  life, 
is  not  consistent  with  the  character  of  prudence,”  would  be 
not  at  all  the  less  true  if  a future  state  were  a chimera,  and 
prudence  a quality  which  was  nowhere  met  with  ; nor  would 
the  truth  of  the  Mathematician’s  conclusion  be  shaken,  that 
“ circles  are  to  each  other  as  the  squares  of  their  diameters,” 
should  it  be  found  that  there  never  had  been  a circle,  or  a 
square,  conformable  to  the  definition,  in  rerum  naturae. 

And  accordingly  an  able  man,  may,  by  patient  Reasoning, 
attain  any  amount  of  mathematical  truths ; because  these  are 
all  implied  in  the  Definitions.  But  no  degree  of  labor  and 
ability,  would  give  him  the  knowledge,  by  “ Reasoning  ” 
alone , of  what  has  taken  place  in  some  foreign  country  ; nor 
would  enable  him  to  know,  if  he  had  never  seen,  or  heard  of, 
the  experiments,  what  would  become  of  a spoonful  of  salt,  or 
a spoonful  of  chalk,  if  put  into  water,  or  what  would  be  the 
appearance  of  a ray  of  light  when  passed  through  a prism. 

Hence  the  futility  of  the  attempt  of  Clarke, 

Fads,  not  anc|  otjjerSj  to  demonstrate  (in  the  mathematical 
sense)  the  existence  of  a Deity.  This  can  on^ 


Dugald  Stewart’s  Philosophy,  Vol.  H. 


Chap.  II.  § 1.] 


L ISCO VERY  OF  TRUTH. 


271 


be  (apparently)  done  by  covertly  assuming  in  the  Prem  sses 
the  very  point  to  be  proved.  No  matter  of  fact  can  be  math- 
ematically demonstrated  ; though  it  may  be  proved  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  leave  no  doubt  on  the  mind.  E.  G.  1 have  no 
more  doubt  that  I met  such  and  such  a man,  in  this  or  that 
place,  yesterday,  than  that  the  angles  of  a triangle  are  equal 
to  two  right  angles : but  the  kind  of  certainty  I have  of  these 
two  truths  is  widely  different ; to  say,  that  I did  not  meet  the 
man,  would  be  false  indeed,  but  it  would  not  be  any  thing  in- 
conceivable, self  -contradictory , and  absurd  ; but  it  would  be 
so,  to  deny  the  equality  of  the  angles  of  a triangle  to  two 
right  angles. 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  distinguish 

these  two  kinds  of  Discovery  of  Truth.  In  re-  Information 

and  inslnic- 

lation  to  the  former,  as  I have  said,  the  word  tion  distinct 
“ information  ” is  most  strictly  applied  ; the 
communication  of  the  latter  is  more  properly  called  “ instruc- 
tion.I speak  of  the  usual  practice  ; for  it  would  be  going 
too  far  to  pretend  that  writers  are  uniform  and  consistent  in 
the  use  of  these,  or  of  any  other  term.  We  say  that  the  His- 
torian gives  us  information  respecting  past  times ; the  Trav- 
eller, respecting  foreign  countries:  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Mathematician  gives  instruction  in  the  principles  of  his  Sci- 
ence ; the  Moralist  instructs  us  in  our  duties,  &c  However, 
let  the  words  be  used  as  they  may,  the  things  are  evidently 
different,  and  ought  to  be  distinguished.  It  is  a question  com- 
paratively unimportant,  whether  the  term  “ Discovery”  shall 
or  shall  not  be  extended  to  the  eliciting  of  those  Truths, 
which,  being  implied  in  our  previous  knowledge,  may  bo 
pstablished  by  mere  strict  Reasoning. 

Similar  verbal  questions,  indeed,  might  be  raised  respecting 
many  other  cases  : e.  g.  ..ne  has  forgotten  ( i.  e.  cannot  re<sob 


^72 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


lect)  the  name  of  some  person  or  place  ; perhaps  vve  even 
try  to  think  of  it,  but  in  vain ; at  last  some  one  reminds  us, 
and  we  instantly  recognize  it  as  the  one  we  wanted  to  recol- 
lect: it  may  be  asked,  was  this  in  our  mind,  or  not  i The 
answer  is,  that  in  one  sense  it  was,  and  in  another  sense,  it 
was  not.  Or,  again,  suppose  there  is  a vein  of  metal  on  a 
man’s  estate,  which  he  does  not  know  of ; is  it  part  of  his 
possessions  or  not  ? and  when  he  finds  it  out  and  works  it, 
does  he  then  acquire  a new  possession  or  not  ? Certainly  not, 
in  the  same  sense  as  if  he  has  a fresh  estate  bequeathed  to 
him,  which  he  had  formerly  no  right  to  ; but  to  all  practical 
purposes  it  is  a new  possession.  This  case,  indeed,  may 
serve  as  an  illustration  of  the  one  we  have  been  considering ; 
and  in  all  these  cases,  if  the  real  distinction  be  understood, 
the  verbal  question  will  not  be  of  much  consequence. 

To  use  one  more  illustration.  .Reasoning  has  been  aptly 
compared  to  the  piling  together  blocks  of  stone  ; on  each  of 
which,  as  on  a pedestal,  a man  can  raise  himself  a small,  and 
but  a small  height  above  the  plain  ; but  which,  when  skilfully 
built  up,  will  form  a flight  of  steps,  which  will  raise  him  to  a 
great  elevation.  Now  (to  pursue  this  analogy)  when  the  ma- 
terials are  all  ready  to  the  builder’s  hand,  the  blocks  ready 
dug  and  brought,  his  work  resembles  one  of  the  two  kinds  of 
Discovery  just  mentioned,  viz.  that  to  which  we  have  assigned 
the  name  of  instruction  : but  if  his  materials  are  to  be  en- 
tirely, or  in  part,  provided  by  himself,  — if  he  himself  is 
forced  to  dig  fresh  blocks  from  the  quarry,  — this  corresponds 
to  the  other  kind  of  Discovery.* 


* “ The  fundamental  differences  between  these  two  great  branches 
of  human  knowledge,  as  well  as  their  consequences,  cannot  perhaps 
be  more  strikingly  illustrated  than  in  the  following  familiar  exposition 


Css AF.  II.  { 2.] 


DISCOVERY  OF  TRUTH. 


273 


§2. 

I have  hitherto  spoken  of  the  employment  of 

Argument  in  the  establishment  of  those  hypo-  Physical  Dts- 

covents. 

thetical  Truths  (as  they  may  be  called)  which 
relate  only  to  our  own  abstract  notions.  It  is  not,  however 
meant  to  be  insinuated  that  there  is  no  room  for  Reasoning  in 
the  establishment  of  a matter  of  fact : but  the  other  class  of 
Truths  have  first  been  treated  of,  because,  in  discussing  sub 
jects  of  that  kind,  the  process  of  Reasoning  is  always  the 
principal , and  often  the  only  thing  to  be  attended  to,  if  we 
are  but  certain  and  clear  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  terms  ; 
whereas,  when  assertions  respecting  real  existence  are  intro 
duced,  we  have  the  additional  and  more  important  business  of 
ascertaining  and  keeping  in  mind  the  degree  of  evidence  for 
those  facts;  since,  otherwise,  our  Conclusions  could  not  be 
relied  on,  however  accurate  our  Reasoning.  But,  undoubt- 


bv  a celebrated  writer.  ‘A  clever  man,’  says  Sir  J.  Ilerschel,  ‘shut 
up  alone  and  allowed  all  unlimited  time,  might  reason  out  for  himself 
all  the  truths  of  mathematics,  by  proceeding  from  those  simple  notions 
of  space  and  number  of  which  he  cannot  divest  himself  without 
ceasing  to  think  ; but  he  would  never  tell  by  any  effort  of  reasoning 
what  would  become  of  a lump  of  sugar,  if  immersed  in  water,  or 
what  impression  would  be  produced  on  his  eye  by  mixing  the  colors 
yellow  an'1  blue,’  results  which  can  be  learnt  only  from  experience. 

“ Thus  then  the  extremes  of  human  knowledge  may  be  considered 
as  founded  on  the  one  hand  purely  upon  reason,  and  on  the  other 
purely  upon  sense.  Now,  a very  large  portion  of  our  knowledge, 
»nd  what  in  fact  may  be  considered  as  the  most  important  part  of  it, 
lies  between  these  two  extremes,  and  results  from  a union  or  mixture 
them,  that  is  to  say,  consists  of  the  application  of  rational  principles 
to  the  phenomena  presented  by  the  objects  of  nature.”  — Trout’s 
Bridgewater  Treatise,  p.  2. 


274 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


edly,  we  may  by  Reasoning  arrive  at  knowledge  concerning 
matters  of  fact,  if  we  ha \e  facts  to  set  out  with  as  data  ; only 
that  it  will  very  often  happen  that,  “ from  certain  facts,”  as 
Campbell  remarks,  “ we  draw  only  probable  Conclusions  ; ” be- 
cause the  other  Premiss  introduced  (which  he  overlooked)  is 
only  probable.  And  the  maxim  of  Mechanics  hob  good  in 
arguments;  that  “ nothing  is  stronger  than  its  weakest  part.” 
He  observed  that  in  such  an  instance,  for  example,  as  the  one 
lately  given,  we  infer  from  the  certainty  that  such  and  such 
tyrannies  have  been  short-lived,  the  probability  that  others  will 
be  so ; and  he  did  not  consider  that  there  is  an  understood 
Premiss  which  is  essential  to  the  argument;  (viz.  that  “ all 
tyrannies  will  resemble  those  we  have  already  observed  ”) 
which  being  only  of  a probable  character,  must  attach  the 
same  degree  of  uncertainty  to  the  Conclusion.  And  the 
doubtfulness  is  multiplied , if  both  Premisses  are  uncertain 
For  since  it  is  only  on  the  supposition  of  both  Premisses  being 
true,  that  we  can  calculate  on  the  truth  of  the  Conclusion,  w & 
must  state  in  fractional  numbers  the  chances  of  each  Premiss 
being  true,  and  then  multiply  these  together,  to  judge  of  the 
degree  of  evidence  of  the  Conclusion.* 

An  individual  fact  is  not  unfrequently  elicited  by  skilfully 
combining,  and  reasoning  from,  those  already  known  ; of 
which  many  curious  cases  occur  in  the  detection  of  criminals 
by  officers  of  justice,  and  by  Barristers,  who  acquire  by  prac 
tice  such  dexterity  in  that  particular  department,  as  to  dtaw 
sometimes  the  right  conclusion  from  data,  which  might  be  in 
the  possession  of  others,  without  being  applied  to  the  same 
sse.  But  in  all  cases  of  the  inferring  of  a general  law  from 
Induction,  that  conclusion  (as  has  been  formerly  remarked)  it 


* See  Book  III.  $ 14. 


Hkap.  II.  $ 2.] 


DISCOVERY  OF  TRUTH. 


275 


ultimately  established  by  Reasoning.  E.  G. 

Bakewell,  the  celebrated  cattle-breeder,  ob-  General  lav* 
. . , established  by 

served,  in  a great  number  ot  individual  beasts,  . . 

° reasoning  from 

a tendency  to  fatten  readily  ; and  in  a great  induction. 
number  of  others,  the  absence  of  this  constitu- 
tion : in  every  individual  of  the  former  description,  he  observed, 
a certain  peculiar  make , though  they  differed  widely  in  size, 
color,  fyc.  Those  of  the  latter  description  differed  no  less  in 
various  points,  but  agreed  in  being  of  a different  make  from 
■he  others  : these  facts  were  his  data ; from  which,  combining 
hem  with  the  general  principle,  that  Nature  is  steady  and 
uniform  in  her  proceedings,  he  logically  drew  the  conclusion 
that  beasts  of  the  specified  make  have  universally  a peculiar 
tendency  to  fattening.  But  then  his  principal  merit  consisted 
in  making  the  observations,  and  in  so  combining  them  as  to 
abstract  from  each  of  a multitude  of  cases,  differing  widely 
in  many  respects,  the  circumstances  in  which  they  all  agreed  , 
and  also  in  conjecturing  skilfully  how  far  those  circumstances 
were  likely  to  be  found  in  the  whole  class.  The  making  oc 
such  observations,  and  still  more  the  combination,  abstraction, 
and  judgment  employed,*  are  what  men  commonly  mean  (as 
was  above  observed)  when  they  speak  of  Induction ; and 
these  operations  are  certainly  distinct  from  Reasoning.t  The 
same  observations  will  apply  to  numberless  other  cases ; as, 
for  instance,  to  the  Discovery  of  the  law  of  “ vis  inertia,’’ 
and  the  other  principles  of  Natural  Philosophy. 

It  may  be  remarked  here,  that  even  the  most  extensive  ob- 
servations of  facts  will  often  be  worse  than  useless  to  those 
who  are  deficient  in  the  power  of  discriminating  and  selecting 


* flee  Rqlit.  Eeon.  Rect.  IX-  p.  229 — 239. 
t fcet.  Rook  I.  4 1.  Note, 


276 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  H 


Their  knowledge,  whether  much  or  little,  is  like  food  to  a 
body  whose  digestive  system  is  so  much  impaired  as  to  oe 
incapable  of  separating  the  nutritious  portions.  To  attempt 
to  remedy  the  defect  of  minds  thus  constituted  “ by  imparting 
to  them  additional  knowledge,  — to  confer  the  advantage  of 
wider  experience  on  those  who  have  not  the  power  of  profit- 
ing by  experience, — is  to  attempt  enlarging  the  prospect  of  a 
short-sighted  man  by  bringing  him  to  the  top  of  a hill.”  * 

But  to  what  class,  it  may  be  asked,  should  be  referred  the 
Disco»«eries  we  have  been  speaking  of?  All  would  agree  in 
calling  them,  when  first  ascertained,  “ New  Truths,”  in  the 
strictest  sense  of  the  word  ; which  would  seem  to  imply  their 
belonging  to  the  class  which  may  be  called  by  way  of  dis- 
tinction, “ Physical  Discoveries : ” and  yet  their  being  ulti- 
mately established  by  Reasoning,  would  seem,  according  to 
the  foregoing  rule,  to  refer  them  to  the  other  class,  viz.  what 


the  Premisses.  In  answer  to  this,  I would  say,  that  they  cer- 
tainly do  belong  to  the  latter  class,  relatively  to  a person  who  is 
in  possession  of  the  data  : but  to  him  who  is  not , they  are  new 
Truths  nf  the  other  class.  For  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that 
the  words  “ Discovery  ” and  “ New  Truths  ” are  necessarily 
relative.  There  may  be  a proposition  which  is  to  one  person 
completely  known;  to  another  (viz.  one  to  whom  it  has  never 
occurred , though  he  is  in  possession  of  all  the  data  from  which 
it  may  be  proved)  it  will  be  (when  he  comes  to  perceive  it,  by 
a process  of  instruction)  what  we  have  called  a Logical  Dis- 
covery : t)  a third  (viz.  one  who  :s  ignorant  of  these  data)  it 


Logical 

Discoveries. 


may  be  called  “ Logical  Discoveries ; ” since 
whatever  is  established  by  Reasoning  must 
have  been  contained  and  virtually  asserted  in 


* Polit.  Econ.  Lect.  IX.  p.  236. 


Chap.  II.  { 3d 


DISCOVERY  OF  TRUTH. 


277 


will  be  absolutely  unknown , and  will  have  been,  when  made 
known  to  him, a perfectly  and  properly  New  Truth,  — a piece 
of  information,  — a Physical  Discovery , as  we  have  called 
it.*  To  the  Pk  ilosopher,  therefore,  who  arrives  at  the  Discov- 
ery by  reasoning  from  his  observations,  and  from  established 
principles  combined  with  them,  the  Discovery  is  of  the  former 
class;  to  the  multitude,  probably  of  the  latter;  as  they  will 
have  been  most  likely  not  possessed  of  all  his  data. 

§ 3. 

It  follows  from  what  has  been  said,  that  in  character 
pure  Mathematics,  and  in  such  Ethical  propo-  of  scientific 
sitions  as  we  were  lately  speaking  of,  we  do  truths- 
not  allow  the  possibility  of  any  but  a Logical  Discovery : i.  e. 
no  proposition  of  that  class  can  be  true,  which  was  not  im- 
plied in  the  Definitions  and  Axioms  we  set  out  with,  which  are 
the  first  principles.  For  since  the  propositions  do  not  profess 
to  state  any  fact,  the  only  truth  they  can  possess,  consists  in 
conformity  to  the  original  principles.  To  one,  therefore,  who 
knows  these  principles,  such  propositions  are  Truths  already 
implied  ; since  they  may  be  developed  to  him  by  Reasoning, 
if  he  is  not  defective  in  the  discursive  faculty;  and  again,  to 


* It  may  be  worth  while  in  this  place  to  define  what  is  properly  to 
be  called  Knowledge : it  implies  three  things  ; 1st,  firm  belief,  2dly,  of 
what  is  true,  3dly,  on  sufficient  grounds.  If  any  one,  e.  g.  is  in  doubt 
respecting  one  of  Euclid’s  demonstrations,  he  cannot  be  said  to  know 
the  proposition  proved  by  it ; if,  again,  he  is  fully  convinced  of  any 
thins  that  is  not  true,  he  is  mistaken  in  supposing  himself  to  know  it  ; 
lastly,  if  two  persons  are  each  fully  confident,  one  that  the  moon  is  in- 
habited, and  the  other  that  it  is  not,  (though  one  of  these  opinions 
must  be  true)  neither  of  them  could  properly  be  said  to  know  the  truth, 
since  he  cannot  have  sufficient  proof  of  it. 

24 


278 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  pBooii  IV 


one  who  does  net  understand  those  principles  ( i e.  is  no! 
master  of  the  Definitions)  such  propositions  are,  so  far  un* 
meaning.  On  the  other  hand,  propositions  relatii  g to  matters 
of  fact,  may  be,  indeed,  implied  in  what  he  already  knew 
(as  he  who  knows  the  climate  of  the  Alps,  the  Andes,  fyc.  fyc, 
has  virtually  admitted  the  general  fact,  that  “the  tops  of 
mountains  are  comparatively  cold  ”)  but  as  these  possess  an 
absolute  and  physical  Truth,  they  may  also  be  absolutely 
“ new,”  their  Truth  not  being  implied  in  the  mere  terms  of  tlu 
propositions.  The  truth  or  falsity  of  any  proposition  con- 
cerning a triangle,  is  implied  by  the  meaning  of  that  and  of 
the  other  Geometrical  terms  ; whereas,  though  one  may  un- 
derstand (in  the  ordinary  sense  of  that  word)  the  full  mean- 
ing of  the  terms  “ planet,”  and  “ inhabited,”  and  of  all  the 
other  terms  in  the  language,  he  cannot  thence  derive  any  cer- 
tainty that  the  planets  are,  or  are  not,  inhabited. 

As  I have  elsewhere  observed,  “ Every  branch  of  study, 
which  can  at  all  claim  the  character  of  a science  (in  the  widest 
acceptation,)  requires  two  things  : 1.  A correct  ascertain- 
ment of  the  data  from  which  we  are  to  reason  ; and,  2.  Cor- 
rectness in  the  process  of  deducing  conclusions  from  them. 
But  these  two  processes,  though  both  are  in  every  case  indis- 
pensable, are,  in  different  cases,  extremely  different  in  their 
relative  difficulty  and  amount;' — in  the  space,  if  I may  so 
speak,  which  they  occupy  in  each  branch  of  study.  In  pure 
Mathematics,  for  instance,  we  set  out  from  arbitrary  Defi- 
nitions, and  Postulates,  readily  comprehended,  which  are  the 
principles  from  which,  by  the  help  of  Axioms  hardly  needing 
even  to  be  stated,  our  reasonings  proceed.  No  facts  whatever 
require  to  be  ascertained  ; no  process  of  induction  to  be  car 
ried  on ; the  reasoning-process  is  nearly  every  thing.  Ik 
Geology,  (la  take  an  instance  of  an  opposite  kind)  the  mosl 


Chap.  II.  § 3.]  DISCOVERY  OF  TRUTH.  2/9 

extensive  information  is  requisite  ; and  though  sound  reason 
ing  is  called  for  in  making  use  of  the  knowledge  acquired,  il 
is  well  known  what  erroneous  systems  have  been  devised 
by  powerful  reasoners,  who  have  satisfied  themselves  too 
soon  with  observations  not  sufficiently  accurate  and  exten- 
sive. 

“ Various  branches  of  Natural-philosophy  occupy,  in  ths 
respect,  various  intermediate  places.  The  two  processes 
which  I have  endeavored  to  describe,  under  the  titles  of 
‘ Physical  investigation  ’ and  ‘ Logical  investigation,’  will,  in 
different  cases,  differ  very  much  in  their  relative  importance 
and  difficulty.  The  science  of  Optics,  for  instance,  furnishes 
an  example  of  one  approaching  very  near  to  pure  mathe- 
matics ; since,  though  the  foundation  of  it  consists  in  facts 
ascertained  by  experiment,  these  are  fewer  and  more  easily 
ascertained  than  those  pertaining  to  other  branches  of  Natu- 
ral-philosophy. A very  small  number  of  principles,  compre- 
hensible even  without  being  verified  by  the  senses,  being 
assumed,  the  deductions  from  them  are  so  extensive,  that,  as 
is  well  known,  a blind  mathematician,  who  had  no  remem- 
brance  of  seeing,  gave  an  approved  course  of  lectures  on  the 
subject.  In  the  application , however,  of  this  science  to  the 
explanation  of  many  of  the  curious  natural  phenomena 
.hat  occur,  a most  extensive  and  exact  knowledge  of  facts 
is  called  for. 

“ In  the  case  of  Political-Economy,  that  the  facts  on  which 
the  science  are  founded  are  few,  and  simple,  and  within  the 
range  of  every  one’s  observation,  would,  I think,  never  have 
Deen  doubted,  but  for  the  error  of  confounding  together  the 
theoretical  and  the  practical  oranches  of  it ; — the  science  ot 
what  is  properly  called  Political-Economy,  — and  the  Dractica 
employment  of  it.  The  theory  supplies  principles,  which  w* 


280 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  I\’ 


may  afterwards  apply  practically  to  an  indefinite  number  of 
various  cases  ; and  in  order  to  make  this  application  cor 
rectly,  of  course  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  circumstances 
of  each  case  is  indispensable.  But  it  should  be  remembered 
that  the  same  may  be  said  even  with  respect  to  Geometiy 
As  soon  as  we  come  to  the  practical  branch  of  it,  and  apply 
it  in  actual  measurements,  a minute  atten  ion  to  facts  is  requi- 
site for  an  accurate  result.  And  in  each  practical  question  in 
Political-Economy  that  may  arise,  we  must  be  prepared  to 
ascertain,  and  allow  for,  various  disturbing  causes,  which  may 
more  or  less  modify  the  results  obtained  from  our  general 
principles  ; just  as,  in  Mechanics,  when  we  come  to  practice, 
we  must  take  into  account  the  thickness,  and  weight,  and  the 
degrees  of  flexibility,  of  ropes  and  levers. 

“ The  facts  then  which  it  may  be  necessary  to  ascertain 
for  the  practical  decision  of  any  single  case  that  may  arise., 
are,  of  course,  in  Political-Economy  (as  in  respect  of  the  ap- 
plication of  the  principles  of  any  science),  indefinite  in  num- 
ber, and  sometimes  difficult  to  collect ; the  facts  on  which  the 
general  principles  of  the  science  are  founded,  come  within  the 
range  of  every  one’s  experience.”  * 


§ 4. 

When  it  is  asked,  then,  whether  such  grtat 

Ambiguity  jy [scoveries^  as  nave  qeen  made  in  Natural  Phi- 
of  the  word 

Reasoning.  losophy,  were  accomplished,  or  can  be  accom- 
plished, by  Reasoning  ? the  inquirer  should  be 
reminded,  that  the  question  is  ambiguous.  It  may  be  an- 
mv e red  in  the  affirmative,  if  by  “ Reasoning  ” is  meant  to  b« 


Pol.  Econ.  Lect.  IX.  p 225. 


Chat.  II.  § 4.] 


DISCOVERT  OF  7. RUTH. 


281 


included  the  assumption  of  Premisses.  To  the  light  perform- 
ance of  that  work,  is  requisite,  not  only,  in  many  cases,  the 
ascertainment  of  facts,  and  of  the  degree  of  evidence  for 
doubtful  propositions,  (in  which,  observation  and  experiment 
will  often  be  indispensable,)  but  also  a skilful  selection  and 
combination  of  known  facts  and  principles;  such  as  implies, 
amongst  other  things,  the  exercise  of  that  powerful  abstraction 
which  seizes  the  common  circumstances  — -the  point  of  agree- 
ment — in  a number  of,  otherwise,  dissimilar  individuals  ; and 
it  is  in  this  that  the  greatest  genius  is  shown.  But  if  “ Reason- 
ing ” be  understood  in  the  limited  sense  in  which  it  is  usually 
defined,  then  we  must  answer  in  the  negative  ; and  reply  that 
such  Discoveries  are  made  by  means  of  Reasoning  combined 
with  other  operations. 

In  the  process  I have  been  speaking  of,  there  is  much 
Reasoning  throughout ; and  thence  the  whole  has  been  care- 
lessly called  a “ process  of  Reasoning.” 

It  is  not,  indeed,  any  just  ground  of  complaint  that  the 
word  Reasoning  is  used  in  two  senses  ; but  that  the  two  senses 
are  perpetually  confounded  together  : and  hence  it  is  that  some 
Logical  writers  fancied  that  Reasoning  (viz.  that  which  Logic 
treats  of ) was  the  method  of  discovering  Truth ; and  that  so 
many  other  writers  have  accordingly  complained  of  Logic  for 
not  accomplishing  that  end  ; urging  that  “ Syllogism  ” ( i.  e. 
Reasoning ; though  they  overlooked  the  coincidence)  never 
established  any  thing  that  is,  strictly  speaking,  unknown  to 
him  who  has  granted  the  Premisses : and  proposing  the 
.introduction  of  a certain  “rational  Logic”  to  accomplish 
this  purpose  ; i.  e.  to  direct  the  mind  in  the  process  of  investi- 
gation. Supposing  that  some  such  system  could  be  devised  — 
mat  it  could  even  be  brought  into  a scientific  form,  (which  he 
must  be  more  sanguine  than  scientific  who  expects,)  — that 
24* 


282 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING  .Boor  IV 


it  were  of  the  greatest  conceivable  utility,  — and  that  it  should 
be  allowed  to  bear  the  name  of  “ Logic  ” (since  it  would  not 
be  worth  while  to  contend  about  a name)  still  it  would  not,  as 
these  writers  seem  to  suppose,  have  the  same  object  proposed 
with  the  Aristotelian  Logic  ; or  be  in  any  respect  a rival  to 
that  system.  A plough  may  be  a much  more  ingenious  and 
valuable  instrument  than  a Jlail ; but  it  never  can  be  substituted 
for  it. 


New  truths 
may  be  such 
in  a different 
sense  to  dffer- 
ferent  persons. 


Those  Discoveries  of  general  laws  of  Nature, 
4*c.  of  which  we  have  been  speaking,  being  of 
that  character  which  we  have  described  by  the 
name  of  “ Logical  Discoveries,”  to  him  who  is 
in  possession  of  all  the  Premisses  from  which 
they  are  deduced;  but  being,  to  the  multitude  (who  are  unac- 
quainted with  many  of  those  Premisses)  strictly  “ New  Truths,” 
hence  it  is,  that  men  in  general  give  to  the  general  facts, 
and  to  them,  most  peculiarly,  the  name  of  Discoveries  ; for 
to  themselves  they  arc  such,  in  the  strictest  sense  ; the  Prem- 
isses from  which  they  were  inferred  being  not  only  origin- 
ally unknown  to  them,  but  frequently  remaining  unknown  tc 
the  very  last.  E.  G.  the  general  conclusion  concerning  cat- 
tle, which  Bakewell  made  known,  is  what  most  Agriculturists 
(and  many  others  also)  are  acquainted  with ; but  the  Prem- 
isses he  set  out  with,  viz.  the  facts  respecting  this,  that,  and  the 
other,  individual  ox,  (the  ascertainment  of  which  facts  was 
his  first  Discovery ,)  these  are  what  few  know,  or  care  to 
know  with  any  exact  particularity. 

And  it  may  be  added,  that  these  discoveries  of  particular 
facts,  which  are  the  immediate  result  of  ohser- 
Observa-  cation,  are,  in  themselves,  uninteresting  and  in- 

tvm  an  ex  s}gn;ficant  iffl  they  are  combined  so  as  to  lead 
fei  intent  ° J 

to  a grand  general  result.  Those  who  on 


Jhap.  II  } 4 ] 


DISCOVERT  OF  TRUTH. 


283 


each  occas.on  watched  the  motions,  and  registered  the  times 
of  occultation,  of  Jupiter’s  satellites,  little  thought,  perhaps, 
themselves,  what,  important  results  they  were  preparing  the 
way  for.*  So  that  there  is  an  additional  cause  which  has  con« 
fined  the  term  Discovery  to  these  grand  general  conclusions 
and,  as  was  just  observed,  they  are,  to  the  generality  of 
men,  perfectly  New  Truths  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word  ; 
not  being  implied  in  any  previous  knowledge  they  possessed. 
Very  often  it  will  happen,  indeed,  that  the  conclusion  thus 
drawn  will  amount  only  to  a probable  conjecture ; which  con- 
jecture will  dictate  to  the  inquirer  such  an  experiment , or 
course  of  experiments,  as  will  fully  establish  the  fact.  Thus 
Sir  H.  Davy,  from  finding  that  the  flame  of  hydrogen  gas 
was  not  communicated  through  a long  slender  tube,  conjec- 
tured that  a shorter  but  still  slenderer  tube  would  answer  the 
same  purpose  ; this  led  him  to  try  the  experiments,  in  which, 
by  continually  shortening  the  tube,  and  at  the  same  time  les- 
sening its  bore,  he  arrived  at  last  at  the  wire-gauze  of  his 
safety-lamp. 

It  is  to  be  observed  also,  that  whatever  credit  is  conveyed 
by  the  word  “ Discovery,”  to  him  who  is  regarded  as  the 
author  of  it,  io  well  deserved  by  those  who  skilfully  select 
and  combine  known  Truths  ( especially  such  as  have  been 
long  and  generally  known ) so  as  to  elicit  important,  and  hithei 
to  unthought-of,  conclusions.  Theirs  is  the  master-mind  : — 
dQ/LTEXTovt'/.y]  cpQo vyoiq : whereas  men  of  very  inferior  powerr 
may  sometimes,  by  immediate  observation,  discover  perfectly 
new  facts,  empirically  ; and  thus  be  of  service  in  furnishing 


* Hence,  Bacon  urges  us  to  pursue  Truth,  without  always  requir 
ag  to  perceive  its  practical  application. 


i84 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  1B°ok  I"V 


materials  to  the  others  ; to  whom  they  stand  in  the  same  rela 
lion  (to  recur  to  a former  illustration)  as  the  brickmaker  of 
stonequarrier  to  the  architect.  It  is  peculiarly  creditable 
to  Adam  Smith,  and  to  Malthus,  that  the  data  from  which 
they  drew  such  important  Conclusions  had  been  in  every  one's 
hands  for  centuries. 

As  for  Mathematical  Discoveries,  they  (as  we  have  before 
said)  must  always  be  of  the  description  to  which  we  have 
given  the  name  of  “ Logical  Discoveries  ; ” since  to  him  whc 
properly  comprehends  the  meaning  of  the  Mathematical  terms, 
(and  to  no  other  are  the  Truths  themselves,  properly  speaking 
intelligible)  those  results  are  implied  in  his  previous  knowl- 
edge, since  they  are  logically  deducible  therefrom.  It  is  not, 
however,  meant  to  be  implied,  that  Mathematical  Discoveries 
are  effected  by  pure  Reasoning,  and  by  that  singly.  For 
though  there  is  not  here,  as  in  Physics,  any  exercise  of  judg 
ment  as  to  the  degree  of  evidence  of  the  Premisses,  nor  any  ex- 
periments and  observations,  yet  there  is  the  same  call  for  skill 
in  the  selection  and  combination  of  the  Premisses  in  such  a 
manner  as  shall  be  best  calculated  to  lead  to  a new,  — that  is, 
unperceived  and  unthought-of — Conclusion. 

In  following , indeed,  and  taking  in  a demonstration,  noth- 
ing is  called  for  but  pure  Reasoning;  but  the  assumption  of 
Premisses  is  not  a part  of  Reasoning,  in  the  strict  and  technical 
sense  of  that  term.  Accordingly,  there  are  many  who  can 
follow  a Mathematical  demonstration,  or  any  other  train  of 
argument,  who  would  not  succeed  well  in  framing  one  of 
their  own.* 


* Hence,  the  Student  must  not  confine  himself  to  this  passi  vt 
kind  of  employment,  if  he  will  truly  become  a Mathematician. 


Chap.  II  , <j.]  DISCOVERY  OF  TRUTH. 

§ 5. 

For  both  kinds  of  Discovery  then,  the  Logi- 
cal, as  well  as  the  Physical,  certain  operations 
are  requisite,  beyond  those  which  can  fairly  be 
comprehended  under  the  strict  sense  of  the 
word  “ Reasoning.”  In  the  Logical,  is  required  a skilfu. 
selection  and  combination  of  known  Truths : in  the  Physical, 
we  must  employ,  in  addition  (generally  speaking)  to  that 
process,  observation  and  experiment.  It  will  generally  happen 
that  in  the  study  of  nature,  and,  universally,  in  all  that  re- 
lates to  matters  of  fact,  both  kinds  of  investigation  will  be 
united  : i.  e.  some  of  the  facts  or  principles  you  reason  from 
as  Premisses,  must  be  ascertained  by  observation ; or,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  safety-lamp,  the  ultimate  Conclusion  will 
need  confirmation  from  experience ; so  that  both  Physical 
and  Logical  Discovery  will  take  place  in  the  course  of  the 
same  process.  We  need  not,  therefore,  wonder,  that  the 
two  are  so  perpetually  confounded.  In  Mathematics,  on  the 
other  hand,  and  in  great  part  of  the  discussions  relating  to 
Ethics  and  Jurisprudence,  there  being  no  room  for  any  Physi- 
cal Discovery  whatever,  we  have  only  to  make  a skilful  use 
of  the  propositions  in  our  possession,  to  arrive  at  every  attain- 
able result. 

The  investigation,  however,  of  the  latter  class  of  subjects 
differs  in  other  points  also  from  that  of  the  former.  For,  set- 
ting aside  the  circumstance  of  our  having,  in  these,  no 
question  as  to  facts , — no  room  for  observation, — there  is 
also  a considerable  difference  in  what  may  be  called,  in  both 
instances,  the  process  of  Logical  investigation ; the  Prem~ 
isses  on  which  we  proceed  being  of  so  different  a nature  in  the 


285 


Operation i 
connected  with 
Reasoning. 


two  Gases. 


2S6 


ON  HIE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Boo*  V. 


To  take  the  example  of  Mathematics,  tlia 

Mathemati-  Definitions,  which  are  the  principles  of  our  llea- 
cal  and  other 

Rsasoninj.  soning,  are  very  few,  and  the  Axioms  still  few 
er  ; and  both  are,  for  the  most  part,  laid  doum 
and  placed  before  the  student  in  the  outset ; the  introduction 
of  a new  Definition  or  Axiom,  being  of  comparatively  rare 
occurrence,  at  wide  intervals,  and  with  a formal  statement- 
besides  which,  there  is  no  room  for  doubt  concerning  either. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  all  Reasonings  which  regard  matters  of 
fact,  we  introduce,  almost  at  every  step , fresh  and  fresh  prop- 
ositions (to  a very  great  number)  which  had  not  been  elicited 
in  the  course  of  our  Reasoning,  but  are  taken  for  granted  ; 
viz.  facts  and  Laws  of  Nature,  which  are  here  the  principles 
of  our  Reasoning,  and  maxims , or  “ elements  of  belief,” 
which  answer  to  the  axioms  in  Mathematics.  If,  at  the  open- 
ing of  a Treatise,  for  example,  on  Chemistry,  on  Agriculiure, 
on  Poiitical-Economy,  4-c.  the  author  should  make,  as  in 
Mathematics,  a formal  statement  of  all  the  propositions  he  in- 
tended to  assume  as  granted,  throughout  the  whole  work,  both 
he  and  his  readers  would  be  astonished  at  the  number  ; and. 
of  these,  many  would  be  only  probable,  and  there  would  be 
much  room  for  doubt  as  to  the  degree  of  probability,  and  foi 
judgment  in  ascertaining  that  degree. 

Moreover,  Mathematical  axioms  are  always  employed  pre- 
cisely in  the  same  simple  form ; e.  g.  the  axiom  that  ‘‘the 
things  equal  to  the  same- are  equal  to  one  another,”  is  cited, 
whenever  there  is  need,  in  those  very  words  ; whereas  the 
maxims  employed  in  the  other  class  of  subjects,  admit  of,  and 
require,  continual  modifications  in  the  application  of  them. 
E.  G.  “ the  stability  of  the  laws  of  Nature,”  which  is  our 
constant  assumption  in  inquiries  .relating  to  Natural  Philoso- 
phy, appears  in  many  different  shapes,  and  in  some  of  them 


Chap.  II.  § 5.] 


CISCO  VERY  OF  TRUTH. 


287 


does  not  possess  the  same  complete  certainty  as  in  others 
e.  g.  when,  from  having  always  observed  a certain  sheep  ru- 
minating, we  infer,  that  this  individual  sheep  will  continue  ta 
ruminate,  we  assume  that  “ the  property  which  has  hitherto 
belonged  to  this  sheep  will  remain  unchanged  ; ” when  we 
infer  the  same  property  of  all  sheep,  we  assume  that  “ the 
property  which  belongs  to  this  individual  belongs  to  the  whole 
species  : ” if,  on  comparing  sheep  with  some  other  kinds  of 
horned  animals,*  and  finding  that  all  agree  in  ruminating,  we 
infer  that  “ all  horned  animals  ruminate,”  we  assume  that 
‘ the  whole  of  a genus  or  class  are  likely  to  agree  in  any 
pomt  wherein  many  species  of  that  genus  agree  ; ” or  in 
other  words,  “ that  if  one  of  two  properties,  fyc.  has  often 
been  found  accompanied  by  another,  and  never  without  it,  the 
former  will  be  universally  accompanied  by  the  latter  : ” now 
all  these  are  merely  different  forms  of  the  maxim,  that 
“ nature  is  uniform  in  her  operations,”  which,  it  is  evident, 
varies  in  expression  in  almost  every  different  case  where 
it  is  applied,  and  the  application  of  which  admits  of  every 
degree  of  evidence,  from  perfect  moral  certainty,  to  mere 
conwcture.t 

ifie  same  may  be  said  of  an  infinite  number  of  principle? 
and  maxims  appropriated  to,  and  employed  in,  each  particular 
branch  of  study.  Hence,  all  such  reasonings  are,  in  com- 
parison of  Mathematics,  very  complex;  requiring  so  much 
more  than  that  does,  beyond  the  process  of  merely  deducing 
the  conclusion  logically  from  the  premisses  : so  that  it  is  no 


* Viz.  having  horns  on  the  skull.  What  are  called  the  horns  of  the 
Rhinoceros  are  quite  different  in  origin,  and  in  structure,  as  ■well  as  is 
Bituation,  from  what  are  properly  called  horns, 
t See  Append.  .Art.  “ Impossible.” 


288 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IT 


wonder  that  the  longest  Mathematical  demonstration  should  he 
so  much  more  easily  constructed  and  understood,  than  a much 
shorter  train  of  just  reasoning  concerning  real  facts.  The 
former  has  been  aptly  compared  to  a long  and  steep,  but  even 
and  regular,  flight  of  steps,  which  tries  the  breath,  and  the 
strength,  and  the  perseverance  only  ; while  the  latter  resem- 
bles a short,  but  rugged  and  uneven,  ascent  up  a precipice 
which  requires  a quick  eye,  agile  limbs,  and  a firm  step  ; and 
in  which  we  have  to  tread  now  on  this  side,  now  on  that — • 
ever  considering,  as  we  proceed,  whether  this  or  that  projec- 
tion will  afford  room  for  our  foot,  or  whether  some  loose  store 
may  not  slide  from  under  us.  There  are  probably  as  many 
steps  of  pure  reasoning  in  one  of  the  longer  of  Euclid’s 
demonstrations,  as  in  the  whole  of  an  argumentative  treatise 
on  some  other  subject,  occupying  perhaps  a considerable 
volume. 


Mathematics 
useful  as  an 
introductory 
praxis  of  Rea- 
soning. 


It  may  be  observed  here  that  Mathematical 
Reasoning,  as  it  calls  for  no  exercise  of  judg- 
ment respecting  probabilities,  is  the  best  kind 
of  introductory  exercise  ; and,  from  the  same 
cause,  is  apt,  when  too  exclusively  pursued,  to 
make  men  incorrect  moral-reasoners. 

As  for  those  Ethical  and  Legal  Reasonings  which  were 
lately  men  >ned  as  in  some  respects  resembling  those  of 
Mathematics,  {viz.  such  as  keep  clear  of  all  assertions 
respecting  facts)  they  have  this  difference  ; that  not  only 
men  are  not  so  completely  agreed,  respecting  the  maxims 
and  principles  of  Ethics  and  Law,  but  the  meaning  also  of 
each  Term  cannot  be  absolutely,  and  forever,  fixed  by  an 
arbitrary  definition  ; on  the  contrary,  a great  part  of  our 
labor  consists  in  distinguishing  accurately  the  various  senses 
in  which  men  employ  each  Term,  — ascertaining  which  is  ths 


Chap.  II.  § 5.] 


DISCOVERY  OF  TRUTH. 


26  ‘J 


Fallacious 
disparagement 
of  reasoning. 


most  proper,  — and  taking  care  to  avoid  confou  lding  them 
together.* 

It  may  be  worth  while  to  add  in  this  place 
that  as  a candid  disposition,  — a hearty  de- 
sire to  judge  fairly,  and  to  attain  truth, — are 
evidently  necessary  with  a view  to  give  fair 
play  to  the  reasoning-powers,  in  subjects  where  we  are  lia- 
ble to  a bias  from  interest  or  feelings,  so,  a fallacious  per- 
version of  this  maxim  finds  a place  in  the  minds  of  some 
persons:  who  accordingly  speak  disparagingly  of  all  exercise 
of  the  reasoning-faculty  in  moral  and  religious  subjects  ; de- 
claiming on  the  insufficiency  of  mere  intellectual  power  for 
the  attainment  of  truth  in  such  matters, — on  the  necessity 
of  appealing  to  the  heart  rather  than  to  the  head,  &c.t  and 
then  leading  their  readers  or  themselves  to  the  Conclusion  that 


the  less  we  reason  on  such  subjects  the  safer  we  are. 

But  the  proper  office  of  candor  is  to  pre- 
pare the  mind  not  for  the  rejection  of  all  evi-  r,0Per  °ffice 
, of  candor. 

dence,  but  for  the  right  reception  of  evidence  ; 

not,  to  be  a substitute  for  reasons,  but  to  enable  us  fairly 
to  weigh  the  reasons  on  both  sides.  Such  persons  as  I am 
alluding  to  are  in  fact  saying  that  since  just  weights  alone , 
without  a just  balance,  will  avail  nothing,  therefore  we  have 
only  to  take  care  of  the  scales,  and  let  the  weights  take  care 
of  themselves. 

This  hind  of  tone  is  of  course  most  especially  to  te  found 
m such  writers  as  consider  it  expedient  to  inculcate  on  the 
mass  of  mankind  what  — there  is  reason  to  suspect  — they  do 


* See  Appendix  on  Ambiguous  Terms, 
t See  Appendix  III. 

25 


21)0 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


not  themselves  fully  believe,  and  which  they  apprehend  is  the 
taore.  likely  to  be  rejected  the  more  it  is  investigated.* 


Since  it  appears,  from  what  has  been  said,  that  universally 
a man  must  possess  something  else  besides  the  Reasoning- 
faculty,  in  order  to  apply  that  faculty  properly  to  his  own  pur 
pose,  whatever  that  purpose  may  be ; it  may  be  inquired 
whether  some  theory  could  not  be  made  out,  respecting  those 
“ other  operations  ” and  “ intellectual  processes,  distinct  from 
Reasoning,  which  it  is  necessary  for  us  sometimes  to  employ 
in  the  investigation  of  truth  ; ” t and  whether  rules  could  not 
be  laid  down  for  conducting  them. 


the  principles  of  Logic,  properly  so  called  ; but  it  would 
hardly  be  possible  to  build  up  any  thing  like  a regular  Science 
respecting  these  matters,  such  as  Logic  is  with  respect  to  the 
theory  of  Reasoning.  It  may  be  useful,  however,  to  observe, 
that  these  “ other  operations  ” of  which  we  have  been  speak- 
>ng,  ana  which  are  preparatory  to  the  exercise  of  Reasoning 


Chap.  111.  — Of  Inference  and  Proof. 


$ 1- 


Different 
applications  of 
Reasoning. 


Something  has,  indeed,  been  done  in  this 
way  by  more  than  one  writer  ; and  more  might 
probably  be  accomplished  by  one  who  should 
fully  comprehend  and  carefully  bear  in  mind 


• See  Powell’s  “ Tradition  unveil  id.1 


t D.  Stewart, 


Chap.  Ill  { 1.]  INFERENCE  ANU  PROOF. 


29 


are  of  two  kinds , according  to  t'ne  nature  of  the  end  proposed 
for  Reasoning  comprehends  Inferring  and  Proving ; which 
are  not  two  different  things,  but  the  same  thing  regarded  in 
two  different  points  of  view : like  the  road  from  London  to 
York,  and  the  road  from  York  to  London.  He  who  infers,* 
proves ; and  he  who  proves,  infers  ; but  the  word  “ infer  ” 
fixes  the  mind  first  on  the  Premiss  and  then  on  the  Conclusion ; 
the  word  “ prove,”  on  the  contrary,  leads  the  mind  from  the 
Conclusion  to  the  Premiss.  Plence,  the  substantives  derived 
from  these  words  respectively,  are  often  used  to  express  that 
which,  on  each  occasion,  is  last  in  the  mind  ; Inference  being 
often  used  to  signify  the  Conclusion  (£.  e.  Proposition  in- 
ferred,) and  Proof  , the  Premiss.  We  say,  also,  “ How  do 
you  prove  that  ? ” and  “ What  do  you  infer  from  that  ? ” 
which  sentences  would  not  be  so  properly  expressed  if  we 
were  to  transpose  those  verbs.  One  might,  therefore,  define 
Proving,  “ the  assigning  of  a reason  [or  argument]  for  the 
support  of  a given  proposition  : ” and  Inferring,  “ the  deduc- 
tion of  a Conclusion  from  given  Premisses.”  In  the  one  cas6 
our  Conclusion  is  given  ( i . e.  set  before  us  as  the  Question) 
and  we  have  to  seek  for  arguments ; in  the  other,  our  Prem- 
isses are  given , and  we  have  to  seek  for  a Conclusion  : i.  e.  tc 
put  together  our  own  propositions,  and  try  what  will  follow 
from  them  ; or,  to  speak  more  Logically,  in  the  one  case,  we 
seek  to  refer  the  Subject  of  which  we  would  predicate  some ■ 
thing,  to  a class  t to  which  that  Predicate  will  (affirmativelj 
or  negatively)  apply  ; in  the  other,  we  seek  to  find  compr& 


* I mean,  of  course,  when  the  word  is  understood  to  imply  correct 
Inference. 

t Observe,  that  “ Class  ” is  used,  here  and  elsewhere,  for  either  al 
actual,  or  what  may  be  called  a potential  Class  : see  Book  i jj  3. 


292 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


headed,  in  the  Subject  of  which  we  have  predicated  something 
some  other  term  to  which  that  Predicate  had  not  been  befors 
applied.*  Each  of  these  is  a definition  of  Reasoning. 


§2. 


To  infer,  then,  is  the  business  of  the  Phi 
Advocate  ^0S0P^er  >'  to  prove,  o(  the  Advocate;  the  for* 
mer,  from  the  great  mass  of  known  and  ad- 
mitted truths,  wishes  to  elicit  any  valuable  additional  truth 
whatever,  that  has  been  hitherto  unperceived ; and  per 
haps,  without  knowing,  with  certainty,  what  will  be  the  terms 
of  his  Conclusion.  Thus  the  Mathematician,  e.  g.  seeks  to 
ascertain  what  is  the  ratio  of  circles  to  each  other,  or  what  is 
the  line  whose  square  will  be  equal  to  a given  circle.  The 
Advocate,  on  the  other  hand,  has  a Proposition  put  before 
him,  which  he  is  to  maintain  as  well  as  he  can.  His  business, 
therefore,  is  to  find  middle-terms  (which  is  the  inventio  of 
Cicero  ;)  the  Philosopher’s  to  combine  and  select  known  facts 
or  principles,  suitably,  for  gaining  from  them  Conclusions 
which,  though  implied  in  the  Premisses,  were  before  unper- 
ceived : in  other  words,  for  making  “ Logical  Discoveries.” 

It  may  be  added  that  all  questions  may  be 
considered  as  falling  under  two  classes  ; viz. 
“ What  shall  be  predicated  of  a certain  Sub- 
ject ; ” and,  “ Which  Copula,  affirmative  o? 
negative,  shall  connect  a certain  Subject  and 
Predicate.”  We  inquire,  in  short,  either 


Questions 
concerning 
Predicate,  and 
concerning 

Copula. 


* “Proving”  may  be  compared  to  the  act  of  putting  away  any  arti- 
cle into  the  proper  receptacle  of  goods  of  that  description ; “ infer' 
ring,'  to  that  of  bringing  out  the  article  when  needed. 


Chap  III.  } 2.J  INFERENCE  AND  PRUOF. 


203 


1st.  “ What  is  A ? ” or,  2d,  “ Is  A,  B,  or  is  it  not?  ” The 
former  class  of  questions  belongs  to  the  Philosopher  ; the  lat. 
ter  to  the  Advocate.  (See  Rhet.  Appendix  G.  p.  387.) 

The  distinction  between  these  two  classes  of  questions  is 
perhaps  best  illustrated  by  reference  to  some  case  in  which 
our  decision  of  each  of  the  questions  involved  in  some  asser- 
tion, is  controverted,  by  different  parties.  E.  G.  Paul  says, 
that  the  apostles  preached  “ Christ  crucified ; to  the  Jews  a 
stumbling-block,  and  to  the  Greeks,  foolishness  : ” that  Jesus, 
who  had  suffered  an  ignominious  death,  was  the  Messiah,  the 
Savior  of  the  World,  was  a doctrine  opposed  both  by  Jews 
and  Gentiles,  though  on  different  grounds,  according  to  their 
respective  prejudices  : the  Jews  who  “ required  a sign  ” ( i . e. 
the  coming  of  the  Messiah  in  the  clouds  to  establish  a splendid 
temporal  kingdom)  were  “offended” — “scandalized” — at 
the  doctrine  of  a suffering  Messiah  : the  Greeks  who  “ sought 
after  philosophical  Wisdom  ” ( i . e.  the  mode  of  themselves 
exalting  their  own  nature,  without  any  divine  aid)  ridiculed 
the  idea  of  a Heavenly  Savior  altogether;  which  the  Jews 
admitted.  In  logical  language,  the  Gentiles  could  not  com 
prehend  the  Predicate ; the  Jews,  denied  the  Copula. 

It  may  be  added,  that  in  modern  phraseology, 

the  operations  of  corresponding  prejudices  are  Changes  oj 
‘ o j j paradox  and 

denoted,  respectively,  by  the  words  “ paradox  ” nonsense. 

(a  “ stumbling-block  ”)  and  “ nonsense  ; ” 
(“foolishness”)  which  are  often  used,  the  one,  by  him  who 
has  been  accustomed  to  hold  an  opposite  opinion  to  what  is 
asserted,  the  other,  by  him  who  has  formed  no  opinion  on  the 
subject.  The  writer  who  proves  an  unwelcome  truth,  is  cen- 
sured as  paradoxical ; he  who  brings  to  light  truths  unknown 
or  unlhought-of,  as  nonsensical, 

25* 


694 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Bock  IV 


§ 3. 

Such  are  the  respective  preparatory  processei 
Different  jn  these  two  branches  of  study,  the  philosophi- 

connected  with  cal’  and  the  *toetoncal.  They  are  widely  differ- 
these  processes,  ent ; they  arise  from,  and  generate,  very  diffei* 
ent  habits  of  mind  ; and  require  a very  different 
kind  of  training  and  precept.  It  is  evident  that  the  business 
of  the  Advocate  and  that  of  the  Judge*  are,  in  this  point,  op- 
posed ; the  one  being  to  find  arguments  for  the  support  of  his 
client’s  cause  ; the  other,  to  ascertain  the  truth.  And  hence 
it  is,  that  those  who  have  excelled  the  most  in  the  former  de- 
partment, sometimes  manifest  a deficiency  in  the  latter, 
though  the  subject-matter,  in  which  they  are  conversant,  re- 
mains the  same.  The  Pleader,  or  Controversialist,  or,  in 
short,  the  Rhetorician  in  general,  who  is,  in  his  own  prov- 
ince, the  most  skilful,  may  be  but  ill-fitted  for  philosophical- 
investigation,  even  where  there  is  no  observation  wanted  : — 
when  the  facts  are  all  ready  ascertained  for  him.  And  again, 
the  ablest  Philosopher  may  make  an  indifferent  disputant ; 
especially,  since  the  arguments  which  have  led  him  to  the 
conclusion,  and  have,  with  him,  the  most  weight,  may  not, 
perhaps,  be  the  most  powerful  in  controversy. 

The  commoner  fault,  however,  by  far,  is  to  forget  the 
Philosopher  or  Theologian,  and  to  assume  the  Advocate,  im- 
properly. It  is  therefore  of  great  use  to  dwell  on  the  distinc- 
tion between  these  two  branches.  As  for  the  bare  process 
of  Reasoning,  that  is  the  same  in  both  cases ; but  the  prepar- 
atory processes  which  are  requisite,  in  order  to  employ  Rea- 
soning profitally,  these,  we  see,  branch  off  into  two  distinct 
channels.  In  each  of  these,  undoubtedly,  useful  rules  may 


Chap.  HI.  § 3.]  INFERENCE  AND  PROOF. 


295 


Rhetorical 

Inquiry. 


be  laid  down  ; but  they  should  not  be  confounded  together 

Bacon  has  chosen  the  department  of  Philosophy  ; 

, . , . _ , „ , Philosophical 

giving  rules  in  his  Urganon,  not  only  for  the  inquiry 

conduct  of  experiments  to  ascertain  new  facts, 

but  also  for  the  selection  and  combination  of  known  facts  and 

principles,  with  a view  of  obtaining  valuable  Inferences  ; and 

t is  probable  that  a system  of  such  rules  is  what  some  writers 

mean  (if  they  have  any  distinct  meaning)  by  their  proposed 

“ Logic.” 

In  the  other  department,  precepts  have  been 
given  by  Aristotle  and  other  Rhetorical  writers 
as  a part  of  their  plan.*  How  far  these  precepts 
are  to  be  considered  as  belonging  to  the  present  system, — 
whether  “ Method  ” is  to  be  regarded  as  a part  of  Logic , — 
whether  the  Matter  of  Logic  (i.  e.  general  maxims,  axioms, 
or  common-places)  is  to  be  included  in  the  system,  — whether 
Bacon’s  is  properly  to  be  reckoned  a kind  of  Logic  ; all  these 
are  merely  verbal  questions,  relating  to  the  extension,  not  of 
the  Science , but  of  the  name.  The  bare  process  of  Reason- 
ing, i.  e.  deducing  a Conclusion  from  Premisses,  must  ever 
remain  a distinct  operation  from  the  assumption  of  Premisses ; 
however  useful  the  rules  may  be  that  have  been  given,  or 
may  be  given,  for  conducting  this  latter  process,  and  others 
connected  with  it ; and  however  properly  such  rules  may  be 
subjoined  to  the  precepts  of  that  system  to  which  the  name 
of  Logic  is  applied  in  the  narrowest  sense.  Such  rules  as  I 


* I have  attempted  the  same  in  Part  I.  of  Elements  of  Rhetoric ; 
although,  (through  some  inadvertency)  I have  found  mvself  men- 
tioned along  with  some  other  writers,  as  having  declared  that  the 
Jiing  is  impossible  If  I ever  had  made  such  an  assertion,  I should 
probably  have  been  the  first  person  that  ever  undertook  to  accomplish 
an  acknowledged  impossibility. 


296 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


now  allude  to  may  be  of  eminent  service  ; but  they  must 
always  be,  as  I have  before  observed,  comparatively  vague 
and  general,  and  incapable  of  being  built  up  into  a regulat 
demonstrative  theory  like  that  of  the  Syllogism  ; to  which 
theory  they  bear  much  the  same  relation  as  the  principles  and 
rules  of  Poetical  and  Rhetorical  criticism  to  those  of  Gram- 
mar ; or  those  of  practical  Mechanics,  to  strict  Geometry.  1 
find  nc  fault  with  the  extension  of  a Term  ; but  I would  sug- 
gest a caution  against  confounding  together,  by  means  of  a 
common  name,  things  essentially  different ; and  above  all  I 
svould  deprecate  the  sophistry  of  striving  to  depreciate  what 
is  called  “the  school-Logic,”  by  perpetually  contrasting  it 
with  systems  with  which  it  has  nothing  in  common  but  the 
name,  and  whose  object  is  essentially  different. 


two  different  plans  for  attaining  one  and  the  same  object,)  have 
themselves  complained  of  one  of  the  effects  of  this  confusion, 
viz.  the  introduction,  early  in  the  career  of  Academical  Edu 
cation,  of  a course  of  Logic ; under  which  name  they  ob- 
serve, men  now*  universally  comprehend  the  works  of 
Locke,  Bacon,  which,  (as  is  justly  remarked)  are  unfit 
for  beginners.  Now  this  would  not  \iave  happened,  if  rnen 
nad  always  kept  in  mind  the  meaning  or  meanings  of  each 
name  they  used. 


§4. 


Aristotle's 
Organon  and 
Bacon  s. 


It  is  remarkable  that  writers,  whose  expres- 
sions tend  to  confound  together,  by  means  of  a 
common  name,  two  branches  of  study  which 
have  nothing  else  in  common  (as  if  they  were 


* ».  e.  In  the  Scotch  universities 


Chap.  IV.  [ I.]  VERBAL  AN1)  REAL  QUESTIONS. 


29? 


And  it  may  be  added,  that  however  justly  the  word  Logic 
may  be  thus  extended,  we  have  no  ground  for  applying  to  the 
Aristotelian  Logie  the  remarks  above  quoted  respecting  tha 
Baconian  ; which  the  ambiguity  of  the  word,  if  not  carefully 
tcept  in  view,  might  lead  us  to  do.  Grant  that  Bacon’s  work 
is  a part  of  Logic  ; it  no  more  follows,  from  the  unfitness  of 
that  for  learners , that  the  Elements  of  the  Theory  of  Reason- 
ing should  be  withheld  from  them,  then  it  follows  that  the  ele- 
ments of  Euclid,  and  common  Arithmetic,  are  unfit  for  boys, 
because  Newton's  Principia , which  also  bears  the  title  of 
Mathematical,  is  above  their  grasp.  Of  two  branches  of  study 
which  bear  the  same  name,  or  even  of  two  parts  of  the  same 
branch,  the  one  may  be  suitable  to  the  commencement,  the 
other  to  the  close  of  the  Academical  career. 

At  whatever  period  of  that  career  it  may  be  proper  to  intro- 
duce the  study  of  such  as  are  usually  called  Metaphysical 
writers,  it  may  be  safely  asserted,  that  those  who  have  had 
the  most  experience  in  the  business  of  giving  instruction  in 
Logic  properly  so  called,  as  well  as  in  other  branches  of 
knowledge,  prefer  and  generally  pursue  the  plan  of  lettinp 
their  pupils  enter  on  that  study,  next  in  order  after  the  ele 
ments  of  Mathematics. 


Chap.  IV.  — Of  Verbal  and  Real  Questions. 

§1. 

The  ingenious  author  of  the  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric,  and 
other  writers,  having  maintained,  or  rather  assumed,  that 
Logic  is  applicable  to  Verbal  controversy  alone,  there  may  be 
*n  advantage  (though  it  has  been  my  aim  throughout  to  show 


29S 


ON  THE  f HO  VINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


the  application  of  it  to  all  reasoning)  in  pointing  out  the  dif 
ference  between  Verbal  and  Real  Questions,  and  the  probable 
origin  of  Campbell’s  mistake.  For  to  trace  any  error  to  its 
source,  will  often  throw  more  light  on  the  subject  in  hand 
than  can  be  obtained  if  we  rest  satisfied  with  merely  detecting 
and  refuting  it. 

Every  Question  that  can  arise,  is  in  fact  a Question 
whether  a certain  Predicate  is  or  is  not  applicable  to  a certain 
Subject,  or,  what  Predicate  is  applicable;*  and  whatever 
other  account  may  be  given  by  any  writer,  of  the  nature  of 
any  matter  of  doubt  or  debate,  will  be  found  ultimately  to 
resolve  itself  into  this.  But  sometimes  the  Question  turns 
on  the  meaning  and  extent  of  the  terms  em- 

Difference  be-  p]0yed  ; sometimes  on  the  things  signified  by 
tween  a verbal  ..  . 

and  a real  “ it  be  made  to  appear,  therefore,  that 

question.  the  opposite  sides  of  a certain  Question  may 

be  held  by  persons  not  differing  in  their  opinion 
of  the  matter  in  hand,  then,  that  Question  may  be  pronounced 
Verbal  ; as  depending  on  the  different  senses  in  which 
they  respectively  employ  the  terms.  If,  on  the  contrary,  i. 
appears  that  they  employ  the  Terms  in  the  same  sense,  but 
still  differ  as  to  the  application  of  one  of  them  to  the  other, 
then  it  may  be  pronounced  that  the  Question  is  Real  ; — that 
they  differ  as  to  the  opinions  they  hold  of  the  things  in  Ques- 
tion. 

If,  for  instance,  (to  recur  to  an  example  formerly  given, 
Book  III.  § 10.)  two  persons  contend  whether  Augustus 
deserved  to  be  called  a “ great  man,”  then,  if  it  appeared 
that  the  one  included,  under  the  term  “ great,”  disinterested 
patriotism  and  on  that  ground  excluded  Augustus  from  the 


• 8®s  Chap.  iii.  § 2 


Chap.  IV.  {2.]  VERBAL  AND  REAL  QUESTIONS. 


299 


glass,  as  wanting  in  that  quality  ; and  that  the  other  also  gave 
him'  no  credit  for  that  quality,  but  understood  no  mere  by  the 
term  “ great,”  than  high  intellectual  qualities,  energy  of  char- 
acter, and  brilliant  actions,  it  would  follow  that  the  parties  did 
not  differ  in  opinion  except  as  to  the  use  of  a Term,  and  that 
the  Question  was  Verbal. 

If,  again,  it  appeared  that  the  one  did  give  Augustus  credit 
for  such  patriotism  as  the  other  denied  him,  both  of  them  in- 
cluding that  idea  in  the  term  great,  then,  the  Question  would 
be  Real.  Either  kind  of  Question,  it  is  plain,  is  to  be  argued 
according  to  Logical  principles ; but  the  middle-terms  employed 
would  he  different ; and  for  this  reason,  among  others,  it  is 
important  to  distinguish  Verbal  from  Real  controversy.  In 
the  former  case,  e.  g.  it  might  be  urged  (with  truth)  that  the 
common  use  of  the  expression  “ great  and  good  ” proves  that 
the  idea  of  good  is  not  implied  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the 
word  great ; an  argument  which  could  have,  of  course,  no 
place  in  deciding  the  other  Question.* 


§ 2. 


Verbal  Ques- 
tions mistaken 


It  is  by  no  means  to  be  supposed  that  all 
Verbal  Questions'are  trifling  and  frivolous.  It 
is  often  of  the  highest  importance  to  settle  cor-  for  Real' 
rectly  the  meaning  of  a word,  either  according  to  ordinal y 
jse,  or  according  to  the  meaning  of  any  particular  writer  o! 
class  of  men.  But  when  Verbal  Questions  are  mistaken  foi 
Real,  much  confusion  of  thought  and  unprofitable  wrangling 
— what  is  usually  designated  as  Logomachy  — 
will  be  generally  the  result.  Nor  is  it  always 


Logomachy. 


See  Book  III.  the  latter  part  of  § 10- 


300 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Bool  IV 


so  easj  and  simple  a task,  as  might  at  first  sight  appear,  ;a 
distinguish  them  from  each  other.  For,  several  objects  to 
which  one  common  name  is  applied,  will  often  have  many 
poirts  of  difference  ; and  yet  that  name  may  perhaps  be  ap- 
plied to  them  all  [univocaily]  in  the  same  sense,  and  may  be 
fairly  regarded  as  the  Genus  they  come  under,  if  it  appear 
‘•hat  they  all  agree  in  what  is  designated  by  that  name,  and 
that  the  differences  between  them  are  in  points  not  essential 
to  the  character  of  that  genus.  A cow  and  a horse  differ  in 
many  respects,  but  agree  in  all  that  is  implied  by  the  term 
“ quadruped,”  which  is  therefore  applicable  to  both  in  the 
same  sense.*  So  also  the  houses  of  the  ancients  differed  I<n 
many  respects  from  ours,  and  their  ships  still  more  ; yet  no 
one  would  contend  that  the  terms  “ house  ” and  “ ship,”  as 
applied  to  both,  are  ambiguous,  or  that  ulxog  might  not  fairly 
be  rendered  house , and  vovg  ship;  because  the  essential  char- 
acteristic of  a house  is,  not  its  being  of  this  or  that  form  01 
materials,  but  its  being  a dwelling  for  men  ; these  therefore 
would  be  called  Lwo  different  kinds  of  houses ; and  conse- 
quently the  term  “ house”  would  be  applied  to  each,  without; 
an)  equivocation,  [univocaily]  in  the  same  sense : and  so  in 
-.he  other  instances. 


* Yet  the  charge  of  equivocation  is  sometimes  unjustly  brought 
against  a writer  in  consequence  of  a gratuitous  assumption  of  cuj 
own.  An  Eastern  writer,  e.  g.  may  be  speaking  of  “ beast  of  burden , 
and  the  reader  may  chance  to  have  the  idea  occur  to  his  mind  of 
Horses  and  Mules  ; he  thence  takes  for  granted  that  these  were  meant 
and  if  it  afterwards  come  out  that  it  was  Camels,  he  perhaps  com 
plains  of  the  writer  for  misleading  him  by  not  expressly  mentioning 
the  Species  ; saying,  “ I could  not  know  that  he  meant  Camels.”  H« 
did  not  mean  Camels,  in  particular  ; he  meant,  as  he  said,  “ beasts  of 
burden:”  and  Camels  are  such,  as  well  as  Horses  and  Mules  He  ii 
not  accountable  for  your  suppositions. 


Chap.  IV.  §2.]  VERBAL  AND  REAL  QUESTIONS.  30. 

Un  the  other  hand,  two  or  more  things  may  bear  the  same 
name,  and  may  also  have  a resemblance  in  many  points,  nay, 
and  may  from  that  resemblance  have  come  to  bear  the  same 
name,  and  yet  if  the  circumstance  which  is  essential  to  each 
be  wanting  in  the  other,  the  term  may  be  pronounced  ambig- 
uous. E.  G.  The  word  “ Plantain  ” is  the  name  of  a com- 
mon herb  in  Europe,  and  of  an  Indian  fruit-tree  : both  are 
vegetables ; yet  the  term  is  ambiguous,  because  it  does  not 
denote  them  so  far  forth  as  they  agree. 

Again,  the  word  “ Priest”  is  applied  to  the  Ministers  of  the 
Jewish  and  of  the  Pagan  religions,  and  also  to  those  of  the 
Christian ; and  doubtless  the  term  has  been  so  transferred  in 
consequence  of  their  being  both  ministers  (in  some  sort)  of 
religion.*  Nor  would  every  difference  that  might  be  found 
between  the  Priests  of  different  religions  constitute  the  term 
ambiguous,  provided  such  differences  were  non-essential  to  the 
idea  suggested  by  the  word  Priest ; as  e.  g.  the  Jewish  Priest 
served  the  true  God,  and  the  Pagan,  false  Gods  : this  is  a 
most  important  difference,  but  does  not  constitute  the  term 
ambiguous,  because  neither  of  these  circumstances  is  implied 
and  suggested  by  the  term  'Ieqehg,  which  accordingly  was 
applied  both  to  Jewish  and  Pagan  Priests.  But  the  tern* 

' Itfjev;  does  seem  to  have  implied  the  office  of  offering  sacri- 
fice,, — atoning  for  the  sins  of  the  people,  — and  acting  as 
mediator  between  Man  and  the  object  of  his  worship.  And 
accordingly  that  term  is  never  applied  to  any  one  under  the 
Christian  system,  except  to  the  ONE  great  Mediator.  The 
Christian  ministers  not  having  that  office  which  was  implied  aa 
essential  in  the  term  ’ Ieqev c,  [sacerdos]  were  never  called  bv 


* See  Discourse  on  “the  Christian  Priesthood,”  appended  to  tilt 
Bt/nptcn  Lectures. 


26 


3f»2 


ON  THE  PllOVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Boon  IV 


that  name,  but  by  that  of  ngea^iTegog*  It  may  be  concluded 
therefore,  that  the  term  Priest  is  ambiguous,  as  corresponding 
to  the  terms  'legeig  and  ngeofivTBQos  respectively,  notwith- 
standing that  there  are  points  in  which  these  two  agree. 
These  therefore  should  be  reckoned,  not  two  different  kinds 
of  Priests,  but  Priests  in  two  different  senses  ; since  (to  adopt 
the  phraseology  of  Aristotle)  the  definition  of  them,  no  far 
forth  as  they  are  Priests,  would  be  different. 

A “ real  ” question  again  is  liable  to  be  mis- 

Real  Ques-  {a^en  por  a “ verbal ,”  when  different  persons 
tions  mistaken  e 

for  Verbal.  who  are  'n  ^act  using  a term  in  the  same  sense, 
are  supposed  to  be  using  it  in  different  senses  ; 
sometimes,  from  its  being  erroneously  taken  for  granted  that 
what  commonly  belongs  to  the  thing  spoken  of  must  be  implied 
in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  name  of  that  thing : — as 
e.  g.  if  any  one  should  conclude,  from  the  ordinary  kinds  of 
wood  being  lighter  than  water,  that  the  ordinary  sense  of  the 
term  “ wood  ” implies  floating  in  water  : sometimes  again, 
from  its  being  rashly  inferred  from  two  persons  having  a dif- 
ference of  opinion  respecting  some  thing,  that  they  each  de- 
note that  opinion  in  their  use  respectively,  of  the  term  which 
expresses  that  thing : as  r g.  if  two  persons  differing  in  opin- 
ion as  to  the  question  of  episcopacy,  should  be  considered 
as  differing  in  their  use  of  the  word  “ Episcopalian,” 
and  implying  by  it,  the  one  a right  and  the  other  a 
wrong  form  of  Church-government  ; whereas  the  word  itself 
does  not  express  or  imply  [connote]  either  the  one  or  the 
other,  but  simply  “ an  adherent  to  an  episcopal  form  of 


• From  which  cur  word  Priest  is  derived,  but  which  (it  is  remark- 
»ble ) is  never  t ;»  islated  “ Priest  ’ in  our  version  of  the  Serpturen 
but  •'  Elder.” 


ha*  J2.J  VERBAL  AND  REAL  QUESTIONS. 


305 


government.’  They  both  mean  the  same  thing ; theii 
difference  cf  opinion  being,  whether  that  thing  be  right  or 
wrong. 

And  most  especially  is  ambiguity  likely  to  be 

, . , , ...  Different  ap • 

erroneously  attributed  to  some  term,  when  dit-  pli -cations  0j-a 

ferent  persons  who  employ  it  in  reality  in  the  term  do  not 

same  sense , are  accustomed  to  apply  it  differ-  lmPty  ambi- 

ently,  according  to  circumstances,  and  thus  to  9ultJ' 

associate  it  habitually  in  their  minds  with  different  things 

E.  G.  “ Patriotism  ” is  applied  by  each  in  reference  to  his 

own  country  ; but  the  word  itself  has  the  same  signification 

with  each  ; just  as  the  word  “ Father  ; ” though  it  is  likely  to 

recall  to  the  mind  of  each  a different  individual.  So  also  the 

term  “ true-believer,”  which  is  applied  by  Mahometans  to  a 

believer  in  the  Koran,  would  be  considered  by  Christians  as 

more  applicable  to  a believer  i.i  the  Gospel  ; but  it  would  not 

be  correct  to  say  that  “ the  one  party  means  by  this  term,  sc> 

and  so,  and  the  other,  something  different : ” for  they  do  not 

attach  different  senses  to  the  word  “true,”  or  to  the  word 

“believe;”  they  differ  only  in  their  persuasions  of  what  is 

true,  and  ought  to  be  believed. 

I have  noticed  some  instances  of  the  above  kinds  of  mis- 
take in  the  Appendix  to  the  third  Series  of  Essays ; and  also 
:n  the  Introduction  to  “ Political  Economy,”  from  which  I will 
.iere  cite  a passage. 

“ In  speaking  of  exchanges,  I did  not  mean  to  limit  myself 
to  voluntary  exchanges  ; — those  in  which  the  whole  transac- 
tion takes  place  with  the  full  consent  of  both  parties  to  all  the 
terms  of  it.  Most  exchanges,  indeed,  are  of  this  character, 
Dut  the  case  of  taxation,  — the  revenue  levied  from  the  sub- 
let in  return  for  the  protection  afforded  by  the  sovereign 
eonstitutes  a remarkable  exception  ; the  payment  being  com 


504 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


pulsory,  and  not  adjusted  by  agreement  with  the  payer.  Stilt 
whether  in  any  case  it  be  fairly  and  reasonably  adjusled,  oi 
the  contrary,  it  is  not  the  less  an  exchange.  And  it  is 
worth  remarking,  that  it  is  just  so  far  forth  as  it  is  an 
exchange,  — so  far  forth  as  protection,  whether  adequate 
or  not,  is  afforded  in  exchange  for  this  payment,  that  the  pay- 
ment itself  comes  under  the  cognizance  of  this  science. 
There  is  nothing  else  that  distinguishes  taxation  from  avowed 
robbery. 

“ Though  the  generality  of  exchanges  are  voluntary,  this 
circumstance  is  not  essential  to  an  exchange  : since  otherwise 
the  very  expression  ‘ voluntary  exchange,1  would  be  tautologi- 
cal and  improper.  But  it  is  a common  logical  error  to  sup- 
pose that  what  usually  belongs  to  the  thing , is  implied  by  the 
usual  sense  of  the  word.  Although  most  noblemen  possess 
large  estates,  the  word  ‘nobleman1  does  not  imply  the  pos- 
session of  a large  estate.  Although  most  birds  can  fly,  the 
ordinary  use  of  the  term  ‘ bird  1 does  not  imply  this ; since 
the  penguin  and  the  ostrich  are  always  admitted  to  be  birds. 
And  though,  in  a great  majority  of  cases,  wealth  is  acquired 
jy  labor,  the  ordinary  use  of  the  word  ‘ wealth  1 does  not  in- 
clude this  circumstance,  since  every  one  would  call  a pearl 
an  article  of  wealth,  even  though  a man  should  chance  to 
meet  with  it  in  eating  an  oyster.” 

It  is  evidently  of  much  importance  to  keep  in  mind  the 
above  distinctions,  in  order  to  avoid,  on  the  one  hand,  stigma- 
tizing, as  Verbal  controversies,  what  in  reality  are  not  such 
merely  because  the  Question  turns  (as  every  question  mustj 
on  the  applicability  of  a certain  Predicate  to  a certain  Sub- 
ject ; or,  on  the  other  hand,  falling  into  the  opposite  error  of 
mistaking  words  for  things,  and  judging  of  men’s  agreernen 


Chap.  Y.  § l.J  VERBAL  AND  REAL  QUESTIONS. 


303 


or  disagreement  in  opinion  in  every  case,  merely  from  theii 
agreement  or  disagreement  in  the  terms  employed. 


Chap.  V.  — Of  Realism. 

§ 1. 

Nothing  has  a greater  tendency  to  lead  to  the  mistake  jus, 
noticed,  and  thus  to  produce  undetected  Verbal  Questions  and 
fruitless  Logomachy,  than  the  prevalence  of  the  notion  of  the 
Realists,*  that  Genus  and  Species  are  some  real  Things, 
existing  independently  of  our  conceptions  and  expressions ; 
and  that,  as  in  the  case  of  Singular-terms  there  is  some  real 
individual  corresponding  to  each,  so,  in  Common-terms  also, 
there  is  some  Thing  corresponding  to  each  ; which  is  the 
object  of  our  thoughts  when  we  employ  any  such  term.t 

* It  is  well  known  what  a furious  controversy  long  existed  in  all 
the  universities  of  Europe  between  the  sects  of  the  Realists  and  the 
Nominalists  ; the  heat  of  which  was  allayed  by  the  Reformation, 
which  withdrew  men’s  attention  to  a more  important  question. 

t A doctrine  commonly,  but  falsely  attributed  to  Aristotle,  who 
expressly  contradicts  it.  He  calls  individuals  “ primary  substances  ” 
{jiqortui  o vcnai)  ; Genus  and  Species  “ secondary,”  as  not  denoting 
(iuSt  t i)  a 'really-existing  thing.”  liana  Si  ova'ia  Soxei  -rode  n iitii- 
veiv.  5 En  l piv  ovv  Ton  tiqujtiuv  ovoiwr  avafiipiofi/jTrjTov  xai  aXySig  imiv, 
oti  tuSe  T l OTjuaivtr  ogrofiov  y'aQ  xai  ev  ctQi&pno  to  SijXor^iEvov  Imiv.  ’Em 
Si  r on  Sivrinwv  ovai<nr,  <t>A  INET A I u i I ofioiiug  tu>  a/i^iart  n'g  ;i  qo  - 
orjooiug  Tods  ri  aijfiah  eir , orav  Any,  av&Qumog,  ij  tmov  O T MHN  TH 
AAHPIE21  aXXu  yaX.Xov  TIOION  TI  arifiairti'  x.T.X.  Aristotle,  Categ 
[ 3.  See  Appendix,  Art.  “ Same.”  There  is  however  a continual 
danger  of  sliding  into  Realism  inadvertently,  unless  one  is  continually 
im  the  watch  against  it : of  which  Aristotle  as  -well  as  many  otlia 
vriters  not  deliberately  holding  the  doctrine,  furnish  instan  ses. 

26* 


306 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


There  b one  circumstance  which  ought  to  ba 

Technical  . _ 

tense  of  Species  no!'cec^  as  having  probably  contributed  not  a 
token  applied  little  to  foster  this  error  : I mean,  the  peculiar 
to  organized  technical  sense  of  the  word  “Species”  when 
applied  to  organized  Beings. 

It  has  been  laid  down  in  the  course  of  this  work,  that  when 
several  individuals  are  observed  to  resemble  each  other  in 
some  point,  a common  name  may  be  assigned  to  them  indi- 
cating [implying,  or  “connoting”*]  that  point,  — applying 
to  all  or  any  of  them  so  far  forth  as  respects  that  common 
attribute,  — and  distinguishing  them  from  all  others;  as,  e.  g. 
the  several  individual  buildings,  which,  however  different  in 
other  respects,  agree  in  being  constructed  for  men’s  dwelling, 
are  called  by  the  common  name  of  “House;”  and  it  was 
added,  that  as  we  select  at  pleasure  the  circumstance  that  we 
choose  to  abstract,  we  may  thus  refer  the  same  Individual  to 
any  one  of  several  different  Species,  and  again,  the  same 
Species,  to  one  Genus  or  to  another,  according  as  it  suits  our 
purpose ; whence  it  seems  plainly  to  follow  that  Genus  ana 
Species  are  no  real  things  existing  independent  of  our 
thoughts,  but  are  creatures  of  our  own  minds. 

Yet  in  the  case  of  Species  of  organized  Beings,  it  seems  at 
first  sight  as  if  this  rule  did  not  hold  good  ; but  that  the  Spe- 
cies to  which  each  individual  belongs,  could  not  be  in  any 
degree  arbitrarily  fixed  by  us,  but  must  be  something  real, 
unalterable,  and  independent  of  our  thoughts.  Caesar  or  Soc- 
rates, for  instance,  it  may  be  said,  must  belong  — different  as 
they  may  be  — to  the  Species  Man,  and  can  belong  to  no 
other;  a ad  the  like,  with  any  individual  Brute,  or  Plant"  e g 


• See  Book  II.  Chap.  v.  $ 1. 


Chap.  V.  $ 1.] 


REALISM. 


30? 


a horned  and  a hornless  sheep  every  naturalist  would  regard 
as  belonging  to  the  same  Species. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  any  one  utters  such  a proposition  as 
“this  apple-tree  isacodlin;”  — “this  dog  is  a spaniel,”  — 
“ Argus  was  a mastiff,”  to  what  head  of  Predicables  would 
such  a Predicate  be  referred  ? Surely  our  logical  principles 
would  lead  us  to  answer,  that  it  is  the  Species  ; since  it  could 
hardly  be  called  an  Accident,  and  is  manifestly  no  other  Pred- 
icable. And  yet  every  Naturalist  would  at  once  pronounce 
that  Mastiff  is  no  distinct  Species,  but  only  a variety  of  the 
Species  Dog.  This  however  does  not  satisfy  our  inquiry  as 
to  the  head  of  Predicables  to  which  it  is  to  be  referred.  It 
should  seem  at  first  sight  as  if  one  needed,  in  the  case  of 
organized  Beings,  an  additional  head  of  Predicables  to  be 
called  “ Variety  ” or  “ Race.” 

The  solution  of  the  difficulty  is  to  be  found  in  the  consid- 
sration  of  the  peculiar  technical  sense  [or  “ second  intention  ”] 
of  the  word  “ Species  ” when  applied  to  organ- 


ralists)  to  such  individuals  as  are  supposed  to  be  from  variety: 
descended  from  a common  stock,  or  which  might 
nave  so  descended  ; viz.  which  resemble  one  another  (to  use 
M.  Cuv.er’s  expression)  as  much  as  those  of  the  same  stock 
do.  Now  this  being  a point  on  which  all  (not  merely  Natu- 
ralists) are  agreed,  and  since  it  is  a fact,  (whether  an  oscer- 
tained  fact  or  not)  that  certain  individuals  are, 
or  are  not,  thus  connected,  it  follows,  that  every  Questions  if 
question  whether  a certain  individual  Animal  or  f act  and 


Plant  belongs  to  a certain  Species  or  not,  is  a rangement. 
question  not  of  mere  arrangement,  but  of  fact. 

But  in  the  case  of  questions  respecting  Genus,  i is  otherwise 


ized  Beings : in  which  case  it  is  always  ap^ 
plied  (when  we  are  speaking  strictly,  as  natu- 


Species  dis 
tinguished  by 
Naturalists 


tions  of  ar  < 


308 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  lBoob.  IV 


[f,  e.  g.  two  Naturalists  differed,  in  t ie  one  placing  (as  Lin 
meus)  all  the  Species  of  Bee  under  one  Genus , which  the 
other  subdivided  (as  later  writers  have  done)  into  several  gen* 
era,  it  would  be  evident  that  there  was  no  question  of  fact  de« 
bated  between  them,  and  that  it  was  only  to  be  considered 
which  was  the  more  convenient  arrangement.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  were  disputed  whether  the  African  and  the  Asiatic 
Elephant  are  distinct  Species , or  merely  Varieties,  it  would  be 
equally  manifest  that  the  question  is  one  of  fact ; since  both 
w'ould  allow  that  if  they  are  descended  (or  might  have  de- 
scended) from  the  same  stock,  they  are  of  the  same  Species; 
and  if  otherwise,  of  two  : this  is  the  fact,  which  they  endeavor 
to  ascertain,  by  such  indications  as  are  to  be  found. 

For  it  is  to  be  further  observed,  that  this  fact  being  one 
which  can  seldom  be  directly  known,  the  consequence  is,  that 
the  marks  by  which  any  Species  of  Animal  or  Plant  is  known , 
are  not  the  very  Differentia  which  constitutes  that  Species. 
Now,  in  the  case  of  unorganized  Beings,  these  two  coincide  , 
the  marks  by  which  a Diamond,  e.  g.  is  dis- 

Mark  by  tinguished  from  other  minerals,  being  the  very 

which  a Spe-  J)ifferentja  that  constitutes  the  Species  Diamond. 
ties  is  known 

not  always  the  And  the  same  is  the  case  in  the  Genera  even  of 
Differentia.  organized  Beings  : the  Linnsean  Genus  “felis,” 
e.  g.  (when  considered  as  a Species,  i.  e.  as 
falling  under  some  more  comprehensive  Class)  is  distinguished 
from  others  under  the  same  Order,  by  those  very  marks  which 
constitute  its  Differentia.  But  in  the  “ Infimse  Species  ’*  (ac- 
cording to  the  view  of  a Naturalist)  of  plants  and  animals, 
this,  as  has  been  said,  is  not  the  case ; since  here  the  Differ- 
entia which  constitutes  each  Species  includes  in  it  a circum 
stance  which  cannot  often  be  directly  ascertained  (viz.  tne 
being  sprung  from  the  same  stock),  but  which  we  conjecture 


Chap.  Y.  § 1.] 


REALISM. 


399 


from  certain  circumstances  of  resemblance  ; so  that  the  marks 
by  which  a Species  is  known,  are  not  in  truth  the  whole  of 
the  Differentia  itself,  but  indications  of  the  existence  of  that 
Differentia;  viz.  indications  of  descent  from  a common  stock. 

There  are  a few,  and  but  a few,  other  Species  to  which  .he 
same  observations  will  in  a great  degree  apply  : I mean  in 
which  the  Differentia  which  constitutes  the  Species,  and  the 
mark  by  which  the  Species  is  known , are  not  the  same  : e.  g. 
“Murder:”  the  Differentia  of  which  is  that  it  be  committed 
“ with  malice  aforethought ; ” this  cannot  be  directly  ascer- 
tained ; and  therefore  we  distinguish  murder  from  any  other 
homicide  by  circumstances  of  preparation,  c^-c.,  which  are  not 
in  reality  the  Differentia,  but  indications  of  the  Differentia ; 
i.  e.  grounds  for  concluding  that  the  malice  did  exist. 

Hence  it  is,  that  Species,  in  the  case  of  organized  Beings, 
and  also  in  a few  other  cases,  have  the  appearance  of  being 
some  real  things,  independent  of  our  thoughts  and  language. 
And  heryce,  naturally  enough,  the  same  notions  have  been 
often  extended  to  the  Genera  also,  and  to  Species  of  other 
things  : so  that  men  have  a notion  that  each  individual  of 
every  description  truly  belongs  to  some  one  Species  and  no 
other  : and  each  Species,  in  like  manner,  to  some  onefrenus' 
whether  we  happen  to  be  right  or  not  in  the  ones  to  which  we 
refer  them. 

Few,  if  any  indeed,  in  the  present  day  avow  and  maintain 
this  doctrine  : but  those  who  are  not  especially  on  their  guard, 
are  perpetually  sliding  into  it  unawares. 

Nothing  so  much  conduces  to  the  error  of  Ambiguity 
Realism  as  the  transferred  and  secondary  use  of  the  words 
of  the  words  “ same,”  * “ one  and  the  same,”  “ same> 
w identical,”  Sfc.  when  it  is  not  clearly  per-  °ne> 


See  Appendix,  Nd.  I.  Art.  “ Same.' 


310 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Book  IV 


ceived  and  carefully  borne  in  mind,  that  they  are  employed 
in  a secondary  sense,  and  that , more  frequently  even  than  in 
the  primary. 

Suppose  e.  g.  a thousand  persons  are  thinking  of  the  Sun  ' 
it  is  evident  it  is  one  and  the  same  individual  object  on  which 
all  these  minds  are  employed.  So  far  all  is  clear.  But  = jp- 
pose  all  these  persons  are  thinking  of  a Triangle  ; — not  any 
individual  triangle,  but  Triangle  in  general;  — and  considet 
ing,  perhaps,  the  equality  of  its  angles  to  two  right  angles, 
it  would  seem  as  if,  in  this  case  also,  their  minds  were  all  em- 
ployed on  “ one  and  the  same  ” object : and  this  object  of 
their  thoughts,  it  may  be  said,  cannot  be  the  mere  word  Tri- 
angle, but  that  which  is  meant  by  it : nor  again,  can  it  be 
every  thing  that  the  word  will  apply  to : for  they  are  not 
thinking  of  triangles , but  of  one  thing.  Those  who  do  not 
maintain  that  this  “one  thing”  has  an  existence  independent 
of  the  human  mind,  are  in  general  content  to  tell  us,  by  way 
of  explanation,  that  the  object  of  their  thoughts  is  the  abstract 
“ idea  ” of  a triangle  ; * an  explanation  which  satisfies,  or  at 
least  silences  many ; though  it  may  be  doubted  whether  they 
very  clearly  understand  what  sort  of  a thing  an  “idea”  is; 
which  may  thus  exist  in  a thousand  different  minds  at  once, 
and  yet  be  “ one  and  the  same.” 

The  fact  is,  that  “ unity  ” ana  'sameness”  are  in  such 
cases  employed,  not  in  the  primary  sense,  but  to  denote  per- 
fect similarity.  When  we  say  that  ten  thousand  different 
persons  have  all  “ one  and  the  same  ” Idea  Id  their  minds  or 
are  all  of  “ one  and  the  same  ” Opinion,  we  mean  no  more 
than  that  they  are  all  thinking  exactly  alike.  When  we  sa> 

* Conceptualise  is  a name  sometime*  applied  to  those  who  ndop* 
this  explanation  ( if  it  can  be  called  an  -xplanation)  ; to  which  claw 
Locke  is  referred. 


Chaf.  V.  j 1.1 


REALISM. 


3J  t 


that  they  are  all  in  the  “ same  ” posture,  we  mean  that  the) 
are  all  placed  alike  ; and  so  also  they  are  said  all  to  have  the 
‘ same  ” disease,  when  they  are  all  diseased  alike. 

One  instance  of  the  confusion  of  thought 

and  endless  logomachy  which  may  spring  from  Logomachy 

inattention  to  this  ambiguity  of  the  words  re™ltm9  from 
° J this  ambigu- 

same,”  <^c.,  is  afforded  by  the  controversy  ity, 
arising  out  of  a sermon  of  Dr.  King  (Archbish- 
op of  Dublin),  published  about  a century  ago.  He  remarked 
(without  expressing  himself  perhaps  with  so  much  guarded 
precision  as  the  vehemence  of  his  opponents  rendered  need- 
ful) that  “ the  attributes  of  the  Deity  (viz.  Wisdom,  Justice, 
SfC.)  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  the  same  with  those  human 
qualities  which  bear  the  same  names,  but  are  called  so  by  re- 
semblance and  analogy  only.”  For  this  he  was  decried  by 
Bishop  Berkeley  and  a host  of  other  objectors,  down  to  the 
present  time,  as  an  Atheist,  or  little  better.  “ If  the  divine 
attributes,”  they  urged,  “ are  not  precisely  the  same  in  kind 
(though  superior  in  degree)  with  the  human  qualities  which 
bear  the  same  name,  we  cannot  imitate  the  Deity  as  the  Scrip- 
tures require  ; — we  cannot  know  on  what  principles  we  shall 
be  judged  : — we  cannot  be  sure  that  God  exists  at  all  ;”  with 
a great  deal  more  to  the  same  purpose  ; all  of  which  would 
have  been  perceived  to  be  perfectly  idle,  had  the  authors  but 
recollected  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of  the  principal  word 
employed. 

For,  1st,  when  any  two  persons  (or  other  objects)  are  said 
.0  have  the  “ same  ” quality,  accident,  <S*c.,  what  we  predicate 
of  them  is  evidently  a certain  resemblance,  and 

kameness 

nothing  else.  One  man  e.  g.  does  not  feel  an-  consisting  in 
other's  sickness  ; but  they  are  said  to  have  the  resemblance 
1 «ame  ” disease,  (not  in  the  sense  in  which  two  anda',a,°M 


312 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Poet.  IV 


men  may  be  killed  by  the  same  cannon-ball,  but)  if  they 
are  precisely  similar  in  respect  of  these  ailments : and  sf. 
also  they  are  said  to  have  the  same  complexion,  if  the  hue 
and  texture  of  their  skin?  be  alike.  2dly,  Such  qualities 
as  are  entirely  relative , which  consist  in  the  relation  borne 
by  the  subject  to  certain  other  things, — in  these,  it  is  mani- 
fest, the  only  resemblance  that  can  exist,  is,  resemblance  of  re- 
lations, i.  e.  ANALOGY.  Courage,  e.  g.  consists  in  the  rela- 
tion in  which  one  stands*  towards  dangers;  Temperance  or 
Intemperance,  — towards  bodily  pleasures,  fyc.  When  it  is 
said,  therefore,  of  two  courageous  men,  that  they  have  both 
the  same  quality,  the  only  meaning  this  expression  can  have, 
is,  that  they  are,  so  far,  completely  analogous  in  their  charac 
ters ; — having  similar  ratios  to  certain  similar  objects.  In 
short,  as  in  all  qualities,  sameness  can  mean  only  strict  resem- 
blance■,  so,  in  those  which  are  of  a relative  nature,  resemblance 
can  mean  only  analogy.  Thus  it  appears,  that  what  Dr.  King 
has  been  so  vehemently  censured  for  asserting  respecting  the 
Deity,  is  literally  true  even  with  respect  ho  men  themselves  ; 
viz.  that  it  is  only  by  Analogy  that  two  persons  can  be  said 
io  possess  the  same  virtue,  or  other  such  quality.  3dly,  But 
what  he  means,  is,  plainly,  that  this  analogy  is  far  less  exact 
and  complete  in  the  case  of  a comparison  between  the  Deity 
and  his  creatures  than  between  one  man  and  another  ; which 
surely  no  one  would  venture  to  deny.  But  the  doctrine 
against  which  the  attacks  have  been  directed,  is  self-evi- 
dent, the  moment  we  consider  the  meaning  of  the  term  em- 
ployed.” 


♦ ’Ev  rw  e/siv  7i 6) g nQog,  Arist. 

t See  Dr.  Copleston’s  excellent  Analysis  and  Defence  of  Archbishop 
King’s  principles,  in  the  Notes  to  his  “ Four  Discourses.” 


Chap.  V.  § 2.J 


REALISM 


313 


In  the  Introduction  and  Notes  to  the  last  edition  of  Arch- 
bishop King’s  Discourse,  I have  considered  the  matters  in 
debate  more  fully ; but  this  slight  notice  of  them  has  been 
introduced  in  this  place,  as  closely  connected  with  the  present 
subject. 


§ 2. 

The  origin  of  this  secondary  sense  of  the  Origin  of 

words,  “ same,”  “ one,”  “ identical,”  tire,  (an  l*ie 

of  “ same,"  £$c 

Attention  to  which  would  clear  away  an  incalcu- 
lable mass  of  confused  Reasoning  and  Logomachy,)  is  easily 
to  be  traced  to  the  use  of  Language  and  of  other  signs , for 
the  purposes-of  reasoning  and  of  mutual  communication.  If 
any  one  utters  the  “ one  single  ” word  “ triangle,”  and  gives 
“one  single”  definition  of  it,  each  of  the  persons  who  hears 
him  forms  a certain  notion  in  his  own  mind,  not  differing  in 
any  respect  from  that  of  each  of  the  rest.  They  are  said 
therefore  to  have  all  “one  and  the  same”  notion,  because, 
resulting  from,  and  corresponding  with,  (that  which  is,  in  the 
primary  sense)  “ one  and  the  same  ” expression  ; and  there 
is  said  to  be  “ one  single  ” idea  of  every  triangle  (considered 
merely  as  a triangle)  because  one  single  name  or  definition  is 
equally  applicable  to  each.  In  like  manner,  all  the  coins 
struck  by  the  same  single  die,  are  said  to  have  “ one  and  the 
same  ” impression,  merely  because  the  (numerically)  “ one  ” 
description  which  suits  one  of  these  coins  will  equally  suit 
any  other  that  is  exactly  like  it.  The  expression  accordingly 
which  has  only  of  late  begun  to  prevail,  “such  and  such 
things  are  of  the  same  description is  perhaps  the  most  phil 
osophical  that  can  be  employed. 

It  is  not  intended  to  recommend  the  disuse  of  the  words 

27 


314 


ON  THE  PROVINCE  OF  REASONING.  [Hook  [y 


“ same,”  “ identical,”  fyc.  in  this  transferred  sense  ; which 
f it  were  desirable,  would  be  utterly  impracticable ; but 
merely,  a steady  attention  to  the  ambiguity  thus  introduced, 
und  watchfulness  against  the  errors  thence  arising.  “ It  is 
with  words  as  with  money.  Those  who  know  the  value  of  it 
best  are  not  therefore  the  least  liberal.  We  may  lend  readily 
and  largely  ; and  though  this  be  done  quietly  and  without 
ostentation,  there  is  no  harm  in  keeping  an  exact  account  in 
our  private  memorandum-book  of  the  sums,  the  persons,  and 
the  occasions  on  which  they  were  lent.  It  may  be,  we  shall 
want  them  again  for  our  own  use ; or  they  may  be  employed 
by  the  borrower  for  a wrong  purpose  ; or  they  may  have  been 
so  long  in  his  possession  that  he  begins  to  look  upon  them  as 
his  own.  In  either  of  which  cases  it  is  allowable,  and  even 
right,  to  call  them  in.”  * 

The  difficulties  and  perplexities  which  have  involved  the 
questions  respecting  personal-identity , among  others,  may  bo 
traced  principally  to  the  neglect  of  this  caution.  I mean  that 
many  writers  have  sought  an  explanation  of  the  primary 
sense  of  identity  (viz.  personal)  by  looking  to  the  secondary. 
Any  grown  man,  e.  g.  is,  in  the  primary  sense  the  same  per- 
son be  was  when  a child  : this  sameness  is,  I conceive,  a 
simple  notion,  which  it  is  vain  to  attempt  explaining  by  any 
other  more  simple ; but  when  philosophers  seek  to  gain  a 
clearer  notion  of  it  by  looking  to  the  cases  in  which  sameness 
is  predicated  in  another  sense,  viz.  similarity , such  as  exists 
between  several  individuals  denoted  by  a common  name, 
(as  when  we  say  that  there  are  growing  on  Lebanon  some  of 
the  same  trees  with  which  the  Temple  was  built ; meaning, 
cedars  of  that  species ) this  is  surely  as  idle  as  if  we  were  to 


• “ Logic  Vindicated.”  Oxford,  1809. 


Chap.  V.  § 2.] 


REALISM. 


315 


attempt  explaining  the  primary  sense,  e.  g.  of  “ rage  ” as  it 
exists  in  the  human  mind,  by  directing  our  attention  to  the 
‘ rage  ” of  the  sea.  Whatever  personal  identity  does  con 
sist  in,  it  is  plain  that  it  has  no  necessary  connection  with  sim- 
ilarity ; since  every  one  would  be  ready  to  say,  “ When  I 
WAS  a child  I thought  as  a child,  — I spake  as  a child,  — 1 
understood  as  a child  ; but  when  I became  a man,  I put  away 
childish  things.” 

But  a full  consideration  of  this  question  would  be  unsuitable 
to  the  subject  of  the  present  work. 


/ 


APPENDIX 


No.  L 

ON  CERTAIN  TERMS  WHICH  ARE  PECULIARLY  LIABLB 
TO  BE  USED  AMBIGUOUSLY. 

r-rST  OF  WORDS  EXPLAINED  IN  THE  FOLLOWING  APPENDIX. 


i.  Argument. 

ii.  Authority. 

Can.  — See  May, 
Must. 

Capable.  — See 
Possible,  Im- 
possible, N e- 
cessary. 

iii.  Case. 

Cause. — See  Res 
Son,  Why. 

iv.  Certain. 

v.  Church. 

vi.  Election. 

vii.  Expect. 

riii.  Experience 

Falsehood.  — See 
Truth 

is  God. 


x.  Gospel. 
Hence.-S?e  Rea- 
son, Why. 

Identical.  — See 
One,  Same. 

xi.  Impossibility. 

xii.  Indifference. 

xiii.  Law, 

xiv.  May, 

xv.  Necessary 

xvi.  Old. 

xvii.  One. 
xviii.  Pay. 

xix.  Person. 

xx.  Possible. 

xxi.  Preach. 

xxii.  Priest, 
xxiii.  Reason, 

xxiv.  Regeneration. 


xxv.  Same. 

xxvi.  Sin. 
xxvii.  Sincerity, 

Sincere, 
xxviii.  Tendency. 
Therefore.- 
See  Why. 

xxix.  Truth. 

xxx.  Why. 
Whence. 

See  Why. 

Value. 

Wealth. 

Labor. 

Capital. 

Rent. 

Wages. 

Profits. 


1.  .:i.s  appeared  to  me  desirable  to  illustrate  the  importance 
of  attending  to  the  ambiguity  of  terms,  by  a greater  num- 


320 


APPEjNDIX  I. 


ber  of  instances  than  could  have  been  conveniently  eithei 
inserted  in  the  context  or  introduced  in  a note,  withou 
too  much  interrupting  the  course  of  the  dissertation  on  Fal 
acies. 

I have  purposely  selected  instances  from  various  subjects, 
and  some,  from  the  most  important ; being  convinced  that  the 
disregard  and  contempt  with  which  logical  studies  are  usually 
treated,  may  be  traced,  in  part,  to  a notion,  that  the  science  is 
incapable  of  useful  application  to  any  matters  of  real  impor- 
tance, and  is  merely  calculated  to  afford  ar.  exercise  of  inge- 
nuity on  insignificant  truisms;  — syllogisms  to  prove  that  a 
horse  is  an  animal,  and  distinctions  of  the  different  senses  of 
**  cams”  or  of  “ gallus  — a mistake  which  is  likely  to  de- 
rive some  countenance  (however  unfairly)  from  the  exclusive 
employment  of  such  trifling  exemplifications. 

The  words  and  phrases  which  may  be  employed  as  ambig- 
uous Middle-terms  are  of  course  innumerable  : but  it  may  be, 
in  several  respects,  of  service  to  the  learner,  to  explain  the 
ambiguity  of  a few  of  those  most  frequently  occurring  in  the 
most  important  discussions,  and  whose  double  meaning  has 
been  the  most  frequently  overlooked  ; and  this,  not  by  enter- 
ing into  an  examination  of  all  the  senses  in  which  each  term 
is  ever  employed,  but  of  those  only  which  are  the  most  liable 
to  be  confounded  together. 

It  is  worth  observing,  that  the  words  whose  ambiguity  is  the 
most  frequently  overlooked,  and  is  productive  of  the  greatest 
amount  of  confusion  of  thought  and  fillacy,  are  among  the 
commonest,  ani  are  those  of  whose  meaning  the  generality 
tonsider  there  is  the  least  room  to  doubt.*  It  is  indeed  from 
.hose  very  circumstances  that  the  danger  arises  ; words  in 


See  Book  III.  $ 10. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


321 


eery  common  use  are  both  the  most  liable,  from  the  looseness 
of  ordinary  discourse,  to  slide  from  one  sense  into  another, 
and  also  the  least  likely  to  hate  that  ambiguity  suspected 
Familiar  acquaintance  is  perpetually  mistaken  for  accurate 
knowledge* 

It  may  be  necessary  here  to  remark,  that  inaccuracy  not 
unfrequently  occurs  in  the  employment  of  the  very  phrase, 
“ such  an  author  uses  such  a word  in  this,  or  that  sense,” 
or  “ means  so  and  so,  by  this  word.”  We  should  not  use 
these  expressions  (as  some  have  inadvertently  done)  in  refer- 
ence, necessarily,  to  the  notion  which  may  exist,  in  the  au- 
thor's mind,  of  the  olject  in  question  ; — his  belief  or  opinion 
respecting  tl  e thing  he  is  speaking  of ; — for  the  notions  con- 
veyed to  ot<  t ers  by  the  word , may  often  (even  according  to 
the  writer’s  awn  expectation)  fall  short  of  this.  He  may  be 
convinced,  e.  g.  that  “ the  moon  has  no  atmosphere,”  or  that 
“ the  Spartans  were  brave  ; ” but  he  cannot  suppose  that  the 
terms  “ moon  ” or  “ Spartans  ” imply  [connote]  any  such 
thing.f  Nor  again,  should  we  regard  the  sense  in  which  they 
understand  him,  as  necessarily  his  sense,  (though  it  is  theirs ) 
of  the  word  employed  ; since  they  may  mistake  his  meaning; 
but  we  must  consider  what  sense  it  is  likely  he  expected  and 
intended  to  convey,  to  those  to  whom  he  addressed  himself. 
And  a judicious  writer  will  always  expect  each  word  to  be 
understood,  as  nearly  as  the  context  will  allow,  in  the  sense,, 
or  in  one  of  the  senses,  which  use  has  established  ; except  so 
far  as  he  may  have  given  some  different  explanation.  Bu. 
there  are  many  who,  from  various  causes,  frequently  fail  of 
Conveying  the  sense  they  design.  And  it  may  be  added,  that 


* See  PoL  Econ.  Lect.  IX. 

+ See  Note  to  last  Essay,  3d  Senes ; and  also  Book  IY.  Ch  it.  { 2. 


322 


APPENDIX  I. 


there  are,  it  is  to  be  feared,  some  persons  in  these  days,  who 
design  to  convey  different  senses  by  the  same  expression,  to 
different  men; — to  the  ordinary  reader,  and  to  the  initiated 
— reserving  to  themselves  a back-door  for  evasion  when 
charged  with  any  false  teaching,  by  pleading  that  they  have 
been  misunderstood  “ in  consequence  of  the  reader’s  not  being 
aware  of  the  peculiar  sense  in  which  they  use  words!” 

It  is  but  fair  perhaps  to  add  this  warning  to  my  readers 
ihat  one  who  takes  pains  to  ascertain  and  explain  the  sense 
of  the  words  employed  in  any  discussion,  whatever  care  he 
may  use  to  show  that  what  he  is  inquiring  after,  is,  the  re- 
ceived sense,  is  yet  almost  sure  to  be  charged,  by  the  inaccu- 
rate, and  the  sophistical,  with  attempting  to  introduce  some 
new  sense  of  the  words  in  question,  in  order  to  serve  a purpose. 

i.  ARGUMENT,  in  the  strict  logical  sense,  has  been  de- 
fined in  the  foregoing  treatise  ; (Compendium,  Book  11.  Ch 
iii.  § 1 :)  in  that  sense  it  includes  (as  is  there  remarked)  the 
Conclusion  as  well  as  the  Premisses  : and  thus  it  is,  that  we 
say  a Syllogism  consists  of  three  propositions  ; viz.  the  Con- 
clusion which  is  proved,  as  well  as  those  by  which  it  is  proved. 
Argumentum  is  also  used  by  many  logical  writers  to  denote 
the  middle  term. 

But  in  ordinary  discourse,  Argument  is  very  often  used  for 
the  Premisses  alone,  in  contradistinction  to  the  Conclusion  ; 
f.  g.  “the  Conclusion  which  this  Argument  is  intended  to 
establish  is  so  and  so.” 

It  is  also  sometimes  employed  to  denote  what  is,  strictly 
speaking,  a course  or  series  of  such  Arguments  ; when  a cer- 
tain Conclusion  is  established  by  Premisses,  which  are  them 
selves,  in  the  same  dissertation,  proved  by  other  propositions, 
Rnd  perhaps  those  again,  by  others  ; the  whole  of  this  disse 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


32? 


tation  is  often  called  an  Argument  to  prove  the  ultimate  cor. 
clusion  designed  to  be  established  ; though  in  fact  it  is  a train 
of  Arguments.  It  is  in  this  sense,  e.  g.  that  we  speak  of 
“ Warburton’s  Argument  to  prove  the  divine  legation  of  Mo- 
ses,” &c. 

Sometimes  also  the  word  is  used  to  denote  what  may  be 
properly  called  a Disputation;  i.  e.  two  trains  of  argument, 
opposed  to  each  other:  as  when  we  say  that  A and  B had  a 
long  Argument  on  such  and  such  a subject ; and  that  A had 
the  best  of  the  Argument.  Doubtless  the  use  of  the  word  in 
this  sense  has  contributed  to  foster  the  notion  entertained  by 
many,  that  Logic  is  the  “ art  of  wrangling,”  that  it  makes 
men  contentious,  fyc. : they  have  heard  that  it  is  employed 
about  Arguments ; and  hastily  conclude  that  it  is  confined  to 
cases  where  there  is  opposition  and  contest.. 

It  may  be  worth  mentioning  in  this  place,  that  the  various 
forms  of  stating  an  Argument  are  sometimes  spoken  of  as 
different  kinds  of  Argument : as  when  we  speak  of  a Cate- 
gorical or  Hypothetical  Argument,  or  of  one  in  the  first  or 
some  other  figure  ; though  every  logician  knows  that  the  same 
individual  Argument  may  be  stated  in  various  figures,  SfC. 

This,  no  doubt,  has  contributed  to  the  error  of  those  whe 
speak  of  the  Syllogism  as  a peculiar  kind  of  Argument ; and 
of  “ Syllogistic  Reasoning,”  as  a distinct  mode  of  Reasoning, 
instead  of  being  only  a certain  form  of  expressing  any  ar- 
gument. 

For  an  account  of  the  different  kinds  of  argument , prop- 
erly so  called,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  “ Elements  of 
Rhetoric.” 

ii.  AUTHORITY.  — This  word  is  sometimes  employed  b 
Us  primary  sense,  when  we  refer  to  any  one’s  example,  lesu 


324 


APPENDIX  1. 


mony,  or  judgment : as  when  e.  g.  we  speaj.  of  correcting  a 
reading  in  some  book,  on  the  Authority  of  an  ancient  MS.  — 
giving  a statement  of  some  fact,  on  the  Authority  of  such  and 
such  historians,  fyc. 

In  this  sense  the  word  answers  pretty  nearly  to  the  Latin 
“ Auctoritas.”  It  is  a claim  to  deference. 

Sometimes  again  it  is  employed  as  equivalent  to  “ Potes- 
tas,”  Power:  as  when  we  speak  of  the  Authority  of  a Magis- 
trate, Sj-c.  This  is  a claim  to  obedience.  It  is  in  the  former 
sense  that  it  is  used  in  our  20th  Article  ; which  speaks  of  the 
Church  having  power  to  decree  rites  and  ceremonies , and 
“ authority  ” in  controversies  of  Faith. 

Many  instances  may  be  found  in  which  writers  have  uncon- 
sciously slid  from  one  sense  of  the  word  to  another,  so  as  to 
blend  confusedly  in  their  minds  the  two  ideas.  In  no  case 
perhaps  has  this  more  frequently  happened  than  when  we  are 
speaking  of  the  Authority  of  the  Church  : in  which  the  ambi- 
guity of  the  latter  word  (see  the  Article  Church)  comes  in 
aid  of  that  of  the  former.  The  Authority  (in  the  primary 
sense)  of  the  Catholic,  i.  e.  Universal  Church,  at  any  particu- 
lar period,  is  often  appealed  to,  in  support  of  this  or  that  doc- 
trine or  practice  : and  it  is,  justly,  supposed  that  the  opinion 
of  the  great  mass  of  the  Christian  World  affords  a presump- 
tion (though  only  a presumption)  in  favor  of  the  correctness 
of  any  interpretation  of  Scripture,  or  the  expediency,  at  the 
time,  of  any  ceremony,  regulation,  Sfc. 

But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  “ authority,”  in  this  sense, 
of  any  Church  or  other  Community,  is  not  that  of  the  Boiv, 
ns  such,  but  of  the  individuals  composing  it.  The  presump- 
tion raised  is  to  be  measured  by  the  numbers,  knowledge, 
judgment,  and  honesty  of  those  individuals,  consider!  d as 
individual  persons  and  not  in  their  corporate  capacity. 


AMBIGUOUS  terms. 


326 


On  the  other  hand,  each  particular  Church  has  Authority 
m the  other  sense,  viz.  Power,  over  its  own  i members,  (as  long 
as  they  choose  to  remain  members)  to  enfcrce  any  tiling  na 
contrary  to  God’s  word.*  But  the  Catholic  or  Universal 
Church,  not  being  one  religious  Community  on  earth,  can 
have  no  “ authority  ” in  the  sense  of  Power ; since  it  is  noto- 
rious there  never  was  a time  when  the  power  of  the  Pope,  of 
a Council,  or  of  any  other  human  Governors,  over  all  Chris- 
tians, was  in  fact  admitted,  whatever  arguments  may  be 
urged  to  prove  its  claim  to  be  admitted. 

Authority  again  in  the  sense  of  Auctoritas  (claim  to  defer 
tnce)  may  have  every  degree  of  weight,  from  absolute  infalli- 
bility, (such  as,  in  religious  matters,  Christians  attribute  to  the 
Scriptures)  down  to  the  faintest  presumption.  On  the  other 
hand,  “ authority  ” in  the  sense  of  “ legitimate  power  ” does 
not  admit  of  degrees.  One  person  may  indeed  possess  a 
greater  extent  of  power  than  another : but  in  each  particular 
instance,  he  either  has  a rightful  claim  to  obedience  or  he  has 
none.  See  Hawkins  on  Tradition.  Hinds’s  History  of  the 
Early  Progress  of  Christianity,  Yol.  II.  p.  99.  Hinds  on 
Inspiration.  Errors  of  Romanism , Chap.  iv.  Essay  on  the 
Omission  of  Creeds , Q-c.  in  the  New  Testament.  And  Essay 
11.  on  the  Kingdom  of  Christ. 

CAN.  — See  “ May,”  “ Must.” 

CAPABLE.  — See  “ P >ssible,”  “ Impossible,”  and 
‘ Necessary.” 

.ii.  CASE.  — Sometimes  Grammarians  use  this  word  to 
lignify  (which  is  its  strict  sense)  a certain  “ variation  in  tha 


* See  Essa}-  on  the  Dangers  to  Christian  Faith,  &e.  Note  A 

2S 


326 


APPENDIX  I. 


writing  and  utterance  of  a Noun,  denoting  the  relation  ia 
which  it  stands  to  some  other  part  of  the  sentence  some- 
times to  denote  that  relation  itself : whether  indicated  by  the 
termination,  or  by  a preposition,  or  by  its  collocation  ; and 
there  is  hardly  any  writer  on  the  subject  who  does  not  occa 
sionally  employ  the  term  in  each  sense,  without  explaining  the. 
ambiguity.  Much  confusion  and  frivolous  debate  has  hence 
resulted.  Whoever  would  see  a specimen  of  this,  may  find 
it  in  the  Port  Royal  Greek  Grammar ; in  which  the  Authors 
insist  on  giving  the  Greek  language  an  Ablative  case,  with  the 
same  termination,  however,  as  the  Dative  : (though,  by  the  way, 
they  had  better  have  fixed  on  the  Genitive ; which  oftener 
answers  to  the  Latin  Ablative)  urging,  and  with  great  truth, 
that  if  a distinct  termination  be  necessary  to  constitute  a case, 
many  Latin  Nouns  will  be  without  an  Ablative,  some  without 
a Genitive  or  without  a Dative,  and  all  Neuters  without  aa 
Accusative.  And  they  add,  that  since  it  is  possible,  in  every 
instance,  to  render  into  Greek  the  Latin  Ablative,  consequent- 
ly there  must  be  an  Ablative  in  Greek.*  If  they  had  known 
and  recollected  that  in  the  language  of  Lapland,  there  are, 
as  we  are  told,  thirteen  Cases,  they  would  have  hesitated  to 
use  an  argument  which  would  prove  that  there  must  there- 
fore be  thirteen  Cases  in  Greek  and  Latin  also ! All  this 
confusion  might  have  been  avoided,  if  it  had  but  been  ob- 
served that  the  word  “ Case  ” is  used  in  two  senses.  See 
Book  III.  § 10.  $§  4. 

CAUSE.  — See  “ Reason,”  and  “ Why.” 

iv.  CERTAIN.  — This  is  a word  whose  ambiguity,  togetnei 

* It  is  in  the  same  way  ;hat  some  of  the  Latin-grammarians  havs 
tniide  on?  of  the  Moods  into  three;  Subjunctive,  Potent' afi  and 
Optative 


ambiguous  terms. 


32? 


with  that  of  many  others  of  kindred  signification  (as  “ may  ' 
“ can,”  “ must,”  “ possible,”  fyc.)  has  occasioned  infinite  per- 
plexity in  discussions  on  some  of  the  most  important  subjects 
such  as  the  freedom  of  human  actions,  the  divine  fore» 
knowledge,  SfC. 

In  its  primary  sense,  it  is  applied  (according  to  its  etymol* 
ogy  from  cerno)  to  the  state  of  a person’s  mind  ; denoting 
any  one’s  full  and  complete  conviction  ; and,  generally,  though 
not  always,  implying  that  there  is  sufficient  ground  for  such 
conviction.  It  was  thence  easily  transferred  metonyrnically 
to  the  truths  or  events , respecting  which  this  conviction  is 
rationally  entertained.  And  “ Uncertain  ” (as  well  as  the 
substantives  and  adverbs  derived  from  these  adjectives)  follows 
the  same  rule.  Thus  we  say,  “ it  is  certain  that  a battle  has 
been  fought : ” “ it  is  certain  that  the  moon  will  be  full  on 
such  a day  : ” “ it  is  uncertain  whether  such  a one  is  alive  or 
dead  : ” “ it  is  uncertain  whether  it  will  rain  to-morrow  : ” 
meaning,  in  these  and  in  all  other  cases,  that  we  are  certain 
or  uncertain  respectively  ; not  indicating  any  difference  in  the 
character  of  the  events  themselves,  except  in  reference  to  our 
knowledge  respecting  them  ; for  the  same  thing  may  be,  at 
the  same  time,  both  certain  and  uncertain,  to  different  individ- 
uals ; e.  g.  the  life  or  death  at  a particular  time,  of  any  one, 
is  certain  .0  his  friends  on  the  spot  ; unceitain  or  contingent, 
to  those  at  a distance. 

From  not  attending  to  this  circumstance,  the  words  “ uncer- 
tain” and  “contingent”  (which  is  employed  nearly  in  the 
same  sense  as  uncertain  in  its  secondary  meaning)  have  been 
considered  by  many  writers*  as  denoting  some  quality  in  the 

* Among  others,  Archbishop  King,  in  his  Discourse  on  Predestina- 
tion, has  fallen  into  this  error;  as  is  explained  in  the  Notes  and  th« 
Appendix  to  my  edition  of  that  work. 


328 


APPENDIX  1 


things  themselves  ; and  have  thus  becom)  involved  in  endless 
confusion.  “Contingent”  is  indeed  applied  to  events  only 
not  to  persons : but  it  denotes  no  quality  in  the  events  them- 
selves  ; only,  as  has  been  said,  the  relation  in  which  they 
stand  to  a person  who  has  no  complete  knowledge  respecting 
them.  It  is  from  overlooking  this  principle,  obvious  as  it  is 
when  once  distinctly  stated,  that  Chance  or  Fortune  has  come 
to  be  regarded  as  a real  agent , and  to  have  been,  by  the  an- 
cients, personified  as  a Goddess,  and  represented  by  statues. 

✓ 

v.  CHURCH  is  sometimes  employed  to  signify  the  Church, 
i.  e.  the  Universal  or  Catholic  Church,  — comprehending  in 
it  all  Christiana  who  are  “ Members  one  of  another,”  and 
who  compose  the  Body,  of  which  Christ  is  the  Head  ; which, 
collectively  taken,  has  no  visible  supreme  Head  or  earthly 
governor,  either  individual,  or  council  ; and  which  is  one 
only  in  reference  to  its  One  invisible  Governor  and  Paracltete 
the  Spirit  of  Christ,  dwelling  in  it,  — to  the  one  common 
faith  and  character,  which  ought  to  be  found  in  all  Christians, 
— and  the  common  principles  on  which  all  Christian  socie- 
ties should  be  constituted.  See  Hinds’s  History  of  the  Rise 
of  Christianity , and  Bernard’s  Church  and  Synagogue , ar 
abridged  translation  from  Vitringa. 

Sometimes  again  it  is  employed  to  signify  a Church ; i.  e 


It  may  be  requisite  to  mention  in  this  place,  that  I have  been  rep- 
resented as  coinciding  with  him  as  to  the  point  in  question,  in  a note 
to  Mr.  Davison's  work  on  Prophecy  ; through  a mistake,  which  the 
author  candidly  acknowledged,  and  promised  to  rectify.  His  mistaka 
arose  from  his  having  (as  he  himself  informed  me)  spoken  from  con- 
jecture only,  witn  rut  having  read  my  publication.  Unfortunately  tha 
error  was  allowed  to  remain  uncorrecf  ed  for  several  years  after  it  had 
beer,  pointed  out  in  fact,  till  the  wb  >le  of  the  edition  containing  the 
mis-statement  had  been  sold  off. 


AMBIGUODI  TEEMS. 


329 


any  one  society,  constituted  on  these  general  principles  ; hav- 
ing governors  on  earth,  and  existing  as  a Community  possess- 
ing a certain  power  over  its  own  membeis  ; in  which  sense 
we  read  of  the  “ Seven  Churches  in  Asia  ; ” — of  Paul’s  having 
“ the  care  of  all  the  Churches,”  SfC.  To  apply  to  some  one 
of  these  communities,  from  its  being  confessedly  a Church,  all 
that  is  said,  in  Scripture  or  elsewhere,  of  the  Church-universal_ 
[or  Catholic ] is  a fallacy,  which,  though  very  glaring,  has 
misled  many.  (See  the  Art.  Truth  ; and  also  Essay  ii.  on 
the  “ Kingdom  of  Christ .”) 

Moreover,  the  word  “ Church”  (like  several  others  denot- 
ing Communities)  sometimes  denotes  the  Body  itself,  as  such, 
and  sometimes  the  individual  members  of  it,  as  individuals. 
This  distinction,  which  is  an  important  one,  has  been  noticed 
above,  under  the  Art.  Authority. 

The  “ Church  ” is  also  sometimes  used  to  denote  the  Clergy , 
as  distinguished  from  the  Laity  ; as,  when  we  speak  of  any 
one’s  being  educated  for  the  Church,  meaning,  “ for  the  min- 
istry.” Some  would  perhaps  add  that  it  is  in  this  sense  we 
speak  of  the  endowments  of  the  Church ; since  the  immediate 
emolument  of  these  is  received  by  clergymen.  But  if  it  be 
considered  that  they  receive  it  in  the  capacity  of  ■public  in- 
structors  and  spiritual  Pastors,  these  endowments  may  fairly 
be  regarded  as  belonging,  in  a certain  sense,  to  the  whole 
Body,  for  whose  benefit  they  are,  in  this  way,  calculated  ; in 
the  same  manner  as  we  consider,  e.  g.  the  endowment  of  a 
professorship  in  a university,  as  a benefaction,  not  to  the  pro- 
fessors alone,  but  to  the  university  at  large. 

vi.  ELECTION. — This  is  one  of  the  terms  which  is 
often  to  all  practical  purposes  ambiguous,  when  not  employed, 
strictly  speaking,  in  two  differen.  senses , but  with  different 
28  * 


330 


APPENDIX  I. 


applications,  according  to  that  which  is  understood  in  con- 
junction with  it.  — See  Book  III.  § 10.  See  also  Essays  on 
some  of  the  Difficulties,  fyc.  Essay  III.  “ On  Election.” 

vii.  EXPECT. — This  wevd  is  liable  to  an  ambigu:ty 
which  may  sometimes  lead,  in  conjunction  with  other  causes 
to  a practical  bad  effect.  It  is  sometimes  used  in  the  sense 
of  “anticipate” — “calculate  on,”  SfC.  [ibnllfn)  in  short 
“ consider  as  probable;  ” sometimes  for  “ require  or  demand 
as  reasonable,”  — “ consider  as  right,”  (d?ial.) 

Thus,  I may  fairly  “expect”  (u£mu)  that  one  who  has  re- 
ceived kindness  from  me,  should  protect  me  in  distress  yet 
I may  have  reason  to  expect  (llnCQeiv}  that  he  wil  not. 
“ England  expects  every  man  to  do  his  duty;”  but  it  would 
be  chimerical  to  expect,  i.  e.  anticipate,  a universa'  perform- 
ance of  duty.  Hence,  when  men  of  great  revenues,  whether 
civil  or  ecclesiastical,  live  in  the  splendor  and  sensuality  of 
Sardanapalus,  they  are  apt  to  plead  that  this  is  expected  of 
them  ; which  may  be  perhaps  sometimes  true,  in  the  sense 
that  such  conduct  is  anticipated  as  probable  ; not  true,  as  im- 
plying that  it  is  required  or  approved.  Thus  also,  because  it 
would  be  romantic  to  expect  (i.  e.  calculate  upon)  in  public 
men  a primary  attention  to  the  public  good,  or  in  men  in  gen- 
eral an  adherence  to  the  rule  of  doing  as  you  would  be  done 
by,  many  are  apt  to  flatter  themselves  that  they  cannot  rea- 
sonably be  expected  (i.  e.  fairly  called  upon)  to  act  on  such 
principles.  What  may  reasonably  be  expected  (in  one  sense 
of  tne  word)  must  be,  precisely  the  practice  of  the  majority; 
since  it  is  the  majority  of  instances  that  constitutes  probabil- 
ity what  may  reasonably  be  expected  (in  the  other  sense)  is 
something  much  beyond  the  practice  of  the  generality ; as 
long  at  least  as  it  shall  be  true  that  “ narrow  is  the  way  that 
ieadeth  unto  life,  and  few  Inere  be  that  find  it.” 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


33  v 

viii.  EXPERIENCE.*  — This  word,  in  its  strict  sense 
applies  to  what  has  occurred  within  a person’s  own  knowledge 
Experience,  in  this  sense,  of  course,  relates  to  the  past  alone. 
Thus  it  is  that  a man  knows  by  Experience  what  sufferings 
he  has  undergone  in  some  disease ; or,  what  height  the  tide 
reached  at  a certain  time  and  place. 

More  frequently  the  word  is  used  to  denote  that  Judgment 
which  is  derived  from  Experience  in  the  primary  sense , by 
reasoning  from  that,  in  combination  with  other  data.  Thus,  a 
man  may  assert,  on  the  ground  of  Experience,  that  he  was 
cured  of  a disorder  by  such  a medicine  — that  that  medicine 
is,  generally,  beneficial  in  that  disorder ; that  the  tide  may 
always  be  expected,  under  such  circumstances,  to  rise  to  such 
a height.  Strictly  speaking,  none  of  these  can  be  known  by 
Experience,  but  are  conclusions  derived  from  Experience. 
It  is  in  this  sense  only  that  Experience  can  be  applied  to  the 
future , or,  which  comes  to  the  same  thing,  to  any  general 
fact ; as  e.  g.  when  it  is  said  that  we  know  by  Experience 
that  water  exposed  to  a certain  temperature  will  freeze. 

“ Men  are  so  formed  as  (often  unconsciously)  to  reason, 
whether  well  or  ill,  on  the  phenomena  they  observe,  and  tc 
mix  up  their  inferences  with  their  statements  of  those  phe- 
nomena, so  as  in  fact  to  theorize  (however  scantily  and 
crudely)  without  knowing  it.  If  you  will  be  at  the  pains 
carefully  to  analyze  the  simplest  descriptions  you  hear  of  any 
transaction  or  state  of  things,  you  will  find,  that  the  process 
which  almost  invariably  takes  place  is,  in  logical  language, 
this;  that  each  individual  has  in  his  mind  certain  major-prem- 
isses or  principles,  relative  to  the  subject  in  question  ; that 
observation  of  what  actually  presents  itself  to  the  senses  suj>< 


* See  Elements  of  Rhetoric,  Book  I. 


332 


APPENDIX  1. 


plies  minor-premisses ; and  that  the  statement  given  (and 
which  is  reported  as  a thing  experienced)  consists  in  fact 
of  the  conclusions  drawn  from  the  combinations  of  those 
premisses. 

“ Hence  it  is  that  several  different  men,  who  have  all  had 
equal,  or  even  the  very  same,  experience,  i.  e.  have  been 
witnesses  or  agents  in  the  same  transactions,  will  often  be 
found  to  resemble  so  many  different  men  looking  at  the  same 
book  : one  perhaps,  though  he  distinctly  sees  black  marks  on 
white  paper,  has  never  learned  his  letters  ; another  can  read, 
but  is  a stranger  to  the  language  in  which  the  book  is  written ; 
another  has  an  acquaintance  with  the  language,  but  under- 
stands it  imperfectly  ; another  is  familiar  with  the  language , 
but  is  a stranger  to  the  subject  of  the  book,  and  wants  power, 
or  previous  instruction  to  enable  him  fully  to  take  in  the  au- 
thor’s drift ; while  another  again  perfectly  comprehends  the 
whole. 

“ The  object  that  strikes  the  eye  is  to  all  of  those  persona 
the  same  ; the  difference  of  the  impressions  produced  on  the 
mind  of  each  is  referable  to  the  differences  in  their  minds. 

“ And  this  explains  the  fact,  that  we  find  so.  much  discre- 
pancy in  the  results  of  what  are  called  Experience  and  Com. 
mon-sense,  as  contra-distinguished  from  theory.  In  former 
times  men  knew  by  experience,  that  the  earth  stands  still,  and 
the  sun  rises  and  sets.  Common-sense  taught  them  that  there 
could  be  no  antipodes,  since  men  could  not  stand  with  their 
heads  downwards,  like  flies  on  the  ceiling.  Experience 
taught  the  King  of  Bantam  that  water  could  not  become  solid. 
And  (to  come  to  the  consideration  of  human  affairs)  the 
experience  and  common-sense  of  one  of  the  most  observant 
and  intelligent  of  historians,  Tacitus,  convinced  him,  that  for 
4 mixed  government  to  be  so  framed,  as  to  combine  the  ele- 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


32  J 

merit?  of  Royalty,  Aristocracy,  and  Democracy,  must  be  next 
to  impossible,  and  that  if  such  a one  could  be  framed,  it  must 
inevitably  be  very  speedily  dissolved.”  * 

There  are  again  two  different  applications  of  the  word  (set 
Book  III.  § 10),  which,  when  not  carefully  distinguished,  lead 
in  practice  to  the  same  confusion  as  the  employment  of  it  in 
two  senses ; viz.  we  sometimes  understand  our  own  personal 
Experience  ; sometimes,  general  Experience.  Hume  nas 
availed  himself  of  this  (practical)  ambiguity,  in  his  Essay  on 
Miracles  ; in  which  he  observes  that  we  have  Experience  of 
the  frequent  falsity  of  Testimony,  but  that  the  occurrence  of 
a Miracle  is  contrary  to  our  Experience,  and  is  consequently 
what  no  testimony  ought  to  be  allowed  to  establish.  Now  had 
he  explained  whose  Experience  he  meant,  the  argument  would 
have  come  to  nothing:  if  he  means,  the  Experience  of  man- 
kind universally,  i.  e.  that  a Miracle  has  never  come  under 
the  Experience  of  any  one , this  is  palpably  begging  the  ques- 
tion : if  he  means  the  Experience  of  each  individual  who  has 
never  himself  witnessed  a Miracle,  this  would  establish  a rule 
(viz.  that  we  are  to  believe  nothing  of  which  we  have  not 
ourselves  experienced  the  like)  which  it  would  argue  insanity 
to  act  upon.  Not  only  was  the  King,  of  Bantam  justified  (as 
Hume  himself  admits)  in  listening  to  no  evidence  for  the 
existence  of  Ice,  but  no  one  would  he  authorized  on  this  prin- 
ciple to  expect  his  own  death  His  Experience  informs  him, 
directly,  only  that  others  have  died.  Every  disease  under 
which  lie  himself  may  have  labored,  his  Experience  must  nave 
told  him  has  not  terminated  fatally  ; if  he  is  to  judge  strictly 
©f  the  future  by  the  past,  according  to  this  rule,  what  should 
hinder  him  from  expecting  the  like  of  all  future  diseases  ? 


* Pol.  Boon.  Lect.  in. 


334 


APPENDIX  1. 


Some  have  never  been  struck  with  this  consequence  o! 
Hume  s principles ; and  some  have  even  failed  to  per- 
ceive it  when  pointed  out : but  if  the  reader  thinks  it  worth 
his  while  to  consult  the  author,  he  will  see  that  his  principles, 
according  to  his  own  account  of  them,  are  such  as  I hava 
stated. 

Perhaps  however  he  meant,  if  indeed  he  had  any  distinct 
meaning,  something  intermediate  between  universal,  and  indi- 
vidual experience  ; viz.  the  Experience  of  the  generality , as 
to  what  is  common  and  of  ordinary  occurrence ; in  which 
sense  the  maxim  will  only  amount  to  this,  that  false  Testimony 
is  a thing  of  common  occurrence,  and  that  Miracles  are  not. 
An  obvious  truth,  indeed  ; but  too  general  to  authorize,  of 
itself,  a conclusion  in  any  particular  case.  In  any  other  indi- 
vidual question,  as  to  the  admissibility  of  evidence,  it  would 
be  reckoned  absurd  to  consider  merely  the  average  chances  for 
the  truth  of  Tcstvnony  in  the  abstract , without  inquiring  u dial 
the  Testimony  is,  in  the  particular  instance  before  us.  As  if, 
e.  g.  any  one  had  maintained  that  no  testimony  co  dd  establish 
Columbus’s  account  of  the  discovery  of  America , because  it 
is  more  common  for  travellers  to  lie,  than  for  new  Continer  ts 
to  be  discovered.*  Such  a procedure  involves  a manifest 
ignoratio  elenchi ; the  two  propositions  brought  forward  a9 
opposed,  being  by  no  means  incompatible  : Experience  tells 
us  that  “a  destructive  hurricane  is  not  a common  occur- 
rence ; ” certain  persons  tell  us  that  “ a destructive  hurricane 
occurred  in  the  West  Indies,  at  such  a time ; ” there  is  (as 
Dr.  Campbell  has  pointed  out)  no  opposition  between  these 
two  assertions. 

It  is  to  be  observed  by  the  way,  that  ther.  is  yet  as 


See  “Historic  Doubts  relative  to  Napoleon  Bonaparte  ' 


AMBIGUOUS  terms. 


335 


additional  ambiguity  in  the  entire  phrase  “ contrary  to  experi 
ence  ; ” in  one  sense,  a miracle,  or  any  other  event,  may  be 
called  contrary  to  the  experience  of  any  one  who  has  nevet 
witnessed  the  like  ; as  the  freezing  of  water  was  to  that  of 
the  King  of  Bantam  ; in  another  and  stricter  sense,  that  only 
is  contrary  to  a man’s  experience,  which  he  knows  by  experi 
ence  not  to  be  true  ; as  if  one  should  be  told  of  an  infallible 
remedy  for  some  disorder,  he  having  seen  it  administered 
without  effect.  No  testimony  can  establish  what  is,  in  this 
latter  sense , contrary  to  experience.  We  need  not  wonder 
that  ordinary  minds  should  be  bewildered  by  a sophistical  em- 
ployment of  such  a mass  of  ambiguities. 

Such  reasonings  as  these  are  accounted  ingenious  and  pro- 
found, on  account  of  the  subject  on  which  they  are  employed  , 
if  applied  to  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  they  would  be  deemed 
unworthy  of  serious  notice. 

The  reader  is  not  to  suppose  that  the  refutation  of  Hume’s 
Essay  on  Miracles  was  my  object  in  this  Article.  That  might 
have  been  sufficiently  accomplished,  in  the  way  of  a “ reductio 
ad  absurdum,”  by  mere  reference  to  the  case  of  the  King  of 
Bantam  adduced  by  the  author  himself.  But  this  celebrate! 
Essay,  though  it  has  often  perhaps  contributed  to  the  amuse- 
ment of  an  anti-christian  sophist  at  the  expense  of  those 
unable  to  expose  its  fallacy,  never  probably  made  one  con- 
vert. The  author  himself  seems  plainly  to  have  meant  it  as 
a specimen  of  his  ingenuity  in  arguing  on  a given  hypothesis  ; 
Tor  he  disputes  against  miracles  as  contrary  to  the  Course  of 
Nature  ; whereas,  according  to  him,  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
a Course  of  Nature  ; his  scepticism  extends  to  the  whole 
external  world  ; — to  every  thing,  except  the  ideas  or  impres- 
sions on  the  mind  of  the  individual ; so  that  a miracle  which 
is  believed . has,  in  that  circumstance  alone,  on  his  principle? 
as  much  reality  as  any  thing  can  have. 


336 


APPENDIX  1. 


But  my  object  has  been  to  point  out,  by  the  use  of  this  ex' 
ample,  the  fallacies  and  blunders  which  may  result  from  inat- 
tention to  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  Experience  : and  this 
cannot  be  done  by  a mere  indirect  argument ; which  refutes 
indeed,  but  does  not  explain , an  error. 

FALSEHOOD  and  FALSITY.  — See  “Truth.” 

ix.  GOD.  — The  Greek  and  Latin  words  which  we  trans- 
late “ God”  having  been  applied  by  the  Heathen  to  the  high- 
est objects  of  their  worship , were,  naturally,  employed  by 
Jews  and  Christians  to  denote  the  object  of  their  own  wor- 
ship. But  the  Heathen  were  far  from  regarding  any  of  these 
supposed  Beings  as  eternal,  or  as  the  Maker  and  Governor  of 
the  Universe.  They  regarded  them  as  the  same  kind  of 
Beings  with  the  Fairies,  Demons,  Nixes,  Bogles,  Genii,  &c., 
which  in  various  parts  of  the  world  are  still  feared,  and  in 
some  places  propitiated  by  offerings  and  other  marks  of  rev- 
erence; and  which  in  fact  are  the  very  Gods  (though  no 
longer  called  by  that  title)  which  our  Pagan  forefathers  wor- 
shipped ; and  a superstitious  dread  of  which  survived  the 
introduction  of  the  belief  in  a supreme  Creator.  But  Chris- 
tians and  also  Mahometans  (whose  creed  is  a corrupted  offset 
of  Cnristianity)  imply  [connote]  by  the  term  “ God  ” the 
supreme  Author  and  Governor  of  the  Universe : as  is  plain 
from  this;  that  any  one  who  should  deny  the  existence  of  *n;y 
Bi.ch  Being,  would  be  universally  considered  as  an  Atheist , 
u c.  as  maintaining  that  there  is  no  “ God.”  And  he  would 
be  not  the  less  reckoned  an  Atheist,  even  though  he  should 
btdieve  (which  is  conceivable)  that  there  do  exist  Beings  supe- 
rior in  power  o Man,  such  as  Fairies,  &c. 

The  Heat'.en  therefore,  for  the  most  part,  come  under  thin 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS 


337 


description.  They  did  not  believe  in  any  God  ir.  oui  sense 
if  the  word.  And  accordingly  the  Apostle  Paul  expressly 
designates  them  as  Atheists  [“  without  God  ”]  adeoi. 

The  more  any  one  studies  the  ancient  Classical  writers, 
the  more  in  error  he  will  be  respecting  their  notions,  if  he 
is  not  attentive  to  the  difference  between  the  meanings  they 
attached  to  certain  terms  and  those  which  we,  now,  attach 
to  corresponding  terms.  The  present  is  one  instance  : and 
another  is,  “ immortality  of  the  soul.”  See  Essay  I.  1st 
Scries. 

x.  GOSPEL.  — This  is  instanced  as  one  of  the  words 
which  is  practically  ambiguous,  from  its  different  applications, 
even  though  not  employed  (as  it  sometimes  is)  in  different 
senses. 

Conformably  to  its  etymological  meaning  of  “ Good-tidings,” 
it  is  used  to  signify  (and  that  especially  and  exclusively)  the 
welcome  intelligence  of  Salvation  to  man,  as  preached  by  our 
Lord  and  his  followers.  But  it  was  afterwards  transitively 
applied  to  each  of  the  four  histories  of  our  Lord’s  life,  pub 
lished  by  those  who  are  called  the  Evangelists.  And  the 
term  is  often  used  to  express  collectively  the  Gospel -doctrines  ; 
i.  e.  the  instructions  given  men  how  to  avail  themselves  of 
the  offer  of  salvation  ; and  preaching  the  Gospel,  is  accord- 
ingly often  used  to  include  not  only  the  proclaiming  of  the 
good  tidings , but  the  teaching  of  what  is  to  be  believed  and 
done,  in  consequence.*  This  ambiguity  is  one  source  of  some 
important  theological  errors : many  supposing  that  Gospel 
truth  is  to  be  found  exclusively,  or  chiefly  in  the  Gospels  ; to 
the  neglect  of  the  other  Sacred  Writings. 

* See  I iscourse  L appended  to  “ Essays  on  the  Dangers,”  feo 

p.  204. 


29 


38 


APPENDIX  I. 


Again,  since  Jesus  is  said  to  have  preached  the  '‘Gospel," 
and  the  same  is  said  of  the  Apostles,  the  conclusion  is  often 
hence  drawn,  that  the  discourses  of  our  Lord  and  the  Apos- 
tolic Epistles  must  exactly  coincide  ; and  that  in  case  of  any 
apparent  difference,  the  former  must  be  the  standard,  and  the 
latter  must  be  taken  to  bear  no  other  sense  than  what  is  im- 
plied by  the  other  ; a notion  which  leads  inevitably  and  imme- 
diately to  the  neglect  of  the  Apostolic  Epistles,  when  every 
thing  they  contain  must  be  limited  and  modified  into  a complete 
coincidence  with  our  Lord’s  Discourses.  Whereas  it  is  very 
conceivable,  that  though  both  might  be  in  a certain  sense 
“ good  tidings,”  yet,  one  may  contain  a much  more  full  de- 
velopment of  the  Christian  scheme  than  the  other.  Which 
is  confirmed  by  the  consideration,  that  the  principal  events  on 
which  the  Religion  is  founded  (the  atoning  sacrifice  and  resur- 
rection of  Christ)  had  not  taken  place,  nor  could  be  clearly 
declared  by  our  Lord,  when  He  preached,  saying,  “the  King- 
dom of  Heaven  is  at  hand ; ” not  that  it  was  actually  estab- 
lished; as  it  was,  when  his  Apostles  were  sent  forth  to  preach 
to  all  nations.  See  Essays  on  the  Difficulties , &c.  Essay  II. 

HENCE.  — See  “ Reason  ” and  “ Why.” 

IDENTICAL.  — See  “ One  ” and  “ Same.” 

xi.  IMPOSSIBILITY.  — According  to  the  definition  we 
may  choose  to  give  of  this  word,  it  may  be  said  either  that  there 
are  three  Species  of  it,  or  that  it  may  be  used  in  three  differ- 
ent senses.  1st.  What  may  be  called  a mathematical  impos- 
sibility, is  that  which  involves  an  absurdity  and  self-contradic- 
tion ; e.g.  that  two  straight  lines  should  enclose  a space,  is  not 
only  impossible,  but  inconceivable,  as  it  would  b>e  at  variance 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


339 


feith  the  definition  of  a straight  line.  And  it  should  be  observed 
that  inability  to  accomplish  any  thing  which  ■s,  in  this  sense,  im 
possible,  implies  no  limitation  of  power , and  is  compatible,  even 
with  omnipotence,  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word.  If  it  be  pro- 
posed, e.  g.  to  construct  a triangle  having  one  of  its  sides 
equal  to  the  other  two,  or  to  find  two  numbers  having  the 
same  ratio  to  each  other  as  the  side  of  a square  and  its  diam- 
eter, it  is  not  from  a defect  of  power  that  we  are  precluded 
from  solving  such  a problem  as  these  ; since  in  fact  the  prob- 
lem is  in  itself  unmeaning  and  absurd:  it  is,  in  reality,  nothing, 
that  is  required  to  be  done. 

It  is  important  to  observe  respecting  an  Impossibility  of  this 
kind,  that  it  is  always  susceptible  of  demonstrative  proof. 
Not  that  every  such  Impossibility  has  actually  been  proved 
such  : or  that  we  can  be  certain  it  ever  will  be  : but  that  it 
must  be  in  itself  capable  of  proof : — the  materials  of  such 
proof — the  data  on  which  it  may  be  founded, — being 
(whether  discovered  or  not)  within  the  range  of  our  knowl- 
edge. This  follows  from  the  very  character  (as  above 
described)  * of  such  truths  as  the  mathematical  : mathemati- 
ca\-impossibilities  being  of  course  included  under  that  term. 
For,  every  such  truth  must  be  implied  — however  tedious  and 
difficult  may  be  the  task  of  eliciting  it — in  the  Definitions  we 
set  out  with,  and  consequently  in  the  Terms,  which  are  the 
exact  representatives  of  those  Definitions.  E.  G.  That  anj 
*wo  sides  of  a Triangle  are  greater  than  the  third  — in  other 
words  that  it  is  impossible  to  construct  a triangle,  one  of  whose 
sides  shall  be  equal  to  the  other  two  — "«*  a matter  of  easy 
and  early  demonstration.  The  incommensurability  of  the 
Bide  and  the  Diameter  of  a square,  — in  other  words  the 


Rook  IY.  Ch,  ii.  § 1. 


S40 


APPENDIX  I. 


impossibility  of  finding  two  numbers  having  o one  another  the 
ratio  o'-  the  Side  to  the  Diameter, — is  a truth  which  was 
probably  believed  some  time  before  a demonstration  of  it  was 
found  : but  it  is  no  less  implied  in  the  definitions  of  “ Straight 
line,”  “ Square,”  &c.  In  the  case  of  the  Circle  again,  the 
ratio  of  the  Diameter  to  the  Circumference  has  been  long 
sought  by  mathematicians ; and  no  one  has  yet  demonstrated, 
or  perhaps  ever  will,  either,  what  their  ratio  is,  or,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  they  are  incommensurable  : but  one  or  the 
other  must  be  within  the  sphere  of  mathematical  demonstra- 
tion. 

When  therefore  any  one  says  that  perhaps  so  and  so  may 
be  an  Impossibility  in  the  mathematical  sense,  though  we  may 
never  be  able  to  prove  it  such,*  he  is  to  keep  in  mind  that  at 
least  such  proof  is  within  the  scope  of  inquiry,  and  that  no 
increase  of  knowledge,  in  the  sense  of  “ Information  respect- 
ing facts,”  f can  be  needed  to  furnish  materials  for  the  demon- 
stration. Every  such  Impossibility  must  be  implied  — though 
we  may  not  perceive  it,  in  the  terms  employed  ; in  short,  it 
must  be  properly  a “ contradiction  in  terms." 

2dly.  What  may  be  called  a Physical  Impossibility  is  some- 
thing at  variance  with  the  existing  Laws  of  Nature,  and  which 
consequently  no  Being,  subject  to  those  Laws,  (as  we  are) 
can  surmount ; but  we  can  easily  conceive  a Being  capable 
of  bringing  about  what  in  the  ordinary  course  of  Nature  is 
impossible.  E.  G.  to  multiply  five  loaves  into  food  for  a mul- 
titude, or  to  walk  on  the  surface  of  the  waves,  are  things 
physically  impossible,  but  imply  no  contradiction  ; on  the 
contrary,  we  cannot  but  suppose  that  the  Being,  if  there 
he  such  a one,  who  created  the  Universe,  is  able  ta 


• See  Bishop  Copleston  on  Predestination, 
■f  See  Book  IV.  Ch.  ii.  § 1. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERM3. 


34’ 


niter  at  will  the  properties  of  any  of  the  substances  it  con- 
tains.* 

And  an  occurrence  of  this  character,  we  call  miraculous 
Not  but  that  one  person  may  perform  without  supernatural 
oower  what  is,  to  another,  physically  impossible  ; as  e.  g 
a man  may  lift  a great  weight,  which  it  would  be  phys- 
ically impossible  for  a child  to  raise;  because  it  is  con- 
trary to  the  Laws  of  Nature  tha.  a muscle  of  this 
degree  of  strength  should  overcome  a resistance  which 
one  of  that  degree  is  equal  to.  But  if  any  one  perform 
what  is  beyond  his  own  natural  powers,  or  the  natural 
powers  of  Man  universally,  he  has  performed  a miracle. 

Much  sophistry  has  been  founded  on  the  neglect  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  these  two  senses.  It  has  even  been  contend- 
ed, that  no  evidence  ought  to  induce  a man  of  sense  to  admit 
that  a miracle  has  taken  place,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a thing 
impossible  ; in  other  words,  that  it  is  a miracle ; for  if  it  were 
not  a thing  impossible  to  man,  there  would  be  no  miracle  in  the 
case  : so  that  such  an  argument  is  palpably  begging  the  ques- 
tion ; but  it  has  often  probably  been  admitted  from  an  indistinct 
notion  being  suggested  of  Impossibility  in  the  first  sense;  in 
which  sense  (viz.  that  of  self-contradiction)  it  is  admitted  that 
no  evidence  would  justify  belief. 

3dly.  Moral  Impossibility  signifies  only  that  high  degree 
of  improbability  which  leaves  no  room  for  doubt.  In  this 
sense  we  often  call  a thing  impossible,  which  implies  no  con- 
tradiction, or  any  violation  of  the  Laws  of  Nature,  but  which 
yet  we  are  rationally  convinced  will  never  occiu  merely  from 
the  multitude  of  chances  against  it ; as,  e.  g.  that  unloaded 


* See  an  able  disquisition  on  Miracles,  subjoined  to  the  Li  foot 
Apollonius  Tyanaeus,  in  the  Encyclopedia  Metropolilana. 

29* 


512 


APPENDIX  I. 


dice  should  turn  up  the  same  faces  one  hundred  times  succes 
sively.*  And  in  this  sense,  we  cannot  accurately  draw  the 
line,  so  as  to  determine  at  what  point  the  improbability 
amounts  to  an  Impossibility;  and  hence  we  often  have  occa- 
sion to  speak  of  this  or  that  as  almost  impossible,  though 
not  quite,  <^c.  The  other  impossibilities  do  not  admit  of  de- 
grees of  approach.  That  a certain  throw  should  recur  two 
or  three  times  successively,  we  should  not  call  very  improba- 
ble ; the  improbability  is  increased  at  each  successive  step  : 
but  we  cannot  say  exactly  when  it  becomes  impossible  : 
though  no  one  would  scruple  to  call  one  hundred  such  recur- 
rences impossible. 

In  the  same  sense  we  often  call  things  impossible  which  are 
completely  within  the  power  of  known  agents  to  bring  about, 
but  which  we  are  convinced  they  never  will  bring  about.  Thus, 
e.  g.  that  all  the  civilized  people  in  the  world  should  with  one 
accord  forsake  their  habitations  and  wander  about  the  world 
as  savages,  every  one  would  call  an  impossibility  ; though  it 
is  plain  they  have  the  power  to  do  so,  and  that  it  depends  on 
their  choice  which  they  will  do  ; and  moreover  that  there  even 
have  been  instances  of  some  few  persons  doing  so.  In  like 
manner,  if  we  were  told  of  a man’s  having  disgracefully  fled 
from  his  post,  whom  we  knew  to  be  possessed  of  the  most  un- 
daunted courage,  we  should  without  scruple  (and  with  good 
reason,  supposing  the  idea  formed  of  his  character  to  be  a just 
one)  pronounce  this  an  Impossibility  ; meaning  that  there  is 
Bufiicient  ground  for  being  fully  convinced  that  the  thing  could 
never  take  p’ace  ; not  from  any  idea  of  his  not  having  power 
nnd  liberty  to  fly  if  he  would  ; for  our  certainty  is  built  on  the 

• And  yet  why  should  they  not?  since  the  chances  are  thi 
wry  same  against  any  given  100  throws.  See  Rhet  Part  I.  Ch 

1*4. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


343 


rery  c rcumstance  of  his  being  free  to  act  as  he  will,  together 
with  h s being  of  such  a disposition  as  never  to  have  the  will 
to  act  disgracefully.  If,  again,  a man  were  bound  hand  and 
foot,  it  would  be,  in  the  other  sense,  impossible  for  him  to  fly 
viz.  out  of  his  power. 

“ Capable  ” has  a corresponding  amb’guity.  E.  G.  We 
speak  of  this  or  that  man  being  “ capable  ” or  '*  incapable  ’ 
of  a cowardly  act,  in  a different  sense  from  that  in  which  we 
speak  of  him  as  “ capable  ” or  “ incapable  ” of  writing  a fine 
poem. 

The  performance  of  any  thing  that  is  morally  impossible  to 
s.  mere  man,  is  to  be  reckoned  a miracle , as  much  as  if  the 
.impossibility  were  physical.  E.  G.  It  is  morally  impossible 
fcff  poor  Jewish  fishermen  to  have  framed  such  a scheme  of 
ethical  and  religious  doctrine  as  the  Gospel  exhibits.  It  is 
morally  impossible  for  a man  to  foretell  distant  and  improbable 
future  events  with  the  exactitude  of  many  of  the  prophecies 
in  Scripture. 

Much  of  the  confusion  of  thought  which  has  pervaded,  and 
has  interminably  protracted,  the  discussions  respecting  the 
long  agitated  question  of  human  freedom,  has  arisen  from 
inattention  to  the  ambiguity  which  has  been  here  noticed.  If 
the  Deity,  it  is  said,  “ foresees  exactly  what  I shall  do  on  any 
occasion,  it  must  be  impossible  for  me  to  act  otherwise  ; ” and 
thence  it  is  inferred  that  man’s  actions  cannot  be  free.  The 
middle-term  employed  in  such  an  argument  as  this  is  “ impos- 
sible,” or  “ impossibility  ” employed  in  two  senses.  lie  to 
whom  it  is,  in  one  sense,  impossible,  (viz.  physically)  to  act 
otherwise  than  he  does,  (i.  e.  who  has  it  not  in  his  poxer)  is 
aoi  a free  agent ; correct  foreknowledge  implies  impossibility 
in  anothei  sense,  viz.  moral  impossibility  ; — the  absence  o< 


344 


APPENDIX  l 


ail  room  for  doubt ;)  and  the  perplexity  is  aggravated  bj 
resorting,  for  the  purpose  of  explanation,  to  such  woids  as 
“ may,”  “ can,”  “ possible,”  “ must,”  fyc.,  all  of  which  are 
affected  by  a corresponding  ambiguity.* 

It  should  be  observed,  that  many  things  which  are  not  usu 
ally  termed  “ mathematically  ” necessary  or  impossible,  wil 
at  once  appear  such,  when  stated,  not  abstractedly , but  with 
all  their  actual  circumstances : e.  g.  that  “ Brutus  stabbed 
Caesar,”  is  a fact,  the  denial  of  which,  though  a falsehood, 
would  not  be  regarded  as  self-contradictory  (like  the  denial 
of  the  equality  of  two  right  angles ;)  because,  abstractedly 
we  can  conceive  Brutus  acting  otherwise : but  if  we  insert 
the  circumstances  (which  of  course  really  existed)  of  his  hav- 
ing complete  power,  liberty,  and  also  a predominant  will  tc 
do  so,  then  the  denial  of  the  action  amounts  to  a “ mathemat- 
ical ” impossibility,  or  self-contradiction  ; for  to  act  voluntarily 
against  the  dictates  of  a predominant  will,  implies  an  effect 
without  a cause. 

Of  Future  events,  that  Being,  and  no  other,  can  have  the 
same  knowledge  as  of  the  past,  who  is  acquainted  with  all  the 
causes,  remote  or  immediate,  internal  and  external,  on  which 
each  depends. 

But  every  one  is  accustomed  to  anticipate  future  events,  in 
human  affairs,  as  well  as  in  the  material  world,  in  proportion 
to  his  knowledge  of  the  several  circumstances  connected  with 
each  ; however  different  in  amount  that  knowledge  may  be, 


* See  Tucker’s  “Light  of  Nature,”  in  the  Chapters  on  Providence, 
on  Free-will,  and  some  others.  I have  endeavored  to  condense  and 
to  simplify  some  of  the  most  valuable  parts  of  his  reasonings  in  the 
Notes  and  Appendix  to  an  edition  of  Archbishop  King’s  Discourse 
urt  Predestination,  published  at  the  end  of  the  Bampton  Lectures. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


315 


in  isference  to  different  occurrences.  Aid  in  both  cases 
alike,  we  always  attribute  the  failure  of  any  anticipation  to  out 
ignorance  or  mistake  respecting  some  of  the  circumstances. 
When  e.  g.  we  fully  expect,  from  our  supposed  knowledge 
of  some  person’s  character,  and  of  the  circumstances  he 
is  placed  in,  that  he  will  do  something  which,  eventually,  he 
does  not  do,  we  at  once  and  without  hesitation  conclude  that 
we  were  mistaken  either  as  to  his  character,  or  as  to  his  situa- 
tion, or  as  to  our  acquaintance  with  human  nature,  generally ; 
and  we  are  accustomed  to  adduce  any  such  failure  as  a proof 
of  such  mistake  ; saying  “ it  is  plain  you  were  mistaken  in 
your  estimate  of  that  man’s  character ; for  he  has  done  so 
and  so  : ” and  this,  as  unhesitatingly  as  we  should  attribute 
the  non-occurrence  of  an  eclipse  we  had  predicted,  not,  to  any 
change  in  the  Laws  of  Nature,  but  to  some  error  in  our  cal- 
culations. 

xii.  INDIFFERENCE,  in  its  application  in  respect  of  the 
Will  and  of  the  Judgment , is  subject  to  an  ambiguity  which 
some  of  my  readers  may  perhaps  think  hardly  worth  noticing; 
the  distinction  between  unbiassed  candor  and  impartiality,  on 
the  one  side,  and  carelessness , on  the  other,  being  so  very  ob- 
vious. But  these  two  things  nevertheless  have  been,  from 
their  bearing  the  same  name,  confounded  together ; or  at  least 
represented  as  inseparably  connected.  I have  known  a per- 
son maintain,  with  some  plausibility,  the  inexpediency,  with  a 
view  to  the  attainment  of  truth,  of  educating  people,  or  ap- 
pointing teachers  to  instruct  them,  in  any  particular  systems 
or  theories,  of  astronomy,  medicine,  religion,  politics,  <^c.,  on 
the  ground,  that  a man  must  wish  tc  believe,  and  to  find  good 
reasons  for  believing,  the  system  in  which  he  has  been  trained, 
and  which  he  has  been  engaged  in  teaching  ; and  this  wish 


APPENDIX  I. 


S46 

must  prejudice  his  understanding  in  favor  of  it,  and  const* 
quently  render  him  an  incompetent  judge  of  truth.* 

Now  let  any  one  consider  whether  such  a doctrine  as  this 
could  have  been  even  plausibly  stated,  but  for  the  ambiguity 
of  the  word  Indifference,  and  others  connected  with  it.  Fo 
it  would  follow,  from  such  a principle,  that  no  physician  is  to 
be  trusted,  who  has  been  instructed  in  a certain  mode  of 
treating  any  disorder,  because  he  must  wish  to  think  the  the- 
ory correct  which  he  has  learned  : nay,  no  physician  should 
be  trusted  who  is  not  utterly  indifferent  whether  his  patient 
recovers  or  dies  ; since  else,  he  must  wish  to  find  reasons  for 
hoping  favorably  from  the  mode  of  treatment  pursued.  No 
plan  for  the  benefit  of  the  public,  proposed  by  a philanthro- 
pist, should  be  listened  to ; since  such  a man  cannot  but  wish 
it  may  be  successful ; fyc. 

No  doubt  the  judgment  is  often  biassed  by  the  inclinations; 
out  it  is  possible,  and  it  should  be  our  endeavor,  to  guard 
against  this  bias.  If  a scheme  be  proposed  to  any  one  for 
embarking  his  capital  in  some  speculation  which  promises 
great  wealth,  he  will  doubtless  wish  to  find  that  the  expecta- 
tions held  out  are  well  founded  : but  every  one  would  call 
him  very  imprudent,  if  (as  some  do)  he  should  suffer  this, 
wish  to  bias  his  judgment,  and  should  believe,  on  insufficient 
grounds,  the  fair  promises  held  out  to  him.  But  we  should 
not  think  such  imprudence  an  inevitable  consequence  of  his 
desire  to  increase  his  property.  His  wishes,  we  should  say, 
were  both  natural  and  wise  ; but  since  they  could  not  render 
the  event  more  probable,  it  was  most  unw'ise  to  allow  them  to 
influence  his  decision.  In  like  manner  a good  man  will  indeed 
wish  to  find  the  evidence  of  the  Christian  religion  satisfactory 


See  Essay  I.  Second  Series 


AMBIGUOUS  l'ERMS. 


347 


But  a wise  man  does  not  for  that  reason  take  for  granted  that 
it  is  satisfactory  ; but  weighs  the  evidence  the  more  carefully 
on  account  of  the  importance  of  the  question. 

It  is  curious  to  observe  how  fully  aware  of  the  operation  of 
this  bias,  and  how  utterly  blind  to  it,  the  same  persons  will  be, 
:n  opposite  cases.  Such  writers,  e.  g.  as  I have  just  alluded 
to,  disparage  the  judgment  of  those  who  have  been  accus 
tomed  to  study  and  to  teach  the  Christian  religion,  and  who 
derive  hope  and  satisfaction  from  it,  on  the  ground  that  they 
must  wish  to  find  it  true.  And  let  it  be  admitted  that  theil 
authority  shall  go  for  nothing ; and  that  the  question  shall  be 
tried  entirely  by  the  reasons  adduced.  But  then,  on  the  same 
principle,  how  strong  must  be  the  testimony  of  the  multitudes 
who  admit  the  truth  of  Christianity,  though  it  is  to  them  a 
source  of  uneasiness  or  of  dismay;  — who  have  not  adopted 
any  antinomian  system  to  quiet  their  conscience  while  leading 
an  unchristian  life  ; but,  when  they  hear  of  “ righteousness, 
temperance,  and  judgment  to  come,  tremble,”  and  try  to  dis- 
miss such  thoughts  till  “ a more  convenient  season.”  The 
case  of  these,  who  have  every  reason  to  wish  Christianity  un- 
true, is  passed  by,  by  the  very  same  persons  who  are  in- 
sisting on  the  influence  of  the  opposite  bias.  According  to 
the  homely  but  expressive  proverb,  they  are  “ deaf  on  one 
ear.” 

And  it  may  be  added,  that  rt  is  utterly  a mistake  to  suppose 
that  the  bias  is  always  in  favor  of  the  conclusion  wished  for : 
it  is  often  in  the  contrary  direction.  The  proverbial  expres- 
sion of  “ too  good  news  to  be  true,”  bears  witness  to  the  ex- 
istence of  this  feeling.  There  is  in  some  minds  a tendency 
to  unreasonable  doubt  in  cases  where  their  wishes  are  strong; 
«— ■ a morbid  distrust  of  evidence  which  they  are  especially 
anxious  to  find  conclusive  ; e.  g.  groundless  fears  for  the 


348 


APPENDIX  I. 


health  or  safety  of  an  xrdently-beloved  jhild,  will  frequentlj 
distress  anxious  parents. 

Different  temperaments  (sometimes  varying  with  the  state 
of  health  of  each  individual)  lead  towards  these  opposite  mis- 
ca'culations,  — the  over-estimate  or  under-estimate  cf  the 
reasons  for  a conclusion  we  earnestly  wish  to  find  true. 

Our  aim  should  be  to  guard  against  both  extremes,  and  to 
decide  according  to  the  evidence  ; preserving  the  Indifference 
of  fr.e  Judgment , even  where  the  Will  neither  can , nor  should 
be  indifferent. 

xiii.  LAW  is,  etymologically,  that  which  is  “ laid  ” down  , 
and  is  used,  in  the  most  appropriate  sense,  to  signify  some 
general  injunction,  command,  or  regulation,  addressed  to  cer- 
tain Persons,  who  are  called  upon  to  conform  to  it.  It  is  irj 
this  sense  that  we  speak  of  “ the  Law  of  Moses,”  “ the  Law 
of  the  Land,”  fyc. 

It  is  also  used  in  a transferred  sense,  to  denote  the  state, 
ment  of  some  general  fact , the  several  individual  instances 
of  which  exhibit  a conformity  to  that  statement,  analogous  to  the 
conduct  of  persons  in  respect  to  a Law  which  they  obey.  It  is 
in  this  sense  that  we  speak  of  “ the  Laws  of  Nature  : ” when 
we  say  that  “ a seed  in  vegetating  directs  the  radicle  down- 
wards and  the  plumule  upwards,  in  compliance  with  a Law  of 
Nature,”  we  only  mean  that  such  is  universally  the  fact ; and 
so,  in  other  cases. 

It  is  evident  therefore  that,  in  this  sense,  the  conformity  of 
individual  cases  to  the  general  rule  is  that  which  constitutes  a 
Law  of  Nature.  If  water  should  henceforth  never  become 
solid,  at  any  temperature,  then  the  freezing  of  water  would 
no  ionger  be  a Law  of  Nature  : whereas  in  the  other  sense, 
a Law  is  not  the  more  or  the  less  a Law  from  the  conformity 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


349 


#r  non-conformity  of  individuals  to  it : if  an  Act  of  cur 
Legislature  were  to  be  disobeyed  and  utterly  disregarded 
by  every  one,  it  would  not  on  that  account  be  the  less  a 

Law. 

This  distinction  may  appear  so  obvious  when  plainly  stated 
as  hardly  to  need  mention : yet  writers  of  great  note  and 
ability  have  confounded  these  two  senses  together : I need 
only  mention  Hooker  (in  the  opening  of  his  great  work)  and 
Montesquieu  : the  latter  of  whom  declaims  on  the  much 
stricter  observance  in  the  Universe  of  the  Laws  of  Nature, 
than  in  mankind,  of  the  divine  and  human  Laws  laid  down  for 
their  conduct : not  considering  that,  in  the  former  case,  it  is 
the  observance  that  constitutes  the  Law. 

xiv.  MAY,  and  likewise  MUST,  and  CAN,  (as  well  as 
CANNOT)  are  each  used  in  two  senses,  which  are  very  often 
confounded  together.  They  relate  sometimes  to  Power , or 
Liberty , sometimes  to  Contingency. 

When  we  say  of  one  who  has  obtained  a certain  sum  of 
money,  “ now  he  may  purchase  the  field  he  was  wishing  for,” 
we  mean  that  it  is  in  his  power ; it  is  plain  that  he  may , in  the 
Bame  sense,  hoard  up  the  money,  or  spend  it  on  something 
else  ; though  perhaps  we  are  convinced,  from  our  knowledge 
of  his  character  and  situation,  that  he  will  not.  When  again 
we  say,  “ it  may  .ain  to-morrow,”  or  “ the  vessel  may  have 
arrived  in  port,”  the  expression  does  not  at  all  relate  to  power, 
but  merely  to  contingency  : i.  e.  we  mean,  that  though  we 
are  not  sure  such  an  event  will  happen  or  has  happened,  we 
are  not  sure  of  the  reverse. 

When,  again,  we  say,  ‘ this  man,  of  so  grateful  a dispo 
sition,  must  have  eagerly  embraced  such  an  opportunity  of 
requiting  his  benefactor,”  or  “ one  who  approves  of  the  slava 
30 


350 


APPENDIX  1. 


trade  ? nust  be  very  hard-hearted,”  we  only  mean  to  imply  the 
absence  of  all  doubt  on  these  points.  The  very  notions  of 
gratitude  and  of  hard-heartedness  exclude  the  idea  of  compul* 
sion,  and  of  yielding  to  irresistible  power.  But  when  we  say 
that  “ all  men  must  die,”  or  that  “ a man  must  go  to  prison 
who  is  dragged  by  force,”  we  mean  “ whether  they  will  o t 
not”  — that  there  is  no  power  to  resist.  So  also,  if  we  say 
that  a Being  of  perfect  goodness  “ cannot  ” act  wrong,  we  do 
not  mean  that  it  is  out  of  his  power : since  that  would  imply 
no  goodness  of  character ; but  that  there  is  sufficient  reason 
for  feeling  sure  that  He  will  not.  It  is  in  a very  different 
sense  that  we  say  of  a man  fettered  in  a prison,  that  he 
“ cannot  ” escape  . meaning,  that  though  he  has  the  will,  he 
wants  the  ability. 

These  words  are  commonly  introduced,  in  questions  con- 
nected with  Fatalism  and  the  Freedom  of  human  actions,  to 
explain  the  meaning  of  “ necessary,”  “ impossible,”  fyc. ; and 
having  themselves  a corresponding  ambiguity,  they  only  tend 
to  increase  the  perplexity. 

“ Chaos  umpire  sits, 

And  by  deciding  worse  embroils  the  fray.” 

MUST.  — See  « May.” 

xv.  NECESSARY.  — This  word  is  used  as  the  contrary  to 

impossible  ” in  all  its  senses,  and  is  of  course  liable  to  a 
corresponding  ambiguity.  Thus  it  is  “ mathematically  Neces* 
sary  ” that  two  sides  of  a triangle  should  be  greater  than  the 
third  ; there  is  a “ physical  Necessity”  for  the  fall  of  a stone; 
and  a “ moral  Necessity  ” that  Beings  of  such  and  such  a 
character  should  act,  when  left  perfectly  free,  in  such  and 
such  a manner  i.  e.  we  are  sure  they  will  act  so  ; though  of 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


35 


course  it  is  in  their  power  to  act  otherwise  ; else  there  would 
be  no  moral  agency.*  This  ambiguity  is  employed  sophist!- 
cally  to  justify  immoral  conduct  ; since  no  one  is  responsible 
for  any  thing  done  under  “necessity,”  — i.  e.  “ physica/ 
necessity;”  as  when  a man  is  dragged  any  where  by  exter 
nal  force,  or  falls  down  from  being  too  weak  to  stand  ; and 
then  the  same  excuse  is  fallaciously  extended  to  “ moral 
necessity  ” also. 

There  are  likewise  numberless  different  applications  of  the 
word  “necessity”  (as  well  as  of  those  derived  from  it)  in 
which  there  is  a practical  ambiguity,  from  the  difference  of  the 
things  understood  in  conjunction  with  it  : e.  g.  food  is  “neces- 
sary ; ” viz.  — to  life  ; great  wealth  is  “ necessary  ” — to  the 
gratification  of  a man  of  luxurious  habits  ; the  violation  of 
moral  duty  is  in  many  cases  “ necessary  ” — for  the  attain- 
ment of  certain  worldly  objects  ; the  renunciation  of  such 
objects,  and  subjugation  of  the  desires,  is  “necessary”  — 
to  the  attainment  of  the  Gospel-prornises,  Spc.  And  thus  it  is 
that  “ necessity  ” has  come  to  be  “ the  tyrant’s  plea  ; ” for  as 
no  one  is  at  all  responsible  for  what  is  a matter  of  physical 
necessity,  — what  he  has  no  power  to  avoid, — so,  a degree 
of  allowance  is  made  for  a man’s  doing  what  he  has  power  to 
avoid,  when  it  appears  to  be  the  less  of  two  evils;  as  e.  g. 
when  a man  who  is  famishing  takes  the  first  food  he  meets 
with,  as  “ necessary  ” to  support  life,  or  throws  over  goods  in 
a storm,  when  it  is  “ necessary  ” in  order  to  save  the  ship. 
But  if  the  plea  of  necessity  be  admitted  without  inquiring  for 
wliut  the  act  in  question  is  necessary,  any  thing  whatever  may 
be  thus  vindicated ; since  no  one  commits  any  crime  which  is 
not,  in  his  view,  “ necessary  ” to  the  attainment  of  some  sup- 
posed advantage  or  gratification. 

* See  the  article  “ Impossibility  ; ” note. 


352 


APPENDIX  I. 


The  confusion  of  thought  is  further  increased  by  the  cm 
ployinent  on  improper  occasions  of  the  phrase  “ absolutely 
necessary  ; ” which,  strictly  speaking,  denotes  a case  in  which 
there  is  no  possible  alternative.  It  is  necessary  for  a man’s 
safety  that  he  should  remain  in  a house  which  he  cannot  quit 
without  incurring  danger  : it  is  absolutely  ( or  simply)  neces 
sary  that  he  should  remain  there,  if  he  is  closely  imprisoned 
in  it. 

I have  treated  more  fully  on  this  fruitful  source  of  sophistry 
in  the  Appendix  (No.  I.)  to  King’s  “ Discourse  on  Predestina- 
tion.” In  the  course  of  it,  I suggested  (in  the  first  edition)  an 
etymology  of  the  word,  which  I have  reason  to  think  is  not 
correct ; but  it  should  be  observed,  that  this  makes  no  differ- 
ence in  the  reasoning,  which  is  not  in  any  degree  founded  on 
that  etymology  ; nor  have  I,  as  some  have  represented,  at- 
tempted to  introduce  any  new  or  unusual  sense  of  the  word, 
but  have  all  along  appealed  to  common  use , — the  only  right 
standard,  — and  merely  pointed  out  the  senses  in  which  each 
word  has  actually  been  employed.  See  the  introduction  to 
this  Appendix. 

xvi.  OLD.  — This  word,  in  its  strict  and  primary  sense, 
denotes  the  length  of  time  that  any  object  has  existed  ; and 
many  are  not  aware  that  they  are  accustomed  to  use  it  in  any 
other.  It  is,  however,  very  frequently  employed  instead  of 
“ Ancient,”  to  denote  distance  of  time.  The  same  transition 
seems  to  have  taken  place,  in  Latin.  Horace  says  of  Lucil- 
.us,  who  was  one  of  the  most  ancient  Roman  authcrs  hurt 
who  did  not  live  to  be  old  — 

“ quo  fit  ut  omnis 

Votiva  pateat  veluti  desoripta  tabe/la 
Vita  Senis” 


AMBIU  OUS  TERMS. 


353 


The  present  is  a remarkat  e instance  of  the  influence  of  air 
ambiguous  word  over  the  thoughts  even  of  those  who  are  not 
ignorant  of  the  ambiguity,  but  are  not  carefully  on  the  watcl 
against  its  effects  ; the  impressions  and  ideas  associated  by 
habit  with  the  word  when  used  in  one  sense,  being  always  apt 
to  obtrude  themse.lves  unawares  when  it  is  employed  in 
another  sense,  and  thus  to  affect  our  reasonings.  E.  G.  “ Ola 
times,”  — “the  Old  world,”  fyc.  are  expressions  in  frequent 
use,  and  which,  oftener  than  not,  produce  imperceptibly  the 
associated  impression  of  the  superior  wisdom  resulting  from 
experience,  which,  as  a general  rule,  we  attribute  to  Old  men. 
Yet  no  one  is  really  ignorant  that  the  world  is  older  now  than 
ever  it  was  ; and  that  the  instruction  to  be  derived  from  ob 
servations  on  the  past  (which  is  the  advantage  that  Old  per • 
sons  possess)  must  be  greater,  supposing  other  things  equal,  to 
every  successive  generation  ; and  Bacon’s  remark  to  this  pur- 
pose appears,  as  soon  as  distinctly  stated,  a mere  truism  : yet 
few,  perhaps,  that  he  made,  are  more  important.  There  is 
always  a tendency  to  appeal  with  the  same  kind  of  deference 
to  the  authority  of  “ Old  times,”  as  of  aged  men. 

It  should  be  kept  in  mind,  however,  that  ancient  customs 
institutions , SfC.  when  they  still  exist , may  be  literally  called 
Old  ; and  have  this  advantage  attending  them,  that  their 
effects  may  be  estimated  from  long  experience  ; whereas  we 
cannot  be  sure,  respecting  any  recently-established  Law  or 
System,  whether  it  may  not  produce  in  time  some  effects 
which  were  not  originally  contemplated.* 

xvii.  ONE — is  sometimes  employed  to  denote  strict  and 


* See  however  the  Article  reprinted  from  the  London  Review,  ia 
the  first  letter  to  Ear  Grey  on  Secondary  Punishments. 

30  * 


354 


APPENDIX  l. 


propet  m.merica.  Unity ; sometimes,  c.ose  Resemblance  • 
correspondence  with  one  single  description.  — See  “ Same.” 

“ Facies  non  omnibus  UNA, 

Nec  diversa  tamen  ; qualem  decet  esse  sororum.”  — Ov.  Met.  b.  :i. 

It  is  in  the  secondary  or  improper,  not  the  primary  tnd 
proper  sense  of  this  word,  that  men  are  exhorted  to  “ be  of 
one  mind  ;”  i.  e.  to  agree  in  their  faith,  — pursuits,  — mutual 
affections,  8f-c.  “The  Church”  [viz. : die  Universal  or  Cath- 
olic Church]  “ is  undoubtedly  one,  and  so  is  the  Human  Race 
one  ; but  not  as  a Society.  It  was  from  the  first  composed  of 
distinct  Societies  ; which  were  called  one,  because  formed  on 
common  principles.  It  is  One  Society  only  when  considered 
as  to  its  future  existence.  The  circumstance  of  its  having 
one  common  Head,  Christ,  one  Spirit,  one  Father,  are  points 
of  unity,  which  no  more  make  the  Church  One  Society  on 
earth,  than  the  circumstance  of  all  men  having  the  same 
Creator,  and  being  derived  from  the  same  Adam,  renders  the 
Human  Race  one  Family.”  * 

It  is  also  in  this  sense  that  two  guineas,  e.  g.  struck  from  a 
wedge  of  uniform  fineness,  are  said  to  be  “ of  one  and  the 
same  form  and  weight,”  and  also  “ of  one  and  the  same  sub- 
stance.” In  this  secondary  or  improper  sense  also,  a child  is 
said  to  be  “ of  one  and  the  same  (bodily)  substance  with  its 
mother:”  or,  simply  “of  the  substance  of  its  mother:”  for 
these  two  pieces  of  money,  and  two  human  Beings,  are  ?iw- 
mericaUy  distinct. 

It  is  evidently  most  important  to  keep  steadily  in  view,  aad 
to  explain  on  proper  occasions,  these  different  uses  of  tka 
word,  lest  men  should  insensibly  slide  into  error  on  the  mosf 


Encyclop.  Metrop.  p.  774. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


353 


important  of  all  subjects,  by  applying,  in  the  secondary  sense, 
expressions  which  ought  to  be  understood  in  the  primary  and 
proper, — ( See  “Person.”)  Unity  is,  as  might  have  been 
expected,  liable  to  corresponding  ambiguities.  E.  G.  Some 
times  what  the  Apostles  say  concerning  “ Unity  of  Spirit  ’ — * 
of  Faith — Sec.  is  transferred  to  Unity  of  Church-Government 

xviii.  PAL.  — In  the  strict  sense,  a person  is  said  to  “ pay,’1 
wno  transfers  to  another  what  was  once  his  own  : in  another 
sense  “ pay  ” is  used  to  denote  the  mere  act  of  handing  over 
what  perhaps  never  was  one’s  own.  In  this  latter  sense  a 
gentleman’s  steward  or  housekeeper  is  said  to  pay  the  trades- 
men their  bills ; in  the  other  sense,  it  is  the  master  who  pays 
them. 

It  is  in  the  secondary  or  improper  sense  that  an  executor  is 
said  to  pay  legacies,  — a landowner  or  farmer  to  pay  tithes, 
<^c.,  since  the  money  these  hand  over  to  another  never  was 
theirs.  See  “ Evidence,”  (in  vol.  of  Tracts,)  p.  339. 

xix.  PERSON,*  in  its  ordinary  use  at  present,  invariably 
implies  a numerically  distinct  substance.  Each  man  is  one 
Person,  and  can  be  but  one.  It  bas  also  a peculiar  theological 
sense,  in  which  we  speak  of  the  “ three  Persons  ” of  the 
blessed  Trinity.  It  was  probably  thus  employed  by  our  Di- 
vines as  a literal,  or  perhaps  etymological,  rendering  of  the 
Latin  word  “ Persona.”  I am  inclined  to  think,  however, 
from  the  language  of  Wallis  (the  Mathematician  and  Logi- 
cian) in  the  following  extract,  as  well  as  from  that  of  some 
other  of  our  older  writers,  that  the  English  word  Person  was 


* Most  of  the  following  observations  will  apply  to  the  word  “ Per 
lonality  ” 


356 


APPENDIX  1. 


formerly  not  so  strictly  confined  as  now,  to  the  sense  it  bei  f 
in  common  conversation  among  us. 

“That  which  makes  these  expressions'”  {viz.  respecting 
the  Trinity)  “seem  harsh  to  some  of  these  men,  is  because 
they  have  used  themselves  to  fancy  that  notion  only  of  the 
word  Person,  according  to  which  three  men  are  accounted  tc 
be  three  persons,  and  these  three  persons  to  be  three  men 
But  he  may  consider  that  there  is  another  notion  of  the  wora 
Person,  and  in  common  use  too,  wherein  the  same  man  may 
be  said  to  sustain  divers  persons,  and  those  persons  to  be  the 
same  man  : that  is,  the  same  man  as  sustaining  divers  capaci- 
ties. As  was  said  but  now  of  Tully,  Tres  Personas  Unus 
sustineo ; meam , adversarii , judicis.  And  then  it  will  seem 
no  more  harsh  to  say,  The  Three  Persons,  Father,  Son,  and 
Holy  Ghost,  ire  One  God,  than  to  say,  God  the  Creator,  God 

the  Redeemer,  and  God  the  Sanctifier,  are  one  God 

it  is  much  the  same  thing  whether  of  the  two  forms  we  use.” 
— Letters  on  the  Trinity , p.  63. 

“ The  word  Person  ( persona ) is  originally  a Latin  word, 
and  does  not  properly  signify  a Man  ; (so  that  another  person 
must  needs  imply  another  man ) for  then  the  word  Homo  would 
have  served,  and  they  needed  not  have  taken  in  the  word 
Persona  • but  rather,  one  so  circumstantiated.  And  the  same 
Man , if  considered  in  other  circumstances  (considerably  dif- 
ferent) is  reputed  another  person.  And  that  this  is  the  true 
notion  of  the  word  Person,  appears  by  those  noted  phrases, 
personam  inducre , personam  deponerc,  personam  agere , and 
many  the  like  in  approved  Latin  authors  Thus  the  same 
man  may  at  once  sustain  the  Person,  of  a King  and  a Father , 
if  he  be  invested  both  with  regal  and  paternal  authority. 
Now  because  the  King  and  the  Father  are  for  the  most  part 
not  onl;  different  persons  but  different  men  also,  (and  the 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS, 


35? 


flke  in  other  cases)  hence  it  conies  to  pass  that  i fiother  Person 
is  sometimes  supposed  to  imply  another  man  ; lut  not  always, 
nor  is  that  the  proper  sense  of  the  word.  It  is  Englished  in 
our  dictionaries  by  the  state , quality  or  condition  wherehy  on < 
man  differs  from  another  ; and  so,  as  the  condition  alters,  tha 
Person  alters,  though  the  man  be  the  same. 

“ The  hinge  of  the  controversy,  is,  that  notion  concerning 
the  three  somewhats , which  the  Fathers  (who  first  used  it)  did 
intend  co  design  by  the  name  Person  ; so  that  we  are  not  from 
the  word  Person  to  determine  what  was  that  Notion ; but 
from  that  Notion  which  they  would  express,  to  determine  in 
what  sense  the  word  Person  is  here  used,”  fyc.  4'C.  — Letter 
V.  in  Answer  to  the-Arian’s  Vindication.* 

What  was  precisely  the  notion  which  these  Latin  Fathers 
‘intended  to  convey,  and  how  far  it  approached  the  classical 
[.ignification  of  the  word  “ Persona,”  it  may  not  be  easy  to 
determine.  But  we  must  presume  that  they  did  not  intend  to 
employ  it  in  what  is,  now,  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word 
Person  ; both  because  “ Persona  ” never,  I believe,  bore  that 
sense  in  pure  Latinity,  and  also  because  it  is  evident  that,  in 
that  sense,  “ three  divine  Persons  ” would  have  been  exactly 


* Dr.  Wallis’s  theological  works,  considering  his  general  celebrity, 
are  wonderfully  little  known.  He  seems  to  have  been,  in  his  day,  one 
of  the  ablest  Defenders  of  the  Church’s  doctrine,  against  the  Arians 
and  Socinians  of  that  period.  Of  course  he  incurred  the  censure,  not 
only  of  them,  but  of  all  who,  though  not  professedly  Arian,  gave 
such  an  exposition  of  their  doctrine  as  amounts  virtually  to  Tritheism. 
I beg  to  be  understood  however  as  not  demanding  an  implicit  defer- 
ence  for  his,  or  for  any  other  human  authority,  however  eminent. 
We  are  taught  to  “ call  no  man  Master,  on  earth.”  But  the  reference 
to  Dr.  Wallis  may  serve  both  to  show  the  use  of  the  word  in  his  clays, 
and  to  correct  the  notion,  should  any  have  entertained  it,  that  the 
yiewe  of  the  subject  here  taken  are,  in  our  Church,  any  thir  g n oval 


358 


APPENDIX  I. 


equivalent  to  “ three  Gods  a meaning  wliich  the  orlhodoj 
always  disavowed. 

It  is  probable  that  they  had  nearly  the  same  view  with 
which  the  Greek  theologians  adopted  the  word  Hypostasis 
which  seems  calculated  to  express  “ that  which  stands  undel 
(i.  e.  is  the  subject  of)  Attributes.”  They  meant,  it  may  be 
presumed,  to  guard  against  the  suspicion  of  teaching,  on  the 
one  hand,  that  there  are  three  Gods,  or  three  Parts  of  the  one 
God  ; or,  on  the  other  hand,  that  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost 
are  no  more  than  three  names*  all,  of  the  same  signification  ; 
and  they  employed,  accordingly,  a term  which  might  serve  to 
denote,  that,  (though  divine  Attributes  belong  to  all  and  each 
of  these,  yet)  there  are  attributes  of  each,  respectively,  which 
are  not  so  strictly  applicable  to  either  of  the  others,  as  such  ; 
as  when,  for  instance,  the  Son  is  called  especially  the  “ Re- 
deemer,” and  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  “ Comforter  or  Paraclete,”  t 
SfC.  The  notion  thus  conveyed  is  indeed  very  faint , and  im- 
perfect ; but  is  perhaps  for  that  very  reason,  (considering 
what  Man  is,  and  what  God  is,)  the  less  likely  to  lead  to  error. 
One  may  convey  to  a blind  man  a notion  of  seeing,  correct  as 
far  as  it  goes,  and  instructive  to  him,  though  very  imperfect : 
f he  form  a more  full  and  distinct  notion  of  it,  his  ideas  will 


* It  is  possible  that  some  may  have  usgd  this  expression  in  the 
very  sense  attached  by  others  to  the  word  “ Person  ; ” led,  in  a great 
degree,  by  the  peculiar  signification  of  “ Name  ” in  Scripture.  For 
Borne  very  important  remarks  on  that  signification,  see  Hinds's  His- 
tory, and  also  a Sermon  on  the  Name  Emmanuel  in  the  vol.  i lately 
published. 

f English  readers  are  not  usually  aware  that  the  title  oi  •*  Para- 
clete” is  ever  distinctly  applied  to  Christ  in  Scripture,  as  it  is  in 
1 John  ii.  1,  because  it  is  there  translated  “advocate”  instead  of 
* comforter.” 


AMBIGTJUuu  ERMS. 


359 


inevitably  be  incorrect. — See  Essay  VII.  § 5,  Second 
Series.* 

It  is  perhaps  to  be  regretted  that  our  Divines,  in  rendering 
the  Latin  “ Persona,”  used  the  word  Person,  whose  ordinary 
sense,  in  the  present  day  at  least,  differs  in  a most  important 
point  from  the  theological  sense,  and  yet  is  not  so  remote 
from  it  as  to  preclude  all  mistake  and  perplexity.  If  “ Hypos* 
tasis,”  or  any  other  completely  foreign  term  had  been  used 
instead,  no  idea  at  all  would  have  been  conveyed  except  that 
of  the  explanation  given  ; and  thus  the  danger  at  least  of  be- 
ing misled  by  a word,  would  have  been  avoided.! 

Our  Reformers  however  did  not  introduce  the  word  into 
their  Catechism  ; though  it  has  been  (I  must  think,  injudicious- 
ly) employed  in  some  popular  expositions  of  the  Catechism, 
without  any  explanation,  or  even  allusion  to  its  being  used  in 
a peculiar  sense. 

As  it  is,  the  danger  of  being  not  merely  not  understood, 
but  misunderstood,  should  be  guarded  against  most  sedulously 
oy  all  who  wish  not  only  to  keep  clear  of  error,  but  to  incul- 
cate important  truth  ; by  seldom  or  never  employing  this  am- 
biguous word  without  some  explanation  or  caution.  For  if 
we  employ,  without  any  such  care,  terms  which  we  must  be 
sensible  are  likely  to  mislead,  at  least  the  unlearned  and  the 
unthinking,  we  cannot  stand  acquitted  on  the  plea  of  not  hav 
mg  directly  inculcated  error. 

* It  is  worth  observing,  as  a striking  instance  of  the  little  reliance 
to  be  placed  on  etymology  as  a guide  to  the  meaning  of  a word,  that 
“ Hypostasis,”  “ Substantia,”  and  “ Understanding,”  so  widely  dif- 
ferent in  their  sense,  correspond  in  their  etymology. 

t I wish  it  to  be  observed,  that  it  is  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  Per- 
son which  renders  it  objectionable ; not,  its  being  nowhere  employed 
tn  Scripture  in  the  technical  sense  of  theologians  ; for  t! is  eircum 
stance  is  rather  an  advantage.  — See  Essoy  VI.  (Second  Series)  § 4, 
note. 


360 


APPENDIX  1. 


I am  persuaded  that  much  heresy,  and  some  infidelity,  may 
be  traced  in  part  to  the  neglect  of  this  caution.  It  is  not  won* 
derful  that  some  should  be  led  to  renounce  a doctrine,  which, 
through  the  ambiguity  in  question,  may  be  represented  to  them 
as  involving  a self-contradiction,  or  as  leading  to  Tritheism  ; — 
that  others  should  insensibly  slide  into  this  very  error;  — or 
that  many  more  (which  I know  to  be  no  uncommon  case) 
should,  for  fear  of  that  error,  deliberately,  and  on  principle, 
keep  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  out  of  their  thoughts,  as  a 
point  of  speculative  belief,  to  which  they  have  assented  once 
for  all,  but  which  they  find  it  dangerous  to  dwell  on  ; though 
it  is  in  fact  the  very  Faith  into  which,*  by  our  Lord’s  ap- 
pointment, we  are  baptized. 

Nor  should  those  who  do  understand,  or  at  least  have 
once  understood  the  ambiguity  in  question,  rest  satisfied  that 
they  are  thenceforward  safe  from  all  danger  in  that  quarter 
It  should  be  remembered  that  the  thoughts  are  habitually  in 
fluenced,  through  the  force  of  association,  by  the  recurrence 
of  the  ordinary  sense  of  any  word  to  the  mind  of  those  who 
are  not  especially  on  their  guard  against  it.  See  “ Fallacies,” 

$5- 

The  correctness  of  a formal  and  deliberate  Confession  of 
Faith,  is  not  always,  of  itself,  a sufficient  safeguard  against 
error  in  the  habitual  impressions  on  the  mind.  The  Roman- 
ists flatter  themselves  that  they  are  safe  from  Idolatry,  because 
they  distinctly  acknowledge  the  truth,  that  “ God  only  is  to  be 
served;'1''  viz.  with  “ Latria  though  they  allow  Adoration, 
(“  hyperdulia”  and  “ dulia  ”)  to  the  Virgin  and  other  Saints, — 
to  Images,  — and  to  Relics:  to  which  it  has  been  justly  re- 


* ct{  to  iro/tct,  “ into  the  Name  ; ” not  “ in  the  Name.”  Matt 
xxviii.  19. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


361 


plied,  that  supposing  this  distinction  correct  in  itself,  It  would 
be,  in  practice,  nugatory  ; since  the  mass  of  the  people  must 
soon  (as  experience  proves)  'ose  sight  of  it  entirely  in  their 
habitual  devotions. 

Nor  again  is  the  habitual  acknowledgment  of  One  God.  of 
itself  a sufficient  safeguard  ; since,  from  the  additional  ambi- 
guities of  “ One”  and  “ Unity,”  (noticed  in  a preceding  Arti- 
cle) we  may  gradually  fall  into  the  notion  of  a me  rely  figura- 
tive Unity  ; such  as  unity  of  substance  merely,  (see  a preced- 
ing Article) — Unity  of  purpose,  — concert  of  action,  Sfc. 
such  as  is  often  denoted  by  the  phrase  “ one  mind.”  See 
“ Same,”  in  this  Appendix,  and  “ Dissertation,”  Book  IV. 
Ch.  v. 

When  however  I speak  of  the  necessity  of  explanations , 
the  reader  is  requested  tc  keep  in  mind,  that  I mean,  not  ex- 
planations of  the  nature  oj  the  Deity,  but  of  our  own  use  of 
words.  On  the  one  hand  we  must  net  content  ourselves  with 
merely  saying  that  the  whole  subject  is  mysterious  and  must 
not  be  too  nicely  pried  into ; while  we  neglect  to  notice  the 
distinction  between  divine  revelations,  and  human  explana- 
tions of  them  ; — between  inquiries  into  the  mysteries  of 
the  divine  nature,  and  into  the  mysteries  arising  from  the  am- 
biguities of  language,  and  of  a language  too,  adopted  by  un- 
inspired men.  For,  whatever  Scripture  declares,  the  Chris- 
tian is  bound  to  receive  implicitly,  however  unable  to  under- 
stand it : but  to  claim  an  uninquiring  assent  to  expressions  of 
man’s  framing,  (however  judiciously  framed)  without  even  an 
attempt  to  ascertain  their  meaning,  is  to  fall  into  one  of  the 
worst  errors  of  the  Romanists. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  require  explanations  of  what  God  o 
in  Himself,  is  to  attempt  what  is  beyond  the  reach  of  the  hu- 
man faculties  and  foreign  from  the  apparent  design  of  Scrip- 

31 


302 


APPENDIX  I. 


ture-revelation  ; which  seems  to  be,  chiefly,  if  not  wholly,  to 
declare  to  us,  (at  least  to  insist  on  among  the  essential  article* 
of  faith  ) with  a view  to  our  practical  benefit,  and  to  the  influ- 
encing of  our  feelings  and  conduct,  not  so  much  the  intrinsic 
nature  of  the  Deity,  as,  what  He  is  and  does,  relatively  to  us. 
Scripture  teaches  us  (and  our  Church-Catechism  directs  out 
attention  to  these  points)  to  “ believe  in  God,  who,  as  the 
Father,  hath  made  us  and  all  the  world,  — as  the  Son,  hath 
redeemed  us  and  all  mankind, — as  the  Holy  Ghost,  sanctfieth 
us,  and  all  the  elect  people  of  God.”  * 

And  this  distinction  is,  as  I have  said,  pointed  out  in  the 
very  form  of  Baptism.  Nothing  indeed  can  be  more  decid- 
edly established  by  Scripture,  — nothing  more  indistinctly  ex 
; plained  (except  as  far  as  relates  to  us)  than  the  doctrine  of 
the  Trinity  ;t  nor  are  we  perhaps  capable,  with  our  present 
faculties,  of  comprehending  it  more  fully. 

In  these  matters,  our  inquiry,  — at  least  our  first  inquiry, 
— should  always  be,  what  is  revealed : nor,  if  any  one  re- 
fuses to  adopt  as  an  article  of  faith,  this  or  that  exposition 
should  he  be  understood  as  necessarily  maintaining  its  falsity. 
For  we  are  sure  that  there  must  be  many  truths  relative  to  the 
Deity,  which  we  have  no  means  of  ascertaining  : nor  does  it 
follow  that  even  every  truth  which  can  be  ascertained,  must 
be  a part  of  the  essential  faith  of  a Christian. 

And  as  it  is  wise  to  reserve  for  mature  age,  such  instruc- 


* Hawkins's  Manual,  p.  12. 

f Compare  together,  for  instance,  such  passages  as  the  following ; 
for  it  is  by  comparing  Scripture  with  Scripture,  not  by  dwelling  on 
insulated  texts,  that  the  Word  of  God  is  to  be  rightly  understood ! 
Luke  i.  35,  and  John  xiv.  9 ; John  xiv.  16,  18,  26,  Matt,  xxviii.  19,  20  • 
John  xvi.  7,  Coloss.  ii.  9 ; Philip,  i.  19,  1 Cor.  vi.  19  ; Matt,  x 2tX 
and  John  xiv.  23. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


363 


tiona  as  are  unsuitable  to  a puerile  understanding,  so,  it  seeins 
the  part  of  a like  wisdom,  to  abstain,  during  this  our  state  of 
childhood,  from  curious  speculations  on  subjects  in  which  even 
the  ablest  of  human  minds  can  but  “ see  by  means  of  a glass, 
darkly.”  On  these,  the  Learned  can  have  no  advantage  ovet 
others  ; though  we  are  apt  to  forget  that  any  mysterious  point 
inscrutable  to  Man,  as  Man,  — surpassing  the  utmost  reach  of 
human  intellect,  — must  be  such  to  the  learned  and  to  the 
ignorant,  to  the  wise  and  to  the  simple,  alike  ; — that  in  utter 
darkness,  the  strongest  sight,  and  the  weakest,  are  on  a level. 
“ Sir,  in  these  matters,”  (said  one  of  the  most  eminent  of  our 
Reformers,  respecting  another  mysterious  point,)  “ I am  so  fear- 
ful, that  I dare  speak  no  further,  yea  almost  none  otherwise, 
than  as  the  Scripture  doth  as  it  were  lead  me  by  the  hand 
And  surely  it  is  much  better  thus  to  consult  Scripture,  and 
take  it  for  a guide , than  to  resort  to  it  merely  for  confirma- 
tions, contained  in  detached  texts,  of  the  several  parts  of  some 
System  of  Theology,  which  the  student  fixes  on  as  reputed 
orthodox,  and  which  is  in  fact  made  the  guide  which  he  per- 
mits to  “ lead  him  by  the  hand  ; ” while  passages  culled  out 
from  various  parts  of  the  Sacred  Writings  in  subserviency  to 
such  system,  are  formed  into  what  may  be  called  an  anagram 
of  Scripture  : and  then,  by  reference  to  this  system  as  « stand- 
ard, each  doctrine  or  discourse  is  readily  pronounced  Ortho- 
dox, or  Socinian,  or  Arian,  or  Sabellian,  or  Nestorian,  fyc. , 
and  all  this,  on  the  ground  that  the  theological  scheme  whicl 
the  student  has  adopted,  is  supported  by  Scripture.  The  ma- 
terials indeed  are  the  stones  of  the  Temple  ; but  the  building 
constructed  with  them  is  a fabric  of  human  contrivance.  If 
instead  of  this,  too  common,  procedure,  students  would  fairly 
search  the  Scriptures  with  a view  not  merely  to  defend  theii 
□pinions,  but  to  form  them,  — not  merely  for  arguments , but 


364 


APPENDIX  I. 


for  truth,  — keeping  human  expositions  to  their  tvvi.  propel 
purposes  [See  Essay  YI.  First  Series,]  and  not  allowing 
these  to  become,  practically,  a standard,  — if,  in  short,  they 
were  as  honestly  desirous  to  be  on  the  side  of  Scripture,  aa 
they  naturally  are  to  have  Scripture,  on  their  side,  how  much 
sounder,  as  well  as  more  charitable,  would  their  conclusions 
often  be ! 

With  presumptuous  speculations,  such  as  I have  alluded  to, 
many  theologians,  even  of  those  who  lived  near,  and  indeed 
during,  the  Apostolical  times,  seem  to  have  been  alike  charge- 
able, widely  as  they  differed  in  respect  of  the  pellicular  ex- 
planations adopted  by  each  : 

“ Unus  utrique 

Error  ; sed  variis  illudit  partibus.” 

And  it  is  important  to  remember,  — what  we  are  very  liable 
to  lose  sight  of — the  circumstance,  that,  not  only  there  arose 
grievous  errors  during  the  time  of  the  Apostles,  and  conse- 
quently such  were  likely  to  exist  in  the  times  immediately  fol- 
lowing, but  also  that  when  these  inspired  guides  were  re- 
moved, there  was  no  longer  the  same  infallible  authority  to 
decide  what  was  error.  In  the  absence  of  such  a guide,  some 
errors  might  be  received  "as  orthodox,  and  some  sound  doc- 
trines be  condemned  as  heterodox. 

The  Gnostics  * introduced  a theory  of  ACons,  or  succes- 
sive emanations  from  the  divine  “ Pleroma  ” or  Fulness  ; one 
of  whom  was  Christ,  and  became  incarnate  in  the  man  Jesus.t 

• Of  these,  and  several  other  ancient  heretics,  we  have  no  accounts 
but  those  of  their  opponents ; which  ho  wever  we  may  presume  to  con- 
tain more  or  less  of  approximation  to  what  was  usually  maintained. 

t These  heretics  appear  to  have  split  into  many  different  sect* 
teacning  various  modifications  of  the  same  absurdities.  - - See  Burton  i 
Hampton  Lectures 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


366 


Yh«  Sabeilians  are  reported  to  have  described  Christ  as  bear- 
ing the  same  relation  to  the  Father,  as  the  illuminating 
(qpwTiOT(x6r)  quality  does  to  the  Sun  while  the  Holy  Ghost 
corresponded  to  the  warming  quality  (i Oalnbv ) : or  again,  the 
Three  as  corresponding  to  the  Body,  Soul,  and  Spirit,  of  a 
man  ; or  again,  to  Substance,  — Thought  or  Reason,  — and 
Will  or  Action.  The  Arians  again  represented  the  Son  and 
the  Holy  Spirit,  as  created  Beings,  but  with  a certain  im- 
parted divinity.  The  Nestorians  and  Eutychians  gave  oppo- 
site, but  equally  fanciful  and  equally  presumptuous  explana- 
tions of  the  Incarnation,  fyc.  fyc. 

Nor  were  those  who  were  accounted  orthodox,  altogcthel 
exempt  from  the  same  fault  of  presumptuous  speculation. 
“ Who,”  says  Chrysostom,  “ was  he  to  whom  God  said,  Let 

us  make  man  ? who  but  he the  Son  of  God  ? ” And 

Epiphanius,  on  the  same  passage,  says,  “ This  is  the  language 
of  God  to  his  Word.”  Each  of  these  writers,  it  may  be  ob- 
served, in  representing  God  (under  that  title)  as  addressing 
Himself  to  the  Son  as  to  a distinct  Being  previously  to  the 
birth  of  Jesus  on  earth,  approaches  very  closely  to  the  Arian 
view.  And  Justin  Martyr,  in  a similar  tone,  expressly  speaks 
of  God  as  “ One,  not  in  number , but  in  judgment  or  de- 
signs.” * I will  not  say  that  such  passages  as  these  may  not 
be  so  interpreted  as  to  exclude  every  form  of  tritheism  ; but 
it  is  a dangerous  thing,  to  use  (and  that,  not  in  the  heat  of 
declamation,  but  in  a professed  exposition)  language  of  such 
a nature  that  it  is  a mere  chance  whether  it  may  not  lead  into 
the  most  unscriptural  errors.  If  the  early  writers  had  not 
been  habitually  very  incautious  in  this  point,  that  could  hardly 


* oil  Tog yeyQa fiftivog  Osog,  sreQog  ton  rov  T a nurta  7Tot(f- 

tvvroQ  ©toijf  aQi&fiiS  /Ltywt  ocXV  av  yvdifitj  ; <§•<?, 

31  * 


366 


APPENDIX  1. 


have  taken  place  which  is  recorded  respecting  the  coanci 
held  at  Rimini  (A.  D.  360)  in  which  a Confession  if  Faith 
was  agreed  upon,  which  the  Arians  soon  after  boasted  of  aa 
sanctioning  their  doctrine,  and  “ the  Church,”  we  are  told, 
“ was  astonished  to  find  itself  unexpectedly  become  Arian.”  * 

The  fact  is,  that  numberless  writers,  both  of  those  who 
were,  and  who  were  not,  accounted  heretics,  being  displeased, 
and  justly,  with  one  another’s  explanations  of  the  mode  of  ex- 
istence of  the  Deity,  instead  of  taking  warning  aright  from 
the  errors  of  meir  neighbors,  sought,  each,  the  remedy,  in 
some  other  explanation  instead,  concerning  matters  unre- 
vealed and  inexplicable  by  man.  They  found  nothing  to  sat- 
isfy a metaphysical  curiosity  in  the  brief  and  indistinct , 
though  decisive,  declarations  of  Scripture,  that  “ God  was  in 
Christ,  reconciling  the  World  unto  Himself;”  — that  “in 
Him  dvvelleth  all  the  Fulness  of  the  Godhead,  bodily  ; ” — 
that  “ it  is  God  that  worketh  in  us  both  to  will  and  to  do  of  his 
good  pleasure;” — that  if  we  “keep  Christ’s  saying,  He 
dvvelleth  in  us,  and  we,  in  Him  ;”  — that  “ if  any  man  have 
not  the  Spirit  of  Christ,  he  is  none  of  his  ; ” — and  that  “ the 
Lord  is  the  Spirit,”  fyc. f They  wanted  something  more  full, 
and  more  philosophical,  than  all  this;  and  their  theology  ac- 
cordingly was  “ spoiled,  through  philosophy  and  vain  deceit, 
after  the  tradition  of  men,  after  the  rudiments  of  the  World, 
and  not  after  Christ.”  Hostile  as  they  were  to  each  other 
the  grand  mistake  in  principle  was  common  to  many  in  all 
parties. 

* See  Essay  VI.  (Second  Series),  § 2.  Note  b. 

f Not,  as  in  our  version,  “ that  Spirit;”  'O  JI  Kx’-Qiog  TO  Ttitvpt & 
ioriv.  In  this  place,  and  also  in  John  i.  21,  our  translators  were  ap- 
parently looking  to  some  version  in  which  an  attempt  is  made  to 
express  in  Latin  the  force  of  the  Greek  Article. 


AMBIGUOTS  terms 


367 


And  in  later  ages  the  Schoolmen  kept  up  tne  same  Spirit 
ind  even  transmitted  it  to  Protestants.  “ Theology  leaches,’ 
(says  a passage  in  a Protestant  work)  “ that  there  is  in  God 
one  Essence,  two  Processions,  three  Persons,  four  Relations, 
five  Notions,  and  the  Circumincession,  which  the  Greeks  call 
Perichoresis.”  ....  What  follows  is  still  more  to  my  pur« 
pose  ; but  I cannot  bring  myself  to  transcribe  any  further. 
u Who  is  this  that  darkeneth  counsel  by  words  without 
knowledge  ? ” 

But  the  substance  of  great  part  of  what  I have  been  say- 
ing, has  been  expressed  in  better  language  than  mine,  in  a late 
work,  which  displays  no  ordinary  ability,  Mr.  Douglas’s  Er- 
rors regarding  Religion. 

“ The  radical  mistake  in  all  these  systems,  whether  hereti- 
cal or  orthodox,  which  have  embroiled  mankind  in  so  many 
scandalous  disputes,  and  absurd  and  pernicious  opinions,  pro- 
ceeds from  the  disposition  so  natural  in  man  of  being  wise 
above  what  is  written.  They  are  not  satisfied  with  believing 
a plain  declaration  of  the  Savior,  ‘ I and  the  Father  are  one.'' 
They  undertake  with  the  utmost  presumption  and  folly  to 
explain  in  what  manner  the  Father  and  the  Son  are  one  ; but 
man  might  as  well  attempt  to  take  up  the  ocean  in  the  hollow 
of  his  hand,  as  endeavor,  by  his  narrow  understanding,  to 
comprehend  the  manner  of  the  Divine  existence.”  . . . P.  50. 

“ Heresies,  however,  are  not  confined  to  the  heterodox. 
While  the  Arians  and  Semi-Arians  were  corrupting  the  truth 
by  every  subtilty  of  argument  and  ingenious  perversion  of 
terms,  the  orthodox  all  the  while  were  dogmatizing  about  the 
Divine  nature  with  a profusion  of  words  which  either  had  no 
meaning,  or  were  gross  mistakes,  or  inapplicable  metaphors 
when  applied  to  the  infinite  and  spiritual  existence  of  God. 
&nd  not  content  with  using  such  arguments  against  the  here- 


368 


APPENDIX  I. 


tics  as  generally  produced  a new  heresy  without  refuting  th# 
former  one,  as  soon  as  they  obtained  the  power,  they  ex- 
pelled them  from  the  Roman  empire,  and  sent  them  with  all 
the  zeal  which  persecution  confers,  and  which  the  orthodox 
from  their  prosperity,  had  lost,  to  spread  every  variety  of 
error  amongst  the  nations  of  the  barbarians. 

“ Orthodoxy  was  become  a very  nice  affair,  from  the  rigor 
of  its  terms,  and  the  perplexity  of  its  creed,  and  very  unlike 
the  highway  for  the  simple,  which  the  Gospel  presents.  A 
slip  in  a single  expression  was  enough  to  make  a man  a here- 
tic. The  use  or  omission  of  a single  word  occasioned  a new 
rent  in  Christianity.  Every  heresy  produced  a new  creed, 

and  every  creed  a new  heresy Never  does  human 

folly  and  learned  ignorance  appear  in  a more  disgusting  point 
of  view  than  in  these  disputes  of  Christians  amongst  them- 
selves ; nor  does  any  study  appear  so  well  calculated  to  foster 
infidelity  as  the  history  of  Christian  sects,  unless  the  reader 
be  guided  by  light  from  above,  and  carefully  distinguish  the 
doctrines  of  the  Bible  from  the  miserable  disputes  of  pretended 
Christians.”  — P.  53. 

To  discuss  this  important  subject  more  fully  (or  perhaps 
indeed  as  fully  as  it  has  been  here  treated  of)  is  hardly  suit- 
able to  a logical  work  : and  yet  the  importance  of  attending 
to  the  ambiguity  I have  now  been  considering,  cannot  be  duly 
appreciated,  without  offering  some  remarks  on  the  subject- 
matter  with  which  that  ambiguity  is  connected  ; and  such  re- 
marks again,  if  scantily  and  imperfectly  developed,  are  open 
to  cavil  or  mistake.  I must  take  the  liberty  therefore  of  re- 
ferring the  reader  to  such  works,  (in  addition  to  those  already 
mentioned)  both  my  own,  and  those  of  others,  as  contain 
something  of  a fuller  statement  of  the  same  views.  It  may 
dc  added,  that  the  views  I have  taken  derive  confirmation 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


369 


Aow  that  they  have  been  so  long  before  the  public.,  from  the 
total  absence  (to  the  best  of  my  knowledge)  of  all  attempts  at 
refutation ; especially  when  considered  in  conjunction  with 
the  strong  objection  to  them  which  is  felt  by  some.  E.  G.  I 
have  seen,  in  an  argumentative  work,  a warning  given  to  the 
reader  against  this  very  Article  (by  name)  as  containing  very 
erroneous  doctrine  ; of  which,  however,  no  refutation  at  all  is 
subjoined  ; which  one  cannot  but  suppose  any  writer  would 
have  done,  who  had  ever  thought  of,  or  heard  of,  any,  even 
plausible,  arguments  against  the  doctrines  censured.  See  Es- 
says (First  Series),  Essay  II.  § 4,  and  Essays  IV.  and  V. ; — • 
Second  Series,  Essay  VI.  § 2,  p.  199  ; VII.  § 3;  and  IX.  § 1. 
— Third  Series,  Essay  II.  § 1.  Archbishop  King’s  Sermon 
on  Predestination,  c f-c.,  and  Encyciop.  Metrupol.  History, 
Chap,  xxvii.  p.  589,  and  Chap.  xxiv.  p.  740. 

xx.  POSSIBLE.  — This  word,  like  the  others  of  kindred 
meaning,  relates  sometimes  to  contingency , sometimes  to 
power  or  liberty  ; and  these  two  senses  are  frequently  con- 
founded. In  the  first  sense  we  say,  e.  g.  “ it  is  possible  this 
patient  may  recover,”  not  meaning  that  it  depends  on  his 
choice ; but  that  we  are  not  sure  whether  the  event  will  not  be 
such.  In  the  other  sense  it  is  “ possible  ” to  the  best  man  to 
violate  every  rule  of  morality ; since  if  it  were  out  of  his 
power  to  act  so  if  he  chose  it,  there  would  be  no  moral  good- 
ness in  the  case ; though  we  are  quite  sure  that  such  never 
will  be  his  choice.  — See  “ Impossible. ” 

xxi.  PREACH.  - The  word  “ preach  ” has  “ so  much 
slid  from  its  original  sense  of  proclaiming  as  a herald,  as  to 
obscure  the  sense  of  every  passage  in  which  the  preaching 
of  the  gospel, — ( y.yovxieiv  to  fvayythov — literally,  ‘ pro 


370 


APPENDIX  1. 


claiming  the  good  tidings,’  occurs.  The  sacred  writers 
constantly  preserve  the  distinction  between  ‘ preaching  ’ and 
‘teaching:’ — ‘announcing,’  — ‘giving  information  of  an 
event;’  and  giving  instruction  to  believers.  And  oi.r  trans- 
lators have  ajso,  almost  always,  adhered  to  this  distinction  ; 
though  the  word  ‘ preach,’  having  in  great  measure  acquired, 
in  their  time,  its  secondary  sense,  there  is  one  passage  in 
which  they  inadvertently  so  employ  it.  When  the  disciples 
were  assembled  at  Troas,  ‘ to  break  bread,  Paul  preached  unto 
them,  and  as  Paul  was  long  preaching , the  young  man  Euty- 
chus  fell  down  from  a window,  and  was  taken  up  dead  : ’ the 
word  diuleyo/di'o;  should  have  been  rendered  ‘ discoursing.’ 
To  disciples,  he  did  not,  in  the  strict  sense,  preach.  So  also 
it  is  not  our  business,  in  the  strict  sense,  to  ‘ preach  the  gospel,’ 
except  to  any  who,  from  their  tender  years,  or  from  neg- 
lected education,  have  never  had  the  glad  tidings  announced 
to  them  of  God’s  giving  his  Son  for  our  salvation.  Our  ordi- 
nary occupation  is  not  to  preach  (y.ijyvneiv}  but  (Sidioxeiv') 
to  teach  men  how  to  understand  the  Scriptures,  and  to  apply 
them  to  their  lives.”  — Discourse  appended  to  “ Essays  on  the 
Dangers  to  Christian  Faith.''1  — Pp.  264,  265. 

xxii.  PRIEST.  — See  “ Dissertation,”  Book  IV.  Ch. 
iv.  § 2. 

Etymologically,  the  word  answers  to  Presbyter,  i.  e.  El- 
der, in  the  Christian  Church,  or  Jewish  Synagogue  ; * and  is 
often  applied  to  the  second  order  of  Christian  Ministers  at  the 
present  day.  But  it  is  remarkable  that  it  never  occurs  in  this 
tense,  in  out  translation  of  the  Scriptures  ; the  word  noeafli- 

* See  Vitringa  on  the  Synagogue.  The  abridged  translation,  by 
Mr.  Bernard,  of  this  valuable  work,  is  an  important  addition  to  oui 
theological  literature. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


.171 

legos  being  always  rendered  by  Elder ; and  its  derivative. 
Priest,  always  given  as  the  translation  of  ’Isqsl )g.  This  lattei 
is  an  office  assigned  to  none  under  the  Gospel-scheme,  except 
the  ONE  great  High  Priest,  of  whom  the  Jewish  Priests  were 
types,  and  who  offered  a sacrifice  (that  being  the  most  distin- 
guishing office  of  a Priest  in  the  sense  of  ’legevs)  which  is  the 
only  one  under  the  Gospel. 

It  is  incalculable  now  much  confusion  has  arisen  from  con- 
founding together  the  two  senses  of  the  word  Priest,  an! 
thence,  the  two  offices  themselves. 

I have  enlarged  accordingly  on  this  subject  in  a Sermon 
delivered  before  the  University  of  Oxford,  and  subjoined  tc 
the  last  edition  of  the  Bampton  Lectures.  See  also  Essays , 
Third  Series,  Essay  II. 

xxiii.  B EASON.  — This  word  is  liable  to  many  ambigui- 
ties, of  which  I propose  to  notice  only  a few  of  the  most 
important.  Sometimes  it  is  used  to  signify  all  the  intellectual 
powers  collectively  ; in  which  sense  it  can  hardly  be  said  to 
be  altogether  denied  to  brutes;  since  several  of  what  we 
reckon  intellectual  processes  in  the  human  mind,  are  evidently 
such  as  some  brutes  are  capable  of. 

Reason  is,  however,  frequently  employed  to  denote  those 
mtellectual  powers  exclusively  in  which  Man  differs  from 
brutes  ; though  what  these  are  no  one  has  been  able  precisely 
to  define.  The  employment  at  will  of  the  faculty  of  Abstrac- 
tion seems  to  be  the  principal ; that  being,  at  least,  principally 
concerned  in  the  use  of  Language.  The  Moral  faculty,  cr 
power  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong,  (which  appears  a lso 
to  be  closely  connected  with  Abstraction,  without  which  it 
could  not  exist)  is  one  of  which  brutes  are  destitute  ; but  then 
Dr.  Paley  and  some  other  ethical  writers  deny  it  to  Man  also 


372 


AiJPEMDIX  l. 


The  description  given  by  that  author  of  our  discernment  ol 
good  and  bad  conduct,  [viz.  as  wholly  dependent  on  expecta 
tion  of  reward  and  punishment,)  would  in  a great  degree  ap' 
ply  to  many  of  the  brute-creation ; especially  the  more  intel- 
ligent of  domestic  animals,  as  dogs  and  horses.  It  is  in  this 
sense,  however,  that  some  writers  speak  of  “ Reason  ” as  en- 
abling us  to  judge  of  virtue  and  vice  ; not,  as  Dr.  Campbell  in 
ms  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric  has  understood  them,  in  the  sense 
of  the  power  of  argumentation. 

Reason,  however,  is  often  used  for  the  faculty  of  carrying 
on  the  “third  operation”  of  the  mind;  viz.  Reasoning,  or 
Ratiocination.  And  it  is  from  inattention  to  this  ambiguity 
(which  has  been  repeatedly  noticed  in  the  course  of  the  fore- 
going treatise,)  that  some  have  treated  of  Logic  as  the  art  of 
rightly  employing  the  mental  faculties  in  general. 

Reason  is  also  employed  to  signify  the  Premiss  or  Prem- 
isses of  an  Argument;  especially  the  Minor-Premiss;  and 
it  is  from  Reason  in  this  sense  that  the  word  “ Reasoning  ” is 
derived. 

It  is  also  very  frequently  used  to  signify  a Cause  ; as  when 
we  say,  in  popular  language,  that  the  “ Reason  of  an  eclipse 
of  the  sun  is,  that  the  moon  is  interposed  between  it  and  the 
earth.”  This  should  be  strictly  called  the  cause.  On  the 
other  hand,  “ Because  ” (i.  e.  “ by-Cause”)  is  used  to  intro- 
duce either  the  Physical  Cause  or  the  Logical  proof : and 
“ Therefore,”  “ Hence,”  “ Since,”  “ Follow,”  “ Consequence,” 
nnd  many  other  kindred  words,  have  a corresponding  ambi- 
guity : e.  g.  “ the  ground  is  wet,  because  it  has  rained ; ” or 
“ it  has  rained,  and  hence  the  ground  is  wet ; ” this  is  the 
assignment  of  .the  cause:  again,  “ it  has  rained,  because  the 
ground  is  wet ; ” “ the  ground  is  wet,  and  therefore  it  has 
rained  : ” this  is  assigning  the  logical  proof ; the  wetness  of 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS 


373 


Ji.a  .ground  is  the  cause,  not  of  the  rain  having  fallen  out  of 
our  knowing  that  it  has  fallen.  And  this  probably  it  is  that 
has  led  to  the  ambiguous  use  iu  all  languages  of  almost  all 
the  words  relating  to  these  two  points.  It  is  an  ambiguity 
which  has  produced  incalculable  confusion  of  thought,  and 
from  which  it  is  the  harder  to  escape,  on  account  of  its  ex- 
tending to  .hose  very  forms  of  expression  which  are  intro- 
duced in  on’er  to  clear  it  up. 

What  adds  to  the  confusion  is,  that  the  Cause  is  often  em- 
ployed as  a Proof  of  the  Effect;*  as  when  we  infer,  from  a 
great  fall  of  rain,  that  there  is,  or  will  be,  a flood  ; which  is 
at  once  the  physical  Effect,  and  the  logical  Conclusion.  The 
case  is  just  reversed,  when  from  a flood  we  infer  that  the  rain 
has  fallen. 

The  more  attention  any  one  bestows  on  this  ambiguity,  the 
more  extensive  and  important  its  results  will  appear.  — See 
Book  i.  § 2.  See  also  Rhetoric,  Book  i. 

xxiv.  REGENERATION.  — This  word  is  employed  by 
some  Divines  to  signify  the  actual  new  life  and  character 
which  ought  to  distinguish  the  Christian  ; by  others,  a release 
from  a state  of  condemnation  ; — a reconciliation  to  God, — 
adoption  as  his  children,  which  is  a necessary  prelimi- 

nary to  the  entrance  on  such  a state ; (but  which,  unhappi.y, 
is  not  invariably  followed  by  it) : and  these  are  of  course  as 
different  things  as  a grain  of  seed  sown,  and  “ the  full  corn 
in  the  ear.” 

* See  Fallacies.  “ Non  causa  pro  causa.”  Book  III.  § 14. 

t “ . . . . Baptism,  wherein  I was  made  a member  of  Christ,  a 
child  of  God,  and  an  inheritor  of  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven.”  . . . , 
“ A death  unto  sin,  and  a new  birth  unto  righteousness,  . . - 

“ We  being  regenerate,  and  made  thy  children  by  adoption  ana 
grace,  $ c.” 


32 


371 


APPENDIX  1. 


Much  controversy  has  taken  place  as  to  the  time  at  which 
and  the  circumstances  under  which,  “ Regeneration”  takes 
place ; the  greater  part  of  which  may  he  traced  to  this 
ambiguity. 

xxv.  SAME  (as  well  as  “ One,”  “ Identical,”  and  otE  i 
words  derived  from  them)  is  used  frequently  in  a sense  very 
different  from  its  primary  one  ; (as  applicable  to  a single  ob- 
ject) ; viz.  it  is  employed  to  denote  great  similarity.  When 
several  objects  are  undistinguishably  alike,  One  single  descrip - 
tion  will  apply  equally  to  any  of  them  ; and  thence  they  are 
said  to  be  all  of  one  and  the  same  nature,  appearance,  <^c. : as 
e.  g.  when  we  say,  “ this  house  is  built  of  the  same  stone  with 
such  another,”  we  only  mean  that  the  stones  are  undistinguish- 
able  in  their  qualities  ; not  that  the  one  building  was  pulled 
down,  and  the  other  constructed  with  the  materials.  Whereas 
Sameness,  in  the  primary  sense,  does  not  even  necessarily 
imply  Similarity ; for  if  we  say  of  any  man  that  he  is  great- 
ly altered  since  such  a time,  we  understand,  and  indeed  im- 
ply by  the  very  expression,  that  he  is  One  person , though 
different  in  several  qualities ; else  it  would  not  be  lie.  Jt  is 
worth  observing  also  that  “ Same,”  in  the  secondary  sense, 
admits,  according  to  popular  usage,  of  degrees:  we  speak  of 
two  things  being  nearly  the  same  but  not  entirely : personal 
identity  does  not  admit  of  degrees. 

Nothing,  perhaps,  has  contributed  more  to  the  error  of 
Realism  than  inattention  to  this  ambiguity.  When  several 
persons  are  said  to  have  One  and  the  same  opinion — thought 
. — or  idea, — many  men,  overlooking  the  true  simple  state- 
ment of  the  case,  which  is,  that  they  are  all  thinking  alike , 
look  for  something  more  abstruse  and  mystical,  and  imagine 
there  must  be  some  One  Thing , in  the  primary  sense,  though 


AMBIGUOUS  TEKMS. 


375 


aot  an  individual,  which  is  present  at  once  in  the  mind  of  each 
of  these  persons : and  thence  readily  sprung  Plato’s  theorj 
of  Ideas  ; each  of  which  was,  according  to  him,  one  real 
eternal  object,  existing  entire  and  complete  in  each  of  tne  in- 
dividual objects  that  are  known  by  one  name.  Hence,  first  in 
poetical  mythology,  and  ultimately,  perhaps,  in  popular  belief, 
Fortune,  Liberty,  Prudence,  (Minerva,)  a Boundary,  (Termi- 
nus,) and  even  the  Mildew  of  Corn,  (Rubigc,)  fy-c.,  became 
personified,  deified,  and  represented  by  Statues;  somewhat 
according  to  the  process  which  is  described  by  Swift,  in  his 
humorous  manner,  in  speaking  of  Zeal,  (in  the  Tale  of  a Tub,) 
“ how  from  a notion  it  became  a word,  and  from  thence,  in  a 
hot  summer,  ripened  into  a tangible  Substance.”  We  find 
Seneca  tin  liking  it  necessary  gravely  to  combat  the  position  of 
some  of  his  Stoical  predecessors,  “ that  the  cardinal  virtues 
are  Animals  : ” while  the  Hindoos  of  the  present  day,  from 
observing  the  similar  symptoms  w'hich  are  known  by  the  name 
of  Small-pox,  and  the  communication  of  the  like  from  one 
patient  to  another,  do  not  merely  call  it  (as  we  do)  one  dis- 
ease, but  believe  (if  we  may  credit  the  accounts  given)  that 
the  Small-pox  is  a Goddess,  who  became  incarnate  in  each 
infected  patient.  All  these  absurdities  are  ir  fact  but  the 
extreme  and  ultimate  point  of  Realism.  — See  Dissertation, 
Book  IV.  Chap.  v. 

xxvi.  SIN,  in  its  ordinary  acceptation,  means  some  actual 
transgression,  in  thought,  word,  or  deed,  of  the  moral  law,  ot 
of  a positive  divine  precept.  It  has  also,  what  may  be 
called,  a theological  sense,  in  which  it  is  used  for  that  sinful- 
ness or  frailty,  — that  liability,  or  proneness,  to  transgression, 
which  a l men  inherit  from  our  first  parents,  and  which  is 


376 


APPENDIX  I 


commonly  denominated  “original”  Sin  ; * in  which  sense  w# 
find  such  expressions  as  “ in  Sin  hath  my  Mother  conceived 
me.”  The  word  seems  also  to  be  still  further  transferred,  tc 
signify  the  state  of  condemnation  itself , in  which  the  children 
of  Auam  are  “ by  nature  born,”  in  consequenc-e  of  this  sinfu 
tendency  in  them  : (or,  according  to  some  divines,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  very  guilt  of  Adam’s  offence  being  actually  im- 
puted to  each  individual  of  his  posterity. f)  It  must  be  in  the 
sense  of  a “ state  of  condemnation,”  that  our  church,  in  her 
offce  for  Intant  Baptism,  speaks  of  “ remission  of  Sins,”  with 
reference  to  a child,  which  is  no  moral  agent : “ following  the 
innocency  of  children,”  ( i . e.  of  actual  Sin)  being  mentioned 
within  a few  sentences.  And  as  it  is  plain  that  actual  Sin 
cannot,  in  the  former  place,  be  meant,  so,  neither  can  it  be, 
in  this  place,  man’s  pronencss  to  Sin : since  the  baptismal 
office  would  not  pray  for,  and  hold  out  a promise  of  “ release  ” 
and  '■'■remission'''1  of  that  (poonj/ja  aaqxog  which,  according  to 
the  Article,  “ remains  even  in  the  regenerate.” 


* Of  the  degree  of  this  depravity  of  our  nature,  various  accounts  are 
given  ; some  representing  it  as  amounting  to  a total  loss  of  the  moral 
faculty,  or  even,  to  a preference  of  evil  for  its  own  sake  ; others  mak- 
ing it  to  consist  in  a certain  undue  preponderance  of  the  lower  pro- 
pensities over  the  nobler  sentiments,  &c.  But  these  seem  to  be  not 
differences  as  to  the  sense  of  the  word,  (with  which  alone  we  are  here 
concerned)  but  as  to  the  state  of  the  fact. 

It  is  worth  while  to  notice  however  the  carelessness  with  which 
some  are  apt  to  express  themselves,  as  if  this  frailty  were  introduced  as 
a consequence  of  Adam's  transgression  ; as  if,  supposing  him  not  frail, 
he  would  have  so  transgressed. 

T I must  again  remind  the  reader  that  I am  inquiring  only  into  tha 
senses  in  which  each  word  has  actually  been  used  ; not  into  the  trutk 
or  falsity  ef  each  doctrine  in  question.  On  the  present  question,  s# 
Essays  on  the  Difficulties  in  St  Paul’s  Writings,  Essay  VI. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


377 


Though  all  Theologians  probably  are  awaie  of  these  dis- 
tinctions, yet  much  confusion  of  thought  has  resulted  from 
their  not  being  always  attended  to. 

xxvii.  SINCERITY  and  SINCERE,  have  a twofold  mean- 
ing of  great  moral  importance.  Sincerity  is  often  used  to 
denote  “ mere  reality  of  conviction  — that  a man  actually 
relieves  what  he  professes  to  believe.  Sometimes  again  it 
.s  used  to  denote  “ unbiassed  conviction;”  or  at  least  an 
earnest  endeavor  to  shake  off  all  prejudices,  and  all  undue  in- 
fluence of  wishes  and  passions  on  the  judgment,  and  to  de- 
cide impartially. 

It  is  in  this  latter  sense  that  “ sincerity”  is  justly  regarded 
s.s  so  commendable  a quality  that  many  and  grea^t  errors  are 
reckoned  pardonable  in  proportion  as  a man  has  earnestly  and 
sincerely  endeavored  to  ascertain  what  is  right  and  true : 
while  he  who  has  not  acted  thus,  but  has  allowed  himself  to 
be  biassed  by  self-interest  or  passion,  deserves  no  credit  for 
the  “ sincerity  ” (i.  e.  reality)  of  hi»  conviction,  even  if  it 
should  happen  to  be  in  itself  a right  one. 

It  is  a common  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  only  influence 
of  interest,  party  spirit,  or  other  improper  motives  is  to  induce 
men  to  make  professions  contrary  to  their  real  conviction. 
But  “ a gift”  as  the  Scriptures  express  it  “ Minds  the  eyes .” 
Not  only  the  outward  profession  but  the  real  convictions  of  the 
judgment  are  liable  to  be  biassed  by  such  motives.  In  fact 
“sincerity”  in  this  sense  will  usually  be  the  last  stage 
of  depravity : as  Aristotle  has  remarked  in  respect  of  the 
character  of  the  ’Mlxdluorog,  — the  man  who  from  long 
indulgence  in  vice  has  so  corrupted  his  principles  as  to  feel 
no  disapprobation  of  it.  It  is  notorious  that  liars  often 
bring  themselves  by  continual  repetition  to  “ credit  their  owa 

32  * 


B78 


APPENDIX  I. 


lie.”  * And  universally  any  one  v ho  persists  in  what  is 
wrong,  and  in  seeking  excuses  to  j istify  it,  will  usually  in 
*ime  succeed  in  deceiving  himself  into  the  belief  that  it  is 
right, t and  thus  warping  his  conscience. 

Yet  the  credit  due  to  the  one  kir  d of  conscientious  Sin 
cority  is  often  (partly  through  this  ambiguity)  bestowed  on 
the  other.  But  it  makes  all  the  difference  whether  you  pursue 
m certain  course  because  you  judge  it  right , or  judge  it  to  be 
right  because  you  pursue  it ; — whether  you  follow  your  con- 
science as  one  follows  a guide , or  as  one  follows  the  horses 
\n  a carriage,  while  he  himself  guides  them  according  to  his 
will. 

xxviii.  TENDENCY.  “ The  doctrine,  as  mischievous  as 
it  is,  I conceive,  unfounded,  that  since  there  is  a tendency  in 
population  to  increase  faster  than  the  means  of  subsistence, 
hence,  the  pressure  of  population  against  subsistence  may  be 
expected  to  become  greater  and  greater  in  each  successive 
generation,  (unless  new  and  extraordinary  remedies  are  re- 
sorted to,)  and  thus  to  produce  a progressive  diminution  of 
human  welfare  ; — this  doctrine,  which  some  maintain,  in  de- 
fiance of  the  fact  that  all  civilized  countries  have  a greater 
proportionate  amount  of  wealth,  (in  other  words,  a smaller 
population,  in  proportion  to  the  means  of  subsistence)  now, 
than  formerly,  — may  be  traced  chiefly  to  an  undetected  am- 
biguity in  the  word  ‘ tendency  j which  forms  a part  of  the 
middle  term  of  the  argument.  By  a ‘tendency’  towards  a 
certain  result  is  sometimes  meant,  ‘ the  existence  of  a cause 
which,  if  operating  unimpeded , wc  rid  produce  that  result. 
In  this  sense  it  may  be  said,  with  truth,  that  the  earth,  or  any 


Shakespere  — The  Tempest.  + See  Epistle  to  Rom.  ch.  i 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


379 


other  body  moving  round  a centre,  has  a tendency  to  fly  ofF  at 
a tangent ; i.  e.  the  centrifugal  force  operates  in  that  direc- 
tion, though  it  is  controlled  by  the  centripetal  ; or,  again,  that 
man  has  a greater  tendency  to  fall  prostrate  than  to  stand 
erect ; i.  e.  the  attraction  of  gravitation  and  the  position  of  the 
centre  of  gravity,  are  such  that  the  least  breath  of  air  would 
overset  him,  but  for  the  voluntary  exertion  of  muscular  force  : 
and,  again,  that  population  has  a tendency  to  increase  beyond 
subsistence ; i.  e.  there  are  in  man  propensities,  which,  if  un- 
restrained, lead  to  that  result. 

“ But  sometimes,  again,  ‘ a tendency  towards  a certain  re- 
sult ’ is  understood  to  mean  ‘ the  existence  of  such  a state  of 
things  that  that  result  may  be  expected  to  take  placed  Now  it 
is  in  these  tvjo  senses  that  the  word  is  used,  in  the  two  prem- 
isses of  the  argument  in  question.  But  in  this  lattefr  sense, 
the  earth  has  a greater  tendency  to  remain  in  its  orbit  than  tc 
fly  off  from  it ; man  has  a greater  tendency  to  stand  erect 
than  to  fall  prostrate  ; and  (as  may  be  proved  by  comparing  a 
more  barbarous  with  a more  civilized  period  in  the  history  of 
any  Country)  in  the  progress  of  society,  subsistence  has  a 
tendency  to  increase  at  a greater  rate  than  population  ; or  at 
least  with  a continually  diminishing  inferiority.  In  this 
Country,  for  instance,  much  as  our  population  has  increased 
within  the  last  five  centuries,  it  yet  bears  a far  less  ratio  to 
subsistence  (though  still  a much  greater  than  could  be  wished) 
than  it  did  five  hundred  years  ago.”  * But  many  of  the  writ- 
ers I have  alluded  to  seem  to  have  confounded  “ an  excess  oj 
increase  ” with  “ an  increase  of  the  excess .” 

THEREFORE.  — See  “ Reason,”  and  “ Why.” 


"Pol.  Econ.  Lect.  IX.  p.  248 — 21 50. 


580 


APPENDIX  l. 


xxix.  TllUTH,  in  the  strict  logical  sense,  applies  to  Piopo 
sitions,  and  to  nothing  else  ; and  consists  in  the  conformity  of 
the  declaration  made  to  the  actual  state  of  the  case  ; agreeably 
to  Aldrich’s  definition  of  a “true”  proposition  — veia  est, 
quae  quod  res  est  dicit. 

It  would  be  an  advantage  if  the  word  Trueness  or  Verity 
could  be  introduced  and  employed  in  this  sense,  since  the 
word  Truth  is  so  often  used  to  denote  the  “ true  ” Proposition 
itself.  “ What  I tell  you  is  the  Truth;  the  Truth  of  what  I 
say  shall  be  proved  ; ” the  term  is  here  used  in  these  two 
senses  ; viz.,  in  the  “ concrete,”  and  in  the  “ abstract  ” sense.* 
In  like  manner  Falsehood  is  often  opposed  to  truth  in  both 
these  senses ; being  commonly  used  to  signify  the  quality  of 
a false  proposition.  But  as  we  have  the  word  Falsity , which 
properly  denotes  this,  I have  thought  it  best,  in  a scientific 
treatise,  al  ,vays  to  employ  it  for  that  purpose. 

In  its  etymological  sense,  Truth  signifies  that  which  the 
speaker  “ trows,”  or  believes  to  be  the  fact.  The  etymology 
of  the  word  AA1IQE2  seems  to  be  similar , denoting  non- 
concealment.  In  this  sense  it  is  opposed  to  a Lie  : and  may 
be  called  Moral,  as  the  other  may  Logical,  Truth.  A witness 
therefore  may  comply  with  his  oath  to  speak  the  Truth, 
though  it  so  happen  that  he  is  mistaken  in  some  particular  of 
his  evidence,  provided  he  is  fully  convinced  that  the  thing  is 
as  he  states  it. 

Truth  is  not  unfrequently  applied,  in  loose  and  inaccurate 
language,  to  arguments  ; where  the  proper  expression  would 
be  “ correctness,”  “ conclusiveness,”  or  “ validity.” 

Truth  again,  is  often  used  in  the  sense  of  Reality , TO  07V. 
Peoplj  speak  of  the  Truth  or  Falsity  of  facts;  properly 


See  Book  II.  Ch.  v.  $ 1. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


381 


spunking,  they  are  either  real  or  fictitious  : it  is  the  statement 
that  is  “ true”  or  “ false.”  The  “ true  ” cause  of  any  thing,  is 
a common  expression  ; meaning  “ that  which  may  with  Truth 
be  assigned  as  the  cause.”  The  senses  of  Falsehood  correspond. 

“ Truth  ” in  this  sense,  of  “ reality,”  is  also  opposed  to 
shadows, — types,  — pictures,  8fC.  Thus,  “the  Law  was 
given  by  Moses,  but  grace  and  ‘ truth  ’ came  by  Jesus  Christ 1 ” 
for  the  Law  had  only  a “ shadow  of  good  things  to  come.  * 

The  present  is  an  ambiguity  of  which  advantage  has  beer 
often  taken,  — through  a deficiency  either  in  candor  or  in 
clearness  of  thought  — in  advocating  the  claims  of  the  Rom- 
ish Church  ; the  ambiguity  of  the  word  Church  (which  see) 
lending  its  aid  to  the  fallacy.  “ Even  the  Protestants,”  they 
say,  “ dare  not  deny  ours  to  be  a ‘ true  Church  ; ’ ” now  there 
can  be  but  “ one  true  Church  : ” (which  they  support  by  those 
passages  of  Scripture  which  relate  to  the  collective  Body  of 
Christians  in  all  those  several  Societies  which  also  are  called 
in  Scripture,  Churches ;)  “ ours  therefore  must  be  the  true 
Church ; if  you  forsake  us,  you  forsake  the  truth  and  the 
Church,  and  consequently  shut  yourself  out  from  the  promises 
of  the  Gospel.”  Those  who  are  of  a logical  and  accurate 
turn  of  mind  will  easily  perceive  that  the  sense  in  which  the 
Romish  Church  is  admitted  by  her  opponents  to  be  a true 
Church,  is  that  of  reality ; — it  is  a real,  not  a pretendea 
Church ; — it  may  be  truly  said  to  be  a Church.  The  sense 
m which  the  concession  is  sometimes  made  use  of,  is  that  of 
a Church  teaching  true  doctrines ; which  was  never  conceded 
to  thf  Church  of  Rome  by  Protestants ; who  hold,  that  a 
Church  may  err  without  ceasing  to  be  a Church. 

“ The  Church  is  one,*  then,  not,  as  consisting  of  One  Soi 


* See  “One. 


382 


APPENDIX  1. 


( iety,  but  because  the  various  societies  o Churches  were  then 
modelled,  and  ought  still  to  be  so,  on  pe  same  principles1 
and  because  they  enjoy  common  privileges,  — cne  Lord,  one 
Spirit,  one  baptism.  Accordingly,  the  Holy  Ghost,  thn  ugh 
his  agents  the  Apostles,  has  not  left  any  detailed  account  of 
the  formation  of  any  Christian  society ; but  He  has  very  dis- 
tinctly marked  the  greai  principles  on  which  all  were  to  ba 
founded,  whatever  distinctions  may  exist  amongst  them.  In 
short,  the  foundation  of  the  Church  by  the  Apostles  was  no! 
analogous  to  the  work  of  Romulus,  or  Solon  ; it  was  not, 
properly,  the  foundation  of  Christian  societies  which  occupied 
them,  but  the  establishment  of  the  principles  on  which  Chris 
tians  in  all  ages  might  form  societies  for  themselves. 

“The  above  account  is  sufficiently  established  even  by  the 
mere  negative  circumstance  of  the  absence  of  all  mention  in 
the  Sacred  Writings  of  any  one  Society  on  earth,  having  a 
Government  and  officers  of  its  own,  and  recognized  as  the 
Catholic  or  Universal  Church  : especially  when  it  is  consid- 
ered that  the  frequent  mention  of  the  particular  Churches  at 
Jerusalem,  Antioch,  Rome,  Corinth,  &c.  — of  the  seven 
Churches  in  Asia,  — and  of  ‘the  care  of  all  the  Churches, 
which  Paul  had  founded,  would  have  rendered  unavoidable  the 
notice  of  the  One  Church  (had  there  been  any  such)  which 
bore  rule  over  all  the  rest,  either  as  its  subjects,  or  as  provin- 
cial departments  of  it.”  * 

UNITY— See  “ One” 

WHENCE  — See  “ Wiiy,”  and  “ Reason.” 


* “Essays  on  the  Dangers  &c.  Note  A,  pp.  169,  170. 


AMBIGUOLS  TERMS. 


383 


xxx.  WHY?  — - As  an  interrogative,  this  word  is  employed 
in  three  senses : viz.  “ By  what  proof?  ” (or  Reason)  “ From 
what  Cause  ? ” “ For  what  purpose  ? ” This  last  is  com- 
monly called  the  “ final  cause.”  E.  G.  “ Why  is  this  pris- 
oner guilty  of  the  crime  ? ” “ Why  does  a stone  fall  to  the 

earth  ? ” “ Why  did  you  go  to  London  ? ” Much  confusion 

has  arisen  from  not  distinguishing  these  different  inquiries. 
See  Reason. 


N.  B.  As  the  words  which  follow  are  all  of  them  connected 
together  in  their  significations,  and  as  the  explanations  of  theii 
ambiguities  have  been  furnished  by  the  kindness  of  the  Pro- 
fessor of  Political  Economy,  it  seemed  advisable  to  place 
them  by  themselves,  and  in  the  order  in  which  they  appeared 
to  him  most  naturally  to  arrange  themselves. 

The  foundation  of  Political  Economy  being  a few  general 
propositions  deduced  from  observation  or  from  conscious- 
ness, and  generally  admitted  as  soon  as  stated,  it  might  have 
been  expected  that  there  would  be  as  little  difference  of 
opinion  among  Political-Economists  as  among  Mathemati- 
cians;— that,  being  agreed  in  their  premisses,  they  could  not 
differ  in  their  conclusions,  but  through  some  error  in  reason- 
ing, so  palpable  as  to  be  readily  detected.  And  if  they  had 
possessed  a vocabulary  of  general  terms  as  precisely  defined 
as  the  mathematical,  this  would  probably  have  been  the  case. 
But  as  the  terms  of  this  Science  are  drawn  from  common  dis- 
course, and  seldom  carefully  defined  by  the  writers  who  em. 
ploy  them,  hardly  one  of  them  has  any  settled  and  invariable 
meaning,  and  their  ambiguities  are  perpetually  overlooked. 


384 


APPENDIX  1. 


The  principal  terms  are  only  seven  : viz.  Value,  Wealth 
Labor,  Capital,  Rent,  Wages,  Profits. 

1.  VALUE.  As  value  is  the  only  relation  with  which 
Political  Economy  is  conversant,  we  might  expect  all  Econo- 
mists to  be  agreed  as  to  its  meaning.  There  is  no  subject  as 
to  which  they  are  less  agreed. 

The  popular,  and  far  the  most  convenient,  use  of  the  word, 
is  to  signify  the  capacity  of  being  given  and  received  in  ex- 
change. So  defined,  it  expresses  a relation.  The  value  of 
only  one  thing  must  consist  in  the  several  quantities  of  all  other 
things  which  can  be  obtained  in  exchange  for  it,  and  never 
can  remain  fixed  for  an  instant.  Most  writers  admit  the  pro- 
priety of  this  definition  at  the  outset,  but  they  scarcely  ever 
adhere  to  it. 

Adam  Smith  defines  Value  to  mean  either  the  utility  of  a 
particular  object,  or  the  power  of  purchasing  other  goods 
which  the  possession  of  that  object  conveys.  The  first  he 
calls  “ Value  in  use,”  the  second  “ Value  in  exchange.” 
But  he  soon  afterwards  says,  that  equal  quantities  of  labor  at  all 
times  and  places  are  of  equal  Value  to  the  laborer,  whatever 
may  be  the  quantity  of  goods  he  receives  in  return  for  them; 
and  that  labor  never  varies  in  its  own  Value.  It  is  clear  that 
he  affixed,  or  thought  he  had  affixed,  some  other  meaning  to 
the  word  ; as  the  first  of  these  propositions  is  contradictory, 
and  the  second  false,  whichever  of  his  two  definitions  we 
adopt. 

Mr.  Ricardo  appears  to  set  out  by  admitting  Adam  Smith’s 
definition  of  Value  in  exchange.  But  in  the  greater  part  of 
his  “ Principles  of  Political  Economy,”  he  uses  the  word  as 
Bynonymous  with  Cost : and  by  this  one  ambiguity  has  ren- 
dered his  great  work  a long  enigma. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


385 


Mr.  Multhus  * * * § defines  Value  to  be  the  power  of  purchasing. 
In  the  very  next  page  he  distinguishes  absolute  from  relative 
Value,  a distinction  contradictory  to  his  definition  of  the  term, 
as  expressive  of  a relation. 

Mr.  M‘Cullocht  distinguishes  between  real  and  exchange- 
able, or  relative  value.  And  in  his  nomenclature,  the  exchange- 
able, or  relative,  Value  of  a commodity  consists  in  its  capacity 
of  purchasing  ; — its  real  Value  in  the  quantity  of  labor  re 
quired  for  its  production  or  appropriation. 

All  these  differences  appear  to  arise  from  a confusion  of 
cause  and  effect.  Having  decided  that  commodities  are  Val- 
uable in  proportion  to  the  labor  they  have  respectively  cost,  it 
was  natural  to  call,  that  labor  their  Value. 

2.  WEALTH.  Lord  Lauderdale  has  defined  Wealth  to 
be  “ all  that  man  desires.”  Mr.  Malthus,  £ “ those  material 
objects  which  are  necessary,  useful,  or  agreeable.”  Adam 
Smith  confines  the  term  to  that  portion  of  the  results  of  land 
and  labor  which  is  capable  of  being  accumulated.  The 
French  Economists,  to  the  net  product  of  land.  Mr.  M‘Cul 
loch§  and  M.  Storch,||  to  those  material  products  which  have 
exchangeable  value  ; according  to  Colonel  Torrens  it  consists 
of  articles  which  possess  utility,  and  are  produced  by  somo 
portion  of  voluntary  effort.  M.  Say  **  divides  wealth  into  nat- 
ural and  social,  and  applies  the  latter  term  to  whatever  is  sus- 
ceptible of  exchange.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  primv'«il 


* “ Measure  of  Value,”  p.  1. 

t “ Principles  of  Political  Economy,”  Part  III.  sect.  1. 

J “Principles  of  Political  Economy,”  p.  28. 

§ “Supplement  to  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,”  Vol.  VI.  p.  ?17 
jj  “ Cours  d’Economie  Politique,”  Tome  I.  p.  91.  Paris  edit. 

S “Production  of  Wealth,”  p 1. 

••  “Traite  d’Economie  Pol.”  1 iv.  II  Chap.  ii. 

33 


S86 


APPENDIX  I. 


difference  betwen  these  definitions  consists  in  the  admi» 
sion  or  rejection  of  the  qualifications  “ exchangeable,”  and 
" material.”  * 

It  were  well  if  the  ambiguities  of  this  word  had  done  no 
more  than  puzzle  philosophers.  One  of  them  gave  birth  to 
the  mercantile  system.  In  common  language,  to  grow  rich 
is  to  get  money  ; to  diminish  in  fortune  is  to  lose  money  : a 
rich  man  is  said  to  have  a great  deal  of  money ; a poor  man, 
very  little  : and  the  terms  Wealth  and  Money  are  in  short 
employed  as  synonymous.  In  consequence  of  these  popular 
notions  (to  use  the  words  of  Adam  Smith)  all  the  different  na- 
tions of  Europe  have  studied  every  means  of  accumulating 
gold  and  silver  in  their  respective  countries.  This  they  have 
attempted  by  prohibiting  the  exportation  of  money,  and  by 
giving  bounties  on  the  exportation,  and  imposing  restrictions 
on  the  importation,  of  other  commodities,  in  the  hope  of 
producing  what  has  been  called  a “ favorable  balance  of 
trade that  is,  a trade  in  which,  the  imports  being  always  of 
less  value  than  the  exports,  the  difference  is  paid  in  money. 
A conduct  as  wise  as  that  of  a tradesman  who  should  part 
with  his  goods  only  for  money  ; and  instead  of  employing 
their  price  in  paying  his  workmen’s  wages,  or  replacing  his 
stock,  should  keep  it  forever  in  his  till.  The  attempt  to  force 


* 11  In  many  cases,  where  an  exchange  really  takes  place,  the  fact 
1 8 liable  (till  the  attention  is  called  to  it)  to  be  overlooked,  in  conse- 
quence of  our  not  seeing  any  actual  transfer  from  hand  to  hand  of  a 
material  object.  For  instance,  when  the  copyright  of  a book  is  sold 
to  a bookseller,  the  article  transferred  is  not  the  mere  paper  covered 
with  writing,  but  the  exclusive  privilege  of  printing  and  publishing. 
It  is  plain,  however,  on  a moment’s  thought,  that  the  transaction  ia 
as  real  an  exchange,  as  that  which  takes  place  between  the  bookseller 
and  his  customers  who  buy  copies  of  the  work.”  — Introd.  i » Pol 
Earn-  Lect.  I. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


38? 


such  a trade  has  been  as  vain,  as  the  trade,  if  it  could  have; 
been  obtained,  would  have  been  mischievous.  But  the  results 
save  been  fraud,  punishment,  and  poverty  at  home,  and  dis- 
cord and  war  without.  It  has  made  nations  consider  the 
Wealth  of  their  customers  a source  of  loss  instead  of  profit; 
and  an  advantageous  market  a curse  instead  of  a blessing 
By  inducing  them  to  refuse  to  profit  by  the  peculiar  advantages 
in  climate,  soil,  or  industry,  possessed  by  their  neighbors,  it 
has  forced  them  in  a great  measure  to  give  up  their  own.  It 
has  for  centuries  done  more,  and  perhaps  for  centuries  to 
come  will  do  more,  to  retard  the  improvement  of  Europe 
than  all  other  causes  put  together. 

3.  LABOR.  The  word  Labor  signifies  both  the  act  of 
laboring,  and  the  result  of  that  act.  It  is  used  in  the  first 
sense  when  we  talk  of  the  wages  of  labor  ; in  the  second 
when  we  talk  of  accumulated  labor.  When  used  to  express 
the  act  of  laboring,  it  may  appear  to  have  a precise  sense, 
but  it  is  still  subject  to  some  ambiguity.  Say’s  definition  * is 
“ action  suivie,  dirigee  vers  un  but ; ” Storch’s,t  “ J'action  des 
facultes  humaines  dirigee  vers  un  but  utile.”  These  defini- 
tions include  a walk  taken  for  the  purposes  of  health,  and 
even  the  exertions  of  an  agreeable  converser. 

The  great  defect  of  Adam  Smith,  and  of  our  own  econo- 
mists in  general,  is  the  want  of  definitions.  There  is,  per- 
haps, no  definition  of  Labor  by  any  British  Economist.  If 
Adam  Smith  had  framed  one,  he  would  probably  have  struck 
out  his  celebrated  distinction  between  “ productive  ” and  n un- 
productive” laborers;  for  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  acj  defi 


* '-Traits,”  &e.  Tome  II.  p.  506. 
, “ Cours,”  Liv.  1.  Chap.  iv. 


38b 


APPENDIX  t. 


nition  of  Laboi  which  will  admit  the  epithet  ‘ unproductive 
to  be  applied  to  any  of  its  subdivisions,  excepting  that  of 
misdirected  labor.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Mr.  M‘Culloch  ot 
Mr.  Mill  had  defined  Labor  they  would  scarcely  have  applied 
that  term  to  the  growth  of  a tree,  or  the  improvement  of  wine 
in  a cellar. 

4.  CAPITAL.  This  word,  as  might  have  been  expected, 
from  the  complexity  of  the  notions  which  it  implies,  has  been 
used  in  very  different  senses. 

It  is,  as  usual,  undefined  by  Adam  Smith.  The  general 
meaning  which  he  attached  to  it  will  however  appear  from 
his  enumeration  of  its  species.  He  divides  it*  into  Fixed 
and  Circulating  : including  in  the  first  what  the  capitalist  re 
tains,  in  the  second  what  he  parts  with.  Fixed  Capital  'ie 
subdivides  into — 1.  Machinery;  2.  Shops  and  other  build- 
ings used  for  trade  or  manufacture  ; 3.  Improvements  of  land  ; 
4.  Knowledge  and  skill.  Circulating  Capital  he  subdivides 
into — 1.  Money;  2.  Provisions  in  the  hands  of  the  provis- 
ion venders  ; 3.  Unfinished  materials  of  manufacture  ; 4.  Fin- 
ished work  in  the  hands  of  the  merchant  or  manufacturer ; 
such  as  furniture  in  a cabinet-maker’s  shop,  or  trinkets  in  that 
of  a jeweller. 

The  following  is  a list  of  the  definitions  adopted  by  some 
of  the  most  eminent  subsequent  economists  : 

Ricardo  f — “ thai  p art  of  the  wealth  of  a country  which 
is  employed  in  production  ; consisting  of  food,  clothing 
tools,  raw  materials,  machinery,  fyc.,  necessary  to  give  effect 
to  labor.” 


• Book  II.  Chap,  i, 

t “ Principles  of  Political  Economy,”  p.  89,  3rd  edit 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


389 


Malthus  * — “ that  portion  of  the  materia  possessions  of 
a country  which  is  destined  to  be  employed  with  a view  to 
profit.” 

Say  t — “ accumulation  de  valeurs  soustraites  a la  ccn- 
8omption  improductive.”  Chap.  iii.  “ Machinery,  neccssa* 
ries  of  the  workman,  materials.” 

Storch  f — “ un  fonds  de  richesses  destine  a la  production 
materielle.” 

M’Culloch  <§ — “that  portion  of  the  produce  of  industry 
which  can  be  made  directly  available  to  support  human  exist- 
ence or  facilitate  production.” 

Mill  || — “something  produced,  for  the  purpose  of  being 
employed  as  the  mean  towards  a further  production.” 

Torrens — “those  things  on  which  labor  has  been  be- 
stowed, and  which  are  destined,  not  for  the  immediate  sup- 
ply of  our  wants,  but  to  aid  us  in  obtaining  other  articles  of 
utility.” 

It  is  obvious  that  few  of  these  definitions  exactly  coincide. 
Adam  Smith’s  (as  implied  in  his  use  of  the  term  ; for  he  gives 
no  formal  definition)  excludes  the  necessaries  of  the  laborer, 
when  in  his  own  possession  ; all  the  rest  (and  perhaps  with 
better  reason)  admit  them.  On  the  other  hand,  Adam  Smith 
admits  (and  in  that  he  seems  to  be  right)  those  things  which 
are  incapable  of  productive  consumption,  provided  they  have 
not  yet  reached  their  consumers.  All  the  other  definitions, 
except  perhaps  that  of  Mr.  Malthus,  which  is  ambiguous,  are 
subject  to  the  inconsistency  of  affirming  that  a diamond,  and 
the  gold  in  which  it  is  to  be  set,  are  Capital  while  the  jeweller 
Keeps  them  separate,  but  cease  to  be  so  when  he  has  formed 

» “Principles,”  &c.  p.  293.  + “Traite,”  &e.  Tome II. p.  454 

l “ Cours,”  &c.  Liv.  II.  Chap.  i.  § “ Principles,”  &c.  p.  92. 

1 “Elements,”  &c.  p.  19,  3rd  edit.  IT  “ Production  of  Wealth,”  p.  fi 

33* 


390 


APPENDIX  I. 


them  i:  ,to  a ung;  almost  all  of  them,  also,  pointedly  excludu 
know’odge  and  skill.  The  most  objectionable,  perhaps,  ia 
that  of  Mr.  M‘Culloch,  which,  while  it  excludes  all  the  fin 
ished  contents  of  a jeweller’s  shop,  would  include  a racing 
Etud. 

Adam  Smith,  however,  is  far  from  being  consistent  in 'his 
use  of  the  word  ; thus,  in  the  beginning  of  his  second  book 
ho  states,  that  all  Capitals  are  destined  for  the  maintenance  of 
productive  labor  only.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  labor  ia 
maintained  by  what  is  to  be  unproductively  consumed. 

5.  RENT.  6.  WAGES.  7.  PROFIT. 

Adam  Smith  first  divided  revenue  into  Rent,  Wages,  and 
Profit ; and  his  division  has  been  generally  followed.  The 
following  definitions  will  best  show  the  degree  of  precision 
wi*h  which  these  three  terms  have  been  employed. 

Adam  Smith. 

1.  Rent.  What  is  paid  for  the  license  to  gather  the  prod 
uce  of  the  land. — Book  I.  Chap.  vi. 

2.  Wages.  The  price  of  labor.  — Book  I.  Chap.  v. 

3 Profit.  The  revenue  derived  from  stock  by  the  person 
tvho  manages  or  employs  it.  — Book  I.  Ch.  vi. 

Say.  ( Traitc  d'Economie  Politique.)  4eme  Edit. 

1.  Rent.  Le  profit  resultant  du  service  productif  de  Ta 
jerre. — Tome  II.  p.  169. 

2.  Wages.  Le  prix  de  l’achat  d’un  service  productif  i» 
iJu»<rel.  — Tpme  II.  p.  503. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


391 


3 Profit.  La  portion  de  la  valeur  produite,  retiree  par  le 
eapitaliste.  — Tome  I.  p.  71,  subdivided  into  interet,  profit  in- 
dustries and  profit  capital. 

Stghch.  ( Cours  d'  Economic  Politique.)  Paris,  1823. 

1.  Rent  Le  prix  qu’on  paye  pour  l’usage  d’un  fonds  do 
terre.  — Tome  I.  p.  354. 

2.  Wages.  Le  prix  du  travail.  — p.  283. 

3.  Profit.  The  returns  to  capital  are  considered  by  Storch, 
under  the  heads,  rente  de  capital,  and  profit  de  Pentrepeneur. 
The  first  he  divides  into  loyer,  the  hire  of  fixed  capital,  and 
interet,  that  of  circulating  capital.  The  second  he  considers 
as  composed  of,  1st,  remuneration  for  the  use  of  capital  ; 
2nd,  assurance  against  risk  ; 3rd,  remuneration  for  trouble.— 
Liv.  III.  Chap.  ii.  viii.  xiii. 

Sismondi.  ( Nouveaux  Principes , Sfc.) 

1.  Rent.  La  part  deda  recolte  annuelle  du  sol  qui  revient 
au  proprietaire  apres  qu’il  a acquitte  les  frais  qui  Pont  fait 
naitre ; and  he  analyzes  rent  into,  1st,  la  compensation  du 
travail  de  la  terre  ; 2d,  le  prix  de  monopole  : 3rd,  la  mieux 
valeur  que  le  proprietaire  obtient  par  la  comparaison  d’une 
terre  de  nature  superieure  a une  terre  inferieure  : 4th,  le  re- 
re  tu  des  capitaux  qu’il  a fixes  lui-meme  sur  la  terre,  et  ne  peut 
fclus  en  retirer.  — Tome  I.  p.  280. 

2 Wages.  Le  prix  du  travail.  — p.  91. 

3.  Profit.  La  valeur  dont  Pouvrage  acheve  surpasse  .es 
uvances  qui  Pont  fait  faire.  L’avantage  qui  resulte  des  tra- 
vaux  passes.  Sub  livided  into  interet  and  profit  mercantile.  — 
p.  94,  359. 


392 


APPENDIX  I. 


Malthus.  ( Principles , Sf  : ) 

1.  Rent.  That  portion  of  the  value  of  he  whole  produce 
of  land  which  remains  to  the  owner  after  payment  of  all  the 
outgoings  of  cultivation,  including  average  profits  on  the  cap- 
ita employed.  The  excess  of  price  above  wages  and  profits. 
— p 131. 

2.  Wages.  The  remuneration  of  the  laborer  for  his  per- 
sonal exertions.  — p.  240. 

3.  Profit.  The  difference  between  the  value  of  the  ad- 
vances necessary  to  produce  a commodity,  and  the  value  of 
the  commodity  when  produced.  — p.  293. 

Mtt.l.  ( Elements , <$*c.)  3rd  Ed. 

1.  Rent.  The  difference  between  the  return  made  to  the 
most  productive,  and  that  which  is  made  to  the  least  produc- 
tive portion  of  capital  employed  on  the  land.  — p.  33. 

2.  Wages.  The  price  of  the  laborer’s  share  of  the  com- 
modity produced.  — p.  41. 

3.  Profit.  The  share  of  the  joint  produce  of  labor  and 
stock  which  is  received  by  the  owner  of  stock  after  replacing 
the  capital  consumed.  The  portion  of  the  whole  annual 
produce  which  remains  after  deducting  rent  and  wages.  Re- 
muneration for  hoarded  labor.  — Chap.  2,  3. 

Torrens.  ( Corn  Trade.)  3rd  Ed. 

1.  Rent.  That  part  of  the  produce  which  is  given  to  tha 
and-pvoprietc  for  the  use  of  the  soil.  — p.  130. 

2.  Wages  The  articles  of  wealth  which  t'nj  laborer  re 
eeives  in  ex  \ge  for  his  labor.  — p.  83. 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


>93 


3.  Profit.  The  excess  of  value  which  the  finished  work 
possesses  above  the  value  of  the  material,  implement?,  and 
subsistence  expended.  The  surplus  remaining  after  the  cost 
of  production  has  been  replaced.  — Production  of  Wealth 
p 53 

M‘Culloch.  ( Principles , <^c.  ) 

1.  Rent.  That  portion  of  the  produce  of  the  earth  which 
j paid  by  the  farmer  to  the  landlord  for  the  use  of  the  natural 
and  inherent  powers  of  the  soil.  — p.  265. 

2.  Wages.  The  compensation  paid  to  laborers  in  return 
for  their  services.  — Essay  on  Rate  of  Wages,  p.  1. 

3.  Profit.  The  excess  of  the  commodities  produced  by  the 
expenditure  of  a given  quantity  of  capital,  over  that  quantity 
of  capital.  — Principles,  p.  366. 

Ricardo.  ( Principles , fyc.)  3rd  Ed. 

1.  Rent.  That  portion  of  the  produce  of  the  earth  which 
is  paid  to  the  landlord  for  the  use  of  the  original  and  inde- 
structible powers  of  the  soil.  — p.  53. 

2.  Wages.  The  laborer’s  proportion  of  the  produce.— 
Chap.  v. 

3.  Profit.  The  capitalist’s  proportion  of  the  produce.  — 
Chap.  vi. 

The  first  observation  to  be  made  on  these  definitions,  is, 
that  the  Rent  of  land , which  is  only  a species  of  an  extensive 
genus,  is  used  as  a genus,  and  that  its  cognate  species  are 
either  omitted,  or  included  under  genera  to  which  they  do  not 
properly  belong  Wages  and  Profits  are  of  h iman  creatiov. : 
they  imp'y  a sacrifice  of  ease  or  immediate  enjoyment, 


APPENDIX  I. 


39-1 


bear  a ratio  to  that  sacrifice  which  is  indicated  by  the  com- 
mon expressions  of  “ the  rate  of  wages,”  and  the  “ rate  of 
profits  ; ” a ratio  which  has  a strong  tendency  to  uniformity. 
But  there  is  another  and  a very  large  source  of  revenue 
which  is  not  the  creation  of  man,  but  of  nature  ; which  owes 
its  origin,  not  to  the  will  of  its  possessor,  but  to  accident ; 
which  implies  no  sacrifice,  has  no  tendency  to  uniformity,  and 
to  which  the  term  “ rate  ” is  seldom  applied. 

This  revenue  arises  from  the  exclusive  right  to  some  instru- 
ment of  production,  enabling  the  employment  of  a given 
amount  of  labor  or  capital  to  be  more  than  usually  produc- 
tive. The  principal  of  these  instruments  is  land  ; but  all 
extraordinary  powers  of  body  or  mind,  — all  processes  in 
manufacture  which  are  protected  by  secrecy  or  by  law,  — all 
peculiar  advantages  from  situation  or  connection,  — in  short, 
every  instrument  of  production  which  is  not  universally  ac- 
cessible, affords  a revenue  distinct  in  its  origin  from  Wages  or 
Frofits,  and  of  which  the  Rent  of  land  is  only  a species.  In 
the  classification  of  revenues,  either  Rent  ought  to  have  been 
omitted  as  a genus,  and  considered  only  as  an  anomalous  in- 
terruption of  the  general  uniformity  of  wages  and  profits,  or 
all  the  accidental  sources  of  revenue  ought  to  have  been  in- 
cluded in  one  genus,  of  which  the  Rent  of  land  would  have 
formed  the  principal  species. 

Another  remark  is,  that  almost  all  these  definitions  of  Profit 
include  the  wages  of  the  labor  of  the  Capitalist -The  conti- 
nental Economists  have  in  general  been  aware  of  this,  and 
have  pointed  it  out  in  their  analyses  of  the  component  parts 
of  Profit.  The  British  Economists  have  seldom  entered  into 
this  analysis,  and  the  want  of  it  has  been  a great  cause  of 
obscurity. 

On  the  other  hand,  much  of  what  properly  belongs  to  Profit 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


396 


end  F'i-  . is  geaerally  included  under  Wages.  Almost  all 
Econ'/tr  *ts  consider  the  members  of  the  liberal  professions 
under  t,/  class  of  laborers.  The  whole  subsistence  of  such 
persons,  observes  Mr.  M‘Culloch,*  is  derived  from  Wages  ; 
and  they  are  as  evidently  laborers  as  if  they  handled  the  spade 
or  the  plough.  But  it  should  be  considered,  that  those  whc 
are  engaged  in  any  occupation  requiring  more  skill  than  that 
of  a common  husbandman,  must  have  expended  capital,  more 
or  less,  on  the  acquisition  of  their  skill ; their  education  must 
have  cost  something  in  every  case,  from  that  of  the  handi- 
craft-apprentice, to  that  of  the  legal  or  medical  student  ; and 
a Profit  cn  this  outlay  is  of  course  lookeo  for,  as  in  other  dis- 
bursements of  capital ; and  the  higher  profit  in  proportion  to 
the  risk  ; viz.  the  uncertainty  of  a man’s  success  in  his  busi- 
ness. Part,  therefore,  and  generally  far  the  greater  part,  of 
what  has  been  reckoned  the  wages  of  his  labor  ought  more 
properly  to  be  reckoned  profits  on  the  capital  expended  in  fit- 
ting him  for  that  particular  kind  of  labor.  And  again,  all  the 
excess  of  gains  acquired  by  one  possessing  extraordinary  tal- 
ents, opportunities,  or  patronage  (since  these  correspond  to 
the  possession  of  land,  — of  a patent-right,  — or  other  mo- 
nopoly,— of  a secret,  fyc.)  may  be  more  properly  regarded 
as  Rent  than  as  Wages. 

Another  most  fruitful  source  of  ambiguity  arises  from  the 
use  of  the  word  Wages,  sometimes  as  expressing  a quantity , 
sometimes  as  expressing  a proportion. 

In  ordinary  language,  Wages  means  the  amount  of  % oml 
commodity , generally  of  silver,  given  to  the  laborer  in  return 
for  a given  exertion  ; and  they  rise  or  fall,  as  that  amount  '% 
increased  or  diminished. 


* “ Principles,”  &p,  p.  228- 


396 


APPENDIX  1. 


*n  the  language  of  Mr.  Ricardo,  they  usually  mean  the 
laborer’s  proportion  of  what  is  produced , supposing  that  prod- 
uce to  be  divided  between  him  and  the  Capitalist.  In  this 
sense  they  generally  rise  as  the  whole  produce  is  diminished  ; 
though  if  the  word  be  used  in  the  other  sense,  they  generally 
fall.  If  Mr.  Ricardo  had  constantly  used  the  word  “ Wages,” 
to  express  a proportion , the  only  inconvenience  would  have 
been  the  necessity  of  always  translating  this  expression  into 
common  language.  But  he  is  not  consistent.  When  he  says,* 
that  “ whatever  raises  the  Wages  of  labor  lowers  the  Profits 
of  stock,”  he  considers  wages  as  a proportion.  When  he 
says, t that  “high  Wages  encourage  population;”  he  con- 
siders wages  as  an  amount.  Even  Mr.  M‘Culloch,  who  has 
clearly  explained  the  ambiguity,  has  not  escaped  it.  He  has 
even  suffered  it  to  affect  his  reasonings.  In  his  valuable  es 
say,  “ on  the  Rate  of  Wages,”  J he  admits  that  “ when  Wages 
are  high,  the  Capitalist  has  to  pay  a larger  share  of  the  prod- 
uce of  industry  to  his  laborers.”  An  admission  utterly  in- 
consistent with  his  general  use  of  the  word,  as  expressing  the 
amount  of  what  the  laborer  receives,  which,  as  he  has  himself 
observed,^  may  increase  while  his  proportion  diminishes. 

A few  only  have  been  noticed  of  the  ambiguities  which 
attach  to  the  seven  terms  that  have  been  selected  ; and  these 
terms  have  been  fixed  on,  not  as  the  most  ambiguous,  but 
as  the  most  important,  in  the  political  nomenclature  “ Sup- 
ply and  Demand,”  “ Productive  and  Unproductive,”  “ Over- 
trading” and  very  many  others,  both  in  political  economy, 
and  in  other  subjects,  which  are  often  used  without  any  more 
explanation  or  any  more  suspicion  of  their  requiring  it,  than 


* “Principles,”  &c.  p.  312.  f Ibid  p.  83.  J P.  161.  4 P.  365 


AMBIGUOUS  TERMS. 


397 


the  words  “ triangle  ” or  “ twenty,”  are  perhaps  even  more 
liable  to  ambiguities  than  those  above  treated  of.  But  it  is 
sufficient  for  the  purpose  of  this  Appen  dix  to  have  noticed,  by 
way  of  specimens,  a few  of  the  most  remarkable  terms  in 
several  different  branches  of  knowledge,  in  order  to  show 
both  the  frequency  of  an  ambiguous  use  of  language,  and  the 
importance  of  clearing  up  such  ambiguity. 

34 


APPENDIX 


No.  II. 

Mlbo'ELLANEVtJS  EXAMPLES  FOR  THE  EXERCISE  01 
LEARNERS. 

N.  B.  In  such  of  the  following  Examples  as  are  not  in  a syl- 
logistic form,  it  is  intended  that  the  student  should  practise 
the  reduction  of  them  into  that  form  ; those  of  them,  that 
is,  in  which  the  reasoning  is  in  itself  sound  : viz.  where  it 
is  impossible  to  admit  the  Premisses  and  deny  the  Conclu- 
sion. Of  such  as  are  apparent  Syllogisms,  the  validity 
must  be  tried  by  logical  rules,  which  it  may  be  advisable  to 
apply  in  the  following  order  : 1st.  Observe  whether  the 

argument  be  Categorical  or  Hypothetical ; recollecting  that 
a hypothetical  Premiss  does  not  necessarily  imply  a hy- 
pothetical Syllogism,  unless  the  reasoning  turns  on  the  hy- 
pothesis. If  this  appear  to  be  the  case,  the  rules  for  hy- 
pothetical Syllogisms  must  be  applied.  2dly.  If  the  argu- 
ment be  categorical,  count  the  terms.  3dly.  If  only  three, 
observe  whether  the  Middle  be  distributed.  4thiy,  Observe 
whether  the  Premisses  are  both  negative  ; ( i . e.  really,  and 
not  in  appearance  only,)  and  if  one  is,  whether  the  Con- 
clusion be  negative  also  ; or  affirmative,  if  both  Premisses 


EXAMPLES 


399 


affirmative.  5thly.  Observe  what  terms  are  Distributed  in 
the  conclusion,  and  whether  the  same  are  distributed  in  the 
Premisses.  6thly.  If  the  Syllogism  is  not  a Categorical  in 
the  first  Figure,  reduce  it  to  that  form. 


1.  No  one  is  free  who  is  enslaved  by  his  appetites  : a sen 
sualist  is  enslaved  by  his  appetites : therefore  a sensualist  is 
not  free. 

2.  None  but  Whites  are  civilized  : the  ancient  Germans 
were  Whites  : therefore  they  were  civilized. 

3.  None  but  Whites  are  civilized  : the  Hindoos  are  not 
Whites  : therefore  they  are  not  civilized. 

4.  None  but  civilized  people  are  Whites  : the  Gauls  were 
Whites  : therefore  they  were  civilized. 

5.  No  one  is  rich  who  has  not  enough  : no  miser  has 
enough  : therefore  no  miser  is  rich. 

6.  If  penal  laws  against  Papists  were  enforced,  they  would 
be  aggrieved : but  penal  laws  against  them  are  not  enforced  : 
therefore  the  Papists  are  not  aggrieved. 


7.  If  all  testimony  to  miracles  is  to  be  admitted,  the  popish 
legends  are  to  be  believed  : but  the  popish  legends  are  not  to  be 
believed  : therefore  no  testimony  to  miracles  is  to  be  admitted. 

8,  If  men  are  not  likely  to  be  influenced  in  the  perform- 
ance of  a known  duty  by  taking  an  oath  to  perform  it,  the 
oaths  commonly  administered  are  superfluous ; if  they  are 
nkely  to  be  so  influenced,  every  one  should  be  made  to  take 
an  oath  to  behave  rightly  throughout  his  life  ; but  one  or  the 
other  of  tnese  must  be  the  case  : therefore  either  the  oaths 
commonly  administered  are  superfluous,  or  every  man  should 
be  made  to  take  an  oath  to  behave  rightly  throughout  his  life 


400 


APPENDIX  II. 


9 The  Scliptures  must  be  admitted  to  be  agieeable  to 
truth  ; and  the  Church  of  England  is  conformable  to  the 
Scriptures:  A.  B.  is  a divine  of  the  Church  of  England  ; and 
this  opinion  is  in  accordance  with  his  sentiments : therefore  it 
must  be  presumed  to  be  true. 

10.  Enoch  (according  to  the  testimony  of  Scripture.) 
pleased  God  ; but  without  faith  it  is  impossible  to  please  Him 
(for  he  that  cometh  to  God  must  believe  that  He  is,  and  that  Ho 
is  a rewarder  of  them  that  diligently  seek  Him  :)  therefore,  c^c. 

11.  “If  Abraham  were  justified  by  works,  then  had  ho 
whereof  to  glory  [before  God:]  but  not  [anyone  can  have  whereof 
to  glory]  before  God  : ” therefore  Abraham  was  not  justifieu 
by  works. 

12.  “ He  that  is  of  God  heareth  my  words : ye  therefore 
hear  them  not,  because  ye  are  not  of  God.” 

13.  Few  treatises  of  science  convey  important  truths,  with 
out  any  intermixture  of  error,  in  a perspicuous  and  interesting 
form  : and  therefore,  though  a treatise  would  deserve  much 
attention  which  should  possess  such  excellence,  it  is  plain  that 
few  treatises  of  science  do  deserve  much  attention. 

14.  We  are  bound  to  set  apart  one  day  in  seven  for  reli- 
gious duties,  if  the  fourth  commandment  is  obligatory  on  us  : 
but  we  are  bound  to  set  apart  one  day  in  seven  for  religious 
duties;  and  hence  it  appears  that  the  fourth  commandment  is 
obligatory  on  us. 

15.  Abstinence  from  the  eating  of  blood  had  reference  to 
the  divine  institution  of  sacrifices : one  of  the  precepts  deliw 
ered  to  Noah  was  abstinence  from  the  eating  of  blood  there- 
fore one  of  the  precepts  delivered  to  Noah  contained  the  di- 
vine institution  of  sacrifices. 

16.  If  expiatory  sacrifices  were  divinely  appointed  befora 
.he  Mosaic  law,  they  must  have  been  expiatory,  not  of  cere- 


EXAMPLES. 


40l 


monial  sin  (which  could  not  then  exist,)  but  of  nsorJ  sin  : if 
so,  the  Levitical  sacrifices  must  have  had  no  less  efficacy ; 
and  in  that  case,  the  atonements  under  the  Mosaic  law  would 
have  “ made  the  comers  thereunto  perfect  as  pertaining  to 
the  conscience  ; ” but  this  was  not  the  case  : therefore,  fyt 
rDaviscn  on  Prophecy .] 

17.  The  adoration  of  images  is  forbidden  to  Christians,  if 
we  suppose  the  Mosaic  law  designed  not  for  the  Israelite? 
alone,  but  for  all  men  : it  was  designed,  however,  for  the  Is 
raelites  alone,  and  not  for  all  men : therefore  the  adoration  ol 
images  is  not  forbidden  to  Christians. 

18.  A desire  to  gain  by  another’s  loss  is  a violation  of  the 
tenth  commandment : all  gaming,  therefore,  since  it  implies  a 
desire  to  profit  at  the  expense  of  another,  involves  a breach 
of  the  tenth  commandment. 

19.  Ail  the  fish  that  the  net  enclosed  were  an  indiscriminate 
mixture  of  various  kinds  : those  that  were  set  aside  and  saved 
as  valuable,  were  fish  that  the  net  enclosed  : therefore  those 
that  were  set  aside  and  saved  as  valuable,  were  an  indiscrim- 
inate mixture  of  various  kinds. 

20.  All  the  elect  are  finally  saved  : such  persons  as  are 
arbitrarily  separated  from  the  rest  of  mankind  by  the  divine 
decree  are  the  elect : therefore  such  persons  as  are  arbitrarily 
separated  from  the  rest  of  mankind  by  the  divine  decree,  are 
finally  saved.  [The  opponents  of  this  Conclusion  generally  deny 
the  Minor  Premiss  and  admit  the  Major;  the  reverse  would  be  the 
more  sound  and  the  more  effectual  objection.] 

21.  No  one  who  lives  with  another  on  terms  of  confidence 
is  justified,  on  any  pretence,  in  killing  him ; Brutus  lived  on 
terms  of  confidence  with  Csesar  : therefore  he  was  not  justi- 
fied, on  the  pretence  he  pleaded,  in  killing  him.  J 

22.  He  that  destroys  a man  who  usurps  despotic  power  in 

34  * 


402 


APPENDIX  II. 


a free  country  deserves  well  of  his  countrymen  : Brutus  du 
strojed  Caesar,  who  usurped  despotic  power  in  Rome  : there 
fore  he  deserved  well  of  the  Romans. 

23.  If  virtue  is  voluntary,  vice  is  voluntary  : virtue  is  vol- 
untary : therefore  so  is  vice.  [Arist.  Eth.  B.  iii.] 

24.  A wise  lawgiver  must  either  recognize  the  rewards  and 
punishments  of  a future  state,  or  must  be  able  to  appeal  to  an 
extraordinary  Providence,  dispensing  them  regularly  in  thin 
life ; Moses  did  not  do  the  former  : therefore  he  must  have 
done  the  latter.  [Warburton.] 

25.  Nothing  which  is  of  less  frequent  occurrence  than  the 
fa.jitv  of  testimony  can  be  fairly  established  by  testimony  : 
any  extraordinary  and  unusual  fact  is  a thing  of  less  frequent 
occurrence  than  the  falsity  of  testimony  (that  being  very  com- 
mon) : therefore  no  extraordinary  and  unusual  fact  can  be 
fairly  established  by  testimony. 

26.  Testimony  is  a kind  of  evidence  which  is  very  likely 
to  be  false : the  evidence  on  which  most  men  believe  that 
there  are  pyramids  in  Egypt  is  testimony : therefore  the  evi- 
dence on  which  most  men  believe  that  there  are  pyramids  in 
Egypt  is  very  likely  to  be  false. 

27.  The  religion  of  the  ancient  Greeks  and  Romans  was  a 
tissue  of  extravagant  fables  and  groundless  superstitions, 
credited  by  the  vulgar  and  the  weak,  and  maintained  by  the 
more  enlightened,  from  selfish  or  political  views:  the  same 
was  clearly  the  case  with  the  religion  of  the  Egyptians  : the 
game  may  be  said  of  the  Brahminical  worship  of  India,  and 
the  religion  of  Fo,  professed  by  the  Chinese  ; the  same,  of 
the  romantic  mythological  system  of  the  Peruvians,  of  the 
stem  and  bloody  rites  of  the  Mexicans,  and  those  of  the  Brit 
ons  and  of  the  Saxons : hence  we  may  conclude  that  all  sys- 
tems of  religion,  however  varied  in  circumstances,  agree 


EXAMPLES. 


403 


Li  Deing  superstitions  kept  up  among  the  vulgar,  from  in- 
terested or  political  views  in  the  more  enlightened  classes 
[See  Dissertation,  Chap.  i.  § 2.]  J 

28.  No  man  can  possess  power  to  perform  impossibilities , 
a miracle  is  an  impossibility  : therefore  no  man  can  possess 
power  to  perform  a miracle.  [See  Appendix,  Art.  “ Impossible.”] 

29.  A.  B.  and  C.  D.  are  each  of  them  equal  to  E.  F.  • 
therefore  they  are  equal  to  each  other. 

30.  Protection  from  punishment  is  plainly  due  to  the  inno 
cent  •,  therefore,  as  you  maintain  that  this  person  ought  no; 
to  be  punished,  it  appears  that  you  are  convinced  of  his  inno- 
cence. 

31.  All  the  most  bitter  persecutions  have  been  religious 
persecutions  : among  the  most  bitter  persecutions  were  those 
which  occurred  in  France  during  the  revolution  : therefore 
they  must  have  been  religious  persecutions. 

32.  He  who  cannot  possibly  act  otherwise  than  he  does,  has 
neither  merit  nor  demerit  in  his  action  : a liberal  and  benevo- 
lent man  cannot  possibly  act  otherwise  than  he  does  in  reliev- 
ing the  poor  : therefore  such  a man  has  neither  merit  not 
demerit  in  his  action.  [See  App.  Art.  “Impossible.”] 

33.  What  happens  every  day  is  not  improbable  : some 
things  against  which  the  chances  are  many  thousands  to  one, 
happen  every  day  : therefore  some  things  against  which  the 
chances  are  many  thousands  to  one,  are  not  improbable. 

34.  The  early  and  general  assignment  of  the  Epistle  to  the 
(Hebrews  to  Paul  as  its  author,  must  have  been  either  from  its 
professing  to  be  his,  and  containing  his  name,  or  from  its 
really  being  his  ; since,  therefore,  the  former  of  these  is  not 
(he  fact,  the  Epistle  must  be  Paul’s. 

85.  “ With  some  of  them  God  was  not  well  pleased  ; fo> 
fcey  were  overthrown  in  the  wilderness.” 


404 


APPENDIX  II 


36.  A sensua  ist  wishes  to  enjoy  perpetual  gratifications 
without  satiety : it  is  impossible  to  enjoy  perpetual  gratifica- 
tions without  satiety  : therefore  it  is  impossible  fora  sensualist 
to  obtain  his  wish. 

37.  If  Paley’s  system  is  to  be  received,  one  who  has  nd 
knowledge  of  a future  state  has  no  means  of  distinguishing 
virtue  and  vice  : now  one  who  has  no  means  of  distinguishing 
virtue  and  vice  can  commit  no  sin  : therefore,  if  Paley’s  sys- 
tem is  to  be  received,  one  who  has  no  knowledge  of  a future 
state  can  commit  no  sin. 

38.  The  principles  of  justice  are  variable  : the  appoint 
ments  of  nature  are  invariable  : therefore  the  principles  of 
justice  are  no  appointment  of  nature.  [Arist.  Eth.  B.  v.] 

39.  Every  one  desires  happiness : virtue  is  happiness  • 
therefore  every  one  desires  virtue.  [Arist.  Eth.  B.  iii.] 

40.  A story  is  not  to  be  believed,  the  reporters  of  which 
give  contradictory  accounts  of  it ; the  story  of  the  life  and 
exploits  of  Buonaparte  is  of  this  description  : therefore  it  is 
not  to  be  believed.  [See  B.  i.  § 3.] 

41.  When  the  observance  of  the  first  day  of  the  week  as  a 
religious  festival  in  commemoration  of  Christ’s  resurrection, 
was  first  introduced,  it  must  have  been  a novelty : when  it 
was  a novelty,  it  must  have  attracted  notice  : when  it  attracted 
notice,  it  would  lead  to  inquiry  respecting  the  truth  of  the 
resurrection  : when  it  led  to  this  inquiry,  it  must  have  exposed 
the  story  as  an  imposture,  supposing  it  not  attested  by  living 
witnesses  : therefore,  when  the  observance  of  the  first  day  of 
the  week,  <^-c.  was  first  introduced,  it  must  have  exposed  as 
an  imposture  the  story  of  the  resurrection,  supposing  it  not 
attested  by  living  witnesses. 

42.  All  the  miracles  of  Jesus  would  fill  more  books  than 
die  world  could  contain  : the  things  related  b/  the  Evange' 


EXAMPLES. 


405 


iisls  are  the  miracles  of  Jesus  : therefore  the  thii  gs  related  by 
the  Evangelists  would  fill  more  bocks  than  the  world  eoula 
contain. 

43.  If  the  prophecies  of  the  Old  Testament  had  been  writ 
ten  without  knowledge  of  the  events  of  the  time  of  Christ 
they  could  not  correspond  with  them  exactly ; and  if  they  had 
been  forged  by  Christians,  they  would  not  be  preserved  and 
acknowledged  by  the  Jews  : they  are  preserved  and  acknowl- 
edged by  the  Jews,  and  they  correspond  exactly  with  the 
events  of  the  time  of  Christ : therefore  they  were  neither 
written  without  knowledge  of  those  events,  nor  were  forged 
by  Christians. 

44.  Of  two  evils  the  less  is  to  be  preferred  : occasional  tur- 
bulence, therefore,  being  a less  evil  than  rigid  despotism,  is  to 
be  preferred  to  it. 

45.  According  to  theologians,  a man  must  possess  faith  in 
order  to  be  acceptable  to  the  Deity  : now  he  who  believes  all 
the  fables  of  the  Hindoo  mythology  must  possess  faith : there- 
fore such  a one  must,  according  to  theologians,  be  acceptable 
to  the  Deity. 

46.  If  Abraham  were  justified,  it  must  have  been  either  by 
faith  or  by  works  : now  he  was  not  justified  by  faith,  (accord- 
ing to  James,)  nor  by  works,  (according  to  Paul) : therefore 
Abraham  was  not  justified. 

47.  No  evil  should  be  allowed  that  good  may  come  of  it . 
all  punishment  :s  an  evil : therefore  no  punishment  should  be 
aLowed  that  good  may  come  of  it. 

48.  Repentance  is  a good  thing : wicked  men  abound  in 
jvepentance  [Arist.  Eth.  B.  ix.]  : therefore  wicked  men  abound 
in  what  is  gord. 

49.  A person  infected  with  the  plague  will  (probably)  dis 
Buppose  three  in  five  of  the  infected  die]  : this  man  is  (probably) 


106 


APPENDIX  II 


infected  with  '.ne  plague  [suppose  it  an  even  ehance'  : theiefoia 
he  will  (probably)  die.  Query.  What  is  the  amount  of  this  prob- 
ability ? Again,  suppose  the  probability  of  the  major  to  be  (instead 

2 4 12 

of  ~)  -,  and  of  the  minor,  (instead  of  -)  to  be  jt,  Query.  What  will 

be  the  probability  of  the  conclusion  ? 

50.  It  must  be  admitted,  indeed,  that  a man  who  has  been 
accustomed  to  enjoy  liberty  cannot  be  happy  in  the  condition 
of  a slave  : many  of  the  negroes,  however,  may  be  happy  in 
the  condition  of  slaves,  because  they  have  never  been  accus- 
tomed to  enjoy  liberty. 

51.  Whatever  is  dictated  by  Nature  is  allowable  : devoted- 
ness to  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  in  youth,  and  to  that  of  gain  in 
old  age,  are  dictated  by  Nature  [Arist.  Rhet.  B.  ii.]  : therefore 
they  are  allowable. 

52.  He  is  the  greatest  lover  of  any  one  who  seeks  that  per- 
son’s greatest  good  : a virtuous  man  seeks  the  greatest  good 
for  himself : therefore  a virtuous  man  is  the  greatest  lover  of 
himself.  [Arist.  Eth.  B.  ix.] 

53.  He  who  has  a confirmed  habit  of  any  kind  of  action, 
exercises  no  self-denial  in  the  practice  of  that  action  : a good 
man  has  a confirmed  habit  of  Virtue  : therefore  he  who  exer- 
cises self-denial  in  the  practice  of  Virtue  is  not  a good  man. 
'Arist.  Eth.  B.  ii.] 

54.  That  man  is  independent  of  the  caprices  of  Fortune 
who  places  his  chief  happiness  in  moral  and  intellectual  ex- 
cellence : a ‘rue  philosopher  is  independent  of  the  caprices 
of  Fortune  : therefore  a true  philosopher  is  one  who  places 
his  chief  happiness  in  moral  and  intellectual  excellence. 

55.  A system  of  government  which  extends  to  those  ac- 
tions that  are  performed  secretly,  must  be  one  which  refers 
either  to  a regular  divine  providence  in  this  life,  or  to  the 
rewards  and  punishments  of  another  world  : every  perfect 


EXAMPLES 


407 


system  of  government  must  extend  to  those  actions  which  are 
performed  secretly  : no  system  of  government  therefore  can 
be  perfect,  which  does  not  refer  either  to  a regular  divine 
providence  in  this  life,  or  to  the  rewards  and  punishments  of 
another  world.  [Warburton’s  Divine  Legation.] 

56.  For  those  who  are  bent  on  cultivating  their  minds  dj 
diligent  study,  the  incitement  of  academical  honors  is  unne> 
cessary  ; and  it  is  ineffectual,  for  the  idle,  and  such  as  are 
indifferent  to  mental  improvement : therefore  the  incitement 
of  academical  honors  is  either  unnecessary  or  ineffectual. 

57.  He  who  is  properly  called  an  actor,  does  not  endeavor 
to  make  his  hearers  believe  that  the  sentiments  he  expresses 
and  the  feelings  he  exhibits,  are  really  his  own  : a barrister 
does  this  : therefore  he  is  not  properly  to  be  called  an  actor. 

58.  He  who  bears  arms  at  the  command  of  the  magistrate 
does  what  is  lawful  for  a Christian  : the  Swiss  in  the  French 
service,  and  the  British  in  the  American  service,  bore  arms  at 
the  command  of  the  magistrate  : therefore  they  did  what  was 
lawful  for  a Christian. 

59.  If  Lord  Bacon  is  right,  it  is  improper  to  stock  a new 
colony  with  the  refuse  of  Jails  : but  this  we  must  allow  not  to 
be  improper,  if  our  method  of  colonizing  New  South  Wales 
be  a wise  one : if  this  be  wise,  therefore,  Lord  Bacon  is  noi 
right. 

60.  Logic  is  indeed  worthy  of  being  cultivated,  if  Aristotle 
is  to  be  regarded  as  infallible  : but  he  is  not : Logic  therefore 
is  not  worthy  of  being  cultivated. 

61.  All  studies  are  useful  which  tend  to  advance  a man  in 
life,  or  to  increase  national  and  private  wealth  : but  the  course 
of  studies  pursued  at  Oxford  has  no  such  tendency : therefore 
it  is  not  useful. 

62.  If  the  exhibition  of  criminals,  publicly  executed,  tend* 


408 


APPENDIX  II. 


to  heighten  in  others  the  dread  of  undergoing  the  same  fate, 
it  may  be  expected  that  those  soldiers  who  have  seen  the  most 
service,  should  have  the  most  dread  of  death  in  battle;  but 
the  reverse  of  this  is  the  case  : therefore  the  former  is  not  to 
be  believed. 

63.  If  the  everlasting  favor  of  God  is  not  bestowed  at  ran- 
dom, and  on  no  principle  at  all,  it  must  be  bestowed  either 
with  respect  to  men’s  persons,  or  with  respect  to  their  con- 
duct : but  “ God  is  no  respecter  of  persons  : ” therefore  his 
favor  must  be  bestowed  with  respect  to  men’s  conduct. 
[Sumner’s  Apostolical  Preaching.] 

64.  If  transportation  is  not  felt  as  a severe  punishment, 
it  is  in  itself  ill-suited  to  the  prevention  of  crime  : if  it  is  so 
felt,  much  of  its  severity  is  wasted,  from  its  taking  place  at 
too  great  a distance  to  affect  the  feelings,  or  even  come  to  the 
knowledge,  of  most  of  those  whom  it  is  designed  to  deter; 
but  one  or  other  of  these  must  be  the  case  : therefore  trans- 
portation is  not  calculated  to  answer  the  purpose  of  preventing 
crime. 

65.  War  is  productive  of  evil : therefore  peace  is  likely  to 
be  productive  of  good. 

66.  Some  objects  of  great  beauty  answer  no  other  percepti- 
ble purpose  but  to  gratify  the  sight : many  flowers  have  great 
beauty  ; and  many  of  them  accordingly  answer  no  other  pur- 
pose but  to  gratify  the  sight. 

67.  A man  who  deliberately  devotes  himself  to  a life  of 
sensuality  is  deserving  of  strong  reprobation : but  those  do 
not  deliberately  devote  themselves  to  a life  of  sensuality  who 
arc  hurried  into  excess  by  the  impulse  of  the  passions : such 
therefore  as  are  hurried  into  excess  by  the  impulse  of  the  pas- 
sions are  not  deserving  of  strong  reprobation.  [Arise.  Eth.  B.  vii 

68.  It  is  a difficult  task  to  restrain  all  'nordinafe  fesires  : tc 


EXAMPLES. 


409 


conform  to  the  precepts  of  Scripture  implies  a restraint  of  all 
inordinate  desires : therefore  it  is  a difficult  task  to  conform 
to  the  precepts  of  Scripture. 

69.  Any  one  who  is  candid  will  refrain  from  condemning  a 
book  without  reading  it : some  Reviewers  do  not  refrain  from 
this : therefore  some  Reviewers  are  not  candid. 

70.  If  any  objection  that  can  be  urged  would  justify  a 
change  of  established  laws,  no  laws  could  reasonably  be 
maintained  : but  some  laws  can  reasonably  be  maintained  : 
therefore  no  objection  that  can  be  urged  will  justify  a change 
of  established  laws. 

71.  If  any  complete  theory  could  be  framed,  to  explain  the 
establishment  of  Christianity  by  human  causes,  such  a theory 
would  have  been  proposed  before  now  ; but  none  such  ever 
has  been  proposed  : therefore  no  such  theory  can  be  framed. 

72.  He  who  is  content  with  what  he  has,  is  truly  rich  : a 
covetous  man  is  not  content  with  what  he  has : no  covetous 
man  therefore  is  truly  rich. 

73.  A true  prophecy  coincides  precisely  with  all  the  cir- 
cumstances of  such  an  event  as  could  not  be  conjectured  by 
natural  reason : his  is  the  case  with  the  prophecies  of  the 
Messiah  contained  in  the  Old  Testament : therefore  these  are 
true  prophecies. 

74.  The  connection  of  soul  and  body  cannot  be  compre. 
hended  or  explained  ; but  it  must  be  believed : therefore 
something  must  be  believed  which  cannot  be  comprehended 
or  explained. 

75.  Lias  lies  above  Red  Sandstone ; Red  Sandstone  lies 
above  Coal : therefore  Lias  lies  above  Coal. 

76.  Cloven  feet  being  found  universally  in  horned  animals, 
we  may  conclude  that  this  fossil  animal,  since  it  appear- 
have  had  cloven  feet,  was  horned. 

35 


410 


APPENDIX  Ii 


77.  All  that  glitters  is  not  gold  : tinsel  glitters  : thereiore  it 
is  not  gold. 

78.  A negro  is  a man : therefore  he  who  murders  a negro 
murders  a man. 

79.  Meat  and  drink  are  necessaries  of  life  : the  revenues 
of  Yitellius  were  spent  on  Meat  and  Drink  : therefore  the  rev- 
enues of  Vitellius  were  spent  on  the  necessaries  of  life. 

80.  Nothing  is  heavier  than  Platina  : feathers  are  heavier 
than  nothing : therefore  feathers  are  heavier  than  Platina. 

81.  The  child  of  Themistocles  governed  his  mother  : she 
governed  her  husband  ; he  governed  Athens  ; Athens,  Greece ; 
and  Greece,  the  world  : therefore  the  child  of  Themistocles 
governed  the  world. 

82.  He  who  calls  you  a man  speaks  truly:  he  who  calls 
you  a fool,  calls  you  a man  : therefore  he  who  calls  you  a fool 
speaks  truly. 

83.  Warm  countries  alone  produce  wines  : Spain  is  a warm 
country  ; therefore  Spain  produces  wines. 

84.  It  is  an  intensely  cold  climate  that  is  sufficient  to  freeze 
Quicksilver:  the  climate  of  Siberia  is  sufficient  to  freeze 
Quicksilver:  therefore  the  climate  of  Siberia  is  intensely  cold 

85.  Mistletoe  of  the  oak  is  a vegetable  excrescence  which 
is  not  a plant;  and  every  vegetable  excrescence. which  is  not 
a plant,  is  possessed  of  magical  virtues  : therefore  Mistletoe  of 
the  oak  is  possessed  of  magical  virtues. 

86.  If  the  hour-hand  of  a clock  be  any  distance  (suppose 
a foot)  before  the  minute-hand,  this  last,  though  moving  twelve 
times  faster,  can  never  overtake  the  other;  for  while  the  min- 
ute-hand is  moving  over  those  twelve  inches,  the  hour-hand 
will  have  moved  over  one  inch  : so  that  they  will  then  be  an 
.nch  apart ; and  while  the  minute-hand  is  moving  over  thal 
one  inch,  the  hour-hand  will  have  moved  over  i inch,  so  thal 


EXAMFLES. 


411 


it  will  still  be  a-head  ; and  again,  while  the  minute-hand  i* 
passing  over  that  space  of  ^ inch  which  now  divides  them, 

the  hour-hand  will  pass  over  rrr  inch  ? so  that  it  will  still  be 
r 144 

a-head,  though  the  distance  between  the  two  is  diminished ; 
8fc.  fyc.  4*c.,  and  thus  it  is  plain  we  may  go  on  for  ever : 
therefore  the  minute-hand  can  never  overtake  the  hour-hand. 
[This  is  one  of  the  sophistical  puzzles  noticed  by  Aldrich  (the  moving 
bodies  being  Achilles  and  a Tortoise  ;)  but  he  is  not  happy  in  his  at- 
tempt at  a solution.  He  proposes  to  remove  the  difficulty  by  dem(  n- 
strating  that,  in  a certain  given  time,  Achilles  would  overtake  the  T(  r- 
toise ; as  if  any  one  had  ever  doubted  that.  The  very  problem 
proposed  is  to  surmount  the  difficulty  of  a seeming  demonstration 
of  a thing  palpably  impossible ; to  show  that  it  is  palpably  impossible, 
is  no  solution  of  the  problem. 

I have  heard  the  present  example  adduced  as  a proof  that  the  pre- 
tensions of  Logic  are  futile,  since  (it  was  said)  the  most  perfect  logical 
demonstration  may  lead  from  true  premisses  to  an  absurd  conclusion 
The  reverse  is  the  truth  ; the  example  before  us  furnishes  a confirma- 
tion of  the  utility  of  an  acquaintance  with  the  syllogistic  form  : in 
which  form  the  pretended  demonstration  in  question  cannot  possibly  be  ex- 
hibited. An  attempt  to  do  so  will  evince  the  utter  want  of  connection 
between  the  premisses  and  the  conclusion.] 

87.  Theft  is  a crime : theft  was  encouraged  by  the  laws  of 
Sparta : therefore  the  laws  of  Sparta  encouraged  crime. 

88.  Every  hen  comes  from  an  egg : every  egg  comes  from 
n hen  : therefore  every  egg  comes  from  an  egg. 

89.  Jupiter  was  the  son  of  Saturn  : therefore  the  son  of 
Jupiter  was  the  grandson  of  Saturn. 

90.  All  cold  is  to  be  expelled  by  heat : this  person’s  disorder 
,s  a cold  : therefore  it  is  to  be  expelled  by  heat. 

91.  Wine  is  a stimulant:  therefore  in  a case  where  stiinu- 
ants  are  hurtful,  wine  is  hurtful. 

9^.  Opium  is  a poison  : but  physicians  advise  some  of  thfiil 


412 


APPENDIX  II. 


Datients  to  take  opium  : therefore  physicians  advise  some  cf 
their  patients  to  take  poison. 

93.  What  we  eat  grew  in  the  fields : loaves  of  bread  are 
what  we  eat : therefore  loaves  of  bread  grew  in  the  fields. 

94.  A nimal-food  may  be  entirely  dispensed  with : (as  is 
shown  by  the  practice  of  the  Brahmins  and  of  some  monks  ;) 
and  vegetable-food  may  be  entirely  dispensed  with  (as  is  plain 
from  the  example  of  the  Esquimaux  and  others  ; but  all  food 
consists  of  animal-food  and  vegetable-food  ; therefore  all  food 
may  be  dispensed  with. 

95.  No  trifling  business  will  enrich  those  engaged  in  it : a 
mining  speculation  is  no  trifling  business  : therefore  a mining 
speculation  will  enrich  those  engaged  in  it. 

96.  He  who  is  most  hungry  eats  most : he  who  eats  least 
is  most  hungry : therefore  he  who  eats  least  eats  most. 
\ See  Aldrich’s  Compendium  : Fallaciae  : where  this  is  rightly  solved.] 

97.  Whatever  body  is  in  motion  must  move  either  in  the 
place  where  it  is,  or  in  a place  where  it  is  not : neither  of 
these  is  possible  : therefore  there  is  no  such  thing  as  motion. 
[In  this  instance,  as  well  as  in  the  one  lately  noticed,  Aldrich  mistakes 
the  character  of  the  difficulty  ; which  is,  not  to  prove  the  truth  of  that 
which  is  self-evident,  but  to  explain  an  apparent  demonstration  militat- 
ing against  that  which  nevertheless  no  one  ever  doubted.  He  says 
in  this  case,  “ solvitur  ambulando  ; ” but  (pace  tanti  viri)  this  is  no 
solution  at  all,  but  is  the  very  thing  which  constitutes  the  difficulty  in 
question  ; for  it  is  precisely  because  we  know  the  possibility  of  motion, 
that  a seeming  proof  of  its  impossibility  produces  perplexity. — See 
Introduction.] 

98.  All  vegetables  grow  most  in  the  increase  of  the  moon : 
hair  is  a vegetable  : therefore  hair  grows  most  in  the  increase 
of  the  moon. 

99.  Most  of  the  studies  pursued  at  Oxford  conduce  to  th« 
improvement  of  the  mind  ; all  the  works  of  ihe  most  cele 


EXAMPLES. 


413 


X 


x 


brated  ancients  are  among  the  studies  pursued  a Oxford: 
therefore  some  of  the  works  of  the  most  celebratec  ancient* 
conduce  to  the  improvement  of  the  mind. 

100.  Some  poisons  are  vegetable  : no  poisons  are  useful 
drugs  : therefore  some  usefu1  drugs  are  not  vegetaole. 

101.  A theory  will  speedily  be  exploded,  if  false,  which 
appeals  to  the  evidence  of  observation  and  experiment : 
Craniology  appeals  to  this  evidence  : therefore,  if  Craniology 
be  a false  theory,  it  will  speedily  be  exploded.  [Let  the  prob- 

7 4 

ability  of  one  of  these  premises  be  — ; and  of  the  other  Query. 

What  is  the  probability  of  the  conclusion,  and  which  are  the 
terms  ?] 

102.  Wilkes  was  a favorite  with  the  populace  ; he  who  is 
a favorite  with  the  populace  must  understand  how  to  manage 
them  : he  who  understands  how  to  manage  them,  must  be 
well  acquainted  with  their  character : he  who  is  well  acquaint 
ed  with  their  character,  must  hold  them  in  contempt : there- 
fore Wilkes  must  have  held  the  populace  in  contempt. 

103.  To  discover  whether  man  has  any  moral  sense,  he 
should  be  viewed  in  that  state  in  which  all  his  faculties  are 
most  fully  developed  ; the  civilized  state  is  that  in  which  all 
man’s  faculties  are  most  fully  developed  : therefore,  to  discover 
whether  man  has  any  moral  sense,  he  should  be  viewed  in  a 
civilized  state. 

104.  Revenge,  Robbery,  Adultery,  Infanticide,  fyc.  have 
been  countenanced  by  public  opinion  in  several  countries : all 
(he  crimes  we  know  of  are  Revenge,  Robbery,  Adultery,  In- 
fanticide, Sfc. : therefore,  all  the  crimes  we  knew  of  have 
been  countenanced  by  public  opinion  in  several  countries. 
TPaley’s  Moral  Philosophy.] 

105.  No  soldiers  should  be  brought  into  the  field  who  aro 


not  well  qualified  to  perform  their  part.  None  but  veteran! 

35* 


414 


APPENDIX  II. 


are  well  qualified  to  perform  their  part.  None  but  veteran? 
should  he  brought  into  the  field. 

106.  A monopoly  of  the  sugar-refining  business  is  benefi- 
cial to  sugar-refiners : and  of  the  corn-trade  to  corn-growers  : 
and  of  the  silk-manufacture  to  silk-weavers,  SfC.  Sj-c. ; and  thus 
each  class  of  men  are  benefited  by  some  restrictions.  Now 
all  these  classes  of  men  make  up  the  whole  community  ; there- 
fore a system  of  restrictions  is  beneficial  to  the  community. 
[ See  Chap.  iii.  § 11.] 

107.  There  are  two  kinds  of  things  which  we  ought 
not  to  fret  about : what  we  can  help,  and  what  we  cannot. 
[To  be  stated  as  a Dilemma.] 

108.  He  vvho  believes  himself  to  be  always  in  the  right  in 
his  opinion,  lays  claim  to  infallibility  : you  always  believe 
yourself  to  be  in  the  right  in  your  opinion:  therefore  you  lay 
claim  to  infallibility. 

109.  No  part  of  mankind  can  ever  have  received  divine  in- 
struction in  any  of  the  arts  of  life  : because  the  Israelites,  who 
are  said  to  have  had  a revelation  made  to  them  of  religion, 
did  not  know,  in  the  times  of  Solomon,  that  the  circumference 
of  a Circle  differs  from  the  treble  of  the  Diameter. 

110.  The  Epistle  attributed  to  Barnabas  is  not  to  be  reck- 
oned among  the  writings  of  the  Apostolic  Fathers ; because, 
if  genuine,  it  is  a part  of  Scripture,  and  if  spurious,  it  is  the 
work  of  some  forger  of  a later  age. 

111.  If  the  original  civilization  of  Mankind  was  not  the 
work  of  a divine  Instructor,  some  instance  may  be  found  cf 
a nation  of  savages  having  civilized  themselves.  [Pol.  Econ. 
Lect.  V.] 

112.  The  Law  of  Moses  prohibited  theft,  murder,  <£-c.  Bui 
that  Law  is  abolished  : therefore  theft,  murder,  fyc.  ar?  not 
arohibited. 


EXAMPLES. 


415 


1 Agriculture  might  have  been  invented  by  man,  without 
a <3u£  erhuman  instructor ; and  so  might  the  working  of  met- 
als ; and  so  might  medicine ; and  so  might  navigation,  fyc. 
and  in  short  there  is  no  art  of  civilized  life  that  can  be 
pointed  out,  which  might  not  have  been  invented  by  the  natu- 
ral faculties  of  man.  Therefore  the  arts  of  civilized  life 
might  have  been  invented  by  man  without  any  superhuman 
instructor.* 

] 14.  All  those  must  disapprove  of  inflicting  punishment  on 
this  woman  who  consider  her  as  innocent : and  as  you  disap- 
prove of  inflicting  punishment  on  her,  it  is  to  be  presumed 
you  think  her  innocent. 

115.  If  a State  has  a right  to  enforce  laws,  (and  without 
this  it  could  not  subsist,)  it  must  have  a right  to  prescribe  what 
the  religion  of  the  People  shall  be.  [See  Book  III.  § 9.] 

116.  Every  man  is  bound  in  duty  to  aim  at  promoting  tha 
good  — generally,  and  in  all  respects  — of  Mankind  : a Civi; 
Magistrate  (or  Legislator)  is  a man  : therefore  a Civil  Magis- 
trate is  bound  in  duty  to  aim  at  promoting  the  good  generally 
and  in  all  respects  — of  Mankind.  And  hence  it  appears 
that,  since  true  Religion  is  one  of  the  greatest  of  goods,  the 
Civil  Magistrate  is  bound  to  enforce,  by  means  of  the  power 
committed  to  him,  the  profession  of  a true  Religion,  and  to 
suppress  heresy.  [See  Essay  I.  on  the  “ Kingdom  of  Christ.”] 

117.  The  month  of  May  has  no  “R”  in  its  name;  nor 
has  June,  July,  or  August : all  the  hottest  months  are 
May,  June,  July  and  August  : therefore  all  the  hottest 
months  are  without  an  “ R ” in  their  names.  [&e  Book  IY. 
Ch.  i.  ( 1.1 

118.  This  man  may  possibly  be  right  in  his  peculiaf 


* See  Polit.  Econ.  Lect.  V.  p.  123. 


416 


APPENDIX  II. 


religious  Creed  ; and  the  same  may  be  said  of  that  inan  : and 
of  a third,  and  a fourth,  &c. : therefore  it  is  possible  they 
may  be  all  right. 

119.  When  the  Disciples  were  first  called  Christians,  they 
must  have  received  the  title  either  from  Believers,  or  from 
Jewish  unbelievers,  or  from  Pagans  : but  one  of  these  suppo- 
sitions is  impossible  ; and  another  is  negatived  by  the  New 
Testament  records ; therefore  the  remaining  supposition  ia 
established. 


APPENDIX 


No.  III. 

PRAXIS  OF  LOGICAL  ANALYSIS. 

Some  have  expressed  much  contempt  for  the  mode  iu 
which  Logic  is  usually  taught,  and  in  which  students  are  ex- 
amined in  it,  as  comprising  no  more  than  a mere  enumeration 
of  technical  rules,  and  perhaps  an  application  of  them  to  the 
simplest  examples,  exhibited  in  a form  already  syllogistic,  or 
nearly  so.  That  such  a description,  if  intended  to  be  univer' 
sal,  is  not  correct,  I am  perfectly  certain  ; though,  hitherto, 
the  indiscriminate  requisition  of  Logic  from  all  candidates  for 
a degree,  has  confined  both  lectures  and  examinations,  in  a 
greater  degree  than  is  desirable,  to  this  elementary  character.* 
But  the  student  who  wishes  to  acquire,  and  to  show  that  he 
has  acquired,  not  only  the  elementary  rules,  but  a facility  of 
applying  them  in  practice,  should  proceed  from  the  study  of 
such  examples  as  the  foregoing,  to  exercise  himself  in  analyz- 
ing logically,  according  to  the  rules  here  given,  and  somewhat 
in  the  manner  of  the  subjoined  specimen,  some  of  Euclid’s 
demonstrations,  — various  portions  of  Aristotle’s  works,  — the 
opening  of  Warburton’s  “Divine  Legation,”  (which  exhibits 


* See  Preface. 


4 IS 


APPENDIX  III. 


the  arguments  in  a form  very  nearly  syllogistic)  — several 
parts  of  Chillingworth’s  Defence  of  Protestantism,  — the  corn 
eluding  part  of  Paley’s  Horse  Paulinse,  — Leslie’s  Method  with 
the  Deists,  — various  portions  of  A.  Smith’s  Wealth  of  Na- 
tions,— and  other  argumentative  Works  on  the  most  dissim- 
ilar subjects.  The  latter  part  of  § 1.  Chap.  V.  of  the  Disser- 
tation on  the  Province  of  Reasoning,  will  furnish  a convenien 
subject  of  a short  analysis. 

A student  who  should  prepare  himself,  in  this  manner,  in 
one  or  more  such  books,  and  present  himself  for  this  kind  of 
examination  in  them,  would  furnish  a good  test  for  ascertain- 
ing his  proficiency  in  practical  Logic. 


As  the  rules  of  Logic  apply  to  arguments  only  after  tney 
have  been  exhibited  at  full  length  in  the  bare  elementary  form, 
it  may  be  useful  to  subjoin  some  remarks  on  the  mode  of  ana- 
lyzing and  reducing  to  that  form,  any  train  of  argument  that 
may  be  presented  to  us  : since  this  must  in  general  be  the 
first  step  taken  in  an  attempt  to  apply  logical  rules.* 

First,  then,  of  whatever  length  the  reasoning  may  be, 
whether  treatise,  chapter,  or  paragraph,  begin  with  the  con- 
cluding assertion; — not  necessarily  the  last  sentence  ex- 
pressed, but  the  last  point  established;  — and  this,  whether 
it  be  formally  enunciated,  or  left  to  be  understood.  Then, 
tracing  the  reasoning  backwards,  observe  on  what  ground 
that  assertion  is  made.  The  assertion  will  be  your  Con- 
clusbn;  the  ground  on  which  it  rests,  your  Premisses.  The 


* These  directions  are,  in  substance,  and  nearly,  in  words,  extracted 
&Mn  the  Preface  to  Hinds’s  abridged  Introduction  to  Logic. 


FRAXIS  OF  LOGICAL  ANALYSIS. 


419 


whole  Syllogism  thus  obtained  may  be  tried  by  the  rules  of 
Logic. 

If  no  incorrectness  appear  in  this  syllogism,  proceed  to 
take  the  premisses  separately,  and  pursue  with  each  the  same 
plan  as  with  the  conclusion  you  first  stated.  A premiss  must 
have  been  used  as  such,  either  because  it  required  no  proof, 
or  because  it  had  been  proved.  If  it  have  not  been  proved 
consider  whether  it  be  so  self-evident  as  to  have  needed  nr 
proof.  If  it  have  been  proved,  you  must  regard  it  as  a con- 
clusion derived  from  other  assertions  which  are  premisses  to 
it : so  that  the  process  with  which  you  set  out  will  be  repeated  ; 
viz.  to  observe  on  what  grounds  the  assertion  rests,  to  state 
these  as  premisses,  and  to  apply  the  proper  rules  to  the  syllo 
gism  thus  obtained.  Having  satisfied  yourself  of  the  correct- 
ness of  this,  proceed,  as  before,  to  state  its  premisses,  if  need- 
ful, as  conclusions  derived  from  other  assertions.  And  thus 
the  analysis  will  go  on  (if  the  whole  chain  of  argument  be 
correct)  till  you  arrive  at  the  premisses  with  which  the  whole 
commences  ; which  of  course  should  be  assertions  requiring 
no  proof;  or,  if  the  chain  be  any  where  faulty,  the  analysis 
will  proceed  till  you  come  to  some  proposition,  either  assumed 
as  self-evident,  though  requiring  proof,  or  incorrectly  deduced 
from  other  assertions.* 

It  will  often  happen  that  the  same  assertion  will  have  been 
proved  by  many  different  arguments  ; and  then,  the  inquiry 
into  the  truth  of  the  premisses  will  branch  out  accordingly 
In  mathematical  or  other  demonstrative  reasoning,  this  will  of 
course  never  take  pla*  , since  absolute  certainty  admits  of  no 
increase  ; and  if,  as  \t  often  the  case,  the  same  truth  admits 
of  several  different  de  onstrations,  we  select  the  simplest  and 
clearest,  and  discard  he  rest.  But  in  probable  reasoning 

• Many  students  proba  > y will  find  it  a very  clear  and  convenient 


42G 


APPENDIX  III. 


there  is  often  a Cumulation  of  arguments,  each  proving  the  sam« 
conclusion ; i.  e.  each  proving  it  to  be  probable.  In  such  eases 
therefore  you  will  have  first  to  try  each  argument  separately  ; 
and  should  each  of  them  establish  tne  conclusion  as  in  some 
degree  probable,  you  will  then  have  to  calculate  the  aggregate 
probability. 

In  this  calculation  Logic  only  so  far  assists  as  it  enables  us 
to  place  the  several  items  of  probability  in  the  most  convenient 
form.  As  the  degree  of  probability  of  each  proposition  that 
is  originally  assumed , is  a point  to  be  determined  by  the  rea- 
soner’s  own  sagacity  and  experience  as  to  the  matter  in  hand, 
so,  the  degree  of  probability  of  each  conclusion , (given,  that 
of  each  of  its  premises,) *  * and  also  the  collective  probability 
resulting  from  several  different  arguments  all  tending  to  the 
same  conclusion,  is  an  arithmetical  question.  But  the  assist- 
ance afforded  by  logical  rules  in  clearly  stating  the  several 

mode  of  exhibiting  the  logical  analysis  of  a course  of  argument,  ta 
4i»-v  it  out  in  the  form  of  a Tree,  or  Logical  Division  ; thus, 


[Ultimate  Conclusion.] 


Z is  X, 
proved  by 


Y is  X, 
proved 
by 


Z is  Y, 
proved  by 


~1 


A is  Y, 


Z is  A, 


[suppose 

admitted.] 


proved  bj 
&c. 


the  argument  that  and  by  the 
; argument  that 


t \ 

B is  X,  Y is  B, 
&c.  & c. 


C is  X, 
&c. 


• See  Fal’acies,  $ 14,  near  the  end. 


PRAXIS  OF  LOGICAL  ANALYSIS. 


421 


items  so  as  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  other  operations,  wir 
not  be  thought  lightly  of  by  any  who  have  observed  the  con 
fusion  of  thought  and  the  fallacy,  which  have  often  been  intro 
duced  through  the  want  of  such  a statement. 

Example  of  Analysis  applied  to  the  first  part  of  Foley's 
Evidences. 

The  ultimate  Conclusion,  that  “ The  Christian  Religion 
came  from  God  ” is  made  to  rest  (as  far  as  “ the  direct  histor- 
'.cal  evidence  ” is  concerned)  on  these  two  premisses ; Thai 
“ A Religion  attested  by  Miracles  is  from  God  ; ” and  thal 
“ The  Christian  Religion  is  so  attested.” 

Of  these  two  premisses  it  should  be  remarked,  the  Minoi 
seems  to  have  been  admitted,  while  the  Major  was  denied,  by  the 
unbelievers  of  old  : whereas  at  present  the  case  is  reversed.’* 

Paley’s  argument  therefore  goes  to  establish  the  Minoi 
premiss,  about  which  alone,  in  these  days,  there  is  likely  to  be 
any  question. 

He  states  with  this  view,  two  propositions  : viz. 

Prop.  I. — “That  there  is  satisfactory  evidence,  thal 
many,  professing  to  be  original  witnesses  of  the  Christian 

* It  is  clear  from  the  fragments  remaining  of  the  ancient  arguments 
against  Christianity,  and  the  allusions  to  them  in  Christian  writers, 
and  also  from  the  Jewish  accounts  of  the  life  of  Jesus  which  are  still 
extant,  (under  the  title  of  Toldoth  Jeschii)  that  the  original  opponents 
of  Christianity  admitted  that  miracles  were  wrought,  but  denied  that 
they  proved  the  divine  origin  of  the  religion,  and  attributed  them  to 
Magic.  This  concession,  in  persons  living  so  much  nearer  to  the  times 
assigned  to  the  miracles,  should  be  noticed  as  an  important  evidence ; 
for,  credulous  as  men  were  in  those  days  respecting  magic,  they  would 
hardly  have  resorted  to  this  explanation,  unless  some,  at  least  plau- 
sible, evidence  for  the  miracles  had  been  adduced.  And  they  could 
not  but  be  sensible  that  to  prove  (had  that  been  possible)  the  pre- 
tended miracles  to  be  impostures,  would  have  been  the  most  decisive 
course  ; since  that  would  at  once  hare  disproved  the  religion. 

36 


122 


APPENDIX  III. 


miracles,  passed  their  lives  in  labors,  dangers,  ana  sufferings, 
voluntarily  undergone  in  attestation  of  the  accounts  which 
they  delivered,  and  solely  in  consequence  of  their  belief  of 
those  accounts;  and  that  they  also  submitted,  from  the  same 
motives,  to  neiv  rules  of  conduct.” 

Prop.  II.  — “ That  there  is  not  satisfactory  evidence,  that 
persons  pretending  to  be  original  witnesses  of  any  other  simi- 
lar miracles,  have  acted  in  the  same  manner,  in  attestation  of 
the  accounts  which  they  delivered,  and  solely  in  consequence 
of  their  belief  of  the  truth  of  those  accounts.” 

Of  these  two  propositions,  the  latter,  it  will  easily  be  per- 
ceived, is  the  Major  premiss,  stated  as  the  converse  by  Nega- 
tion (Book  II.  Chap.  ii.  § 4)  of  a universal  affirmative  : the 
former  proposition  is  the  Minor. 

As  a Syllogism  in  Barbara , therefore,  the  whole  wil 
stand  thus : 

“ All  miracles  attested  by  such  and  such  evidence,  are  wor- 
thy of  credit : ” (by  conversion,  “ none  which  are  not  worthy 
of  credit  are  so  attested.”) 

“ The  Christian  miracles  are  attested  by  such  and  such 
evidence  : ” Therefore  “ they  are  worthy  of  credit.” 

The  Minor  premiss  is  first  proved  by  being  taken  as  several 
distinct  ones,  each  of  which  is  separately  established.  See 
Book  II.  Chap.  iv.  § 1. 

i.  It  is  proved  that  the  first  propagators  of  Christianity  suf- 
fered ; by  showing, 

1st  A priori , from  the  nature  of  the  case,  that  they  were 
likely  to  suffer : [because  they  were  preachers  of  a re- 
ligion unexpected  and  unwelcome : 1.  to  the  Jews  ; and 
2.  to  the  Gentiles.*] 


* As  Paul  expresses  it,  “to  the  Jews,  a stumbling-block ; and  to  th* 
Greeks,  foolishness." 


• PRAXIS  OF  LOGICAL  ANALYSIS. 


423 


2d.  From  profane  testimony. 

3d.  From  the  testimony  of  Christian  Writings  [And 
here  comes  in  the  proof  of  one  of  the  premisses  of  this 
last  argument ; viz.  the  proof  of  the  credibility,  as  ti 
this  point  at  least,  of  the  Christian  Writings.] 

These  arguments  are  cumulative ; i.  e.  each  separately  goes 
to  establish  the  probability  of  the  one  common  conclusion,  tha 
‘ the  first  propagators  of  Christianity  suffered.'1'1 

By  similar  arguments  it  is  shown  that  their  sufferings  were 
such  as  they  voluntarily  exposed  themselves  to. 

II.  It  is  proved  that  “ What  they  suffered  for  was  a miracu- 
lous story  : ” by 

1st.  The  nature  of  the  case ; They  could  have  had  nothins 
but  miracles  on  which  to  rest  the  claims  of  the  new  re- 
ligion. 

2d,  By  allusions  to  miracles,  particularly  to  the  Resurrec- 
tion, both  in  Christian  and  in  Profane  Writers,  as  the 
evidence  on  which  the  religion  rested. 

The  same  course  of  argument  goes  to  show  that  the  mira- 
cles in  attestation  of  which  they  suffered  were  such  as  they 
professed  to  have  witnessed. 

These  arguments  again  are  cumulative. 

III.  It  is  proved  that  “ The  miracles  thus  attested  are  what  we 
call  the  Christian  miracles  : ” in  other  words,  that  the  story 
was,  in  the  main,  that  which  we  have  now  in  the  Christian 
Scriptures ; by 

^ 1st.  The  nature  of  the  case;  viz.  that  it  is  improbable 
the  original  story  should  have  completely  died  away,  and 
a substantially  new  one  have  occupied  its  place  ; 

$ 2d.  by  The  incidental  al  usions  of  ancient  writers,  both 


124 


APPENDIX  III 


Christian  and  profane,  to  accounts  agreeing  with  those  of 
our  Scriptures,  as  the  ones  then  received  ; 

^ 3d.  by  The  credibility  of  our  Historical  Scriptures  : This 
is  established  by  several  distinct  arguments,  each  sep- 
arately tending  to  show  that  these  books  were,  from  the 
earliest  ages  of  Christianity,  well  known  and  carefully 
preserved  among  Christians  : viz. 

§ i.  They  were  quoted  by  ancient  Christian  writers. 

§ ii.  with  peculiar  respect. 

^ iii.  Collected  into  a distinct  volume , and 
§ iv.  distinguished  by  appropriate  names  and  titles  of 
respect. 

§ v.  Publicly  read  and  expounded,  and 
§ vi.  had  commentaries , fyc.  written  on  them  : 

§ vii.  Were  received  by  Christians  of  different  sects  ; 4*' 
4-c* 

The  latter  part  of  the  first  main  proposition,  branches  ofi 
into  two  ; viz.  1st.,  that  the  early  Christians  submitted  to  new 
rules  of  conduct ; 2d,  that  they  did  so,  in  consequence  of  their 
belief  in  miracles  wrought  before  them. 

Each  of  these  is  established  in  various  parts  of  the  above 
course  of  argument,  and  by  similar  premisses  ; viz.  the  nature 
of  the  case, — the  accounts  of  heathen  writers,  — and  the 
testimony  of  the  Christian  Scriptures,  Sfc. 


The  Major  premiss,  that  “ Miracles  thus  attested  rie  wor- 
hy  of  credit,”  (which  must  be  combined  with  the  former,  .n 
order  to  establish  the  conclusion,  that  “ the  Christian  miracles 
are  worthy  of  credit,”)  is  next  to  be  established. 

* For  some  important  remarks  respecting  the  different  ways  in 
ivhich  this  part  of  the  argument  is  presented  to  different  persons,  Set 
K Hinds  on  Inspiration,”  pp.  30 — 4G. 


PBAXIS  OF  LOGICAL  ANALYSIS. 


425 


Previously  to  his  entering  on  the  secc.nd  main  proposition, 
(which  I have  stated  to  be  the  Converse  by  negation  of  this 
Major  premiss,)  he  draws  his  conclusion  (Ch.  x.  Part  I.)  from 
the  Minor  premiss,  in  combination  with  the  Major,  resting 
that  Major  on 

§ 1st.  The  a priori  improbability  that  a false  story  should 
have  been  thus  attested  : viz. 

“ If  it  be  so,  the  religion  must  be  true.*  These  men  could 
not  be  deceivers.  By  only  not  bearing  testimony,  they  might 
have  avoided  all  these  sufferings,  and  have  lived  quietly. 
Would  men  in  such  circumstances  pretend  to  have  seen  what 
they  never  saw ; assert  facts  which  they  had  no  knowledge 
of ; go  about  lying,  to  teach  virtue ; and  though  not  only  con- 
vinced of  Christ’s  being  an  impostor,  but  having  seen  the  suc- 
cess of  his  imposture  in  his  crucifixion,  yet  persist  in  carrying 
it  on  ; and  so  persist,  as  to  bring  upon  themselves,  for  nothing, 
and  with  a full  knowledge  of  the  consequence,  enmity,  and 
hatred,  danger  and  death  ? ” 

§ 2d.  That  no  false  story  of  Miracles  is  likely  to  be  so  at 
tested,  is  again  proved,  from  the  premiss  that  “ no  false 
story  of  miracles  ever  has  been  so  attested  ; ” and  this 
premiss  again  is  proved  in  the  form  of  a proposition  which 
includes  it ; viz.  that  “ No  other  miraculous  story  what- 
ever is  so  attested.” 

§ This  assertion  again,  bifurcates  ; viz.  it  is  proved  re- 
specting the  several  stories  that  are  likely  to  be,  or  that 


* This  is  the  ultimate  conclusion  deduced  from  the  premiss,  that 
rfit  is  attested  by  real  Miracles ; which,  in  the  present  day,  comes  to 
the  same  thing  : since  those  for  whom  he  is  writing  are  ready  at  one? 
to  admit  the  truth  of  the  religion,  if  convinced  of  the  reality  of  th« 
Miracles.  The  ancient  Jews  were  not. 

36* 


«2b 


APPENDIX  III. 


have  been  adduced,  as  parallel  to  the  Christian,  that 
either 

1 §.  They  ai  3 not  so  attested ; or 

2 §.  They  are  not  propfcrly  miraculous  ; i.  e.  that  admit- 
ting the  veracity  of  the  narrator,  it  does  not  follow  tha 
any  miracle  took  place  ; as  in  cases  that  may  be  ex- 
plained by  false  perceptions, — accidents , SfC. 


In  this  way  the  learner  may  proceed  to  analyze  the  rest  of 
the  work,  and  to  fill  up  the  details  of  those  parts  of  the  argu- 
ment which  I have  but  slightly  touched  upon.* 

It  will  be  observed  that,  to  avoid  unnecessary  prolixity,  I 
have  in  most  of  the  above  syllogisms  suppressed  one  premiss, 
which  the  learner  will  be  able  easily  to  supply  for  himself. 
E.  G.  In  the  early  part  of  this  analysis  it  will  easily  be  seen, 
that  the  first  of  the  series  of  cumulative  arguments  to  provo 
that  the  propagators  of  Christianity  did  suffer,  would  at  full 
'ength  stand  thus  : 

“ Whoever  propagated  a religion  unwelcome  to  the  Jews 
and  to  the  Gentiles,  was  likely  to  suffer ; 

The  Apostles  did  this  ; 

Therefore  they  were  ’ikely  to  suffer,”  <^*c.  fyc. 

It  is  also  to  be  observed,  that  the  same  proposition  used  in 
different  syllogisms  may  require  to  be  differently  expressed  by 
a substitution  of  some  equivalent , in  order  to  render  the  argu- 
ment, in  each,  formally  correct.  This  of  course  is  always 
allowable,  provided  great  care  is  taken  that  the  exact  mean- 
ing be  preserved  : e.  g.  if  the  proposition  be,  “ The  persons 
•vho  attested  the  Christian  miracles  underwent  sufferings  in  at 


* See  note  at  the  end  of  this  Appendix. 


PRAXIS  OF  LOGICAL  ANALYSIS. 


427 


testation  of  them,”  I am  authorized  to  state  the  same  assertion 
in  a different  form,  thus,  “ The  Christian  miracles  are  attested 
by  men  who  suffered  in  attestation  of  their  reality,”  <^*c. 

Great  care  however  should  be  used  to  avoid  being  misled 
by  the  substitution  of  one  proposition  for  another,  when  the 
two  are  not  (though  perhaps  they  sound  so)  really  equivalent, 
so  that  the  one  warrants  the  assumption  of  the  other.  — See 
Book  iii.  § 3. 

Lastly,  the  learner  is  referred  to  the  Supplement  to  Chap, 
iii.  § 1,  p.  107,  where  I have  treated  of  the  statement  of  a 
proposition  as  several  distinct  ones,  each  implying  all  the  rest, 
but  differing  in  the  division  of  the  Predicate  from  the  Subject 
Of  this  procedure  the  above  analysis  affords  an  instance. 


Note  referred  to  at  page  426. 

When  the  Student  considers  that  the  foregoing  is  omy  one 
out  of  many  branches  of  evidence,  all  tending  to  the  same 
point,  and  yet  that  there  have  been  intelligent  men  who  have 
held  out  against  them  all,  he  may  be  apt  to  suspect  either  that 
there  must  be  some  flaw  in  these  arguments,  which  he  is 
unable  to  detect,  or  else  that  there  must  be  much  stronge 
arguments  on  the  other  side  than  he  has  ever  met  with. 

To  enter  into  a discussion  of  the  various  causes  leading  to 
Infidelity  would  be  unsuitable  to  this  occasion ; but  1 will  notico 
one  as  being  more  especially  connected  with  the  subject  of 
this  work,  and  as  being  very  generally  overlooked.  “ In  no 
ither  instance  perhaps ,”  (says  Dr.  Hawkins,  in  his  valuable 
Essay  on  Tradition)  “ besides  that  of  Religion , do  men  com ■ 
nit  the  very  illogical  mistake , of  first  canvassing  all  the  objec- 
tions agains*  any  particular  system  whose  pretensions  to  truth 
they  would  examine , before  they  consider  the  direct  argument t 


128 


APPENDIX  Hi. 


m its  favor.'"  (P.  82.)  But  why,  it  may  be  asked,  do  they 
make  such  a mistake  in  this  case  ? An  answer,  which  I think 
would  apply  to  a large  proportion  of  such  persons,  is  this  t 
because  a man  having  been  brought  up  in  a Christian  country 
has  lived  perhaps  among  such  as  have  been  accustomed  from 
their  infancy  to  take  for  granted  the  truth  of  their  religion, 
and  even  to  regard  an  uninquiring  assent  as  a mark  of 
commendable  faith  ; and  hence  he  has  probably  never  even 
thought  of  proposing  to  himself  the  question, — Why  should 
I receive  Christianity  as  a divine  revelation  ? Christianity 
being  nothing  new  to  him,  and  the  presumption  being  in  favor 
of  it,  while  the  burden  of  proof  lies  on  its  opponents,  he  is 
not  stimulated  to  seek  reasons  for  believing  it,  till  he  finds  it 
controverted.  And  when  it  is  controverted,  — when  an  op- 
ponent urges  — How  do  you  reconcile  this,  and  that,  and  the 
other,  with  the  idea  of  a divine  revelation  ? these  objections 
strike  by  their  novelty , by  their  being  opposed  to  what  is  gen- 
erally received.  He  is  thus  excited  to  inquiry  ; which  he  sets 
about,  — naturally  enough,  but  very  unwisely,  — by  seeking 
for  answers  to  all  these  objections  : and  fancies  that  unless 
they  can  all  be  satisfactorily  solved,  he  ought  not  to  receive 
the  religion.  “ As  if,”  (says  the  Author  already  cited)  “ there 
could  not  be  truth,  and  truth  supported  by  irrefragable  argu- 
ments, and  yet  at  the  same  time  obnoxious  to  objections,  nu- 
merous, plausible,  and  by  no  means  easy  of  solution.  There 
are  objections  (said  Dr.  Johnson)  against  a plenum,  and  objec- 
tions against  a vacuum  ; but  one  of  them  must  be  true.”  He 
adds,  that  “ sensible  men,  really  desirous  of  discovering  the 
truth,  will  perceive  that  reason  directs  them  to  examine  first 
the  argument  in  favor  of  that  side  of  the  question,  where  die 
first  presumption  of  truth  appears.  And  the  presumption  is 
manifestly  m favor  of  that  religious  creed  already  adopted  by 
the  country.  . . Their  very  earliest  inqui-y  iherefore  must 


PRAXIS  OF  U 6ICAL  ANALYSIS. 


429 


be  into  the  direct  arguments  for  the  authority  of  that  book  on 
which  their  country  rests  its  religion.” 

But  reasonable  as  such  a procedure  is,  there  is,  as  I have 
said,  a strong  temptation,  and  one  which  should  be  carefully 
guarded  against,  to  adopt  the  opposite  course ; to  attend  first 
to  the  objections  which  are  brought  against  what  is  established, 
and  which,  for  that  very  reason,  rouse  the  mind  from  a state 
of  apathy. 

When  Christianity  was  first  preached,  the  state  of  things 
was  reversed.  The  presumption  was  against  it,  as  being  a 
novelty.  “ Seeing  that  all  these  things  cannot  he  spoken 
against , ye  ought  to  be  quiet''  was  a sentiment  which  favored 
an  indolent  acquiescence  in  the  old  pagan  worship.  The 
stimulus  of  novelty  was  all  on  the  side  of  those  who  came  to 
overthrow  this,  by  a new  religion.  The  first  inquiry  of  any 
one  who  at  all  attended  to  the  subject,  must  have  been,  not, — 
“ What  are  the  objections  to  Christianity  ? ” — but,  “ On  what 
grounds  do  these  men  call  on  me  to  receive  them  as  divine 
messengers  ? " And  the  same  appears  to  be  the  case  with 
the  Polynesians  among  whom  our  Missionaries  are  laboring : 
they  begin  by  inquiring,  “ Why  should  we  receive  this  re- 
ligion ? ” and  those  of  them  accordingly  who  have  embraced 
it,  appear  to  be  Christians  on  much  more  rational  and  deliber- 
ate conviction  than  many  among  us,  even  of  those  who,  in 
general  maturity  of  intellect  and  civilization,  are  advanced 
considerably  beyond  those  Islanders. 

I am  not  depreciating  the  inestimable  advantages  of  a re- 
ligious education  ; but,  pointing  out  the  peculiar  temptations 
which  accompany  it.  The  Jews  and  Pagans  had,  in  theii 
early  prejudices,  greater  difficulties  to  surmount,  than  ours 
but  they  were  difficulties  of  a different  kind.  — See  Essays  on 
the  Dangers , fyc.  Disc.  i.  § 3 ; and  also  Rhet.  Part  I.  Ch.  iii 
§ 1- 


I Dave  subjoined,  in  parallel  columns,  extracts  from  Hume’s  “ Essay  on  Miracles,”  from  two  Ri  ■ 
views,  professedly  Christian,  but  organs  of  two  most  opposite  religious  schools,  and  from  Scripture. 
The  coincidence  between  the  first  three,  and  the  contrast  they  present  to  Scripture,  being,  I think,  not 


430 


APPENDIX  III. 


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To  these  extracts  might  have  been  added  an  expiession,  3JI 
the  late  Mr.  Coleridge,  of  his  contempt  and  disgust  for  the  very 
name  of  Evidences  of  Christianity.  He  proposes,  not  as  a con- 
firmation of  other  evidences,  (which  he  might  have  done  with 
much  truth,)  but  as  a complete  substitute  for  them,  a man’s 
feeling  of  the  suitableness  of  the  religion  for  his  wants  ; a suit- 


432 


APPENDIX  III. 


ableness  which  doubtless  many  of  the  Mahometans  perceiv* 
in  their  own  religion,  and  of  the  Hindoos  in  theirs.* 

The  coincidence  between  writers  of  such  different  schools  is 
very  striking,  and  affords  matter  for  much  reflection.  They 
all  agree  in  representing  the  “Faith”  that  is  required  of  a 
Christian  as  wholly  independent  of  evidence , and  as  necessa- 
rily, or  most  properly,  based  on  feelings  such  as  attach  Pagans 
to  their  superstitions.  And  they  all  apparently  calculate  on 
the  reader’s  being  totally  ignorant  of  the  New  Testament,  of 
which  almost  every  chapter  convicts  Jesus  and  his  followers 
of  that  '•'•timidity'1''  in  appealing  to  the  evidence  of  miracles 
and  prophecies  which  is  censured  and  derided.  For,  the  pas- 
sages above  cited  from  Scripture,  even  if  multiplied  many 
fold,  as  might  easily  be  done,  would  give  but  a very  inade- 
quate view  of  the  case  ; inasmuch  as  the  general  tenor  of  all 
the  narrative,  and  all  the  teaching,  of  the  New  Testament, 
presupposes  evidence  as  the  original  ground  on  which  belief 
had  been  all  along  demanded  : the  unbelief  which  it  “ de- 
nounces as  sin  ” being,  not  as  those  other  writers  represent, 
the  requiring  of  evidence,  but — on  the  contrary , — the  rejec- 
tion of  evidence. 

The  fallacy  of  representing  all  appeal  to  reason  as  useless 
in  cases  where  the  “ argumentative  faculty  ” is  not  alone  suffi- 
cient — which  is  like  denying  the  utility  of  light,  because  it  will 
not  enable  a man  to  see,  whose  eyes  are  not  in  a state  to  per- 
form their  functions,  — has  been  already  noticed,  Book  IV 
Ch.  ii.  § 5. 

It  may  be  a useful  exercise  for  the  learner  to  analyze  some 
olhers  of  this  collection  of  fallacies,  referring  to  Book  I.  § 2, 
to  Book  II.  Ch.  ii.  § 3,  and  to  Appendix  I.  Art.  “ Expeiience.” 

* I have  treated  of  this  point  in  the  “ Lessons  on  Christian  Evi- 
lences,”  under  the  head  of  “ Internal  Evidence.”  See  also  Professoi 
Powell’s  valuable  work,  “ Tradition  Unveiled.” 


INDEX 


OP  THE 


PRINCIPAL  TECHNICAL  TERMS. 


Absolute  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  j 1. 

Abstraction.  — The  act  of  “ drawing  off”  in  thought,  and  attending  t« 
separately,  some  portion  of  an  object  presented  to  the  mind,  b.  ii 
ch.  v.  § 2. 

Abstract  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1 

Accident.  — In  its  widest  technical  sense,  (equivalent  to  Attribute ,) 
any  thing  that  is  attrib  ; ted  to  Rn  o'  / cr,  md  can  only  be  conceived 
as  belonging  to  some  substance  tqn  which  sense  it  is  opposed  to 
“ Substance ; ”)  in  its  narrower  and  more  properly  logical  sense,  a 
Predicable  which  may  be  present  or  absent,  the  essence  of  the 
Species  remaining  the  same,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 4. 

Accidental  Definition.  — A definition  which  assigns  the  Properties  of 
a Species,  or  the  Accidents  of  an  Individual ; it  is  otherwise 
called  a Description,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 6. 

A JJirmative  — denotes  the  quality  of  a Proposition  which  asserts  the 
agreement  of  the  Predicate  with  the  subject,  b.  ii.  cn.  ii.  § 1. 

Amphibolia — a kind  of  ambiguity  of  sentence,  b.  iii.  § 10. 

Analogous.  — A term  is  so  called  whose  single  signification  applies 
with  unequal  propriety  to  more  than  one  object,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1, 
and  b.  iii.  § 10. 

Antecedent. — That  part  of  a Conditional  Proposition  on  which  the 
other  depends,  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 6. 

Apprehension  {simple.')  — The  operation  of  the  mind  by  which  we  men 
tally  perceive  or  form  a notion  of  some  object,  b.  ii.  ch.  i.  § 1 

Argument.  — An  expression  in  which,  from  something  laid  down  as 
granted,  something  else  is  deduced,  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 1. 

Arbitrary  — division,  faulty,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 5 ; definition,  b.  ii.  ch.  v. 
§ (3. 

Assertion—  ar.  affirmation  or  denial,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § i 


436 


INDEX. 


Attributive  term,  b.  ii.  eh.  v.  § 1. 

Bacon  — erroneously  supposed  to  have  designed  his  Organon  as 
rival  system  to  that  here  treated  of,  Introd.  § 3,  and  b.  iv.  eh.  iii 
§ 3. 

Categories,  b.  iv.  eh.  ii.  § 1, 

Categorematic.  — A word  is  so  called  which  may  by  itself  be  employed 
as  a Term,  b.  ii.  eh.  i.  § 3. 

Categorical  Proposition  — is  one  which  affirms  or  denies  a Predicate 
of  a Subject,  absolutelv,  and  without  any  hypothesis,  b.  ii.  eh.  ii. 

§ 4- 

Circle  — fallacy  of,  b.  iii.  § 13. 

Class  — strictly  speaking,  a Class  consists  of  several  things  coining 
under  a common  description,  b.  i.  § 3. 

Contraposition,  see  Negation. 

Common  term  — is  one  which  is  applicable  in  the  same  sense  to  more 
than  one  individual  object,  b.  i.  § 6 ; b.  ii.  ch.  i.  § 3,  and  b.  ii 
ch.  iv.  § 6. 

Compatible  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1. 

Composition — Fallacy  of,  b.  iii.  § 11. 

Conclusion.  — That  Proposition  which  is  inferred  from  the  Premisses 
of  an  Argument,  b.  ii.  § 2,  and  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 1. 

Concrete  term,  b.  ii.  ch.  v § 1 

Conditional  Proposition  — is  one  which  asserts  the  dependence  of  one 
categorical  Proposition  on  another.  A conditional  Syllogism  is 
one  hi  which  the  reasoning  depends  on  such  a Proposition,  b.  ii. 
ch.  iv.  § 6. 

Connotative  term,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1. 

Consequent.  — That  part  of  a conditional  Proposition  which  depends  on 
the  other.  (Consequens),  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 6,  Note. 

Consequence.  — The  connection  between  the  Antecedent  and  Conse- 
quent of  a conditional  Proposition.  (Consequentia),  b.  ii.  ch.  iv 
§ 6,  Note. 

Constructive — conditional  syllogism,  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 3. 

Contingent.  — The  matter  of  a Proposition  is  so  called  when  the  terms 
of  it  in  part  agree,  and  in  part  disagree,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 2. 

Contradictory  Propositions — are  those  which,  having  the  same  terms, 
differ  both  m Quantity  and  Quality,  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 5. 

Contrary  Propositions  — are  two  universals,  affirmative  and  negative, 
with  the  same  terms,  b.  ii.  cll..ii.  § 3. 

Contrary  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1 

Converse,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 4. 


INDEX. 


437 


Conversion  of  a Proposition  — is  the  transposition  of  the  terms,  s* 
that  the  Subject  is  made  the  Predicate,  and  vice  versd,  j.  ii.  ch.  ii 
§ 4. 

Copula.  — That  part  of  a Proposition  which  affirms  or  denies  the 
Predicate  of  the  Subject:  viz.  is,  or  is  not, -expressed  or  implied, 
b.  ii.  ch.  i.  § 2. 

Ooss-divisions,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § § 5 and  6. 

Definite  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1. 

Definition.  — An  expression  explanatory  of  that  which  is  defined,  *.  a, 
separated,  as  by  a boundary,  from  every  thing  else,  b.  ii.  eh.  v 
§ 6 ; b.  iii.  § 10. 

Description.  — An  accidental  Definition,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 6. 

Destructive — conditional  Syllogism,  b ii.  ch.  iv.  § 3. 

Deaf-mutes — incapable  of  a train  of  reasoning,  till  they  shall  have 
learned  some  kind  of  general  siyns.  Introd.  § 5. 

Dictum  — “ de  omni  et  nullo  ; ” Aristotle’s  : an  abstract  statement  of 
an  Argument,  generally,  b.  i.  § 4.  Applicable  to  a Sorites,  b.  ii- 
cli.  iv.  § 7. 

Difference  ( Differentia .)  — The  formal  or  distinguishing  part  of  the 
essence  of  a Species,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 4. 

Dilemma.  — A complex  kind  of  conditional  syllogism,  having  more 
than  one  Antecedent  in  the  Major  Premiss,  and  a disjunctive 
Minor,  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 5. 

Discovery  of  Truth  — two  kinds  of,  b.  iv.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Discourse.  — The  third  operation  of  the  mind,  Reasoning,  b.  ii.  ch.  i. 
§ 1- 

Disjunctive  Proposition  — is  one  which  consists  of  two  or  more  cate- 
goricals,  so  stated  as  to  imply  that  some  one  of  them  must  be 
true.  A syllogism  is  called  disjunctive,  the  reasoning  of  which 
turns  on  such  a proposition,  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 4. 

Distributed  — is  cpplicd  to  a Term  that  is  employed  in  its  full  extent, 
so  as  to  comprehend  all  its  significates,  — every  thing  to  which  it 
is  applicable,  b.  i.  § 5,  and  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 2. 

Division,  logical  — is  the  distinct  enumeration  of  several  things  signi- 
fied by  a common  name  ; and  it  is  so  called  metaphorically,  tiom 
its  being  analogous  to*the  (real  and  properly- called)  division  ■!  t 
whole  into  its  parts,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 5. 

Division.  — Fallacy  of,  b.  iii.  § 11. 

Drift  of  a proposition,  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 1. 

DUiptical  expressions — apt  to  lead  to  ambiguity,  b.  in.  § 10. 

EnsiatU  — Figure,  the  third  Figure,  so  called  b.  ii.  ch  iii.  § 4. 

27* 


438 


INDEX. 


Erlhymeme.  — An  argument  having  one  I remiss  expressed  and  th« 
other  understood,  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 7. 

Equivocal.  — A Term  is  defined  to  be  equivocal  whose  different  signi- 
fications apply  equally  to  several  objects.  Strictly  speaking, 
there  is  hardly  a word  in  any  language  which  may  not  be  regarded, 
as  in  this  sense,  equivocal ; but  the  title  is  usually  applied  only 
in  any  case  where  a word  is  employed  equivocally  ; c.  g.  where  tha 
Middle-term  is  used  in  different  senses  in  the  two  Premisses  ; or 
where  a proposition  is  liable  to  be  understood  in  various  senses, 
according  to  the  various  meanings  of  one  of  its  terms,  b.  iii.  § 10. 

Essential  Definition  — is  one  which  assigns,  not  the  Properties  or  Ac- 
cidents of  the  thing  defined,  but  what  are  regarded  as  its  essen- 
tial parts,  whether  physical  or  logical,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 6. 

Evidence  — of  Christianity,  App.  No.  III. 

Example  — use  of,  implies  a universal  premiss,  b.  iv.  ch.  i.  § 2,  — is 
not  what,  strictly  speaking,  deters,  b.  iii.  § 10. 

Exception , proof  of  a rule,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 6. 

Exclusive  — Figure,  the  second  Figure,  so  called,  b.  ii.  eh.  iii.  § 4 

Extreme.  — The  Subject  and  Predicate  of  a Proposition  are  called  its 
Extremes  or  Terms,  being,  as  it  were,  the  two  boundaries,  having 
the  copula  (in  regular  order)  placed  between  them.  In  speaking 
of  a syllogism,  the  word  is  often  understood  to  imply  the  ex- 
tremes of  the  Conclusion,  b.  ii.  ch.  i.  § 2. 

Fallacy.  — Any  argument,  or  apparent  argument,  which  professes  to 
be  decisive  of  tire  matter  at  issue,  while  in  reality  it  is  not,  b.  ri- 
ch. v.  § 4. 

False  — in  its  strict  sense,  denotes  the  quality  of  a Proposition  which 
states  something  not  as  it  is,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Figure  of  a Syllogism  — denotes  the  situation  of  its  Middle-term  in 
reference  to  the  Extremes  of  the  Conclusion  — The  Major  and 
Minor  Terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 4. 

Form  — fallacies  in,  b.  iii.  § § 1 and  7. 

Generalization.  — The  act  of  comprehending  under  a common  name 
several  objects  agreeing  in  some  point  which  we  abstract  from 
each  of  them,  and  which  that  common  name  serves  to  indicate, 
b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 2. 

ffmm.  — A Predicable  which  is  considered  as  the  material  part  of  the 
- Species  of  which  it  is  affirmed,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 3. 

Ewne.  — Essay  on  Miracles,  b.  i.  § 3,  note ; and  Appendix  I.  Art 
Experience.  Coincidence  with  some  Christiar  writers,  Appen 
dixlil. 


INDEX. 


4 


Hypothetical  Proposition  — is  one  ■\vlnch  asserts  not  absolutely,  bu 
under  an  hypothesis,  indicated  by  a conjunction.  A hypothetic^ 
Syllogism  is  one  of  which  the  reasoning  depends  or  such  a prop- 
osition,  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  $ 2. 

Idea  — “•  abstract,”  (supposed)  Introd.  § 5,  and  t it , ch.  v.  § § 1 and  2 

Illative  Conversion  — is  that  in  which  the  truth  of  the  Converse  fol- 
lows from  the  truth  of  the  Exposita,  or  Proposition  given,  b.  ii, 
ch.  ii.  § 4. 

impossible.  — The  Matter  o a Proposition  is  so  called  when  the  ex- 
tremes altogether  disagree,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 1.  — Ambiguity  of,  Ap- 
pendix II. 

Indefinite  Proposition  — is  one  which  has  for  its  Subject  a Common- 
term  without  any  sign  to  indicate  distribution  or  non-distribution* 
b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 2. 

Indefinite  Terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1. 

Indirect  reduction  — of  Syllogisms  in  the  last  throe  Figures,  b.  ii, 
ch.  iii.  § 6. 

Individual.  — An  object  which  is,  in  the  strict  and  primary  sense,  one, 
and  consequently  cannot  be  logically  divided;  whence  the  name, 
b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 5. 

Induction.  — A kind  of  argument  which  infers,  respecting  a whole 
class,  what  has  been  ascertained  respecting  one  or  more  individ- 
uals of  that  class,  b.  iv.  ch.  i.  § 1. 

Infer.  — To  draw  a conclusion  from  granted  premisses,  b.  iv.  ch.  iii. 
§ 1.  See  Pkove. 

Lfima  Species  — is  that  which  is  not  subdivided,  except  into  individ- 
uals, b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 4. 

information.  — b.  iv.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Ignoratio-elenchi — fallacy  of,  b.  iii.  § 15 — 19. 

Inseparable  Accident — is  that  which  cannot  be  separated  from  th« 
individual  it  belongs  to,  though  it  may  from  the  Species,  b.  ii. 
ch.  v.  § 4. 

Instruction.  — b.  iv.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Interrogation  — fallacy  of,  b.  iii.  § 9. 

Irrelevant-conclusion — fallacy  of,  b.  iii.  § 15 — 19. 

Judgment.  — The  second  operation  of  the  mind,  wherein  we  pro- 
nounce mentally  on  the  agreement  and  disagreement  of  two  of 
the  notions  obtained  by  simple  Apprehension,  b.  ii.  tV.  i.  § 1. 

Knowledge.  — b.  iv.  ch.  ii.  § 2.  Note. 

Language  — an  indispensable  instrument  for  reasoning,  Inlrod.  5 b 
Logic,  conversant  about,  b.  ii.  ch.  i.  § 2 


INDEX 


40 


Limitation.  — See  “ Per  Accidens .” 

Locke  — notions  of  Syllogism,  Introd.  § 3. 

Logical  definition  — is  that  which  assigns  the  Genus  and  Pilfersnc# 
of  the  Species  defined,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 'l. 

logomachy.  — b.  iv.  ch.  iv.  § 12. 

Major  term  of  a Syllogism  — is  the  Predicate  of  the  Conclusion. 
The  Major  Premiss  is  the  one  which  contains  the  Major  term. 
In  Hypothetical  Syllogisms,  the  Hypothetical  Premiss  is  called 
the  Major,  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 2,  and  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 2. 

Matter  of  a proposition  — the  nature  of  the  connection  of  its  extreme, 
b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 3.  Fallacies  in,  b.  iii.  § § 1 and  13. 

Metaphor.  — b.  iii.  § 10. 

Metonymy.  — b.  iii.  § 10. 

Middle  term  of  a categorical  Syllogism  — is  that  with  which  the  two 
extremes  of  the  conclusion  are  separately  compared,  b.  ii.  ch.  iii. 
§ 2,  and  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 4. 

Minor  term  of  a categorical  Syllogism  — is  the  Subject  of  the  con- 
clusion. The  Minor  Premiss  is  that  which  contains  the  Minor 
term.  In  Hypothetical  Syllogisms,  the  Categorical  Premiss  is 
called  the  Minor,  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 2,  and  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 2. 

Modal  categorical  proposition  — is  one  which  asserts  that  the  Predi- 
cate exists  in  the  Subject  in  a certain  mode  or  manner,  b.  ii.  ch. 
ii.  § 1,  and  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 1. 

Mood  of  a categorical  Syllogism  — is  the  designation  of  its  three 
propositions,  in  the  order  in  which  they  stand,  according  to  their 
quantity  and  quality,  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 4. 

Necessary  matter  of  a proposition  — is  the  essential  or  invariable 
agreement  of  its  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 3.  — Necessary , ambiguity 
of,  Appendix,  No.  I. 

Negation — conversion  by  (otherwise  called  conversion  by  contraposi- 
tion), b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 4. 

Negative  categorical  proposition  — is  one  which  asserts  the  disagree- 
ment of  its  extremes,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Negative  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1. 

New  Truths  — of  two  kinds,  b.  iv.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Nominal  Definition  — is  one  which  explains  only  the  meaning  of  the 
term  defined,  and  nothing  more  of  the  nature  of  the  thing  signi- 
fied by  that  Term  than  is  implied  by  the  Term  itself  to  every  on# 
who  understands  the  meaning  of  it,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 6,  and  b iv, 
ch.  ii.  § 3. 

Nominalism.  — b.  iv.  ch.  v.  Introd.  j 5,  and  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  $ ■&. 


INDEX. 


44 


Objections  — fallacy  of,  b.  iii.  § 17. 

Operations  of  the  mind — three  laid  down  by  logical  writers,  b.  ii 
eh.  i.  § 1. 

Opposed.  — Two  propositions  are  said  to  be  opposed  to  each  other, 
when,  having  the  same  Subject  and  Predicate,  they  differ  eithei 
in  quantity  or  quality,  or  both,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 3. 

Opposition  of  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1. 

Oatensive  reduction  — of  Syllogisms  in  the  last  three  figures,  b.  ii. 
ch.  iii.  § 5. 

Paronymous  words,  b.  iii.  § 8. 

Part — logically,  Species  are  called  Parts  of  the  Genus  they  come 
under,  and  individuals,  parts  of  the  Species  ; really,  the  Genus  is 
a Part  of  the  Species,  and  the  Species,  of  the  Individual,  b.  ii 
ch.  v.  § 5. 

Particular  Proposition  — is  one  in  which  the  Predicate  is  affirmed  oi 
denied  of  some  part  only  of  the  subject,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Per  Accidens.  — Conversion  of  a proposition  is  so  called  when  the 
Quantity  is  changed,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 4. 

Physical  definition  — is  that  which  assigns  the  parts  into  which  the 
thing  defined  can  be  actually  divided,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 6. 

Positive  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1. 

Postulate  — a form  in  which  a Definition  may  be  stated,  b.  ii» 
ch.  v § 6. 

Predicaments,  b.  iv.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Predicate  of  a Proposition  — is  that  Term  which  is  affirmed  or  denied 
of  the  other,  b.  ii.  ch.  i.  § 2. 

Predicable.  — A Term  which  can  be  affirmatively  predicated  of  several 
others,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 2. 

Premiss.  — A proposition  employed  to  establish  a certain  conclusion, 
b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 1. 

Privative  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1. 

Probable  arguments,  b.  iii.  §§  11  and  14. 

Proper-names  — ambiguity  of,  b.  iii.  § 10. 

Property.  — A Predicable  which  denotes  something  essentially  con." 
joined  to  the  essence  of  the  Species,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 3. 

Proposition.  — A sentence  which  asserts,  t.  e.  affirms  or  denies,  b.  ii. 
ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Prove.  ■ — To  adduce  Premisses  which  establish  the  truth  of  a certain 
conclusion,  b.  iv.  ch.  iii.  § 1. 

proximum  Genus  of  any  Species -- is  the  nearest  [least  remote'  t/3 
which  it  can  be  referred,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  $ 4. 


442 


INDEX. 


Pure  categorical  proposition  — is  one  which,  asserts  simply  that  tnj 
Predicate  is,  or  is  not,  contained  in  the  Subject,  b.  ii.  ch  ii.  § 1 
and  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  $ 1. 

Quality  of  a Proposition — is  its  affirming  or  denying.  This  is  tha 
Quality  of  the  expression , which  is,  in  Logic,  the  essential  circum- 
stance. The  Quality  of  the  matter  is,  its  being  true  or  false  ; 
which  is,  in  Logic,  accidental,  being  essential  only  in  respect  of 
the  subject-matter  treated  of,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Quantity  of  a Proposition  — is  the  extent  in  which  its  subject  ia 
taken ; viz.  to  stand  for  the  whole,  or  for  a part  only  of  its  Sig- 
niticatcs,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Question.  — That  which  is  to  be  established  as  a Conclusion,  stated 
in  an  interrogative  form,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 4. 

Real  definition — is  one  which  explains  the  nature  of  the  thing  defined 
beyond  what  is  necessarily  understood  by  the  Term,  b.  ii.  ch 
v.  § G. 

Realism.  — Introd.  § 3.  b.  iv.  ch.  v. 

Reasoning  — General  Signs  necessary  for,  Introd.  § 5. 

Reduction  — of  syllogisms  in  the  last  three  Figures,  to  the  first,  so  as 
to  fall  under  the  Dictum,  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  §§  5 and  6,  — of  hypothet- 
ical syllogisms  to  categorical,  b.  ii.  ch.  iv.  § 6. 

References  — fallacy  of,  b.  iii.  § 14. 

Refutation  — of  an  argument,  liablo  to  be  fallaciously  used,  b.  iii.  §§  6 
and  7. 

Relative  terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 1. 

Same.  — Secondary  use  of  the  word,  b.  iv.  ch.  v.  § 1,  and  Append. 
No.  I. 

Second  intention  of  a term,  b.  iii.  § 10. 

Separable  accident  — is  one  which  may  be  separated  from  the  individ- 
ual, b.  iii.  Introd. 

Significate.  — The  s.everal  things  signified  by  a common  Term  ara 
its  significates  (Significata),  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Signs  — general,  indispensable  for  reasoning,  Introd.  § 5. 

Singular  term  is  one  which  stands  for  one  individual.  A Singular 
proposition  is  one  which  has  for  its  subject  either  a Singular 
term,  or  a common  term  limited  to  one  Individual  by  a singular 
•iign,  e.  g.  “This,”  b.  ii.  ch.  i.  § 3 ; b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  $ 2,  and  b.  ii.  ch. 
v.  $ 1. 

Sz?  ites.  — An  abridged  form  of  stating  a series  of  Syllogisms,  of  whiefc 
the  Conclusion  of  each  is  a Premiss  of  the  succeeding,  b.  ii.  ch 

4 7- 


INDEX.. 


facies.  — A predicable  which  is  considered  as  expressing  the  wholi 
essence  of  the  individuals  of  which  it  is  affirmed,  b.  li.  eh.  v.  § 3, 
— peculiar  sense  of,  in  Natural  History,  b.  iv.  ch.  v.  § 1. 

Stewart,  Professor  Dugald,  his  mistake  respecting  Aristotle’s  “ Dictum 
b.  i 4 4 — instance  of  fallacy  from,  b.  iii.  § 14. 

Subaltern  Species  and  Genus  — is  that  which  is  both  a Species  of  srmfi 
higher  Genus,  and  a Genus  in  respect  of  the  Species  into  which 
it  is  divided.  Subaltern  opposition,  is  between  a Universal  and 
a Particular  of  the  same  Quality.  Of  these,  the  Universal  is  the 
Subalternant,  and  the  Particular  the  Subalternate , b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 3f 
and  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 4. 

Subcontrary  opposition  — is  between  two  Particulars,  the  Affirmative 
and  the  Negative,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 3. 

Subject  of  a proposition  — is  that  term  of  which  the  other  is  affirmed 
or  denied,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 2. 

Summum  Genus  — is  that  which  is  not  considered  as  a Species  of  any 
higher  Genus,  b.  ii.  ch.  v.  § 4. 

Syllogism.  — An  argument  expressed  in  strict  logical  form  ; viz.  so 
that  its  conclusiveness  is  manifest  from  the  structure  of  the  ex- 
pression alone,  without  any  regard  to  the  meaning  of  the 
Terms,  b.  ii.  ch.  iii.  § 1. 

Syncategoreinatic  words  — are  such  as  cannot  singly  express  a Term, 
but  only  a part  of  a Term,  b.  ii.  ch.  i.  § 3. 

Term.  — The  Subject  or  Predicate  of  a Proposition,  b.  ii.  ch.  i.  § 2. 

Tendency — ambiguity  of,  Appendix,  No  I. 

Thaumatrope,  b.  iii.  § 11. 

True  Proposition  — is  one  which  states  what  really  is,  b.  ii.  eh.  ii.  § 1. 

Truth  new  — two  kinds  of,  b.  iv.  ch.  ii.  § 2,  and  Appendix,  No.  I. 

Tucker  — his  Light  of  N ature,  Append.  I.  art.  xi. 

Universal  Proposition  — is  one  whose  Predicate  is  affirmed  or  denied 
of  the  whole  of  the  Subject,  b.  ii.  ch.  ii.  § 1. 

Univocal.  — A Common  term  is  called  Univocal  in  respect  of  thoafl 
things  to  which  it  is  applicable  in  the  same  signification  h ii  ch, 
v.  § 1. 

Wallis,  Professor,  his  remark  on  jests,  b.  iii.  § 20. 

Watts  — his  nc  tion  of  Logic,  Introd.  § 3. 


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dents and  men,  who  have  not  time  fully  to  examine  a complete  history,  need. 
The  material  is  selected  with  good  judgment,  and  the  work  is  written  in  the  au- 
thor’s attractive  style.  I shall  recommend  its  use  in  this  department  of  study. 

From  HOWARD  CROSBY,  D.  D.,  LL.  D.,  Chancellor  of  University  of  New  York. 

Messrs.  Sheldon  & Co.  have  just  issued  a very  comprehensive  and  yet  brief 
survey  of  the  History  of  Philosophic  Thought,  prepared  by  the  late  Dr.  Joseph 
Haven.  It  is  well  fitted  for  a college  text-book. 

Its  divisions  are  logical,  its  sketch  of  each  form  of  philosophy  clear  and  dis- 
criminating, and  its  style  as  readable  as  so  condensed  a work  r an  be.  I know 
of  no  compendium  which  gives  ihe  bird’s-eye  view  of  the  history  of 
philosophy  as  thoroughly  as  this  hand-  book  of  '71  r.  Haven . 

SHELDON  & COMPANY, 


NEW  YORK. 


ENGLISH  LITERATURE 


SHAW’S  NEW  HISTORY  OF  ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  LIT- 
ERATURE. 

404  Pages. 

Prepared  on  the  basis  of  Shaw’s  “ Manual  of  English  Literature,”  by  Truman 
J.  Backus,  ofVassar  College,  in  Ictrc/e,  clea?'  tjybe,  and  especially  arranged 
for  teaching  this  subject  in  Academies  and  High  Schools,  with  copious  references 
to  “The  Choice  Specimens  gf  English  and  American  Literature.”  It  contains  a 
map  of  Britain  at  the  close  of  the  sixth  century,  showing  the  distribution  of  its 
Celtic  and  Teutonic  population  ; also  diagrams  intended  to  aid  the  student  in 
remembering  important  classifications  of  authors. 

CHOICE  SPECIMENS  OF  AMERICAN  LITERATURE  AND 
LITERARY  READER. 

518  Pages. 

Selected  from  the  works  of  American  authors  throughout  the  country,  and 
designed  as  a text-book,  as  well  as  Literary  Reader  in  advanced  schools.  By 
Benj.  N.  Martin,  D.  D.,  L.  H.  D. 

.<>-<>-«. 

DR.  FRANCIS  WAYLAND’S 

VALUABLE  SERIES. 


INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY  ( Elements  of). 

426  Pages. 

By  Francis  Wayland,  late  President  of  Brown  University. 

This  work  is  a standard  text-book  in  Colleges  and  High  Schools. 

THE  ELEMENTS  OF  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

By  Francis  Wayland,  D.-D.,  President  of  Brown  University,  and  Professor  of 
Moral  Philosophy. 

Fiftieth  Thousand.  12mo,  cloth, 

***  This  work  has  been  highly  commended  by  Reviewers,  Teachers,  and 
others,  and  has  been  adopted  as  a class-book  in  most  of  the  collegiate,  theologi- 
cal, and  academical  institutions  of  the  country. 

ELEMENTS  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY. 

By  Francis  Wayland,  D.  D.,  President  of  Brown  University. 
Twenty-sixth  Thousand.  12mo,  cloth, 

***  This  important  work  of  Dr.  Wayland’s  is  fast  taking  the  place  of  every 
other  text-book  on  the  subject  of  Political  Econoiny  in  cur  colleges  and  higher 
schools  in  all  parts  of  the  country. 

We  publish  Abridged  Editions  of  both  the  Moi'al  Science  and  Political 
JPconomy,  for  the  use  of  Schools  and  Academies. 

SHELDON  & COMPANY, 

NEW  YOPK- 


VALUABLE  COLLEGE  TEXT-BOOKS. 


KENDRICK'S  XENOPHON’S  ANABASIS. 

533  Pages. 

Comprising  the  whole  work,  with  Kiepert’s  Revised  Map  of  the  Route  of  the 
Ten  Tkousatid,  Introduction,  full  though  brief  Notes,  and  complete  Vocabulary, 
by  A.  C.  Kenbrick,  D.  D.,  LL.  D.,  Rochester  University. 

BULLIONS’S 

LATIN-EN GUSH  AND  ENGLISH-LAT1N  DICTIONARY, 

(1.258  pages.)  This  book  has  peculiar  advantages  in  the  distinctness  of  the 
marks  of  the  quantities  of  Syllables,  the  Etymology  and  Composition  of  Words, 
Classification  of  Syllables,  Synonyms,  and  Proper  Names,  and  a judicious 
Abridgment  of  Quotations.  For  cheapness  and  utility  it  is  unequalled. 


LONG'S  ATLAS  OF  CLASSICAL  GEOGRAPHY. 

This  Atlas,  by  George  Long,  M.  A.,  late  Fellow  of  Trinity  College,  Cam- 
bridge. contains  fifty-two  Maps  and  Plans,  finely  engraved  and  neatly  colored ; 
with  a Sketch  of  Classical  Geography,  and  a full  Index  of  Places.  The  maps, 
showing  the  ideas  which  the  ancients  had  of  the  world  at  various  intervals  from 
Homer  to  Ptolemy,  and  the  typographical  plans  of  ancient  places,  battles, 
marches,  will  be  of  interest  and  advantage  ; and  the  Atlas  will  be  of  great  help 
to  classical  students,  and  in  libraries  of  reference. 


BAIRD’S  CLASSICAL  MANUAL, 

(200  pages.)  This  is  a student’s  hand-book,  presenting,  in  a concise  form,  an 
epitome  of  Ancient  Geography,  the  Mythology,  Antiquities,  and  Chronology  of 
the  Greeks  and  Romans. 

LOOKER’S  NEW  PHYSIOLOGY. 

376  Pages. 

Revised,  corrected,  and  put  into  the  most  perfect  form  for  text-book  use,  by  J. 
A.  Sewall,  M.  D,,  of  the  Illinois  State  Norma!  University. 

This  JVew  'Physiolor/y  has  been  Wendy  JEleclrolyped  in  large-sized  type, 
using  the  black-faced  ti/2>e  to  bring  out  prominently  the  leading  ideas.  It 
contains  a full  series  of  Questions  at  the  end  of  the  book,  and  a complete 
Glossary  and  Index. 

IjOPKINS’S  LECTURES  ON  FLORAL  SCIENCE. 

Delivered  before  the  Lowell  Institute,  Boston,  by  Mark  Hopkins,  D.  D.,  Pres- 
ident of  Williams  College. 

Royal  12mo,  cloth. 


TEXT-BOOKS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 


ALDEN’ S CITIZEN’S  MANUAL. 

1SS  Pages. 

A Text-Book  on  Civil  Government , in  connection  with  Americaji  Institutions. 

By  Joseph  Alden,  D.  D.,  LL.  D.,  President  of  the  State  Normal  School,  Al- 
bany, N.  Y. 

This  book  was  prepared  for  the  purpose  of  presenting:  the  subjects  of  which  it 
treats  in  a manner  adapted  to  their  study  in  Common  Schools.  It  has  been 
extensively  adopted,  and  is  widely  used,  with  most  gratifying  results.  It  is  intro- 
ductory to  this  author’s  larger  book. 

THE  SCIENCE  OE  GOYEENMENT, 

In  connection  with  American  Institutions.  29S  pages. 

By  Dr.  Alden'.  Intended  as  a text-book  on  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  for  High  Schools  and  Colleges.  This  book  contains  in  a compact  form 
the  facts  and  principles  which  every  American  citizen  ought  to  know.  It  may  be 
made  the  basis  of  a brief  or  of  an  extended  course  of  Instruction,  as  circumstances 
may  require. 


PATTERSON’S  COMMON  SCHOOL  SPELLER. 

160  Pages. 

By  Calvin  Patterson,  Principal  Grammar  School  No.  13,  Brooklyn,  N.  Y. 

This  book  is  divided  into  seven  parts,  and  thoroughly  graded. 

PATTERSON’S  SPELLER  AND  ANALYZER. 

176  Pages. 

Designed  for  the  use  of  higher  classes  in  schools  and  academies. 

This  Speller  contains  a carefully  selected  list  of  over  6,000  words,  which  em- 
brace all  such  as  a graduate  of  an  advanced  class  should  know  how  to  spell. 
Words  seldom  if  ever  used  have  been  carefully  excluded.  The  book  teaches  as 
much  of  the  derivation  and  formation  of  words  as  can  be  learned  in  the  time  al- 
lotted to  Spelling. 

PATTERSON’S  BLANK  EXERCISE  BOOK. 

For  Written  Spelling.  Small  size.  Bound  in  stiff  paper  covers. 

40  Pages. 

PATTERSON’S  BLANK  EXERCISE  BOOK. 

For  Written  Spelling.  Large  size.  Bound  in  board  covers. 

72  Pag-es. 

Each  of  these  Exercise  Books  is  ruled , numbered , and  otherwise  arranged  to 
correspond  with  the  Spellers.  Each  book  contains  directions  by  which  written 
exercises  in  Spelling  may  be  reduced  to  a system. 

There  is  also  an  Appendix , for  Corrested  Words , which  is  in  a convenient  for7?i 
for  reviews. 

By  the  use  of  these  Blank  Exercise  'Bootes  a class  of foiir  hundred  may , 
i?i  thirty  minutes , spell  fifty  words  each , making  a total  of  20,000  words , and 
carefully  criticise  and  correct  the  lesson;  each  student  thereby  receiving  the 
benefit  of  spelling  the  entire  lesson  and  correcting  mistakes. 


Date  Due 


- Aug  19  37 

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Library  Bureau  Cat.  no.  « 1 37 
R< 

Fairchilds’  Moral  Philosophy ; or,  The  Science  of 
Obligation.  By  J.  H.  Fairchild?,  President  of  Oberlin 
College.  1 vol.  12mo. 

The  fiim  of  this  volume  is  to  set  forth,  more  fully  than  has  hitherto  heen 
done,  the  doctrine  that  virtue,  in  its  elementary  form,  consists  m benevo- 
lence. and  that  all  forms  of  virtuous  action  are  modifications  ot  this  principle 
After  presenting  this  view  of  obligation,  the  author  takes  up  the  questions  oi 
Practical  Ethics,  Government  and  Personal  Rights  and  Duties,  and  treats 
them  in  their  relation  to  Benevolence,  aiming  at  a solution  ol  the  problems  01 
right  and  wrong  upon  this  simple  principle. 

Any  of  the  above  sent  by  mail,  vost-paid , ov  receipt  of  vnce. 


Duke  University  Libraries 


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Sheldon  d Comj>any’s  2'exl-Soods. 


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